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PREFACE
This work is the second and last sequel to Major Naval Operations, published by the
Naval War College Press in 2008 as Newport Paper 32. The first sequel, Major Fleetversus-Fleet Operations in the Pacific War, 1941–1945, was published (as Historical
Monograph 22) by the Naval War College Press / Government Printing Office in
2014; a second edition came out in 2016. The focus of that volume was on the
description and analysis of three major fleet-versus-fleet operations. In contrast,
this work, Major Naval Operations in European Waters, 1939–1945 (twenty-seventh
in the Naval War College Press’s Historical Monograph series), looks at three different types of major naval/joint operations: an attack on enemy maritime trade,
the defense and protection of friendly maritime trade, and a major amphibious/
anti-amphibious operation. The principal purpose is to impress on commanders
and their staffs the critical importance of studying the theory and practice of major
naval/joint operations. Another purpose is to present a method for analyzing a
historical case study from an operational instead of a tactical perspective, and then
drawing appropriate conclusions and identifying operational lessons.
The first two chapters of this book are devoted to maritime-trade warfare. However,
the emphasis in chapter 1 (“The Destruction of Convoy PQ17: June 27–July 10, 1942”)
is on attacking enemy maritime trade, while chapter 2 (“Major Convoy Operation to
Malta: August 10–15, 1942 [Operation PEDESTAL]”) pertains to the defense and protection of friendly shipping. The third chapter (“The Allied Landing at Anzio-Nettuno:
January 22–March 4, 1944 [Operation SHINGLE]”) describes and analyzes in some detail a major amphibious operation and the major anti-amphibious operation that the
German defenders planned and conducted against it. Each of these chapters is based
on an article previously published in the Naval War College Review, but is considerably
longer, with new sections based on additional primary and secondary sources.
The internal structure of each chapter is very similar to that of those of the
Pacific War volume. Any major operation is planned and executed within a much
broader and very important framework determined by policy and strategy. Hence,
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it is necessary here to describe in some detail the strategic setting for each major naval operation. Each chapter outlines the main aspects of the operating area
(e.g., physical characteristics, climate) in which the opposing forces were deployed
and employed. Another section analyzes the various elements of theater geography
from a military viewpoint—central and exterior positions, distances, basing areas,
decisive points, lines of operation, lines of communication, and so on. Each chapter
also lays out the operational command organizations and command-and-control
arrangements of the opposing sides.
The decisions of operational commanders are all too commonly critiqued on
the basis of what became known after the war. Such an approach is both unscientific and wrong. The proper method is to analyze such decisions in light solely of
the information the commanders had when they made them. Accordingly, each
chapter distills the information available prior to the planning of the operation and
prior to its execution. The bulk of each chapter, of course, is devoted to the planning of, preparation for, and execution of the respective major naval operation.
Any study of major operations or campaigns is essentially a waste of time unless
it attempts to draw conclusions from them and to derive from these conclusions
operational lessons; each chapter ends, therefore, with such an analysis. Finally,
each chapter includes detailed orders of battle and maps that graphically present
the operational ideas (concepts of operations) involved.
This monograph relies critically on primary sources, especially from the collections of the German Military Archives in Freiburg; the Military Branch of the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland; and The
National Archives, Kew Gardens, Richmond, Surrey, United Kingdom.
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude and thanks to several individuals who
made it possible to complete this book. As in the past, Dr. Carnes Lord, editor, Naval War College Press, provided strong and consistent support. Dr. Robert Ayer, Capt.,
USCG (Ret.), managing editor, edited the manuscript and helped enormously by pointing out unclear, contradictory, and sometimes erroneous statements in the draft. The
Naval War College Press’s Publishing Services office did a superb job of proofreading
the text, as well as of coordinating the production and correction of proofs and their
preparation for the press. Mr. Art Lamoureux prepared most of the superb maps and
figures, Mr. Bill Miner the remainder. My heartfelt thanks go to Richard LaBranche,
Capt., USN, who was chairman of the Joint Military Operations Department when
most of the work on this book was performed; to Capt. Edmund Hernandez, the current chairman; and to Professor Fred Horne, Capt., USN (Ret.), the department’s executive officer: all allowed me the maximum time available to work on this project.
Milan Vego
Joint Military Operations Department
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

I

The Destruction of Convoy PQ17
June 27–July 10, 1942

T

he most critical and urgent problem for the Western Allies in the northern
European theater in 1941–42 was securing the war matériel being sent to the
Soviet Union. Initially, the Germans did not react strongly against the Allied
convoys sailing to northern Russia. That began to change soon after February 1942,
when the Germans redeployed almost all their heavy surface forces and a large number of U-boats from home waters to northern Norway. Attacks by the Luftwaffe and
U-boats became not only more intensive but increasingly deadly. Correspondingly,
the Allied convoys suffered ever-larger losses. The single most devastating action was
the German attack on Convoy PQ17 in July 1942, in which, during a week of attacks, the Luftwaffe and U-boats sank twenty-two out of thirty-six merchant ships
and one of three rescue ships. The planned augmentation of this effort with a foray
(code-named Unternehmen [Undertaking] RÖSSELSPRUNG) by the battleship Tirpitz
and other heavy surface ships was short-lived, because Allied forces detected the German ships prematurely. Nevertheless, the Germans had achieved a significant victory
against the Allies’ efforts to supply their embattled Russian ally. In its aftermath, convoys to Russia via the Arctic route were suspended for almost two months; the next
convoy (PQ18) did not sail until September 2, 1942. Out of forty ships in that convoy,
thirteen were lost. However, during the next two years, convoys sailed to northern
Russia only during the long, dark months of winter. As a result, they suffered much
smaller losses than prior to September 1942: none in October–December 1942 or in
1943, three in 1944, and two in March 1945.1
In operational terms, the German attack against Convoy PQ17 was a major naval/
joint operation versus enemy maritime trade. For the Allies, the defense of Convoy
PQ17 amounted to a major naval/joint operation to defend maritime trade. Strategically, this operation was an integral part of the Allies’ efforts to defend and preserve
their military-economic potential at sea, and on the Germans’ part, to destroy it.
THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE NORTHERN THEATER
Germany’s invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 had changed the strategic situation in the northern area radically in Germany’s favor. By obtaining control
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of the Jutland Peninsula, the Danish straits, and Norway, Germany greatly weakened Britain’s strategic position in the northern area. This loss was ameliorated
somewhat by the Anglo-American occupation in June 1941 of Iceland, from where
their land-based aircraft could control surrounding sea areas. From Iceland the Allies also were able to raid the German-controlled Norwegian coast.2
Notwithstanding, German control of Norway made it impossible for the British
to blockade the Shetlands–southern Norway line, as had been done in World War
I (when Britain and the United States established the Northern Barrage minefield).
It also weakened greatly the British position in the Shetland–Faeroes–Iceland gap.
The northern portion of the North Sea was now open to German naval forces.3
Further, control of the Norwegian coast significantly improved the effectiveness
of Kriegsmarine (navy) and Luftwaffe (air force) attacks on enemy shipping in the
northern Atlantic Ocean and the Barents Sea.
Nazi Germany also greatly benefited economically from the seizure of Norway.
Among other things, it gave the Germans access to commodities important to their
war industries, including aluminum, copper, paper, and timber. Germany also now
had a more secure route, through Narvik, for Swedish iron ore.4 Along the 1,745
nautical miles (nm) between Oslo in the south and Kirkenes around North Cape,
some two hundred thousand tons of Axis shipping moved every day. At the same
time, the political situation in Norway was difficult for the Germans, who realized
that the majority of the populace was pro-British, hoping that the British would
prevail and that the Germans and Soviets would exhaust themselves.5
Hitler placed great strategic importance on Germany’s continued control of
Norway. He was extremely concerned about the possibility of enemy landings there.
Hitler’s views were shared by Adm. Erich Raeder, commander in chief (CINC) of
the Kriegsmarine and the Naval Warfare Directorate (Seekriegsleitung, or SKL).
On October 10, 1941, Hitler issued his instruction (Führerweisung) Nr. 37, which
assigned new missions to the German armed forces in northern Norway. The Kriegsmarine was to attack enemy sea traffic to Murmansk and protect German shipping
in the Arctic. The Army High Command (Armeeoberkommando, or AOK) Norway,
the Luftwaffe, and the Kriegsmarine were directed to cooperate closely during the
coming months in preparing to oppose possible enemy landings in front and on the
sea flanks of German forces. Hitler directed the 5th Air Fleet to return to Norway
and to establish there the post of Air Leader (Fliegerführer) North.6
On December 14 Hitler further ordered a buildup of defense installations in
Norway and the improvement of roads in the coastal area. He believed that if the
Western Allies captured Norway they would be able to supply the Soviet Union
regularly, thereby posing a serious threat to the German northern front. The enemy
also would be able to operate in the Baltic. Information gathered by German agents
as well as statements by Western leaders and reports in the Western press lent these
views new urgency.7

THE DESTRUCTION OF CONVOY PQ17

In meetings with Admiral Raeder on December 29, 1941, and January 12, 1942,
Hitler declared that the enemy threat to Norway required redeployment of heavy
German ships as a deterrent. On the basis of information from Swedish sources, he
believed the British and Americans might land between Trondheim and Kirkenes.
Hitler considered Norway the Schicksalzone (“zone of destiny”) of the entire war.8
Meeting again with Raeder on January 22, Hitler stated his belief, based on the latest information, that Britain and the United States were planning to attack northern Norway and that if successful they would influence the war decisively.9
In Hitler’s view, every German heavy surface ship that was not in Norway was in
the wrong place; Raeder fully agreed.10 The battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
and heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen would be moved from Brest to Norway, additional
S-boats would be moved to northern Norway, and heavy coastal artillery would
be significantly increased.11 Hitler also directed Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring,
CINC of the Luftwaffe, to reinforce the air forces in Norway. Hitler demanded unconditional execution of his orders for the security of the northern area.12 All these
measures had to be accelerated: the danger was immediate.13
THE ALLIED DECISION TO SEND AID TO THE SOVIET UNION
The importance of Norway and adjacent sea areas increased significantly after Germany invaded the Soviet Union (USSR) on June 22, 1941. There was a real possibility that the Germans ultimately might prevail in the war and thereby endanger
the survival of Great Britain. Hence, the British government, led by Prime Minister
Winston S. Churchill, and that of the United States, led by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, were determined to do everything possible to help the Soviet war effort.
At a conference in Moscow (September 29–October 1, 1941) both governments
gave assurances of aid and support in the common struggle against Nazi Germany.
The protocol of that meeting, signed on October 1, referred to “the provision of
supplies, which will be made available at British and U.S.A. centres of production,
for the Soviet Union by Great Britain and the United States of America within the
period beginning from October 1941 till the end of June 1942. Great Britain and
the U.S.A. will give aid to the transportation of these materials to the Soviet Union
and will help with the delivery.”14
After significant successes on the Eastern Front within the first few months, the
Germans suffered a series of setbacks in that theater during the fall of 1941 and early
winter of 1941–42. Their forces were stopped at the gates of Leningrad (Saint Petersburg today) and in southern Russia and were obliged to retreat in the battle of Moscow (October 2, 1941–January 7, 1942). Yet, despite these reverses, the Wehrmacht’s
power was not broken. Because there was no prospect of a second (i.e., Western)
front in 1942, it was vitally important for the Western Allies to keep the Soviet Union
in the war; otherwise, victory over Nazi Germany would be impossible. Hence, they
made every effort to supply the USSR with increasing amounts of war matériel.
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The Western Allies faced serious difficulties in doing so. Three main routes
were available: across the Pacific to Vladivostok; across the southern Atlantic and
around the Cape of Good Hope to the port of Basra in the Persian Gulf and thence
upriver and overland (called the “Persian Corridor”); and the Arctic route, across
the northern Atlantic to Iceland and then to the north Russian ports of Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. Each had advantages and disadvantages. The Pacific route
to Vladivostok passed near northern Hokkaido, and once Japan opened hostilities
with the United States and Britain in December 1941, it could be used only by
Soviet-flag ships. This route was also the longest of the three. As for the Persian
route, the trip around the Cape of Good Hope (which shipping from American
East Coast ports had to use until July 1943, when the Mediterranean route was
15
opened) was about 14,500 miles long and required seventy-six days. The third and
shortest, but most dangerous, route was the one from Scotland/Iceland to northern
Russian ports. The Germans posed a serious threat to this route: Luftwaffe aircraft,
U-boats, and heavy surface ships were based in northern Norway. The Allied problem was made worse by extreme cold, bad weather, and ice. Despite all the difficulties of the northern route, however, the Soviets adamantly insisted on it, because it
could deliver badly needed war matériel more quickly and closer to their forces at
the front. Another possible reason was Soviet fear of too strong an Anglo-American
presence in Persia.16 Ultimately, the decision to establish the Arctic route was made
by Churchill, with the full support of Roosevelt.17 Adm. Sir Dudley Pound, the British First Sea Lord (1939–43), and Adm. Sir John Tovey, commander in chief of the
Home Fleet, were opposed.18
Between August 1941 and May 1945, the Western Allies shipped some 2.3 million
tons of war supplies to the Soviet Union. More than half, about 1.2 million tons, went
via the Arctic route, six hundred thousand were sent through the Persian ports, and
five hundred thousand arrived via the North Pacific route. These supplies included a
substantial quantity of war matériel desperately needed by the Soviets; 1,880 aircraft,
2,150 tanks, 2,250 field guns, 8,300 trucks, and 6,400 other vehicles.19
OPERATING AREA
During the attack on and defense of Convoy PQ17 in July 1942, the opposing naval
and air forces operated in both the Norwegian and Barents Seas (see map 1); however, the majority of combat actions took place in the Barents. The Barents Sea is
one of the marginal seas of the Arctic Ocean. It extends for about 650 miles and has
an area of 550,000 square miles. It borders in the west on the Greenland Sea, in the
north on the Svalbard Islands (of which the largest is Spitsbergen) and Franz Josef
Land (Zemlya Frantsa Iosifa), in the east on Novaya Zemlya, and in the south on
the Kola Peninsula and northern Norway.
The Barents Sea is relatively shallow, with an average depth of about 125 fathoms. In over half of it, depths range between 109 and 273 fathoms. The maximum
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depth is found in the western part of the Bjørnøyrenna Channel; depths of less than
fifty-four fathoms predominate near the Svalbards and in the southeast.20 In the
eastern part of the Barents Sea the depth of water varies from fifty-five to around
190 fathoms.21 The Norwegian Sea encompasses an area of 425,000 square miles,
has an average depth of 1,093 fathoms, and is divided into a deep basin (1,640 to
2,185 fathoms) and a continental shelf off the Norwegian coast. This shelf varies in width from a hundred miles (at 55° north latitude) to only fifteen miles off
Vesterålen. Its depths vary between fifty-five and 220 fathoms; several troughs in
the shelf exceed 164 fathoms.22
The White Sea (Beloye More), at 34,700 square miles, is bounded by Karelia in
the west, the Kola Peninsula to the north, and the Kanin Peninsula to the northeast.
Its average depth is 32.5 fathoms, with a maximum depth of 191. The northern
part of the White Sea contains few islands but is encumbered greatly by shoals and
reefs.23
The 23,560-square-mile Svalbards are some four hundred miles north of Norway. Spitsbergen, at 15,075 square miles, is the largest island in the Svalbard group.
The Svalbards are highly mountainous, with peaks up to 5,600 feet, and are characterized by many large and small glaciers that collectively cover some 60 percent
of the land surface. There is a large number of fjords; the longest, Wijdefjorden, is
sixty-seven miles long.24
Bear and Jan Mayen Islands are the most important islands in the Barents Sea. The
seventy-square-mile Bear Island (Bjørnøya) is the southernmost of the Svalbards. Its
highest elevation is about 1,760 feet. It lies some 250 miles north-northwest of North
Cape (Nordkapp) and 140 miles south-southeast of Spitsbergen. This triangularshaped island is some ten miles long and eight miles wide. The southern and eastern part of the island is mountainous. The thirty-four-mile-long, 144-square-mile
Jan Mayen is a mountainous, volcanic island partly covered by glaciers. It consists
of two islands, the larger Nord-Jan and smaller Sør-Jan, which are linked by an isthmus 1.6 miles wide. Jan Mayen is about 310 miles from the central part of Greenland, 370 miles northeast of Iceland, and 620 miles west of North Cape.
Iceland’s 39,770 square miles occupy the most important strategic position in the
northern Atlantic, some 150 miles east of Greenland, four hundred from northern
Scotland, and 550 from Norway. The Faeroes are only about 250 miles away.25 The
Denmark Strait, 172–460 miles wide and 358 to 3,587 fathoms deep, separates Iceland from Greenland.26 Iceland is volcanic and has numerous mountain ranges. Its
coast, especially in the north, is highly indented by fjords and large bays. The fjords
seldom freeze except at their heads; however, drifting ice often interferes with navigation. Some of the best harbors are on the western coast. Iceland’s entire coast is
fronted by an extensive 109-fathom shelf that extends forty to sixty miles offshore.

THE DESTRUCTION OF CONVOY PQ17

The southern approaches to the Barents Sea are guarded by the Shetland and
Faeroe groups of islands. The 540-square-mile Faeroe Islands (Føroyar in Faeroese)
comprise eighteen islands. The most important are Suðuroy, Sandoy, Vágar,
Streymoy, Eysturoy, Kalsoy, Kunoy, Borðoy, and Viðoy.27 The Faeroes are located 267 miles southeast of Iceland and two hundred miles north-northwest of
Scotland. The Shetlands occupy 567 square miles and are about fifty miles northnortheast of the Orkneys and 170 miles southeast of the Faeroes. They consist of
more than a hundred islands and islets. The most important islands in this group
are Mainland, Yell, and Fair Isle.28
Northern Norway encompasses some 148,726 square miles (including the Svalbards and Jan Mayen). It extends for about 1,100 miles from northeast to southwest. It has one of the longest, most rugged, and most indented coastlines in the
world. The coastline stretches some 1,572 miles; 15,627 miles, when fjords and bays
are included; and 51,747 miles, counting the fifty thousand islands and islets that
front the coastline.
The Kola Peninsula covers some fifty-six thousand square miles and extends
from north to south for about 242 miles and 342 from east to west.29 Its northern coast is steep, the southern flat. The highest peak on the peninsula is Mount
Chasnachorr, 3,900 feet. The Kola Inlet (Kol’skiy Zaliv), the largest fjord on the
peninsula, extends for some thirty-five miles and has three branches. Depths vary
between 109 and 164 fathoms. During the period in question, the northern branch
was always free from ice; only during the most severe winters could ice floes be
found in February or March.30
In the southeastern part of the Barents Sea, the largest island is the 1,350-squaremile Kolguyev, forty-seven miles north of Mys Svyatoy Nos.31 Novaya Zemlya,
35,000 square miles in area, consists of two islands separated by the Matochkin
Shar, a narrow, fifty-five-mile-long strait separating the northern and southern islands of Novaya Zemlya. The southern island consists of a level plain backed by
hills and mountains. The Matochkin Shar is backed by high mountains reaching a
height of 3,445 feet. The northern island is mostly covered by ice caps.32
The duration of a day in the Barents Sea varies greatly with season and latitude (see figure 1). Depending on the latitude, the polar day starts between midMarch and mid-May, the polar night between mid-September and mid-November.33
Above the Arctic Circle (66° 33ʹ 46ʺ north) the summer sun does not go down for
weeks. At latitude 74° north the midnight sun lasts ninety-nine days, the polar
night eighty-four days. At Jan Mayen (69° 64ʹ north, 18° 09ʹ east) the midnight sun
extends from May 14 to July 28, the polar night between November 7 and January
21.34 On January 1 it is dark all day; on March 30 daylight lasts thirteen hours, fortyeight minutes; and on July 1 the sun shines all day. At Bear Island the midnight sun
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Figure 1: DURATION OF DAYLIGHT/DARKNESS IN LATITUDE 76º N
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lasts from May 1 to August 10, the polar night from November 7 to February 4.35 At
the time of the German attack on Convoy PQ17, there was a midnight sun.36
The oceanographic features of the Barents Sea and the surrounding sea areas are
influenced heavily by topography and prevailing weather conditions. In the Barents
Sea, the water temperature in June–July 1942 was several degrees above freezing
but could go as low as 28.4°F (–2°C).37 Tides in the Barents Sea are semidiurnal;
their ranges vary from three feet in the Proliv Yugorskiy Shar (linking the Kara
and Pechora Seas) to seven feet in the southeastern part of the Barents. Off Novaya
Zemlya, tides vary from 1.4 to 1.8 feet.38
The Barents Sea has a very complex system of currents, because of the mixing of
relatively warm water from the Atlantic with the cold Arctic Current. One branch
of the Gulf Stream, the North Atlantic Current, enters the Norwegian Sea across
the Faeroes–Shetlands gap and the Iceland–Faeroes Ridge. At the northern slope
of the Iceland–Faeroes Ridge, the encounter of warm Atlantic and cold Arctic water produces the Iceland–Faeroes Front. The North Atlantic Current after entering
the Barents Sea mostly flows northward. After reaching the Bjørnøyrenna Channel

Figure 1
Duration of daylight/
darkness in latitude 76° N
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one branch becomes the Nordkapp Current, while another of its branches flows
north of the Hopenrenna (Hopen Trench). It is then divided into several smaller
branches. One of these, the West Spitsbergen Current, flows northward into the
Fram Strait (between the Svalbards and Greenland). West of the Fram Strait the
East Greenland Current flows south from the Arctic Ocean. A major branch of the
North Atlantic Current flows along the western and northern coast of Norway and
is called the Norwegian Current (or Norwegian Coastal Current). During winter
the current is deep and narrow, in the summer wide and shallow.39 It is divided into
two main branches; one flows in an easterly direction (and changes its name to the
Murman Current) as it leaves the Norwegian area, then flows along the Kola Peninsula coast to the White Sea. The influx of Arctic water into the Barents Sea takes
place along two routes, one between Spitsbergen and Franz Josef Land, the other
between Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya.40
The climate in the Barents Sea is subarctic. It is influenced by geographic latitude, the incidence of solar radiation, and the entry and circulation of the relatively
warm Atlantic water. In the northern part, air temperatures in the winter months
average –13°F (–25°C), in the summer months 23°F (–5°C). In the southwestern
part the corresponding temperatures are 32°F (0°C) and 50°F (20°C). In the east,
air temperatures can be –4°F (–20°C) over the ice-free area, –22°F (–30°C) in the
north and southeast. On land and in remote areas, the air temperature can go as
low as –58°F (–50°C).
In the Barents Sea, the winds tend to be moderate, typically eight to ten knots.
Stronger winds, when they occur, generally do so close to mountainous coasts.41
In the southwestern part of the sea, the prevailing winds are easterly, gales (Force
8) and storms usually coming from the northeast-to-northwest sector. Winds in
the southeastern part of the Barents Sea and the Kara Sea in the fall, winter, and
early spring generally come from the south-southwest to south. Severe gales accompany the passage of cyclonic storms, with winds reaching or exceeding Force
7 along the open coast for seven or eight days a month from November to the end
of February.42 The weather and climate in northern Norway are influenced heavily
by depressions arriving from the Atlantic, relatively warm currents, and the very
rugged coastal terrain. The Barents Sea is well-known for rough weather and high
seas that occur frequently and last for extended periods. A high sea state results in
very wet decks for surface ships—that is, their bows bury themselves in oncoming
waves.43 In the summer, the dominant winds are from the west, while in the winter
months they are generally from the northeast.44 These winds can generate waves in
the fifty-foot range, higher in the western than the eastern part of the sea.45
Northern Norway experiences variable weather conditions because of its rugged topography and its multitude of fjords and offshore islands. The strength and
direction of the wind can change often and quickly. Strong winds may blow from
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different directions at locations that are fairly close to each other, and a strong wind
may blow outside a fjord while calm weather prevails within it.46 The frequency of
gales varies greatly depending on the time of the year. For example, at Tromsö in
midwinter the wind averages between Forces 2 and 3, while from July through September it remains below Force 2. There is little seasonal variation in the strength of
wind near Altafjord, most often Force 2. Gales occur once a month on average. At
Vardø, the winds are strongest (Forces 4 and 5) in January and February and lightest
(Force 3 on average) in August.47 In the area from the Russian-Norwegian border to
the White Sea, winds, fog, and rain arise with great suddenness and change rapidly.
Prevailing winds are easterly in the summer, strong and variable in the fall; in the
winter months, southwesterly winds prevail, accompanied by strong storms.48
In the Barents Sea, cloudiness is always common; the highest incidence is in
July, the lowest in March and April. In the southeastern part of the Barents Sea skies
are cloudy on average 75 percent of the year. Extensive stratus clouds and ceilings
below a thousand feet are quite common—especially in summer, less so in winter.49
There are fewer than thirty clear days and more than 180 cloudy days annually.
Near Jan Mayen, most precipitation occurs during the winter months. In February there are on average nineteen days with precipitation—seventeen days with
snow and one or two with hail. Over an entire year there are on average 173 days
with precipitation, 118 of them with snow and four with hail.50 In the southeastern
part of the Barents Sea, from November through May it is relatively dry; a short
season of moderate rain lasts from June through October. In the winter months,
snow falls ten to fifteen days a month, accumulating until the spring thaw.51
Visibility is at its worst in fog and snow. In the Barents Sea, July and August
each average ten days of fog; in the winter, fog is very rare.52 Fog is most frequent
over loose ice; on the boundary of solid ice, the weather is mostly clear.53 In the
southwestern part of the Barents Sea, fog occurs most frequently in calm weather
or in easterly and southeasterly winds. Near Iceland, fog is frequent in the summer
months, its frequency depending on location. For example, in the winter months
there is little or no fog on Iceland’s west coast and in summer only one or two foggy
days each month; there are only nine days of fog, on average, during the entire
year. On the island’s north coast, there are on average only one or two foggy days
each winter month and seven each summer month; the most fog occurs in July—
thirteen days. On the northern coast there are on average fifty-three days with fog
during the entire year. On the east coast of Iceland, winter sees one or two foggy
days per month, eight in summer. The months with the most fog are June and July,
with thirteen days each. The east coast experiences fog on some sixty-three days
over the entire year. On the southern coast, winter months have two to three foggy
days each month and five per month in summer. The month with the most fog is
June—eight days. The southern coast experiences fifty-two foggy days in a year.
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Fog over Iceland is often very dense; especially near the ice boundary, visibility is
often as little as 330 feet. Fog represents the greatest problem for ships off Iceland’s
northern coast and in the zone where the cold polar current collides with warm
water from the south.54
In northern Norway, fog forms more often just off the coast than over the open
sea. Coastal fog is more frequent in the summer than in the winter; from the
Norwegian border to the White Sea, thick fog usually occurs at the end of May
and the beginning of June, especially off the coast. These fogs penetrate fjords but
are very patchy there; conversely, it can be foggy inside a fjord but clear outside.
Mirages frequently occur in calm weather in the summer, mainly in the morning
and evening.55
In the southeastern part of the Barents Sea visibility is often poor during all
seasons. Fog is prevalent during the entire year, although less frequent in winter.
After the beginning of April, fogginess increases, reaching a maximum in July and
August, then decreases. “Sea smoke”—low fog floating over the sea—can be seen in
the fall and the first half of winter, anywhere that sharp decreases in air temperature occur. In the area of the Kola Inlet, fog is most prevalent from June through
August and from October through March. Dense Arctic sea smoke can persist for
extended periods, especially amid weather patterns that produce strong southerly
and southeasterly winds.56
In 1942 the four hundred nautical miles of sea between Greenland and Spitsbergen was covered by ice the entire year. The ice moves with the polar current
from the Greenland Sea.57 By mid-June, the Barents Sea is navigable to latitude
75° north and as far east as longitude 50°.58 In September, almost the entire Barents
Sea is ice-free; in the winter months, about two-thirds of it is covered with ice. The
eastern part is ice-free in early July; the entire Barents Sea south of 77° north also
is navigable, because of the influence of the North Atlantic Current.59 Despite the
presence of large ice fields, the western and northern coasts of Norway rarely see
ice. Only in strong northern and northwest winds might drift ice appear off the island of Mageröy (northeast of Hammerfest).60 In the eastern part of the Barents Sea,
during the navigation season (June–October) a large volume of ice from the Kara
Sea enters the Barents through the Kara Strait, then scatters.61 In the southeastern
part of the Barents ice is found in small bays and inlets beginning in early October.
This area is closed for navigation from November through May. The White Sea is
generally free from ice from June through October.62
The weather, ice conditions, and duration of daylight in the Barents Sea and
the adjoining littoral area greatly influenced the combat employment of surface
ships, submarines, and aircraft during World War II. In the summer months, good
visibility and low sea state generally prevailed.63 This facilitated air reconnaissance
and shadowing. At the same time, long hours of daylight made it considerably
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more difficult for submarines to conduct their typical night surface attacks. Lack of
cloud cover made it difficult for torpedo bombers to achieve surprise.64 Moreover,
in summer visibility frequently was reduced by fog, which could conceal targets
and so leave attackers at a great disadvantage.65
During the winter months, fully laden eastbound convoys frequently met gales
of great violence. Heavy deck cargo—tanks, wagons, locomotives—endangered the
stability of ships and forced some to return. Heavy snow and ice on a ship’s upper
deck and top-hamper are dangerous if allowed to accumulate—they can cause a
ship to capsize—and once formed increase a ship’s silhouette significantly. In the
Barents Sea, such topside icing represents a serious hazard: thick layers of ice can
form on decks, sides, superstructure, hatches, masts, rigging, deck-mounted ma66
chinery, and antennae. The most common form, spray icing, occurs when seawater spray hitting a ship freezes, creating a shell of ice.67 Icing also can be very dangerous for aircraft; it can greatly increase drag and weight and reduce wing lift. Not
only rain but small water droplets may freeze on contact with aircraft. The most
severe ice accretion occurs at air temperatures just below 32°F (0°C).68
The westbound convoys from Russia did not carry much cargo. Therefore, the
light ships ballasted their sterns down, so as to submerge their propellers, and their
bows up, which sometimes made them unmanageable. Escorts also suffered badly;
they lost boats, davits, and men on many occasions.69 The employment of destroyers was made difficult by high sea states.70
In the Greenland and Barents Seas, pack ice affected routing of Allied ships
bound to and from northern Russia. Generally, it was desirable to keep as far as
possible from the German airfields in northern Norway and from U-boats lurking
between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands. One way to do this was to take ships through
the ice; however, the Allies soon learned that the thin hulls of escorts were easily
damaged. Also, ice prevented a convoy from maneuvering as a whole.71 In general,
ice was always a danger for surface ships, even outside the pack—small floes could
not be detected easily—so it was preferable to leave a margin of about forty miles
from an ice boundary.72
Pack ice and icebergs were carried down the east coast of Greenland through
the Denmark Strait. Between mid-August and November or December there was
little ice in the strait. However, navigation was more restricted by darkness during
the rest of the year, especially from March to June, when the strait was mostly covered by ice. However, ice seldom was found within the hundred-fathom line, along
which usually lay the boundary between the northward-flowing, warm Irminger
Current (a branch of the North Atlantic Current) and the cold East Greenland
Current. Sometimes ice crossed that line and came within the sight of Iceland’s
coast.73 The ice situation in the Denmark Strait greatly affected the routing of Allied
convoys to northern Russia. Generally, ice along Iceland’s north coast meant that
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Allied ships could not pass around the west and north coasts from Reykjavík but
had to be routed “south-about” if bound northeastward.74
The boundaries of the pack ice in the Barents Sea change considerably over the
course of a year. From December to early June, pack ice normally extends close to
or beyond Bear Island. For example, in March the pack ice’s southern limit is the
northwestern tip of Jan Mayen Island and the west coast of Spitsbergen, extending
from there to Bear Island and the Kanin Peninsula.75 In April 1942, when ice conditions were the worst, with the pack ice boundary at its southernmost, it might be
necessary to route ships nearly a hundred miles farther south—leaving only 150–
200 miles to the Norwegian coast. In contrast, when the pack ice boundary moved
northward, it was possible to sail in a west-to-east direction in the area between
North Cape and Spitsbergen. In a mild season, there was a passage of fifty miles
between Bear Island and the ice edge, which allowed the routing of convoys farther
north to avoid contact with the German surface ships based in northern Norway.
Because of the ice conditions in 1942, Allied ships had to traverse the 260 nautical miles between longitudes 20° and 35° east while only 230 nautical miles from the
Norwegian coast. These conditions prevailed through the end of June.76 In March and
April 1942 the ice limits were farther south than at any other time of the year. This
forced the convoys to northern Russia to pass south of Bear Island and thus within
about 250 miles of the Norwegian coast.77 After April, the sea area gradually enlarged,
because the ice boundary moved north and east. Thereafter, it was more difficult for
German surface ships to attack Allied convoys. In August, pack ice ran northward
from Scoresby Sound off Greenland, then from Bell Sound (in western Spitsbergen)
south of South Cape and Hope Island, then in a northeastern direction.78
BASING/DEPLOYMENT AREAS
The deployment areas of the opposing forces were Iceland and the Faeroes, Shetlands,
and Orkneys for the Allies, northern and central Norway and the Kola Peninsula for
the Germans (see map 2).
In northern Norway, the Germans used several large fjords for basing their naval forces operating in the Arctic. Altafjord, some twenty nautical miles long, is
the largest fjord in western Finnmark. It contains three wide and deep passages:
Stjernsund, Rognsund, and Vargsund.79 Tides in Altafjord are strong, especially
in Rognsund.80 Altafjord can accommodate ships of any size.81 The largest port in
Finnmark, Tromsö, is some 190 miles north of the Arctic Circle. Another basing
area for the German heavy ships was the 110-nautical-mile-long, forty-nauticalmile-wide Vestfjord, between the Lofoten Archipelago and the Salten district on
Norway’s mainland. It is fronted by numerous islands and skerries (small rocks,
reefs, and islets). Its smallest width is seven hundred yards, at Tranøy. The depth of
water between Røst and Flein Islands is about 164 fathoms.82 Gimsøystraumen was
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a temporary anchorage for the German surface ships; located between Gimsøya
and the western side of Austvågøy, it provides access to Vestfjord.
The forty-eight-mile-long Ofotfjord, or Narvikfjord, has a maximum depth of
about three hundred fathoms. It backs up to very mountainous terrain, the highest
peaks at about five thousand feet. The port of Narvik, near the head of Ofotfjord
some thirty miles from the entrance, is almost completely surrounded and sheltered by high mountains. It was the transshipment point for iron ore from Swedish mines and a base for German surface ships and U-boats. The German heavy
combatants and their accompanying destroyers also used the eighty-one-mile-long
Trondheimfjord, about four hundred miles to the south. It is more than three hundred fathoms deep and mostly ice-free year-round.
For the Allied convoys, the main ports in Iceland were Reykjavík and Hvalfjord.
Reykjavík, a major port, comprises Gamla Höfnin (Old Harbor) and Sundahöfn.
Hvalfjord, seven miles southwest, is on the Álftanes Peninsula at the end of a fjord
seventeen miles long and three miles wide, with an entrance 492 feet wide and
thirteen to thirty-nine feet deep.83 The fjord is navigable throughout—ice rarely
presents a problem—and tides in the port vary from ten to thirteen feet. Seydisfjord (Seyðisfjörður), on the northeastern coast of Iceland, was also used, mostly
by the Allied ships assigned to protect convoys to northern Russia. It extends westsouthwest for about eight miles and is surrounded by steep mountains. Depths in
the fairway vary from 121 to 295 feet.
The fifty-six islands of the Orkneys have many excellent harbors. One, Scapa
Flow, was the main base for the Home Fleet. It is the best anchorage in the Orkneys,
an almost landlocked shelter. Its depths range up to 118 feet, and tidal currents
within the harbor itself are almost negligible. However, gale force winds might generate considerable surge in velocity of currents.84
The principal destination in northern Russia for the Allied convoys was Murmansk, twenty-five miles south of the Kola Inlet’s entrance. Tides there range from
4.6 to 8.0 feet, and prevailing winds are from the west and southwest.85 Moderate gales can be expected from two to four days each month throughout the year,
the most severe weather coming between November and February. From January
through April, heavy fog makes navigation difficult, sometimes impossible, for
days at a time.86 The Allied ships also occasionally used the six-mile-long Yokanga
roadstead, about 190 sea miles to the southeast; its main anchorage could accommodate ships of all sizes, with depths varying from nine to eighteen meters; other
parts of the roadstead contain extensive shoals.87 The main Russian naval base in
the area was then Polyarny (formerly Aleksandrovsk), at the entrance to the Kola
Inlet; a naval airfield was at Vayenga, about sixteen miles farther up the inlet, near
Severomorsk.88 The second most important port for the Allied ships was Arkhangelsk, on the Severnaya (Northern) Dvina River in the White Sea. The port is on
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the east bank, twenty-eight miles upriver. Tides are negligible, from 1.3 to 2.3 feet,
but because of ice the port was normally open only from the end of April through
October. There are numerous shoals, many uncharted, between Ostrov (i.e., island)
Zelenets and Ostrov Kego at the western approaches to the Severnaya Dvina.89
The German base of operations in northern Norway extended from Trondheim
to Altafjord, a distance of about seven hundred miles. Naval forces and aircraft
based in central and northern Norway occupied an exterior position with respect
to convoys in the Barents Sea and attacked along multiple, converging, and relatively short lines. Trondheim is about 485 miles from Narvik and another 215
miles from Altafjord. The sea distance from Trondheim to Reykjavík is about 1,116
miles, from Bear Island to Tromsö 352 miles and Bear Island to Trondheim 470. Jan
Mayen occupies a central position within the Barents Sea—some 720 miles from
Trondheim, 620 miles west of North Cape, 513 northeast of Iceland, and 310 east
of Greenland. Bear Island lies 145 miles from the southern tip of Spitsbergen and
about 285 miles northwest of North Cape.
The Allied forces that deployed from the Orkneys, northern Scotland, and Iceland also operated from an exterior position, but their lines of operation were fewer
and much longer than those of the Germans. Iceland is 150 miles east of Greenland,
four hundred miles northwest of Scotland, and six hundred miles west of Norway.
The distance between Reykjavík and Jan Mayen is 590 miles, and another 527 miles
separate Jan Mayen and Bear Islands. Pentland Firth (a strait separating the Ork
neys from Caithness, in northern Scotland) is about 788 miles from Reykjavík. The
distances from Scapa Flow to Stavanger, Trondheim, and Narvik are 239, 794, and
1,248 miles, respectively.
ALLIED OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
The highest British naval authority was the Admiralty, under the civilian First Lord,
Albert V. Alexander. (His position was the equivalent of today’s Secretary of the
Navy in the United States.) The Admiralty itself consisted of five uniformed “sea
lords” plus four other high officials. The First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff was
Admiral Pound. He was the senior naval officer responsible for naval operations.
In contrast to the Air Ministry, the Admiralty’s responsibilities included both operational planning and execution. Its most important divisions were Plans and Operations, Trade, and Intelligence. The Plans and Operations Division coordinated
closely with the Intelligence Division.90
The principal operational-level command for European waters was the Home
Fleet. At the outbreak of war in September 1939, it consisted of the 2nd Battle
Squadron, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, aircraft carriers, cruisers (the 2nd, 7th,
12th, and 18th Squadrons), Destroyer Command (6th, 7th, 8th, and 18th Destroyer
Flotillas), submarines (2nd and 6th Submarine Flotillas), and minesweepers (the
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1st Minesweeping Flotilla), plus Orkney and Shetland forces. The majority of the
Home Fleet’s ships were based at Scapa Flow and on the Channel coast at Portland.
Other bases were at Rosyth and Dundee in Scotland and on the North Sea coast of
England at Blyth and on the Humber River.91
With the outbreak of war, the composition of the Home Fleet underwent significant changes, in that many heavy units were reassigned. The CINC of the Home
Fleet after November 1940 was Admiral Tovey. On March 26, 1942, to reinforce the
Home Fleet, the U.S. Navy formed Task Force (TF) 39, initially led by Rear Adm.
John W. Wilcox. On that day the task force—composed of the battleship Washington (BB 56), the carrier Wasp (CV 7), and heavy cruisers Wichita (CA 45) and
Tuscaloosa (CA 37), plus eight destroyers—sailed from Portland, Maine, for Scapa
Flow. One day later Admiral Wilcox was lost overboard in a heavy sea; he was replaced by Rear Adm. Robert C. Giffen.92
The Home Fleet’s geographic area of responsibility was never formally defined
but in practice encompassed the northern part of the North Sea and the waters
north of the Shetlands–Faeroes–Iceland–Greenland line. Initially, its main mission
was to prevent German naval forces from breaking out of the North Sea and operating in the Atlantic. After the summer of 1941, its focus shifted to Norwegian
waters and the Barents Sea. Overall responsibility for convoys to northern Russia
rested with its commander in chief, Admiral Tovey.
The southern part of the North Sea and the English Channel constituted separate commands deploying light forces. The squarish ocean area bounded by the
northernmost tip of Scotland, the southwestern tip of England, and longitude 30°
west was the responsibility of the Western Approaches Command, in Liverpool
(moved from Plymouth on February 7, 1941). Its commander in chief, Adm. Sir
Percy Noble (after February 17, 1941), was mainly concerned with the protection
of convoys between North American and British ports.93 However, Western Approaches Command also provided the ships necessary for the close, direct screening of convoys to the northern USSR.
CONVOYS TO NORTHERN RUSSIA
The first convoy (code-named DERVISH) to the USSR by the Arctic route departed
from Hvalfjord, Iceland, on August 21, 1941—only two months after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. This convoy consisted of only six merchant ships, and
all reached Arkhangelsk after a ten-day voyage.94 From September 13, 1941, serial
numbers were given to each convoy heading to (the PQ series) or from (QP) northern Russia.95 The first of the eastbound, PQ convoys left Hvalfjord on the 28th.96
The first westbound convoy, QP1, left Arkhangelsk on September 28 and arrived at
Dunnet Head in northern Scotland on October 11.97 Between 1941 and 1945, fortytwo eastbound escorted convoys (comprising 848 ships) and thirty-six westbound
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escorted convoys (735 ships), plus one eastbound and one westbound unescorted
convoy, sailed the Arctic route between Russia and the West.98
Ports of origin for the Allied convoys to the Soviet Union were on the American
East Coast and in northern Scotland. The American ships sailed from Philadelphia
and then joined one of the transatlantic convoys in Halifax or Sydney, Nova Scotia,
Canada. Afterward they sailed under U.S. or Canadian escorts across the northern
Atlantic to a point where their escorts turned westward to their home bases while
the merchant vessels continued to Iceland. There, at Hvalfjord or Reykjavík, they
were joined by British ships that had been organized at Gare Loch or Loch Ewe on
the western coast of Scotland. Together, they formed PQ convoys.99
The port facilities in both Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, the principal destina100
tions, were very primitive. However, as noted previously, Murmansk is always icefree, but Arkhangelsk was closed to large ships for six months out of the year because
of ice.101 The sea routes from Reykjavík to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk are 1,500 and
1,900 nautical miles long, respectively; however, the run to Murmansk was actually
some two thousand nautical miles, to keep as far as possible from the Luftwaffe’s
aircraft (see map 3). Transit time for a convoy from Iceland to Murmansk was about
ten days, to Arkhangelsk twelve days.102 The merchant ships from the United States
had already steamed a long distance merely to assembly points in Iceland. For example, a merchant vessel out of Philadelphia had to travel 645 nautical miles to Halifax
or 960 to Sydney; the distances from Halifax and Sydney to Reykjavík are 1,940 and
1,655 nautical miles, respectively. PQ convoys ran generally through the Denmark
Strait (which was mined); then eastward, keeping as far north as ice conditions allowed; then south toward the Kola Inlet or southeastward to Arkhangelsk.103
Allied convoys to Russia varied in size between fifteen and thirty ships, although
some were larger. Smaller convoys ran to the USSR until early 1942, when it was
decided to increase their size.104 On February 26, 1942, Admiral Tovey requested
that westbound and eastbound convoys sail simultaneously so that their transits through the most dangerous areas could be synchronized. This would entail
fourteen-day cycles for convoys to and from Russia.105 The first pair sailed in early
March 1942, and the synchronization became standard thereafter.106 In May, Admiral Tovey further requested reducing the number of convoys during the coming
summer months, because improved weather would greatly aid enemy reconnaissance, whereas the ice boundary would not have receded northward sufficiently to
avoid air attacks.107 However, his second request was not accepted by the Admiralty.
The Allied convoys were very vulnerable to attack by surface ships and U-boats
the entire way and by aircraft for some 1,400 miles.108 Both ends of the convoy route
were within range of Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft. In contrast, the British reconnaissance seaplanes operated from a single base, Sullom Voe in the Shetland
Islands. (The Germans believed that seaplanes were also based on the Langanes
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Peninsula, Iceland.) The maneuvering area for a convoy and its covering forces
was limited northward and westward by ice and southward and southeastward by
the enemy-occupied coast. Within that zone the currents were uncertain, and frequent gales could disperse a convoy, driving ships many miles from their intended
routes.109
Initially, the Allied convoys to northern Russia were defended only weakly. This
highly unfavorable situation began to change for the better when in late April 1942
additional destroyers, corvettes, and trawlers were transferred from Western Approaches Command to the Home Fleet, bringing the number of antisubmarine
(A/S) escorts for each convoy to about ten.110 However, the Allies’ continuing shortage of destroyers and the difficulty of refueling them at sea (each convoy was accompanied by at least one fleet oiler for refueling the short-legged destroyers and
corvettes) limited the ability to hunt U-boats at significant distances from convoys.111 Each eastbound convoy was accompanied by two submarines to discourage
enemy surface attack. Several British and Soviet submarines patrolled northwest
and west of North Cape.112
The Allies tried repeatedly to involve the Soviet Northern Fleet further in protecting convoys. Admiral Tovey pressed the Admiralty “for strong and continuous
Russian patrol activity off the Kola Inlet, to make that area untenable by U-boats,
and for short-range and long-range fighter protection.”113 Tovey believed that fighter cover during what was the most dangerous part of the voyage—both long-range
(two hundred miles off the Kola Inlet) and short-range (sixty miles off)—was both
crucial and within Soviet capabilities. The Northern Fleet had enough destroyers
and smaller A/S ships to operate farther from its bases than heretofore. Specifically,
Tovey felt the Soviets should take responsibility for defense of the convoys while in
the White Sea and that their submarines based in Polyarny, on the Kola Peninsula,
could be employed for scouting and intercepting heavy German surface ships.114
The inadequacy of the protection of convoys east of Bear Island was a matter of
great urgency for the Allies. On May 9, 1942, Churchill argued to Stalin that “it is
essential that U.S.S.R. Naval and Air Forces should realize that they must be largely
responsible for the convoys whether incoming or outgoing, when to the Eastward
of the meridian of longitude 28° East in waters which are out of sight of Murman
Coast.”115 The British also asked the Russians not only to reinforce escorts at the
eastern end of the voyage with long-range fighters or A/S aircraft but also to bomb
enemy airfields during convoy transits to discourage German surface attacks east
of Bear Island.116 In his response to the prime minister on May 13 Stalin did not
specifically mention 28° east longitude but assured him that “you may not doubt
that on our part all possible measures will be taken immediately. It is necessary,
however, to take into consideration the fact that our Naval Forces are very limited,
and that our Air Forces in its [sic] vast majority are engaged at the battlefront.”117
On May 24 Stalin wrote, “On our part our naval and air forces will do their utmost
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THE DESTRUCTION OF CONVOY PQ17

for the protection of these transports which was indicated in your message to me
on 9th May, i.e., when Eastward of the 28th Meridian.”118
The Soviets promised repeatedly to provide adequate protection to the Allied
convoys but seldom did so in practice.119 Formally, the Soviets did in fact take responsibility for protecting Allied convoys once they crossed longitude 28° east.120
They also conducted intensive reconnaissance of the German naval and air bases
in northern Norway. Submarines of the Northern Fleet patrolled off the Norwegian
coast, covering the possible deployment routes of German surface forces.121 However, the fact is that the Soviets were unable to protect the Allied convoys effectively
during the most dangerous phase of their run.122
THE GERMAN OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
The Germans’ command organization in the northern theater was highly fragmented. The Germans never established a true multiservice or joint command in this theater; instead, each of the three services controlled its own forces. Cooperation was
supposed to be achieved through liaison officers posted at the main headquarters of
each service. The highest command echelon controlling army troops in Norway and
Finland was Armeeoberkommando Norwegen (High Army Command Norway), led
by General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst from Command Post Finland in Rovaniemi,
Finland. His command had been created from Army Group XXI in Norway in December 1940. On January 14, 1942, a part of AOK Norway was designated AOK Lappland (Lapland) for operations in Finland; two weeks earlier, General Falkenhorst
had been directed to move his headquarters back to Norway.123
Admiral Raeder and Reichsmarschall Göring each had operational command over all their respective forces. Raeder led the High Command of the Navy
(Oberkommando der Marine, or OKM, established January 11, 1936). The Naval
Warfare Directorate, SKL, formed on April 1, 1937, had responsibility for the conduct of naval warfare as a whole; its Operations Directorate (1./SKL) was the most
important of its six staff subdirectorates in 1942. The OKM had a permanent representative at Hitler’s headquarters (see figure 2). Contact with the Luftwaffe was also
maintained through a liaison officer, at the Luftwaffe CINC level.124
By the end of 1941, the highest operational headquarters of the Kriegsmarine
overall were the Fleet Command (Flottenkommando) and four naval group commands (Marinegruppenkommandos, or MGKs): North, East, West, and South.
Other major commands were Naval Station Baltic (Marinestation Ostsee), Naval
Station North Sea (Marinestation Nordsee), and German Naval Command Italy
(Deutsches Marinekommando Italien). Naval Group Command North (MGK
Nord) was led at this time by Gen. Adm. Rolf Carls; the month before he arrived his new command had been renamed (originally Naval Group Command
East, established in November 1938) and moved from Kiel to Sengwarden, near
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Wilhelmshaven, on August 8, 1940.125 MGK Nord was responsible for all Kriegsmarine activity in the Baltic, the German Bight, Denmark, and Norway.126
MGK West was established in August 1939, its original area of responsibility encompassing the German Bight, the North Sea, and the Atlantic. When its headquarters moved to Paris in August 1940, the German Bight and central and northern part
of the North Sea were transferred to MGK Nord. MGK West, retaining operational
control in the Atlantic, now became specifically responsible for the southern part of
the North Sea, the English Channel, Bay of Biscay, and the “southwest approaches” to
the British Isles.127 (Subordinate to the Flottenkommandant, fleet commander, were
various “type” commanders.) In general, the establishment of naval group commands
transferred ashore the operational control of seagoing forces, in essence reducing the
fleet commander to a tactical commander in combat.128
In 1942, the bulk of the German fleet was deployed to northern Norway. The
fleet commander was Adm. Otto Schniewind, flying his flag in Tirpitz. His direct
subordinates were the commanders of battleships (Befehlshaber der Schlacht
schiffe, or B.d.S.), of destroyers (Führer der Zerstörer), and of T(orpedo)-boats
(Führer der Torpedoboote). The commander of battleships was retitled Befehlshaber der Kreuzer (commander of cruisers), or B.d.K., in June 1942, and the leader of
torpedo boats became Führer der Schnellboote (leader of S-boats, which displaced
a hundred tons and were capable of forty-four knots) in April 1942. At Kirkenes
was the 8th S-boat Flotilla (dissolved on July 10, 1942), while the 6th S-boat Flotilla
was temporarily deployed to northern Norway.129
The post of leader of U-boats (Führer der U-Boote) had been renamed commander of U-boats (Befehlshaber der U-Boote) on October 17, 1939, the latter

Figure 2
German naval organization
in Norway, June 1942
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German term signifying enhanced importance. In the operational chain of command, that made the U-boat commander, Adm. Karl Dönitz, directly subordinate
to the OKM; administratively, U-boats still reported to the fleet command.130
Directly under Naval Group Command North was the Commanding Admiral
Norway (Kommandierende Admiral Norwegen), Gen. Adm. Hermann Boehm.
The entire Norwegian coast was divided into three geographically based commands: Admiral Norwegian Polar Coast (at Tromsö), Admiral Norwegian Northern Coast (at Trondheim), and Admiral Norwegian Western Coast (at Bergen).
There was also a Commandant of Naval Defenses Oslofjord (at Horten). In accordance with Hitler’s Instruction Nr. 37, the post of Admiral Arctic was established
on October 16, 1941. Admiral Norwegian Polar Coast became subordinate to Ad131
miral Arctic. Adm. Hubert Schmundt, with headquarters in Kirkenes, was the
first Admiral Arctic (October 1941–August 1942), reporting to Commanding Admiral Norway. However, at the beginning of 1942 the latter proposed that Admiral
Arctic be directly subordinated to Naval Group Command North, to unify conduct
of the naval war in Arctic waters. Another reason was that Commanding Admiral
Norway lacked the necessary communications means.132
After April 1942, Commanding Admiral Norway became responsible for the
security of sea traffic around North Cape to supply the frontline forces in Finland
and for the sustainment of Mountain Corps Norway in Finnmark.133 For his part,
Admiral Arctic was directed to attack enemy maritime traffic, protect German
coastal shipping, and conduct defensive mining of coastal waters and ports. A special naval commander was to be appointed for these tasks.134 However, in practice it
was Admiral Carls who controlled all operations in the Arctic—Admiral Schmundt
essentially relayed Carls’s orders to subordinates.135
On June 18, 1942, the SKL made Admiral Arctic responsible for U-boat warfare against shipping and escorts east of the Denmark Strait and Jan Mayen Island.
The weight of the main effort (Schwerpunkt) would be the U-boat attacks on PQ
convoys; however, should an Allied landing occur, the main effort would shift to
enemy transports and their escorts.136
After the invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the 5th Air Fleet (Luftflotte 5), under Gen. Hans-Jürgen Stumpff, was the highest Luftwaffe command
echelon in Norway and Finland. Until the end of 1941, Air Leader North (West) in
Stavanger was its principal subordinate (see map 4). His forces were based in the
area of Stavanger and Trondheim.137 In Instruction Nr. 37 of October 1941, Hitler
directed that a major part of the 5th Air Fleet be transferred from Finland back to
Norway. Headquarters was moved to Oslo, while a command post was established
at the Finnish town of Kemi (on the Gulf of Bothnia and near Sweden’s border). Air
Leader North (West) was in Forus/Stavanger, Air Leader Lofoten in Bardufoss, and
Air Leader North (East) in Kirkenes (see figure 3).138
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Source: Müller-Meinhard, “Der Einfluss der Feindlagebeurteilung . . . (l),” p. 519.

The 5th Air Fleet’s operational area (Operationsgebiet) encompassed the Skagerrak (between Norway and Denmark), the northern part of the North Sea, northern
Scotland, the northern Atlantic, the Arctic Ocean, and the Murmansk front.139 Its
main missions were defending against any enemy amphibious landing, reconnoitering coastal waters, and attacking Arctic convoys in cooperation with the Kriegsmarine.140 Specifically, it was responsible for cooperation with naval forces, security
for German sea supplies, offensive mining, and defense against raids. With respect
to U-boats, the Luftwaffe’s main tasks were to scout the operating areas of boats engaging convoys, combat any fighter aircraft posing a threat to U-boats, and attack,
jointly with the U-boats, the PQ convoys. With naval surface forces, the Luftwaffe’s
main missions were reconnaissance of operating areas and attacks on naval targets
within the framework of an operation.141
In practice, cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine in the
northern area was unsatisfactory, primarily because both practiced rather rigid,
centralized command and control. For example, if Admiral Arctic needed air reconnaissance, he had to send a request to Naval Group Command North in Sengwarden, from where it was forwarded to the 5th Air Fleet in Oslo or the command
post in Kemi. This arrangement resulted in a long delay in obtaining permission.
If the request was granted, the headquarters that granted it gave orders to the appropriate air commanders.142 Other factors that made radio communications difficult were a lack of interoperability (the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe used different
transmitters) and the highly mountainous and fragmented terrain of Norway.143 All

Figure 3
Organization of the 5th
Air Fleet, June 1942

25ºW

GREENLAN D

t

Reykjavík
Hvalfjord

20º

ean

ic

10º

Seydisfjord
25 June

Langanes
Peninsula

i
el

ICELAND

Appro x. m

rai
k St
r
a
m
Den

Score
sb
Soun y
d

Jan Mayen

Ap
pr
o
x
.e
xtr
em
ei

ce

lim
it—
Au
gu
st–
S

e
p
te
m
be
r

m
i t—
P
Q
Ap
Co
r il
nv
oy
heaSearc
vy h fo
c
r
o
v
eri enem
ng
gro y
up

Faeroe
Islands

Gr
ou

p

0º

Sullom Voe
Shetlands

Initial
“jumping-off ”
position for
1st Combat Group

10 June
3 U-boats

M
Namsos

Oslo

Trondheim

10ºE

Stavanger

Bergen

ord

j
North
er F
Cape rsang
Po

AIR LEADER
NORTH (EAST)

Optimal area
for attack on
Convoy PQ17 by
German heavy
surface ships

Hope Island

The Thousand
Islands

jord

er F

2nd Combat Group
(Narvik)

Stockholm

20º

nland
Gulf of Fi

1st Combat Group
(Trondheim)

30º

Leningrad

White Sea

Kanin
Peninsula

Kolguyev

40º

USSR

Arkhangelsk

Cape
Kanin

0

Barents Sea

Reinforcement by
Soviet destroyers
and submarines

ang
Banak
Var
let
ds
n
Kirkenes
a In
a
Altafjord
Kol
Petsamo
Isl
Tromsö
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of this made it very difficult to organize cooperation between the Luftwaffe and
the Kriegsmarine. Raeder complained about the problem to Hitler, who ordered
the Luftwaffe to reinforce its units in Norway and improve its cooperation with
the Kriegsmarine. The leaders of the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine discussed
the matter and decided to exchange liaison officers between the 5th Air Fleet and
Admiral Arctic.144
ALLIED VERSUS GERMAN NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
For both the Allies and the Germans, accurate and timely intelligence about the
enemy’s order of battle (OOB), plans, intentions, and movements was essential.
The British Admiralty’s Naval Intelligence Division (NID) was responsible for preparing daily, often hourly, reports regarding enemy forces anywhere in the world.
The Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC), created in February 1939 as the most
important of NID’s eight sections, was headed by a navy captain.145 The Director of
Naval Intelligence (DNI) worked closely with his counterparts in the War Office
and the Air Ministry within the Joint Intelligence Committee.146
The British relied on several sources of intelligence: direction finding, photographic reconnaissance, captured enemy documents, prisoners of war, and signals
intelligence, the last being the most important. The main source of decrypted enemy messages was the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park,
Buckinghamshire, England.147 Normally, German ships at anchor in Trondheim
did not use radio communications, but ships anchored at Vestfjord and Altafjord
did, between themselves. Shore commands communicated by radio with the heavy
ships when they were at sea—sending a steady stream of messages, in fact. So, the
absence of such signals was a good indicator that the ships were still in port or in
some other fjord.148
British air reconnaissance of the German naval bases and anchorages and of airfields in northern Norway was extremely difficult, because of the long distances
involved and the often appalling weather. The British deployed submarines between
North Cape and Bear Island to observe enemy naval movements. The Allies’ network of Norwegian agents, which would prove so valuable later in the war, had not
yet been established fully.149 However, the British were lucky in having some excellent Swedish sources on German forces in Norway. The British naval attaché in
Stockholm, Capt. Henry M. Denham, established good relations with the Swedish
secret service, especially a Major Törnberg (assistant to Maj. Carl Petersén, head
of C-Bureau, engaged in secret intelligence collection). The Swedes, in turn, had
a good source of intelligence: the Germans’ telegraph and teleprinter lines to their
naval, army, and Luftwaffe forces in Norway passed through Swedish territory. The
Swedes tapped those lines, broke a number of German ciphers, and often provided
the results to Denham. To avoid suspicion being cast on the Swedish secret service,
Denham met his contacts in parks or other public places; he would memorize the
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information, get back to his embassy, and send a signal to the DNI in London. It was
these Swedish sources, for instance, that gave the first positive clues about the movements of the battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen in May 1941.150
The single most critical factor in the ultimate success of the British in the Battle
of the Atlantic was their own ability to read the German navy’s radio messages.
Yet not all messages were read, and the codes were generally difficult to crack.151
But the British did break the German naval cipher HYDRA, which was used by not
only the patrol vessels and minesweepers but also the U-boats based in Norway, as
well as the heavy ships. (The exception was that in special operations the Germans
used their NEPTUNE cipher, which the British code breakers at Bletchley Park only
partially penetrated.) Major changes in the German cipher settings occurred every
forty-eight hours and minor ones every twenty-four hours. Bletchley Park largely
mastered the daily changes of cipher settings; it was the major changes that caused
a problem. Once a major code change was broken, the lesser ones usually were
cracked quickly.152 However, delays did occur, leaving gaps varying in length from
four to forty-eight hours.153 Hence, there were cases when the British were blind,
or at least not “current,” at critical moments. The British were unable to learn anything about landline communications except for what they received from Stockholm. They also were unaware of German written instructions. In short, the British
intelligence service, excellent as it was, could not be relied on to give a complete and
continuous picture even of what was happening, let alone what was going to happen,
on the other side of the North Sea.154
Further, on February 1, 1942, the Germans directed all U-boat cipher operators
to abandon the HYDRA codes. To tighten security, they introduced a new version
of the ENIGMA coding machine, the Triton M4, which used four rotors instead of
three. Codes generated by the Triton M4 (called SHARK by the British) were unreadable by existing methods;155 it was not until late 1942 that Bletchley Park was
able to read these SHARK messages.156
For the Kriegsmarine the primary intelligence agency was the Naval Intelligence
Service (Marinenachrichtendienst), established in June 1941, replacing the Naval
Intelligence Inspectorate (Marinenachrichten Inspektion).157 It was initially the 2nd
Office Group (Amtsgruppe) of the SKL (2./SKL) and in 1944 became the 4th Division, one of the most important office groups. Its Division of Radio Intelligence
(Funkaufklärung) (4./SKL/III), better known as B-Dienst (Beobachtung-Dienst,
Observation Service), had primary responsibility for monitoring, deciphering, and
evaluating enemy radio communications.158
B-Dienst was regarded highly by the rest of the Kriegsmarine for its professionalism and the excellent quality of its analysis. Admiral Raeder praised its work highly.159 B-Dienst and German Military Intelligence (the Abwehr) had at least a loose
administrative relationship, because two of the Abwehr’s departments dealt with
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“naval matters”—Group IV (Radio Intelligence) and Group V (Naval Espionage).160
B-Dienst played a pivotal role in the first part of the Battle of the Atlantic.161 It
generally had a reasonably clear and current picture of the convoy situation and
provided U-boats information essential to their attacks.162 It achieved a great success when in March 1942 it cracked the Allied convoy code and became able to give
Dönitz decoded signals within twenty-four hours of their transmission. From June
through November 1942, almost all orders to U-boats were based on knowledge of
decoded signals.163
The Germans had fairly good knowledge of the Allies’ naval OOB in northern
Scotland and Iceland, mostly from radio intercepts obtained by B-Dienst, photographic reconnaissance by Luftwaffe aircraft, and reports from U-boats. Initially,
however, they did not have precise information on Allied efforts to supply the Soviet Union via the Arctic route. Yet as early as September 1941 the German Supreme
Command of the Wehrmacht and the OKM noticed their increased importance.
They believed at first that these convoys were intended solely to support Soviet
forces on the Murmansk front. They also thought that the Soviets, with the help of
the British and Canadians, would try to capture the vital nickel mines at Petsamo,
in Finland. This estimate of the situation informed Hitler’s Instruction Nr. 36, issued September 22, 1941, for winter operations in Norway.164
In time, air reconnaissance and information obtained from agents indicated
that the enemy convoys were bringing in supplies to be used on the entire Eastern Front. The Germans also deduced that Murmansk and Arkhangelsk were their
principal destinations. German radio intercepts revealed that eastbound convoys
were designated PQ, westbound QP. The Germans knew that the enemy had sent
seven eastbound convoys (PQs 1–7) by the end of 1941. However, because of bad
weather conditions in the Arctic, the Germans never learned the positions of those
convoys or the compositions of their screens.165
By mid-January 1942, the SKL had a clearer picture of the operational situation.
It learned that convoys originated in Scottish ports, but erroneously believed that
partial convoys from the United States stopped at Seydisfjord, Iceland, and from
there sailed to northern Russia, three or four times per month (see map 1). Their
screens were composed of cruisers and destroyers, sometimes with a single aircraft
carrier.166 In mid-February the Germans learned that the PQ route ran from Iceland
to the southern tip of Bear Island, then eastward to longitude 38° 40ʹ east, then
southward to latitude 70° north, where the routes to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk
separated. The return QP convoys left the northern Russian ports at the same time
as the PQ convoys heading to those ports and were routed southward of the PQs.
The intervals between successive convoy pairs, the Germans concluded, were about
fifteen days.167
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ATTACKS ON THE ALLIED CONVOYS, JANUARY–JUNE 1942
Until the winter of 1941–42, the operational situation for the Allies in northern waters was highly favorable: the German forces were not strong enough to endanger
the convoys to Russia. This situation gradually changed after Hitler directed Admiral Raeder to deploy all available heavy ships and U-boats to Norwegian waters.
During the first few months of 1942, the Kriegsmarine sent all of its combat-ready
heavy surface ships and a major part of its destroyers. The battleship Tirpitz was
sent to Norway on January 16, 1942. The battleships (often referred to as battle
cruisers) Gneisenau and Scharnhorst and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen were to
be redeployed from Brest to German ports. However, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
were damaged during that redeployment on February 11–13, 1942 (Operation
CERBERUS), and their arrival in Norway was delayed. Prinz Eugen and the heavy
cruiser Admiral Scheer were ordered to Norway. However, Prinz Eugen was torpedoed by the British submarine Trident on February 23 and put out of action for
nine months; it was to serve for the remainder of the war in the Baltic. The Germans
also deployed about 20 percent of all their U-boats to Norway.168 Tirpitz and Admiral
Scheer, which arrived in Norway safely, were based at Trondheim, from where they
could either operate in the Arctic or break out into the northern Atlantic.169
Between January 1 and the end of June 1942, the Allies ran nine eastbound convoys (PQs 8–16) to, and eight westbound convoys (QPs 5–12) from, northern Russia. PQs 8 and 9 consisted of seven and eight merchant ships, respectively. The third
convoy (PQ10) had only three; the fourth (PQ11), thirteen. The Germans made
only halfhearted efforts to stop these convoys. Out of thirty-one ships in these four
convoys, none were sunk and only one was damaged.170 Eighteen merchant ships
sailed in the first three westbound convoys (QPs 5–7), and none suffered any loss
before reaching Icelandic ports.171
In contrast, from March through the end of June 1942 virtually every convoy to
Russia came under attack.172 Initially, the Germans used their surface ships timidly;
had they been more aggressive, it is difficult to see how convoys to northern Russia
could have continued.173 The Germans progressively increased their efforts against
the Arctic route, starting with the PQ12/QP8 convoys. The eastbound PQ12, of sixteen merchant ships, sailed from Reykjavík on March 1 and arrived at Murmansk
twelve days later. The westbound QP8, with fifteen ships, also left Murmansk on
the 1st, arriving at Reykjavík on the 11th.174
PQ12 was the first heavily protected convoy to northern Russia. Cover was provided by the entire Home Fleet up to longitude 14° east. Admiral Tovey was unable to obtain escorts for antiaircraft (AA) defense beyond that line; the Russians
had promised long-range fighter cover for convoys approaching the Kola Inlet, but
only at some future, unspecified date. PQ12 was detected by a Luftwaffe aircraft
on March 5, and the next day the Germans sent out Tirpitz with three destroyers
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(Operation SPORTPALAST) to find and destroy the convoy. (Tovey believed that the
Germans must have assumed the convoy was carrying troops.) However, after two
days of searching, Tirpitz failed to detect the convoy, which arrived at Murmansk
on the 12th without loss. From the westbound QP8 only one straggler was sunk,
by the Tirpitz’s destroyers on March 7. Aircraft from the carrier Victorious attacked
Tirpitz on its way back to Trondheim, but unsuccessfully; Tirpitz took refuge in
Narvik and then completed its sortie on the 15th. In the meantime, Tovey sent the
8th Destroyer Flotilla to sweep up the Norwegian coast, to latitude 66° north, to
intercept Tirpitz, and on the night of March 12/13 five British submarines were off
the southern entrance to Trondheim. None of these forces were able to attack.175
Nevertheless, the Germans realized they had been lucky that Tirpitz had survived
the attack by the British carrier planes. Afterward, Hitler issued strict orders that
in the future Tirpitz should not be put at risk unless any enemy carrier in striking
range had been detected and neutralized.176
Admiral Raeder briefed Hitler on March 12 that Tirpitz’s inability to detect the
enemy convoy PQ12 showed the weakness of the German naval situation in the
northern area. The enemy, it was seen, would react to any German foray with a
strong combat group, possibly including aircraft carriers. Carriers were the most
dangerous threat to the German heavy ships. They could operate close to the Norwegian coast, obscured from the air, and not be destroyed by the Luftwaffe. The
German destroyers and torpedo boats were numerically weak and could be threatened from the air.177 Raeder argued that because the Kriegsmarine had no aircraft
carriers, a successful foray in the Arctic absolutely required support, especially for
reconnaissance, from a strong air force in the Norwegian area. Any operation in
the Arctic would involve German naval forces, but these had to maintain readiness
against an enemy landing; they would be employed only if air reconnaissance was
effective. The Luftwaffe must also, he asserted, be employed against any enemy
carriers; their destruction at sea or in their bases must be the Luftwaffe’s highest
objective in the northern area. Taking out the enemy carrier would mean a fundamental improvement in German operational possibilities.178 In Raeder’s view, the
best ultimate solution was to speed up the construction of German aircraft carriers
and carrier aircraft. A serious threat to the enemy in the northern area would be
posed by a combat group composed of Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, one carrier, two heavy
cruisers, and twelve to fourteen destroyers.179
From March to May 1942, the Germans attacked Convoys PQs 13–15 with landbased bombers, other aircraft, destroyers, and U-boats. Results were meager: only a
single enemy cruiser, two destroyers, and several steamers were sunk. However, the
Germans learned some valuable lessons from these operations.180
Convoys PQ13 and QP9, each consisting of nineteen ships, sailed on March
20 and 21, respectively. PQ13 sailed from Reykjavík to Murmansk; QP9 (after a
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delay of forty-eight hours because of the presence of U-boats off the Kola Inlet)
left Murmansk for Reykjavík.181 The A/S escort for PQ13 consisted of two destroyers, one minesweeper, and two trawlers and for the QP9 convoy one destroyer and
two minesweepers. One cruiser accompanied each convoy as close screen; another cruiser west of Bear Island and a third covering the western half of the route
guarded against the enemy surface forces in Trondheim. Five minesweepers and
one Russian destroyer reinforced the A/S escort off the Kola Inlet. However, no air
support was available outside the immediate vicinity of the inlet.182
Convoy PQ13 was detected by the Luftwaffe off Bear Island on March 28. Shortly
afterward dive-bombers attacked the convoy repeatedly, sinking three Allied ships.
The next day, the eight-thousand-ton light cruiser Trinidad and the 1,940-ton (full
load) destroyer Eclipse came in contact with enemy destroyers. In a brief engagement in low visibility one German destroyer was sunk and another damaged; Trinidad was hit by a torpedo, while Eclipse suffered damage as well. The convoy ran
into heavy weather and became widely scattered. Nevertheless, all ships but two
that were sunk by U-boats reached Murmansk on the 31st. Convoy QP9 was fortunate: it was not attacked. It arrived at Reykjavík on April 3.183 The SKL considered
the operation against Convoy PQ13 to have been successful. Tirpitz did not take
part in the attack, because bad weather prevented good air reconnaissance.184
The next eastbound convoy, PQ14, twenty-three ships, left Reykjavík on April
8 for Murmansk. The westbound QP10’s ten ships left Murmansk on April 10
bound for Reykjavík.185 PQ14 was escorted by five destroyers, four corvettes, two
minesweepers, and four A/S trawlers. Close cover was provided by the cruisers
Edinburgh and Norfolk and two destroyers. QP10 was accompanied by the cruiser
Liverpool, five destroyers, one minesweeper, and two trawlers; for heavy cover there
were two battleships (King George V and Duke of York), one aircraft carrier (Victorious), two cruisers (Kent and Nigeria), and eight destroyers.186 Convoy PQ14 ran
into ice southwest of Jan Mayen, and about two-thirds of the convoy lost touch.
Some fifteen ships returned to Iceland, with several escorts that had been damaged
by ice. The remaining eight ships with most of the escorts carried on, to be sighted
by enemy aircraft on April 13. Three days later they were attacked by U-boats east
of Bear Island, which sank one ship. The remaining seven arrived safely at Murmansk on the 19th.187 Convoy QP10, attacked by the Luftwaffe and U-boats for
three days between the Kola Inlet and Bear Island, lost four ships; one ship returned
to the Kola Peninsula; the remaining eleven reached Iceland on the 21st.188 From
the German perspective, the results of the attack on Convoys PQ14 and QP10 were
unimpressive for so many aircraft and ten U-boats. The reasons were probably the
Allies’ strong distant and close screens and the continuous daylight; these factors
together made it impossible to employ the Luftwaffe on the most decisive days.189
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In early April, however, Admiral Pound warned the cabinet’s Defence Committee that geographic conditions in the Arctic, especially the ice boundary, were so
heavily in the enemy’s favor that convoy losses might well reach a point at which
their sailing became an uneconomical proposition. During the third week of April,
Admiral Tovey proposed that if the convoys could not be postponed until the ice
boundary moved northward, they should at least be limited in size.190 On April 27,
however, President Roosevelt cabled to Churchill that the United States, it seemed
to him, had made such a tremendous effort to get supplies to Russia that it would
be a serious mistake to allow them to be interrupted “except for most compelling
reasons.”191 Roosevelt informed Churchill soon afterward, at the end of April, that
107 U.S. ships were already loaded or were being loaded in Britain and the United
States and he wanted to use them within the next month. On May 2 Churchill
replied, “With great respect, what you suggest is beyond our power to fulfill.”
Churchill could not press the Admiralty any further.192
In the meantime, eastbound Convoy PQ15, twenty-five ships, sailed from Reykjavík on April 26, while westbound Convoy QP11, thirteen ships, left Murmansk
two days later.193 PQ15 was escorted by four destroyers, one AA ship, and three
minesweepers, QP11 by five destroyers, five corvettes, and two trawlers. A light
cruiser (Edinburgh) was in close cover for QP11; distant cover for both convoys
was provided by a force in which for the first time U.S. ships operated as part of
the Home Fleet: two battleships (King George V and USS Washington), one aircraft
carrier (Victorious), two U.S. heavy cruisers (Wichita and Tuscaloosa), and ten destroyers (four of them American).194 Four British submarines off the Norwegian
coast moved northeastward with the convoy to provide cover from enemy surface
forces based in Trondheim. One British submarine sailed with the convoy itself as
far as longitude 5° east.195
Convoy PQ15 was detected by enemy aircraft on April 28 and the next day by
U-boats as well. It was attacked by six Junkers Ju-88 bombers on May 1. Admiral
Tovey directed two heavy cruisers (Nigeria and London) then west of Bear Island
to stay out of the U-boat operating area unless the convoy was threatened by enemy cruisers or battleships.196 PQ15 lost three ships before it reached Murmansk on
May 5.197 For some reason, the Germans tried harder to destroy QP11 than PQ15;
QP11 was attacked five times by three destroyers east of Bear Island. QP11 lost one
merchant ship and had one escorting destroyer (Amazon) damaged but suffered no
further losses before it arrived at Reykjavík on May 7.198 However, three German
destroyers clashed with and torpedoed the cruiser Edinburgh, which had to be abandoned. Two British destroyers, Foresight and Forrester, received serious damage. The
Germans lost one destroyer, and two others were damaged.199 On May 2, a Polish
submarine (P551) was mistakenly attacked by the British escorts and sunk.200 The
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Allied heavy covering forces, meanwhile, had been detected by the German aircraft
while coming out from Scapa Flow and shadowed up to the latitude of Seydisfjord.201
The British believed that Lützow (formerly Deutschland) moved to Norway on
May 12 and ten days later to Narvik to join Admiral Scheer. Conversely, Tovey asserted—incorrectly—in a dispatch that all German destroyers based in northern
Norway had been either sunk or damaged and accordingly he changed the protection afforded to Arctic convoys. Four cruisers accompanied by three destroyers
would provide close cover west of Bear Island for defense against “pocket” battleships.202 Admiral Tovey surmised that the enemy would leave the eastern part of the
route to the U-boats and Luftwaffe but assign its surface ships to attack convoys between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands. There the convoys would require heavy cover.203
Henceforth the main body of the Home Fleet would cruise northeast of Iceland in
case Tirpitz sortied.204
Convoy PQ16, of thirty-five ships, sailed from Hvalfjord on May 21.205 It was
escorted by five destroyers, four corvettes, four trawlers, one minesweeper, and one
AA sloop (a rough equivalent of the U.S. destroyer escort type).206 Some degree of
protection from U-boats was provided as far as longitude 10° east by four flying
boats based in Iceland. The Soviets promised to support the operation by attacking
German air bases in northern Norway with two hundred bombers. In the event, they
carried out only a minor attack—after the Germans ended their attacks on PQ16.207
Convoy PQ16 was detected by enemy aircraft on May 24 and for the next six
days was shadowed continuously. The first air attack came on the evening of the
first day, about 380 miles from the German air bases in Norway. Over the next five
days the Germans used no fewer than thirty-four torpedo bombers and two hundred other bombers against the convoy. They sank seven ships and damaged three
others at a cost of, according to British sources, three aircraft confirmed lost and
twelve others probably shot down. U-boats tried repeatedly to attack the convoy
but, with one exception in which they sank a ship, were driven off by escorts.208 The
ships of Convoy PQ16 entered Murmansk and Arkhangelsk on May 30 and June
1, respectively.209 After five days of attack, out of its thirty-four ships (one having
turned back), seven had been sunk by Luftwaffe aircraft, only one by U-boats. The
Germans lost two U-boats.210
The westbound QP12, with fifteen ships, left Murmansk on May 21 escorted by
six destroyers, one AA ship, and four trawlers. It was sighted by German aircraft
shortly after it sailed but was not attacked; the Germans concentrated on PQ16.211
QP12 arrived at Reykjavík on the 29th.212
ALLIED PLANS
Allied planning for Convoys PQ17 and its “pair,” QP13, followed a well-established
pattern. While the Admiralty and the Home Fleet were gravely concerned about
the safety of convoys to northern Russia during the summer months, they had no
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choice but to send them; political reasons—support of the embattled Soviet Union—
trumped purely military considerations.213 The sailings of the convoys could not be
concealed from the Germans for more than a day or two. It was clear to Admirals
Pound and Tovey that sooner or later a disaster was bound to occur, especially when
perpetual summer daylight prevailed. Pound believed firmly that another sortie by
Tirpitz was inevitable, notwithstanding the failure of its first foray, against Convoys
PQ12 and QP8. His urging to the War Cabinet that convoys be postponed until winter being overruled, preparations for Convoy PQ17 went ahead.214
Admiral Tovey received information in June 1942 that the enemy intended to
bring out his main force to attack an eastbound convoy. This meant that enemy surface ships would be between Norway and Spitsbergen—where British ships would
be operating about a thousand miles from friendly air bases. The British destroyers
also would be too short on fuel to escort any damaged ships.215 The only hope, Tovey
argued, was to induce the Germans to use their heavy ships toward the west. That
might be done by holding an eastbound convoy at longitude 10° east for twelve to
eighteen hours (unless it was known that the German heavy ships were still in port
or weather prevented shadowing by enemy aircraft). Tovey hoped that this seeming withdrawal would either tempt the German heavy ships to pursue, cause them
to return to port, or draw them into the operating area of the British and Soviet
submarines.216 The Admiralty rejected Tovey’s proposal, although, interestingly, its
instructions of June 27 envisaged the possibility, under certain circumstances, of
the convoy being temporarily turned back on Admiralty orders.217 The same document stated that the safety of the convoy against surface attack west of Bear Island
“must be met by our surface forces, and to the eastward of that meridian [10° east]
must be met by submarines; and that the cruiser covering force was not intended to
go east of Bear Island, unless the convoy was threatened by the presence of a surface
force which the cruisers could fight, or in any case to go beyond longitude 25° E.”218
Convoy PQ17 consisted of thirty-six merchant ships (twenty-three of them
American), plus three rescue ships, which technically were not part of the convoy. Cdre. John C. K. Dowding was in command.219 The convoy carried 156,492
tons of weapons, equipment, and other supplies, including 594 tanks, 4,246 motor vehicles, and 297 aircraft.220 Two oilers (designated Force Q) would accompany
the convoy to refuel destroyers accompanying Convoys PQ17 and QP13 and the
Cruiser Covering Force.221
The route ran from Hvalfjord around the western and northern coasts of Iceland;
through the Denmark Strait; past the east coast of Jan Mayen; northeast to the vicinity of latitude 75° north, longitude 19° east; from there due east, passing north of Bear
Island, and then southeast.222 Upon crossing the longitude of the Kola Inlet (approximately 33° east), the track would split, one leading into Murmansk and the other to
Arkhangelsk.223 This route passed farther north than usual, because the ice boundary
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had moved farther from Bear Island, allowing the convoy to be routed farther from
the enemy air bases in northern Norway.224 It was also thereby longer than usual.225
Defenses for the PQ17/QP13 convoys were similar to those for PQ16/QP12.
They comprised a direct A/S screen and “long-range escort force” sailing with the
convoy, a Cruiser Covering Force for close cover, and a Battle Fleet for distant cover and support. The direct screen and long-range escort were under Cdr. John E.
Broome, RN. The direct A/S screen consisted of four corvettes, two auxiliary AA
ships, four minesweepers, and four armed trawlers; the long-range escort consisted
of six destroyers and two submarines. (See “Allied Order of Battle” sidebar.)226
The Cruiser Covering Force comprised the ships of the 1st Cruiser Squadron (CS
1), under Rear Adm. Louis H. K. Hamilton, RN, with a substantial U.S. Navy augmentation. CS 1 consisted of two British (London and Norfolk) and two American
(Tuscaloosa and Wichita) heavy cruisers, plus one British (Somali) and two American (Wainwright and Rowan) destroyers. The force was organized into the 1st Division (London and Norfolk), 2nd Division (Tuscaloosa and Wichita), and 3rd Division
(Somali, Wainwright, and Rowan).227 This force would provide cover as far as Bear
Island.228 The Battle Fleet, under Admiral Tovey, was composed of the British battleship Duke of York, the U.S. battleship Washington, the British carrier Victorious, the
British heavy cruiser Cumberland and light cruiser Nigeria, and twelve destroyers.229
Tovey’s plan was for the Battle Fleet to reach latitude 65° 56ʹ north, longitude 10°
30ʹ east at 0730 on July 1. Four destroyers from Seydisfjord would join the force, the
others would be detached to Seydisfjord, and the Battle Fleet would station itself so
as to provide distant cover for Convoy PQ17. CINC Rosyth (Scotland) was asked
to arrange antisubmarine and long-range fighter escorts for the Battle Fleet as far
northward as possible.230
Initially, eight British submarines and one Free French patrolled between North
Cape and Bear Island.231 British submarines north of latitude 51° north were informed that the main German units might be near the longitude of Bear Island
south of their patrol lines prior to attacking the convoys. Ice conditions might force
the convoy to pass south of Bear Island. Hence, the submarines were told, it was
of utmost importance to report their positions accurately, particularly with regard
to latitude.232 Five Soviet submarines patrolled north of Ingøy Island (thirty-seven
miles west of North Cape).233
Admiral Hamilton issued on June 25 an operation order positing that the Germans would be tempted sufficiently by PQ17 and QP13 to send their heavy ships
to sea. The British believed that two pocket battleships and some destroyers had
been moved to more northerly ports in Norway, and more aircraft as well. Hamilton assumed that the enemy units most likely to be encountered would be Tirpitz,
Lützow, Admiral Hipper, and Admiral Scheer, plus some ten destroyers. Considering
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Allied Order of Battle
Convoy PQ17
(Cdre. John C. K. Dowding; total 39 ships)
Merchant Ships
(Total 36: 23 U.S., 8 U.K., 2 Soviet, 2 Panamanian, 1 Dutch)
Alcoa Ranger (U.S.) (sunk)
Azerbaijan (Soviet)
Bellingham (U.S.)
Benjamin Harrison (U.S.)
Bolton Castle (U.K.) (sunk)
Carlton (U.S.) (sunk)
Christopher Newport (U.S.) (sunk)
Daniel Morgan (U.S.) (sunk)
Donbass (Soviet)
Earlston (U.K.) (sunk)
El Capitan (Panamanian) (sunk)
Empire Byron (U.K.) (sunk)
Empire Tide (U.K.)
Exford (U.S.) (returned to Reykjavík)
Fairfield City (U.S.) (sunk)
Hartlebury (U.K.) (sunk)
Honomu (U.S.) (sunk)
Hoosier (U.S.) (sunk)
Ironclad (U.S.)
John Witherspoon (U.S.) (sunk)
Navarino (U.K.) (sunk)
Ocean Freedom (U.K.)
Olopana (U.S.) (sunk)
Pan Atlantic (U.S.) (sunk)
Pan Kraft (U.S.) (sunk)
Paulus Potter (Dutch) (sunk)
Peter Kerr (U.S.) (sunk)
Richard Bland (U.S.) (returned to Reykjavík)
River Afton (U.K.) (sunk)
Samuel Chase (U.S.)
Silver Sword (U.S.)
Troubador (Panamanian)
Washington (U.S.) (sunk)
West Gotomska (U.S.)
William Hooper (U.S.) (sunk)
Winston-Salem (U.S.)
Rescue Ships
(Total 3, U.K.)
Rathlin
Zaafaran (sunk)
Zamalek

Convoy Screen
(Cdr. John E. Broome, RN, in Keppel)
Long-Range Escorts
6 destroyers: Fury, Keppel, Leamington, Ledbury, Offa, Wilton
2 submarines: P614, P615
A/S Screen
4 corvettes: Dianella, Lotus, Poppy; La Malouine (Free French)
4 A/S trawlers: Ayrshire, Lord Austin, Lord Middleton, Northern Gem
2 auxiliary AA vessels: Palomares, Pozarica
4 minesweepers: Bramble, Britomart, Leda, Salamander
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Supply Group
(Force Q)
2 fleet oilers: Gray (for QP13); Grey Ranger (damaged by ice on June 28; replaced by
Aldersdale [sunk])
1 destroyer: Douglas

Cruiser Covering Force
(Cruiser Squadron 1, Rear Adm. Louis H. K. Hamilton, RN)
4 heavy cruisers
2 British: London (flag), Norfolk
2 U.S.: Tuscaloosa (CA 37), Wichita (CA 45)
3 destroyers
1 British: Somali
2 U.S.: Rowan (DD 405), Wainwright (DD 419)

Battle Fleet
(Adm. Sir John Tovey, CINC Home Fleet, in Duke of York)
2 battleships
1 British: Duke of York
1 U.S.: Washington (BB 56) (Rear Adm. R. C. Giffen—TF 39)
1 aircraft carrier: Victorious (Vice Adm. Sir Bruce Fraser)
1 heavy cruiser: Cumberland
1 light cruiser: Nigeria
12 destroyers
10 British: Ashanti, Blankney, Escapade, Faulknor, Marne, Martin, Middleton,
Onslaught, Onslow, Wheatland
2 U.S.: Mayrant (DD 402), Rhind (DD 404)

Submarines

(Total 14)
8 British: Sahib (P212), Sea Wolf (47S), Sturgeon (73S), Tribune (N76), Trident,
Unrivalled (P45), Unshaken (P54), Ursula (N59)
1 Free French: Minerve
5 Soviet

Operation E.S. (Deception)
1st Mining Squadron
4 colliers
2 light cruisers (Sirius, Curacoa)
5 destroyers
Several trawlers
Sources: Naval Staff, Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 57; Dowding, “Report of Convoy from Iceland to Time of ‘Scatter’”; “War Diary U.S.S. Washington, for Period from July 1, 1942, to July 31, 1942,” folder BB 56 Washington War Diary—with
Home Fleet, box 1554, Wasatch to Washington, RG 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Records
Relating to Naval Activity during World War II, NARA; Harriman (NAVCOM LONDON) to OPNAV, 2148/29TM (29 June 1942).

those ships’ respective speeds, the most likely combination would be Tirpitz with
Admiral Hipper and Lützow with Admiral Scheer.234
In Hamilton’s view, CS 1’s primary objective was to get PQ17 to Russia. A slightly less important objective was to bring the enemy heavy ships into action with the
Battle Fleet and Cruiser Covering Force. To increase the chances of the latter, PQ17
probably would be turned back at approximately 10° east longitude and then run
eastward again. The hope was, he explained, to lure the German ships thereby farther from their bases or keep them longer at sea within Allied submarine zones.235
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The Battle Fleet would begin covering an area in the vicinity of 71° north, 0° east
by the afternoon of the sixth day since leaving Iceland (D+6) and remain until D+8,
keeping south of latitude 72° 30ʹ north.236 The Cruiser Covering Force would leave
Seydisfjord on the morning of D+5 to reach its covering area at latitude 73° north,
longitude 4° east at about noon on D+6. It would remain there until D+8—longer if
circumstances dictated. Hamilton’s expressed intent was to avoid being drawn close
to enemy shore-based aircraft or submarine concentrations.237
In support of the operation, Allied planners devised a deception (Operation
E.S.), a dummy convoy aimed at deceiving the Germans into believing that an Allied attack on Norway was imminent. Five ships of the 1st Mining Squadron, four
colliers, two light cruisers (Sirius and Curacoa), five destroyers, and some trawlers
238
were assembled at Scapa Flow, in the Orkneys. This group would sortie several
days prior to the departure of PQ17 and pass west of the Shetlands, hoping to be
seen and reported by enemy aircraft; at latitude 61° 30ʹ north, longitude 1° east it
would turn back toward Scapa Flow. The deception would be reinforced by the
bombing of targets in southern Norway, as if the “convoy” was heading there.239
In June 1942, arrangements were made with the Soviets to deploy a few British
PBY-2 Catalinas (the aircraft of No. 210 Squadron) to Arkhangelsk for reconnoitering the area between Altafjord and Convoy PQ17 on July 1–3 as it moved eastward.
(The resulting patrol encountered nothing remarkable.)240 Rear Adm. Geoffrey J.
A. Miles, head of the British military mission to Moscow, informed the Admiralty on June 16 that the people’s commissar (minister) of the navy, Adm. Nikolay
Kuznetsov, had promised that all Soviet resources would be devoted to convoy protection. Kuznetsov, Miles reported, had not been satisfied with the Soviet air effort
for PQ16 but was optimistic about the future and would again ask the State Defense
Committee (chaired by Stalin) for more long-range fighters. In addition, bombers,
instead of bombing aerodromes, might in the future help long-range fighters. The
Royal Air Force would send as many long-range Hurricane fighters as possible to
the air base at Ponoy, near Murmansk, before Convoy PQ17’s arrival.241
GERMAN PLANS
German general plans for the employment of heavy surface ships against PQ convoys were based on “appreciations” (staff studies) prepared by various naval commands during the winter and spring of 1941–42. As was the custom in the Kriegsmarine (and the Wehrmacht in general), the highest command echelon, in this
case Naval Group Command North, issued an “operational instruction” (operative
Weisung), on the basis of which the subordinate commanders issued “operation
orders” (Operationsbefehle). The Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe prepared separate
operation orders for the attack on Convoy PQ17, but the plan of each service envisaged close cooperation with the other.
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On June 4 Admiral Carls issued an operational instruction for employing the
Trondheim and Narvik groups (designated the 1st and 2nd Combat Groups, respectively) against the next PQ convoy. The instruction anticipated that because the
PQ/QP convoys ran at fourteen-to-fifteen-day intervals, the next could be expected
in the Jan Mayen area on June 20. Generally, the PQ convoys sailed in column formation, four or five merchant ships in each column. The screen usually consisted
of one cruiser in the convoy’s midsection and three to four destroyers some 5,500
yards ahead. Individual destroyers and any other escorts secured the flanks. The last
convoy had sailed close to the ice boundary, and now a heavy security group that
included a carrier had been positioned by the enemy eastward of the Jan Mayen–
Faeroes area.242
The operational instruction established two chains of command, one for the
first phase (deployment of the combat groups to their “jumping-off ” positions)
and another for the second phase (movement from the jumping-off positions to the
attacking positions). In the first phase, for the Trondheim force, Naval Group Command North would exercise operational control, while the fleet commander in Tirpitz would have tactical control. For the Narvik group, operational control would
be in the hands of Admiral Arctic on board the S-boat mother ship Tanga, while
tactical command and control would be exercised by the commander of cruisers, in
Lützow.243 In the second phase of the operation, the groups would proceed to a rendezvous at a point to be determined; overall operational control over both surface
forces and U-boats would reside with Commander, Naval Group Command North,
though Admiral Arctic would retain operational control of the S-boats operating
in the Kola Peninsula area. After both groups joined, tactical command and control would rest in the hands of the fleet commander. The headquarters of Admiral
Arctic would serve as radio relay for the U-boats. The fleet commander would not
directly control the U-boats.244
The June 4 instruction also specified the composition of the Trondheim and
Narvik combat groups: the Trondheim group would be composed of Tirpitz, Admiral Hipper, two destroyers, and three torpedo boats; at Narvik Lützow, Admiral
Scheer, and six destroyers would assemble. Besides two combat groups, Admiral
Carls expected to have three U-boats northeast of Jan Mayen by June 10 to obtain
early contact with the next PQ convoy and its heavy covering forces. Additional Uboat groups would be between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands.245
Operationally, RÖSSELSPRUNG was simple in concept but difficult in execution.
Almost everything depended on a timely and covert joining of the two combat
groups, followed by unobserved movement toward the anticipated position of
Convoy PQ17 (see map 4). Specifically, the Trondheim group’s jumping-off position would be Gimsøystraumen, in Vestfjord; at the same time, the Narvik group,
directed by Admiral Arctic, would move to its jumping-off position at the northern
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exit of Altafjord, in the skerries of Sørøya. Both groups were to be at their jumpingoff points within twenty-four hours. Destroyers and torpedo boats were to be fully
refueled. After the combat groups joined, the torpedo boats would refuel at
Altafjord and remain there on three-hour alert. Owing to their short radius of action, the destroyers’ speed would be limited.246 There was danger of torpedoes from
not only enemy surface forces and aircraft but also submarines; the latter had been
used to screen the previous PQ convoy. On signal from Commander, Naval Group
Command North both combat groups would sortie so as to arrive at a meeting
point he would promulgate.247 Orders to break off the action, if necessary, would
either come from MGK Nord or result from an independent decision of the fleet
commander.248

German Order of Battle
1st Combat Group
(I Kampfgruppe, Trondheim)
1 battleship: Tirpitz (flag)
1 heavy cruiser: Admiral Hipper
5 destroyers:
5th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-14 (flag) Friedrich Ihn, Z-4 Richard Beitzen
6th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-20 (flag) Karl Galster, Z-10 Hans Lody, Z-6 Theodor Riedel
2 torpedo boats: T-7, T-15

2nd Combat Group
(II Kampfgruppe, Narvik)
1 pocket battleship (Panzerschiff): Lützow
1 heavy cruiser (formerly pocket battleship): Admiral Scheer
8th Destroyer Flotilla
5 destroyers: Z-28 (flag), Z-24, Z-27, Z-29, Z-30
1 oiler: Dithmarschen

9 U-boats: U-88, U-251, U-255, U-334, U-355, U-376, U-456, U-457, U-703
5th Air Fleet
Reconnaissance
I./K.G. 40, 1. (F)/22, 1. (F)/124; 2./406; 3./406; 3./906; 1./125 Vestfjord; 74
reconnaissance aircraft (including three squadrons of Focke-Wulf FW-200
Condors and four squadrons of Blohm & Voss BV-138 Seedrache seaplanes)
Combat Units
K.G. 30; I./K.G. 26 (LT); 1./406 (LT); 1./906 (LT) 103 Ju-88 bombers; 42 He-111 torpedo bombers; 15 He-115 torpedo bombers (on floats); 30 Ju-87 dive-bombers
Sources: Flottenchef/B.d.S., “Operationsbefehl. Einsatz der Flottenstreitkräfte im Nordraum gegen einen PQ-Geleitzug
(Deckname Rösselsprung),” 14 June 1942, pp. 100–102, Akte VIII, 13 (PQ17) May 1942–July 1942, RM 7/1024, BA-MA;
Marinegruppenkommando Nord to Seekriegsleitung, Abschlussbericht, “Rösselsprung,” 20 July 1942, p. 32, Akte VIII, 13
(PQ17) May 1942–July 1942, RM 7/1024, BA-MA; Vertragsnotiz Unternehmung “Rösselsprung,” Juli 1942, p. 81, RM 7/1024,
BA-MA; Operationen von Flottenstreitkräften im Nordpolarmeer im Jahre 1942, pp. 19–21; Irving, Destruction of Convoy
PQ.17, p. 40.
Legend:
(F) = Fern Aufklärungsgruppe (Long Range Reconnaissance Group)
K.G. = Kampfgeschwader (Battle Wing)
LT = Lufttorpedo (Aerial Torpedo)
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The situation would require massing German forces rapidly and keeping the
duration of the operation short—here the commander had the suspected heavy
covering group in mind. The primary mission was the quick destruction of the enemy’s merchant ships. The heavy surface ships should merely neutralize the cargo
ships; their actual sinking should be left to the U-boats and Luftwaffe. Among these
the tankers would be especially important targets. It also would be desirable to
capture several enemy ships. In any case, it was attacking the convoy, not the heavy
covering group, that was the primary mission of Tirpitz and Admiral Hipper.249
The enemy convoy was to be detected by U-boat patrol lines, after which the
Luftwaffe would maintain continuous contact. The Luftwaffe also would search
for the enemy heavy group, in the Shetland–Faeroe–Iceland–Jan Mayen area. If the
heavy group was not detected there, it would be critically important next to reconnoiter the sea 250 nautical miles around the convoy. The Luftwaffe also was tasked
with scouting the vicinities of Reykjavík, Scapa Flow, and the Firths of Forth and
Moray (in Scotland).250 On the day the combat groups sortied from their Trondheim and Narvik bases, the Luftwaffe would reconnoiter a quadrant out to two
hundred nautical miles from the coast northeastward from latitude 62° north to the
longitude of North Cape. The day they left the jumping-off positions, the Luftwaffe
would search an arc two hundred nautical miles offshore from the latitude of the
southern tip of Lofoten to the longitude of North Cape.251
Pursuant to an instruction from Hitler on March 14, 1942, Naval Group Command
North requested that the 5th Air Fleet assign three squadrons of Focke-Wulf (FW) 200
Condor long-range reconnaissance aircraft, four squadrons of Blohm & Voss (BV) 138s
and several three-plane “chains” (Kette) of bombers and Ju-88 fighter-bombers for air
reconnaissance.252 However, the 5th Air Fleet informed Naval Group Command
North on June 19 that its request could not be fulfilled. In the 5th Air Fleet’s view,
the attack on PQ16 in late May had shown clearly that the Luftwaffe was capable of
inflicting heavy losses on convoys by itself but only at the cost of further diluting
the 5th Air Fleet’s already inadequate forces.253
On June 14, Admiral Schniewind, the fleet commander, issued a six-and-a-halfpage operation order, “Employment of Fleet Forces in the Northern Area against
a PQ Convoy.” The mission was simple: “destroy a PQ-convoy in cooperation with
U-boats and Luftwaffe.”254 In keeping with the overall instruction, Schniewind’s order divided his forces into three: the Trondheim group, the Narvik group, and the
U-boats. (See “German Order of Battle” sidebar.) The Trondheim group consisted
of Tirpitz, Admiral Hipper (with the fleet commander embarked), and five destroyers (in contrast to the two envisaged in Carls’s operational instruction). The Narvik group had Lützow, Admiral Scheer, and five destroyers. Three U-boats would
be stationed northeast of Iceland beginning on the 10th. Other available U-boats,
“probably three to four,” would be in the attacking position between Jan Mayen
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and Bear Islands. Any other U-boats available later would be stationed off Bear
Island. At the time the operation order was issued, there were only two destroyers
in Trondheim (Ihn and Lody); four other destroyers were to be transferred from
Germany to Norway within the next few days. There were also two or three torpedo boats in Trondheim to escort the group.255 In the skerries of Vestfjord and
other coastal waters would be minesweepers and submarine chasers. The U-boats
would follow a route through Andfjord; a former fishing steamer (Schiff 31) would
escort them.256
Upon issuance of a coded signal from Naval Group Command North, the
fleet forces would move to their jumping-off points as had been specified by Naval Group Command North, arriving, combat ready, within twenty-four hours.257
About five hours prior to the sortie of the combat groups from jumping-off points,
Air Leader Lofoten and Air Leader North (East) would fly reconnaissance in the
quadrant bounded by latitude 68° north and longitude 25° east, out to two hundred
nautical miles offshore. Within the effective range of the Luftwaffe’s fighter aircraft,
close air support would be provided during all phases of the operation.258
Admiral Schniewind reiterated the need for quick massing, concentrated employment, and quick destruction of the enemy. The primary objective was destruction of the enemy’s merchant ships; screening ships were to be attacked only if they
jeopardized the primary objective. The most favorable conditions for the attack
would be found east of Bear Island, between longitudes 20° and 30° east. The main
objective would be accomplished faster and more effectively if the U-boats and the
Luftwaffe provided reliable reconnaissance.259
In his written intent (Absicht), Admiral Schniewind laid down that suppression
of the strongest enemy force would be the responsibility of the 1st Combat Group.
As soon as Convoy PQ17 was detected and located, the combat groups would take
up their stations—but as late as possible, to reduce the reaction time available for
the enemy.260 The enemy should be attacked on the bow sectors and from the east;
the enemy was to be encircled only when his combat power was broken up.261 If
the enemy’s close screen consisted of no more than two cruisers, the attack could
be conducted from two directions from the outset; this would result in quicker
destruction of the convoy.262
Schniewind stressed that engagement with superior enemy forces should be
avoided. The operation, he reaffirmed, was to be executed quickly, before an enemy force composed of battleships and carriers and believed to be in the Faeroes–
Iceland area would have an opportunity to intervene.263 If enemy heavy forces were
encountered, the action should continue only as long as the prospects for success
were favorable.264
On June 2 Admiral Schmundt (Admiral Arctic) issued his operation order for
the movement of the pocket-battleship group from Narvik to Altafjord (code name
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KONZERT). In addition to Lützow, Admiral Scheer, and the five destroyers, the Narvik combat group included the 6th S-boat Flotilla (seven boats) and a supply ship.265
Close air support en route to Altafjord would be provided by Luftwaffe fighters
based in Bardufoss and Altengaard (near Altafjord). Air reconnaissance would
search primarily for enemy carriers from latitude 67° north, longitude 26° east out
to two hundred nautical miles off the Norwegian coast. Higher-density reconnaissance would be flown between latitudes 69° and 79° north and longitudes 14° and
19° east. Air reconnaissance would be conducted throughout the movement.266
On June 11 Admiral Schmundt directed three U-boats, organized as the
Eisteufel (“Ice Devil”) group, to take up patrol positions in the Denmark Strait to
watch for the first sign of PQ17. These U-boats’ primary mission was first detecting and then tracking the convoy. Surface ships of destroyer size and larger could
be attacked only when positively identified as hostile. In any uncertain situation,
such as thick weather, all attacks on warships were prohibited. The German ships
also were directed not to attack enemy submarines but otherwise “to act as though
submarines they meet are hostile.”267
The 5th Air Fleet issued its operation order on the 14th. It gave as the main
missions air reconnaissance and the close support of naval forces. Subordinate
commanders were to use all available forces in attacking the PQ convoy.268 Upon
execution of RÖSSELSPRUNG Luftwaffe aircraft would begin a three-hundrednautical-mile-wide search off the Norwegian coast. Specific assignments were the
following: Air Leader North (West), from latitude 62° north to a line from the southern tip of the Lofotens to the southwestern tip of Jan Mayen; Air Leader Lofoten,
from the southern tip of the Lofotens to a line connecting North Cape to the southern
tip of Spitsbergen; Air Leader North (East), from the line between North Cape (longitude 25° east) and the southern tip of Spitsbergen out to longitude 30° east.269
Air Leader North (West) was to cover the Trondheim group, Air Leader Lofoten
the Narvik group.270 Fighter protection would be organized by the commander of
fighters, Norway, in cooperation with the fleet commander at Trondheim, and by
Air Leader Lofoten in cooperation with the commander of cruisers.271 After the
PQ convoy crossed longitude 5° east, Air Leader Lofoten would be responsible for
the sea area to three hundred nautical miles off the Norwegian coast, from a line
connecting the southern tip of Lofoten and the southwestern tip of Jan Mayen to
another between the southern tip of Spitsbergen and North Cape. Air Leader North
(West) would have the zone west and southwest of the Lofoten–Jan Mayen line (see
map 4).272
In the meantime, on June 6, Admiral Raeder met with Hitler to discuss operations in the Arctic. Hitler was informed of the pending operation in which Tirpitz
was to participate; his agreement was lukewarm at best, but he did not reject the idea.
Hitler was unclear about the operation’s form but felt it should not be risky for heavy
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Map 5
German attack on Convoy
PQ17, July 3–6, 1942
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ships in any case. After the meeting, Raeder directed Vice Adm. Theodor Krancke,
OKM’s liaison to the Führer’s headquarters, to explain to Hitler once again that
the operation, on which the SKL placed great importance, would require sufficient
Luftwaffe air cover; it could not be successful otherwise.273
Hitler formally approved the plan for RÖSSELSPRUNG on the 9th. However, Raeder
failed to respond forcefully to Hitler’s remark that he now saw “great danger for
heavy ships by the [enemy] aircraft carrier,” a reservation meaning that the enemy
carrier had to be located prior to the attack on the convoy and eliminated. The SKL
was allowed to move the Trondheim group to Altafjord but then had to await orders to attack, orders that could come only with Hitler’s approval. Raeder’s unwillingness to act energetically—to confront Hitler and get him to lift his restrictions
on the employment of the heavy ships—was the key element in the ultimate failure
of RÖSSELSPRUNG, notwithstanding the German forces’ overall success against
Convoy PQ17.274
EXECUTION
Convoy PQ17, now consisting of thirty-six ships plus one rescue ship, sailed from
Hvalfjord at 1600 on June 27 at six knots (see map 5).275 The next day the convoy
encountered heavy fog and ice floes in the Denmark Strait. One merchant vessel
ran aground, and an oiler was damaged so heavily by ice that it had to return. Several other ships suffered slight damage from ice.276
The Home Fleet’s Battle Force sailed from Scapa Flow on June 29 and steamed
northward so as to support both PQ17 and QP13.277 Convoy PQ17 was fully formed
at 1200 on the 30th when it was joined by a long-range escort force under Commander Broome and two rescue ships.278 The convoy was then about a hundred
miles southwest of Jan Mayen Island.279 The next day, the Cruiser Covering Force
sailed from Seydisfjord.280
Operation E.S.’s dummy convoy sailed on the 29th and carried out its movement
eastward toward the Norwegian coast on June 30 and July 1. However, Luftwaffe
reconnaissance aircraft did not observe it, and so the Germans did not react at all.281
The entire deception plan was a failure.
At 1640 on June 30, Luftwaffe aircraft detected westbound Convoy QP13, reporting it as consisting of thirty-nine ships and ten escorts, some two hundred nautical miles north of North Cape. However, because of heavy fog they were unable to
maintain contact.282 At 1050 on July 1, QP13 was sighted by U-88 250 nautical miles
northeast of Jan Mayen but was not attacked.283 At 1615 on the 1st, U-255 reported
the convoy’s position as sixty nautical miles east of Jan Mayen and its composition
as thirty-eight steamers and ten to twelve destroyers and other escort vessels. U-255
estimated the convoy’s speed at eight knots; B-Dienst later confirmed this.284
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At noon on July 1, the British first noted German shadowing aircraft over Convoy
PQ17. The weather was calm, all the Allied destroyers had been refueled, and the
convoy was two hundred miles west of Bear Island.285 The PQ17 and QP13 convoys
passed each other at latitude 73° north, longitude 3° east at a distance of some ten
miles on the afternoon of the 1st.286 The Cruiser Covering Force overtook Convoy
PQ17 and sailed parallel to it but forty miles north, so as to avoid German detection.287
In the meantime, Bletchley Park learned that the Luftwaffe had detected PQ17.288
The OIC began to decrypt special intelligence traffic of between noon on July 1
and noon on July 2 and learned that the Germans’ Narvik group had arrived at
Altafjord that morning. It also knew that Tirpitz had sortied from Trondheim the
previous night; a British aircraft confirmed its absence. Yet Tirpitz was not actually
289
located by air reconnaissance that day.
On July 2, one fleet tanker and one destroyer left PQ17 to join westbound QP13.
That evening PQ17 ran into fog, which persisted until the forenoon of the 3rd.
Bad weather prevented Allied aircraft from reconnoitering the Norwegian ports
for several days.290
Admiral Carls, despite the failure to detect the enemy’s heavy surface group,
believed that the pending operation, including the heavy surface ships, was fully
justified. Deployment of the German ships would start when the enemy PQ convoy
crossed 5° east longitude, anticipated for the evening of July 2.291 Accordingly, Naval Group Command North requested during the forenoon of the 2nd that 1./SKL
issue “execute” orders. This request was approved, and signals were sent at 1257.
At 1200, the Trondheim group received an order to be in three-hour readiness.292
On the basis of reports from U-266, Admiral Arctic decided to keep four U-boats
in continuous contact with the convoy. By 1400 on July 2 a patrol line of six Uboats was in place halfway between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands.293 As planned, the
Trondheim group sortied at 2000 for Gimsøystraumen, and four hours later the
Narvik group left for Altafjord.294 Lützow ran aground in the Tjeldsund and took no
further part in the operation. Likewise, three destroyers (Lody, Riedel, and Galster)
of the Trondheim group touched ground in Gimsøystraumen and suffered damage;
they returned to Trondheim the next day.295 The Germans believed (wrongly, as it
turned out) that the enemy did not notice the deployment of the Trondheim and
Narvik groups.296
At about midnight on July 2/3, the U-boats and aircraft lost contact with Convoy PQ17.297 At 0700 on the 3rd, the convoy changed course to due east, to pass
Bear Island into the Barents Sea. The Admiralty reported that the ice boundary was
even farther north than had been anticipated, and Admiral Hamilton suggested
to Commander Broome that he change to a more northward course. Broome did
not entirely accept that suggestion, being anxious to make progress eastward;298 he
changed the convoy’s course northward, to 021 degrees.299
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At 1600, Admiral Carls asked for a decision regarding RÖSSELSPRUNG. He shared
his intention to deploy the Tirpitz group to Altafjord with Raeder and the SKL. Afterward, Raeder directed Admiral Krancke to transmit Raeder’s approval of Carls’s
intent to Hitler, explaining to Hitler that movement of the Tirpitz group to Altafjord
was only a preliminary and did not constitute execution of RÖSSELSPRUNG. In a
message sent at 1720, Carls ordered Schniewind to carry out the redeployment.300
With the Tirpitz group at Altafjord, only a few hours would have been lost if Hitler’s
approval for the larger operation came before midday on July 4.301
In the early morning of the 3rd, the Admiralty informed CINC Home Fleet that
a PBY-2 Catalina seaplane, backed by one B-24 Liberator heavy bomber if necessary, would patrol between latitude 71° 30ʹ north, longitude 19° 10ʹ east and latitude 71° 55ʹ north, longitude 23° 40ʹ east from 1530 on July 3 to 0300 on July 5. This
patrol was intended to cover the approaches from Altafjord to the convoy’s route.
Aircraft from Sullom Voe would fly additional searches westward of Lofoten. Five
Catalinas would be available at Arkhangelsk to search ahead of the convoy after it
crossed longitude 35° east.302
At 0130 on the 4th, PQ17 changed course to the northeast and entered an area
full of heavy ice growlers.303 At 0415, Luftwaffe aircraft detected it eighty nautical
miles northeast of Bear Island, equidistant from that island and Spitsbergen.304 At
0450, Convoy PQ17 suffered its first loss when an aircraft torpedoed the American merchantman Christopher Newport, of seven thousand gross registered tons
(in German documents, Bruttoregistertonnen, or BRT).305 During the day German
aircraft maintained contact, with only short interruptions caused by bad weather.306
As of 1700, however, the Germans still did not have definite information on the
heavy cover group—with probably one battleship, two or three cruisers, and three
destroyers—reported at 1352 northeast of Convoy PQ17 and on a southeasterly
course.307 The area north of latitude 71° north was, as Admiral Carls reported to the
SKL at 1745, not being observed continuously. Accordingly, Admiral Carls believed
that RÖSSELSPRUNG should be launched no later than 1700 on July 5. The 1st and
2nd Combat Groups were in a three-hour readiness status at Altafjord.308
In the meantime, at about 1230 on July 4, the Admiralty bypassed Admiral Tovey
to give his subordinate Admiral Hamilton, with the Cruiser Covering Force, permission to pass east of longitude 25° east should the situation require it. However,
the Admiralty had no information that specifically justified the change in Tovey’s
plans, so Tovey qualified it, directing Hamilton that “once the convoy is east of 25°
E or earlier at your discretion, you are to leave the Barents Sea unless assured by
Admiralty that Tirpitz cannot be met.”309 At 1520, Hamilton signaled that he would
stay with the convoy until the enemy surface threat had been clarified, but certainly
no longer than 1200 on the 5th.310 These Admiralty messages marked the beginning
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of interference by Admiral Pound in the decisions and actions of subordinate commanders during the operation.311
During the afternoon of the 4th, British aircraft reported that Tirpitz and Admiral Hipper had left Trondheim. Admiral Tovey’s force was then 180–200 miles
northwest of Bear Island, within the mutually supporting distance of the carrier
Victorious.312 At 1640, Hamilton ordered the convoy to change course from 090 to
045 degrees to open the distance from the enemy airfield at Banak to four hundred
miles.313 Also that afternoon, Bletchley Park assessed that although there was no
verification via photographic reconnaissance, it was “tolerably certain” that Admiral Scheer and Lützow had been in Altafjord since 1400 on July 3 (when it became
known they had left Trondheim). By then all four German heavy ships might be at
314
sea heading toward the convoy.
At 1809, Admiral Hamilton replied to the Admiralty that he intended to withdraw to the westward of Convoy PQ17 at about 2200 on July 4, after refueling
his destroyers.315 The Admiralty at 1839 directed Hamilton, because new information might be available shortly, to remain with the convoy “pending further
instruction.”316 At that time, Hamilton’s Cruiser Covering Force was between ten
and twenty miles ahead of the convoy.317 Some 350 miles away the Battle Fleet was
hovering southwest of Spitsbergen.318
All that day the weather north of Bear Island had steadily improved; however,
the cloud ceiling was low (985 to 1,640 feet), making it easier for enemy aircraft to
attack the convoy.319 The first attack, by a few bombers, came at 1930. It scored no
hits, but Luftwaffe aircraft carried out a series of more-deadly raids during the evening. At about 2030, twenty-three Heinkel (He) 111 torpedo bombers attacked the
convoy. They torpedoed three ships; two of these had to be sunk by the escort, but
the other was able to continue the voyage. Four enemy planes were shot down.320
Convoy PQ17 had come out of heavy air attacks remarkably well—its antiair defense had proved very effective.321
At 2325, Bletchley Park sent the Admiralty an intercepted message:
Most Secret Source (Ultra):
1. [The Germans have] located westbound convoy from Russia on North Cape meridian
P.M. yesterday July 2nd and have since lost in fog.
2. Eastbound convoy is expected to be sighted shortly and will be attacked in accordance
with plan;
3. Warships are expected to move from Trondheim and Narvik (? 36) hours before convoy
reaches meridian 5 deg E. Main attack to be concentrated during passage between 15th and
30th meridian;
4. U-boats already on station close to Arctic. A two repeat A two. [A2 was the level of reliability of this part of the report.]322
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THE DECISION TO SCATTER THE CONVOY
On the evening on the 4th, Admiral Pound personally went to Bletchley Park to get
a close look at the stream of decrypted messages.323 The OIC received good news
at about 1900: the “break-in” for the most recent ENIGMA rotor settings had been
accomplished and decrypts for the twenty-four hours up to noon that day could be
expected very shortly.324 At 1918, Bletchley advised Tovey that the German “CINC
of the Fleet in Tirpitz arrived to Alta[fjord] 0900/4th. Destroyers and torpedo boats
[were to] complete with fuel at once. Scheer was already present at Alta[fjord]. [Actually, Hipper and Lützow were also.] At 1623/3 two U-boats were informed their
main task was to shadow convoy.”325 Cdr. Norman Denning of the OIC wanted to
add a comment that the new evidence indicated that Tirpitz was still at Altafjord.
However, after discussion with Admiral Pound, Denning’s assessment was deleted
from the message sent at 1918.326
It was not known how long refueling the destroyers would take. Although expected, the German ships’ arrival in Altafjord reinforced the view that a move
against the convoy was imminent if not already under way.327 But it was not certain,
Denning was convinced, that the German ships had yet left Altafjord. He was supported in his view by his superior, John “Jock” Clayton, the deputy director of the
OIC. (Clayton, a rear admiral on the retired list, had been brought back on active
service as a captain.) Further support came from Harry Hinsley, the German-traffic
analyst at Bletchley. For Denning, who compared the current situation with Tirpitz’s foray against Convoy PQ12 in March, the absence of any signal from Naval
Group Command North to Tirpitz was an indicator that the heavy ships were still at
Altafjord. There also were no reports from the British submarines. Denning briefed
Pound but was given little opportunity to explain his reasoning; the admiral instead
asked direct questions to which he expected short, factual answers. At one point
Pound asked Denning whether he knew that Tirpitz was not at sea.328 Denning responded that the German sortie against Convoy PQ12 suggested that the Germans
would not now risk Tirpitz if there were danger from the “Home Fleet, particularly
its aircraft carriers.”329 He also assured Pound that “if Tirpitz has put out to sea you
can be sure that we should have known very shortly afterward[,] within four to six
hours.”330
Denning also pointed to several “negative” indicators. For example, Bletchley
Park knew that the Germans had sighted CS 1 but erroneously thought it included
a battleship. That would indicate a large force, and therefore the Germans would
not send Tirpitz to sea. (Bletchley had found no evidence that the Germans had
detected the heavy covering force.) Another point was that the Germans had not
warned their U-boats to stay clear of the convoy (i.e., so as not mistakenly to attack German ships). Neither had the German wireless-telegraphy traffic markedly increased since noon. The British and Soviet submarines off North Cape had
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reported no sightings. Collectively, all these “negatives” made a good case that Tirpitz was still at Altafjord.331
Nonetheless, to Admiral Pound’s question, “Can you assure me that Tirpitz is
still at anchor in Altafjord?” Denning could only respond, “No. I shall have information only after the Tirpitz has left.”332 On this question, in fact, hung the entire
future of Convoy PQ17, but Denning was not in a position to give the desired assurance.333 Pound then asked, “Can you at least tell me whether Tirpitz is ready to
go to sea?” To which Denning responded, “I can at least say that she will not leave
in the next few hours. If she were on the point of sailing, the destroyer escort would
have preceded her and made an antisubmarine sweep. They have not been reported
by our submarines patrolling the Altafjord.”334
At 2000 the expected stream of decrypts began to reach the OIC but provided no
new “positive” information bearing on Admiral Pound’s question. At 2030, Pound
convened a staff meeting, at which Clayton was present.335 (Coincidentally, that meeting was held just as Convoy PQ17 was repelling enemy air attacks.)336 At 2031, the
OIC received a decrypt of a German message from 1130 on July 4 confirming that
Tirpitz had not left Altafjord as of noon. This signal, which was included in the 2110
ULTRA summary, had informed the U-boats that no German surface ships were then
in their operating area and that the British heavy ships, if encountered, should be
their main targets. However, this information did not change the situation, because
an assessment already had been made that the destroyers and torpedo boats accompanying Tirpitz would not have completed refueling until about noon.337
At the 2030 meeting, Admiral Pound and his staff opined that the enemy attack
could occur anytime after 0200 on the 5th; if that happened, Admiral Hamilton’s
cruisers would be destroyed. The participants also (falsely) believed that the farther
apart the merchant ships were, the better their chances of escape: once the alarm
was given, the enemy would stay in the vicinity no longer than necessary to pick
off a few ships. However, an eight-knot convoy might require a good deal of time
to disperse over a large area, whereas the air and U-boat attacks had started already
and were certain to continue.338
When Clayton returned to the OIC at about 2130, he informed his own staff
that Admiral Pound was now taking the view that the convoy had to be dispersed,
that Tirpitz had sortied and could reach the convoy by 0200 on July 5. Clayton’s staff
persuaded him to go back to Admiral Pound and make the case that instead Admiral Tovey should be advised that Tirpitz had not sailed out and would not until the
Germans had information on the strength of the Allied heavy covering force.339 The
naval section at Bletchley Park agreed. But Clayton was unable to convince Admiral
Pound, who had made up his mind.340
The fate of Convoy PQ17 was now decided, by three short Admiralty messages. At 2111 Pound sent a signal to Hamilton (repeated to Tovey): “Cruiser force
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withdraw to westward at high speed.” Another (repeated to Hamilton) went directly to Broome, the screen commander, at 2123: “Owing to threat from surface ships
convoy is to disperse and proceed to Russian ports.” This was followed by another
at 2136: “[Reference] My 2123/4th. Convoy is to scatter.”341
At the time Admiral Pound made his decision, Convoy PQ17 was some 130
miles north-northeast of Bear Island and almost due north of North Cape (bearing
008) at a distance of about 240 miles (see map 6).342 The Allied ships had some 450
miles to go to reach Novaya Zemlya. The Battle Fleet was then some 230 miles from
the convoy and four hundred from the Tirpitz group—too far away from either the
convoy or the enemy heavy ships.343
At 2215, Commander Broome passed the signal to scatter to the convoy commodore. The convoy was then at latitude 75° 55ʹ north, longitude 22° 52ʹ east.
Broome, with his destroyers (other ships of the A/S screen remained with the convoy), steamed away to join Admiral Hamilton’s force.344 Commodore Dowding sent
a message to Broome: “Many thanks. Goodbye and good hunting”; Broome replied,
“It’s a grim business leaving you here.”345
At 2230, Hamilton turned his force onto a westerly course that would pass south
of the convoy—that is, between the convoy and the probable enemy forces. The visibility was extremely variable, with numerous fog patches. The Cruiser Covering
Force, with the destroyers, withdrew westward at twenty-five knots.346
Both Hamilton and Broome were affected less by the content of Pound’s three
messages than by the quick succession in which they had been sent. Their cumulative effect—especially since the last signal had a more urgent priority marking
than the previous one—was to imply that danger was pressing.347 From that they
inferred that an attack by Tirpitz was imminent. Commander Broome duly obeyed
the order to scatter the convoy—for which he was never to forgive himself.348 In a
bitter irony, the third message’s order to “scatter” the convoy was actually a merely
technical amendment of the term “disperse” that had been used in the second signal; Hamilton and Broome could not have known this. Later, the official Royal
Navy history would explain the two terms in a footnote: “disperse” meant ships
should break formation and proceed at convenient speed toward their destinations,
remaining for some hours in proximity to each other; by contrast, to “scatter” was
to turn to widely varying courses, in accordance with a scheme laid down in convoy
instructions.349
Officially, the decision to scatter the convoy was explained later in this way.
Convoy PQ17 still had thirty ships intact. The combined threat of air and U-boat
attacks was considerable. The convoy had reached a position beyond the effective
range of the Battle Fleet, even if that force were put at risk to engage Tirpitz and the
enemy’s other heavy ships. In the Admiralty’s view, if the convoy continued on its
way, it would be harassed by enemy U-boats and aircraft. Any enemy heavy ships
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Map 6:
MOVEMENTS OF REMNANTS OF CONVOY PQ17, 4–17 JULY 1942
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that approached most likely would be encountered east of North Cape. The enemy
would need no more than ten hours to reach the convoy and could return to safety
in even less time. Thus, the decision to scatter the convoy: the losses to be anticipated from a surface attack were worse, by this argument, than those that would be
inflicted by U-boats and aircraft. But as it turned out, the convoy lost twenty ships
after the signal to scatter was given, and only fourteen ships reached Soviet ports.350
The Admiralty’s reasoning was faulty: the effectiveness of Luftwaffe bombers and
Kriegsmarine U-boats in attacking individual merchant ships had been proved.
The threat of enemy aircraft could be neutralized only by superior airpower—
unlikely to be provided by the Soviets.
This was only the second time an Allied convoy had been scattered. In the first
instance, Convoy HX84 (Halifax to Liverpool) had received such an order on November 5, 1940, when Admiral Scheer was about to attack. However, there were
significant differences: the area in which HX84’s thirty-seven ships could disperse
was much larger, and neither German aircraft nor U-boats were attacking. Also,
the earlier convoy was protected by only a single ship, the armed merchant cruiser
Jarvis Bay. Admiral Scheer subsequently sank five ships, including the escort.351
The order to scatter Convoy PQ17 was given in glaring contravention of the
“Atlantic Convoy Instructions and Orders” that Admiral Tovey had issued in March
1942. They stipulated that in the face of enemy heavy ships, convoy escorts should
remain in the vicinity to track and, if circumstances allowed, attack enemy surface
ships. Tovey was to note that Convoy PQ17 had more than half completed its voyage, to within eight hundred miles away from Arkhangelsk, having lost only three
ships. In his view, the decision to scatter had been premature—and disastrous.352
In a personal letter to Admiral Noble of the Western Approaches Command
on July 12, 1942, Admiral Tovey would place responsibility for the destruction of
Convoy PQ17 squarely on the Admiralty for the “scattering of [the] convoy unnecessarily early and . . . the appalling conditions of panic suggested by the signals
they made.” He had sent an officer “down to the Admiralty to make clear to them
what the reactions at sea were to the information passed out and to those three
signals in particular.” Tovey, he wrote to Noble, had himself told the Admiralty by
telephone that he considered it “wrong for the Admiralty to issue definite orders to
the convoy and escort.” The Admiralty should “give them information by all means
and, if they wish make a recommendation, but leave it to the fellow on the spot to
decide the action to be taken.” The Admiralty had responded to the last point that
it “consider[ed] it putting an unfair responsibility on to an officer of Commander’s
rank [i.e., Broome].”353
Whatever the merit of the Admiralty’s reply, it did not absolve Admiral Pound of
bypassing Admirals Tovey and Hamilton. Tovey also wrote to Noble that Hamilton
was entirely responsible for the inaction, having “failed completely to appreciate the altered situation due to his imagining that there was still a strong likelihood of his being
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brought to action by the Tirpitz.” Hamilton had thought it best to have the convoy’s
destroyer escort join his own three destroyers in CS 1’s screen. “I deeply regret,”
Tovey commented, “this mistake of his as there was not the slightest doubt that if
the destroyers had returned to the convoy within a reasonable time they could have
helped materially in its defence and in rescuing survivors.”354 Indeed, the presence
of destroyers obviously would have strengthened Convoy PQ17’s AA defenses;
however, it is unlikely that they would have reduced significantly the number of
merchant ships sunk.
At 0115 on the 5th, Admiral Hamilton sent the following message to his ships,
addressing also Commodore Dowding, the convoy’s merchant ships, and the remaining escorts:
I know you will all be feeling as distressed as I am at having to leave that fine collection of
ships to find their own way to harbor. The enemy under the cover of his shore-based aircraft
has succeeded in concentrating a far superior force in this area. We were therefore ordered
to withdraw. We are all sorry that the good work of the close escort could not be completed.
I hope we shall all have a chance of settling this score with them soon.355

Hamilton was very much concerned about the potential effect on morale of the
escort force’s apparent desertion of the merchant ships. Had he known that the
Admiralty possessed no more information regarding the enemy heavy units than
he did himself, he would have remained in a covering position until the convoy had
dispersed widely.356 It was claimed later that Admiral Pound would not have made
his fateful decision except for the presence of two U.S. cruisers; the American ships
were operating under British command for the first time, and he did not want to
lose them.357
DESTRUCTION OF THE CONVOY, JULY 5–8
On July 5, the weather in the operating area was variable, between four-tenths and
fully overcast, with fog banks. Atmospheric disturbances sporadically interrupted radio traffic. Convoy PQ17 was being shadowed continuously by Luftwaffe aircraft.358
After the order to scatter was issued, most merchant ships proceeded alone,
some in groups of two or three—most to seek shelter at Novaya Zemlya, a few toward Arkhangelsk. Two AA ships (Palomares and Pozarica) joined a small convoy
of merchant ships protected by one corvette and two or three minesweepers; on
July 5, these ships headed for Novaya Zemlya. One corvette (Dianella) escorted the
submarines until they separated from the merchant ships to patrol to the west; the
corvette carried on eastward and alone. One minesweeper, Salamander, escorted a
rescue ship and two merchant vessels.359
Less than half of PQ17’s merchant ships that remained by the end of July 4
reached safety. On July 5 and over the following two days, eighteen, including the
oiler Aldersdale and the rescue ship Zaafaran, were sunk, most of them between
approximately latitudes 74° and 77° north and longitudes 35° to 45° east. Eight,
including the rescue ship and oiler, were sunk by bombs and six were torpedoed
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by U-boats. Between the evening of the 6th and the early morning of the 8th, four
more ships were torpedoed off the southwest coast of Novaya Zemlya, probably by
a single U-boat.360
HITLER FINALLY GIVES PERMISSION, JULY 5
In the early morning on July 5, the Admiralty was still in the dark about whether
German heavy forces had left Altafjord. At 0238 on July 5, Admiral Tovey received
this ULTRA message:
1. It is not repeat not known if German heavy forces have sailed from Altenfjord [Altafjord],
but they are unlikely to have done so before 1200/4th
2. It appears that Germans may be in some confusion whether a battleship is in company
with CS 1. Germans do not repeat not appear to be aware of positions of C-in-C Home
Fleet.361

At 0322, the Admiralty informed Admiral Miles in Moscow that air reconnaissance indicated that
enemy heavy units have moved from Trondheim to Narvik and [are] believed to be using a
base in Altafjord area from which to operate against PQ17. British forces other than close
escort for PQ17 have been withdrawn west of Bear Island and convoy ordered to scatter in
approximate position 76 degs North 28 degs East at 2200B/4 [in the +2 time zone, on the
4th] to proceed to North Russia ports. British submarines are being moved from previous
patrol positions to area between latitudes 73 degs and 72 degs N and longitudes 23 degs and
32 degs E. Catalina aircraft temporarily based in Arkhangelsk will carry out reconnaissance
between positions 74 degs N 28 degs E and 73 degs N 32 degs E.

The Admiralty requested that Admiral Miles try to arrange with Soviet authorities
for regular air reconnaissance of the Altafjord area, for air attacks against enemy
heavy units in harbors or at sea, and for the bombing of enemy airfields, “which is
of added importance with convoy scattered.”362
At 1625, an ULTRA message was sent to Rear Adm. Richard Bevan, the senior
British naval officer in northern Russia, advising him that the “most likely time
of enemy surface attack is now tonight 5/6 July or early hours of tomorrow 6th
July.” The “enemy may strike on 065 degs direction from North Cape. Submarine
and Catalina aircraft might sight enemy. Request striking force [presumably Soviet]
may be at short notice from 2000 today 5th July.”363
In the meantime, at 0655 German air reconnaissance had reported an enemy
force composed of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, one possible battleship, four heavy
cruisers, eight destroyers, and two torpedo boats, proceeding on a westerly course
at fifteen knots.364 This group was some five hundred miles away from the convoy,
which the Germans now knew had scattered. For the Germans, this new sighting confirmed the aircraft report concerning the enemy cruiser force received the
previous afternoon to the effect that no enemy heavy units were anywhere near the
convoy. It was this report that enabled Admiral Raeder to get Hitler’s final permission for the Tirpitz foray.365
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During the forenoon of the 5th, the operational situation for the Germans was
mixed. On the positive side, the convoy had been dissolved, probably, they thought,
because of the aerial and U-boat attacks. Most of its ships were still to be found
within an area approximately sixty nautical miles on a side, but that was too large
an area to allow its composition to be determined precisely.366 The Germans mistakenly believed that the enemy cruiser group’s retirement westward must mean it
had lost a heavy cruiser. The heavy covering force was well to the west of Bear Island, making full use of fog banks to disguise its location and makeup, 450 nautical
miles from the convoy and from North Cape. This distance meant there would be
minimal danger to the German forces if they approached the convoy unobserved
and got the engagement over with quickly. If the enemy heavy force were spotted
during the Germans’ approach to the convoy, there would be sufficient time to turn
away.367 In sum, the Allied heavy covering force was too far off to interfere with an
attack on PQ17 by the 1st and 2nd Combat Groups.368 On the negative side, general conditions for an attack by the German heavy ships on July 5 were less favorable than they had been the previous day. The convoy was now farther away—the
combat would be eastward of North Cape. Also, during the withdrawal phase the
distance to the enemy heavy forces would decrease steadily. But the risk was still
bearable.369
Admiral Carls believed, first, that if any enemy battleship close to the convoy
were damaged by U-boats and aircraft by 1200, he would be justified in carrying
out the operation regardless of the presence of an enemy carrier; and second, that
carrier aircraft would have less impact if the convoy were attacked above latitude
72° north. The deadline for initiating RÖSSELSPRUNG was 1300 on the 5th; after
that, the attack would take place too close to the Russian coast.370 Carls accordingly
requested Admiral Raeder not only to issue the code word for executing the operation but also to leave no option to cancel the order later (Rückbefehl). However,
Raeder refused to do either, because of Hitler’s precondition that the enemy carrier
must be taken out of the equation first. This was communicated at 0915 to Admiral
Carls, who pressed the matter. The precondition, he argued, made everything dependent on the quality of air reconnaissance. The enemy was unwilling to operate
its heavy covering group within the effective range of Luftwaffe torpedo and heavy
bombers. However, Admiral Carls understood the group to have been already at
sea on July 1 and doubted it could continue to operate for long. It might withdraw
to refuel and then take up a waiting position. Therefore, he was convinced, the enemy carrier group would not pose a threat to the German heavy ships.371
Hitler finally gave permission for the operation during the forenoon of the 5th,
the latest favorable time. The code word was issued at 1137, and Naval Group Command North took operational control of the U-boats in Arctic waters.372 The Führer’s approval for RÖSSELSPRUNG was transmitted to Admiral Carls three minutes
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later, with a caveat from Raeder that the conditions permitting its execution would
no longer exist if the enemy carrier were detected or the German combat groups
were found by enemy aircraft. Forces that had been on one-hour combat alert
since 0900 were directed at 1052 to be in immediate readiness to sortie. At 1141,
the combat groups received the requisite code word from Naval Group Command
North. At 1230, Naval Group Command North took control of the entire operation and directed Admiral Schniewind in Tirpitz to sortie toward North Cape,
passing Breisund and escorted by minesweepers.373
At 1700, the Soviet submarine K21 reported (inaccurately) the presence of Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer, and eight destroyers at latitude 71° 25ʹ north, longitude 23° 40ʹ
east, or some forty-five miles southwest of North Cape, on a northeasterly course.
374
The submarine claimed to have hit Tirpitz with two torpedoes. However, British
intelligence considered that, in view of subsequent sightings, “improbable.”375
Tirpitz had not in fact been hit; nevertheless, K21’s sighting report was of great value to Admiral Tovey.376 At 1816, Allied reconnaissance aircraft reported eleven enemy ships at latitude 71° 31ʹ north, longitude 27° 10ʹ east on a northeasterly course
at ten knots. The British submarine Unshaken (P54) shifted farther east and at 2029
reported Tirpitz and Admiral Hipper, escorted by at least six destroyers, in latitude
71° 30ʹ north, longitude 28° 40ʹ east, steering 060 degrees at twenty-two knots.377
At 1700 the Germans received an important message, an intercepted Allied submarine sighting report of two battleships at latitude 71° 25ʹ north, longitude 23° 40ʹ
east, moving northeasterly. The Allied 1816 sighting report also was intercepted,
and the two together left no doubt that the enemy had detected the German combat groups.378 Also, at 1945 the Germans learned that the enemy had begun systematically to jam radio communications on all channels, making the transmission of
orders difficult.379
RÖSSELSPRUNG IS CANCELED
Naval Group Command North concluded at 2000 on July 5 that the enemy heavy
group was in generally the same position as on the 4th. The enemy heavy cruisers had been detected at 1745 on a westerly course and had been tracked until
2010, when they disappeared in fog. The Germans calculated that the enemy heavy
covering group would have to close the German combat groups to about two hundred nautical miles to attack but would not go closer, because of the danger of
attacks from the Luftwaffe. This meant that RÖSSELSPRUNG could be carried out
only between 2000 on July 5 and 0200 the next morning. The chances of success
in attacking a now widely dispersed convoy were small. Hence, although an attack
on PQ17 might have psychological benefits for the Germans, it was not worth the
risk of engaging an enemy carrier force.380 Carls had been told by Raeder that if
the enemy sighted the German combat groups, the entire operation would have to
be aborted. A clash with the enemy heavy covering group must be avoided in any
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case; the possibility that its carrier might cut off the combat groups’ withdrawal was
unacceptable.381
Raeder and Carls conferred by telephone at 2035 and 2103 and agreed that, given where it had been sighted, the enemy would be able to bring his heavy covering
group to bear against the German combat groups during their return to base.382 On
that basis, Raeder decided to abandon the entire operation; at 2132, Admiral Carls
sent a message to Admiral Schniewind aborting RÖSSELSPRUNG.383 Schniewind was
directed to take Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer, Admiral Hipper, and five destroyers to
North Cape and then through the “inner leads” (the channel between Norway’s
mainland and outer island chain) to Vestfjord. Operational control of the U-boats
was returned to Admiral Arctic.384 Lützow, two destroyers, and the torpedo boats
385
were directed to Trondheim and were put under the control of Admiral Arctic.
Raeder’s decision was based on Hitler’s view that Germany could not afford to
put its few remaining heavy ships at risk. Because Allied air reconnaissance had detected the German combat groups prematurely, it was highly possible that the Tirpitz group would be attacked by carrier aircraft. Another factor was that, the convoy already having dispersed widely, the risk entailed in employing surface forces
against it would not be commensurate with the remaining mission elements—that
is, finishing off the enemy convoy would be better left to the U-boats and aircraft.386
At 0230 on July 6 the Admiralty sent a message to Convoy PQ17’s escorts stating
that an “attack by enemy surface forces is probable in next few hours. Your primary
duty is to avoid destruction to enable you to return to scene of attack and pick up
survivors after enemy have retired.”387 Shortly afterward, the Admiralty requested
that after such an attack, once it was clear “that enemy heavy ships have retired to
westward,” the escorts “arrange for a search for survivors by all available means
including my Catalinas in north Russia not required for searching and shadowing
enemy.”388
At 1946, however, the Admiralty advised that the “risk of attack by enemy surface vessels is now greatly lessened” and directed the remaining escorts to pick
up survivors from the sunken ships.389 Those unable to do so but in contact with
several merchantmen should form them into groups and escort them to Yokanga
“unless otherwise directed by S.B.N.O. North Russia [Senior British Naval Officer,
Rear Admiral Bevan].” Escorts short on fuel should proceed to Arkhangelsk, where
they would be refueled. The two auxiliary AA ships should not risk taking part in
rescue operations but instead proceed without delay to Arkhangelsk.390
At 1040 on the 6th, Admiral Hamilton’s force joined the Battle Fleet. The weather in the area was unfavorable for air reconnaissance. Tovey felt that nothing was
to be gained by steering northeastward and so detached Hamilton’s cruisers and
eight destroyers to Seydisfjord at 1230. Shortly afterward, the Battle Fleet turned
southward. All the ships reached their home bases on July 8.391
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In the meantime, the Germans continued their efforts to detect and attack the
remnants of Convoy PQ17. On the morning of the 6th, those remnants covered an
area of three hundred kilometers by sixty (186 by 37 miles), east of longitude 40°
east. The U-boats at that point had no contact with the remnants of PQ17 and were
directed by Admiral Arctic to search between longitudes 42° and 48° east. Two Uboats returned to Narvik during the night of July 6/7; two other boats were on their
way to Kirkenes, where they would arrive on the evening of the 6th.392
On the 7th, Commodore Dowding (who had survived the sinking of his ship
by a U-boat on the 5th) collected five merchant ships and one rescue ship in the
Matochkin Shar, organized them as a convoy, and headed for Arkhangelsk that evening. They were accompanied by the two auxiliary AA ships, three corvettes, three
393
minesweepers, and three trawlers, all remnants of Convoy PQ17’s escort force.
Ashore in the USSR, Admiral Bevan planned to send a British corvette to reinforce
the escorts and bring the ships to Arkhangelsk on a track passing near the east coast
of Novaya Zemlya, south of Kolguyev Island, and around Cape Kanin. Bevan also
informed the Admiralty that “C. in C. White Sea [commander of the White Sea
Flotilla] is requesting C. in C. Northern Fleet that additional cover may be provided
by 3 Soviet Union destroyers. Catalina leaves for reconnaissance 1000B 8th. 4 more
Flying boats approaching Svyatoy Nos.”394
The ensuing voyage of the Convoy PQ17 remnants was a succession of accidents. The ships encountered heavy fog and then ran into a solid ice barrier south
of Byelushya Bay, Novaya Zemlya (the British had not known about the ice, but the
Germans did). Several ships were forced to head for the Yokanga anchorage; Admiral Bevan was completely unaware that remnants of PQ17 had left the Matochkin
Shar until these ships reported entering Yokanga. The Soviet Northern Fleet had
failed to inform him. Neither had the Soviets given Bevan information about ice
conditions.395
During the night of July 8/9, German aircraft reconnoitered off Novaya Zemlya,
the Kanin Peninsula, other western waterways, the piers at Yokanga, the Murmansk–
Leningrad railway, and airfields in the Byelomorsk area (Onega Bay).396 Because of
heavy fog, they did not fly north of latitude 72° north on the 8th or 9th. However, at
1151 on the 9th German aircraft reported five enemy merchant vessels. Attacks by
thirty-eight aircraft in two groups from 1st Group, 30th Battle Wing (I./KG 30) at
Banak followed. The Germans claimed one seven-thousand-ton vessel and another
of eight thousand tons damaged. Because of fog at Banak on the flyers’ return,
I./KG 30 was diverted to Petsamo, while II./KG 30 reached Banak.397
The Luftwaffe received information on the convoy from U-boats operating in
the area. During the night of July 9/10 some forty German bombers carried out
a high-level attack against them for four hours, ending at 0230. Two Allied merchant ships were sunk, while four German aircraft were believed to be shot down.
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The surviving ships reached Arkhangelsk on July 11.398 Also on the 10th, German
aircraft attacked docking facilities and fuel tanks at Rost and airfields in the Murmansk area and suppressed coastal batteries on the Rybachy Peninsula.399
On July 16 Commodore Dowding returned northward, with three corvettes, to
Byelushya Bay, Novaya Zemlya, to find more remnants of PQ17, organize them as a
convoy, and bring it to Arkhangelsk. After a stormy voyage, he arrived on the 19th
to find five merchant ships, two British trawlers, and one Soviet icebreaker at anchor. The new convoy soon got under way, to be joined by another merchant ship
at Moller Bay, Novaya Zemlya, on the morning of the 21st. The convoy’s defenses
were reinforced on July 22, by one auxiliary AA ship, one corvette, two minesweepers, and two Soviet destroyers. Two days later it arrived in Arkhangelsk, having
400
suffered no losses.
To sum up: between July 2 and 10, the 5th Air Fleet employed 130 Ju-88s, fortythree He-111s (twenty aborted), and twenty-nine He-115s (six aborted) in attacking Convoy PQ17. U-boats were able to sink many ships heavily damaged by the
Luftwaffe. The 5th Air Fleet stopped its attacks on Convoy PQ17 only when it could
find no more ships.401 German losses in these attacks totaled only five aircraft: one
BV-138, two He-111s, one He-115, and one FW-200.402 In the aftermath, the Germans would grossly exaggerate their success. On the basis largely of B-Dienst radio
intercepts, they were to claim that between July 4 and 11, their aircraft and U-boats
had sunk thirty-seven ships of combined 231,090 BRT.403 They firmly believed that
of these, U-boats had sunk sixteen ships of 107,947 combined BRT, while the 5th
Air Fleet had sunk twenty-one, of 136,081 combined BRT (figures that actually add
up to 244,028).404
The true losses were heavy enough. The Luftwaffe and U-boats destroyed twentytwo merchant ships (fourteen American) of Convoy PQ17’s thirty-four that tried
to get through (or 65 percent; thirty-six and three rescue ships had started).405 The
ships sunk carried 430 tanks, 210 aircraft, and 3,350 motor vehicles, plus 99,316
tons of other cargo.406
POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSEQUENCES
The almost total destruction of PQ17 had significant military, psychological, and
political effects. In purely military terms, the Germans accomplished a major tactical objective. The decision of the British chiefs of staff on July 13 to recommend
that convoys “not be sent to Northern Russia in present circumstances” had a negative operational effect. The Royal Navy suffered a major loss of confidence regarding its ability to protect convoys to northern Russia.407
On the 14th Churchill informed Roosevelt of the situation. Only four ships had
reached Arkhangelsk, with “four or five more precariously in the ice off Nova Zembla
[Novaya Zemlya] out of the thirty-three included in Convoy P.Q.17. If a half [of the
convoy] had got through we should have persevered, but with only about a quarter arriving the operation is not good enough.” Churchill pointed out that out of six
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hundred tanks, only slightly more than one hundred had arrived. The British Admiralty “cannot see what better protection can be devised, nor can they hazard battleships east of Bear Island.” He claimed that Adm. Harold R. Stark, the commander of
U.S. naval forces in Europe in London, agreed with the Admiralty’s view and “that
all possible was done by us last time.” Also, the U.S. battleship Washington had already been withdrawn to the Pacific. Churchill advised against “running P.Q.18 [convoy] which must start 18th [July] at latest.” He asked Roosevelt “how you feel about
it,” inasmuch as twenty-two ships in the planned convoy were American. Churchill
concluded that “future prospects of supplying Russia by this northern route are bad.
Murmansk has been largely burnt out and there are several signs of an impending
German attack upon it. By the time that perpetual daylight gives place to the dark period, Archangel will be frozen.” He also wanted to know Roosevelt’s view of a draft of
a forthcoming message to Stalin about suspension of all convoys to northern Russia.408
On July 16, Churchill sent another message to Roosevelt in which he laid out the
possibility of only a temporary stoppage of convoys to northern Russia. He wrote
that if the planned major effort to resupply Malta in August (PEDESTAL) was carried off “without serious losses it might render possible an attempt in September to
run an even more powerfully mounted and protected convoy to Russia.” Further,
“The Malta convoy will decide whether very strong sea-borne fighter protection is
effective. That can only be proved by trial.”409 Roosevelt replied the same day: after
consultation with Adm. Ernest J. King, he was obliged “reluctantly [to] agree to
the position which the Admiralty has taken regarding the Russian convoy to the
North and I think your message to Stalin is a good one. I assume you will send it
at once.”410
Churchill did so the next day: “In the case of P.Q.17, however, the Germans at
last used their forces in the manner we had always feared. They concentrated their
U-boats to the westward of Bear Island and reserved their surface forces for attack
to the eastward of Bear Island. The final story of P.Q.17 convoy is not yet clear. At
the moment only four ships have arrived at Archangel, but six others are in Nova
Zembla harbours. The latter may, however, be attacked from the air at any time.
At the best, therefore, only one-third will have survived.”411 In the same telegram,
Churchill explained
the dangers and difficulties of these convoy operations, when the enemy’s battle-squadron
takes its station in the extreme North. We do not think it right to risk our Home Fleet east of
Bear Island or where it can be brought under the attack of the powerful German shore-based
aircraft. If one or two of our very few most powerful battleships were to be lost or even seriously damaged while Tirpitz and her consorts, soon to be joined by Scharnhorst, remained
in action, the whole command of the Atlantic would be lost. Besides affecting the food
supplies by which we live, our war effort would be crippled; and above all the great convoys
of American troops across the ocean, rising presently to as many as 80,000 in a month,
would be prevented and the building up of a really strong second front in 1943 rendered
impossible.412
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Moreover, Churchill’s naval advisers had told him that
if they had the handling of the German surface, submarine and air forces, in present circumstances, they would guarantee the complete destruction of any convoy to North Russia. They
have not been able so far to hold out hopes that convoys attempting to make the passage in
perpetual daylight would fare better than P.Q.17. It is, therefore, with the greatest regret that
we have reached the conclusion that to attempt to run the next convoy, P.Q.18, would bring no
benefit to you and would only involve dead loss to the common cause. At the same time, I give
you my assurance that, if we can devise arrangements which give a reasonable chance of at
least a fair proportion of the contents of the convoys reaching you, we will start them again
at once. The crux of the problem is to make the Barents Sea as dangerous for German warships as they make it for ours. This is what we should aim at doing with our joint resources.

At the same time, however, Churchill promised that “we are prepared to despatch
immediately to the Persian Gulf some of the ships which were to have sailed in P.Q.
convoy. Selection of ships would be made in consultation with Soviet authorities in
London in order that priorities of cargo may be agreed.”413
In his response on July 23, Stalin was direct, crude, and dismissive. He falsely
charged, “First, the British Government refuses to continue the sending of war materials to the Soviet Union via the Northern route. Second, in spite of the agreed
communique concerning the urgent tasks of creating a second front in 1942 the
British Government postpones this matter until 1943.” Stalin’s own naval experts
“consider[ed] the reasons put forward by the British naval experts to justify the
cessation of convoys to the Northern ports of the U.S.S.R. wholly unconvincing.
They are of the opinion that with goodwill and readiness to fulfil the contracted
obligations these convoys could be regularly undertaken and heavy losses could be
inflicted on the enemy.” Stalin continued,
Of course I do not think that regular convoys to the Soviet Northern ports could be effected
without risk or losses. But in war time no important undertaking could be effected without
risk or losses. In any case I never expected that the British Government will stop despatch
of war materials to us just at the very moment when the Soviet Union in view of the serious
situation on the Soviet-German front requires these materials more than ever. It is obvious
that the transport via Persian Gulf could in no way compensate for the cessation of convoys
to the Northern ports.414

In the same telegram Stalin criticized the Admiralty’s decision to disperse Convoy
PQ17: “Our [naval] experts find it also difficult to understand and to explain the
order given by the Admiralty that the escorting vessels of the P.Q.17 should return
whereas the cargo boats should disperse and try to reach the Soviet ports one by
one without any protection at all.”415
The most probable reason for Stalin’s accusatory tone was that he had become
intensely suspicious of Churchill’s true motives. He even believed that Britain might
seek a separate peace with Nazi Germany.416 Churchill and his cabinet agreed not to
respond to Stalin’s unfounded charges, to “avoid a wrangle, which would be of no
advantage to either of us.”417
On July 29, Churchill wrote instead to Roosevelt, that he hoped “to resume convoys in September, if Russians can provide necessary air force to deny the German
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surface ships use of the Barents Sea and that if the battle in Egypt goes well we
should be able to make a firm offer of air support.”418 Roosevelt responded that
he agreed with Churchill’s reply to Stalin but at the same time cautioned that “we
have got always to bear in mind the personality of our ally and the very difficult
and dangerous situation that confronts him, no one can be expected to approach
the war from a world point of view whose country has been invaded.”419 On the
31st, Churchill informed Stalin that “we are making preliminary arrangements for
sailing a convoy of forty ships during the first week in September.” He also made
it clear that “there is little chance of even one-third of the ships getting through to
you, as was the case in P.Q.17, unless the air threat to the German surface forces in
the Barents Sea is such as to deter the latter from operating against the convoy.”420
PQ18, with forty ships, the first eastbound convoy after PQ17, left Loch Ewe
in northwest Scotland on September 2, 1942. It was attacked by U-boats and Luftwaffe aircraft. Thirteen ships were lost, three to U-boats and the rest to torpedo
bombers. The remaining twenty-seven ships reached Arkhangelsk on the 17th. The
westbound QP15, with twenty-eight ships, sailed out of Arkhangelsk on November
17 and reached Loch Ewe on November 30 and December 3, having lost only two
ships, both to U-boats.421
CONCLUSION AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
The decision to send badly needed supplies to the Soviet Union was made purely
for political and strategic reasons. Admirals Pound and Tovey were opposed to that
decision. Their main concerns seem to have been the lack of adequate forces to
support such an effort and the possibility of large losses in naval ships and personnel. (The Soviets, for whatever reasons, were either unable or unwilling to provide
much support in defense of the Allied convoys.) The British admirals’ concerns
were well-founded. The convoy route to northern Russia was not only long but open
to deadly attacks by the Luftwaffe and U-boats. The problem was compounded by
the prevalence of bad weather and ice conditions and by the long daylight hours
in summer. Yet in retrospect, the decision to help the Soviet Union was sound and
fully justified strategically. It played a critical role in the Soviet ability to withstand
the German offensive on the Eastern Front in 1941–42.
Political and military strategic decisions always should be made by the highest national political leadership, the highest alliance/coalition political leadership, or both.
At the same time, military leaders always should forcefully present their views on
whether political or military strategic objectives or both are achievable with the forces
that are available or becoming available. Ultimately, strategic decisions made by the
highest political leadership must be accepted and faithfully carried out by subordinate
military and naval leaders.
The Allied operational command organization seemed fairly simple and
straightforward. However, for some reason the Home Fleet’s area of responsibility
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was not defined formally. The Home Fleet was the single largest British naval command available for keeping the Kriegsmarine in check. However, its forces were
never adequate, because of competing demands from other theaters. In fact, it was
forced repeatedly to provide ships to other fleets. The Home Fleet was composed
primarily of heavy surface ships and carriers; it lacked an adequate number of
smaller ships suitable for convoying duties. That is why Western Approaches Command provided most of the A/S escorts for Allied convoys to northern Russia. The
U.S. Navy also reinforced the Home Fleet, sending its newly formed TF 39.
The German operational command organization in Norway and the adjacent
area was highly unsatisfactory. No multiservice (joint) command was established
in that theater throughout the entire war. This meant that each service prepared
and executed its own operational plans. The effectiveness of the joint employment
of naval forces and the Luftwaffe depended almost entirely on close cooperation
among middle- and low-level commanders. For the Kriegsmarine, the problem
was not made much easier by the Fleet Command forces’ being within the area of
responsibility of Naval Group Command North. In addition, Naval Group Command North’s headquarters was too far away from its subordinate commands in
Norway. To make things yet worse, the Kriegsmarine had a penchant for changing
both the titles of and the subordination among various forces. This was especially
the case with the Fleet Command. Another major problem was the insufficient
freedom of action allowed to subordinate naval commanders, the result of tooclose supervision by seniors. This was seen especially in the relationship between
Naval Group Command North and Admiral Arctic.
Both the Allies and the Germans in preparing plans for and employing their
respective forces in combat required well-organized and effective intelligence apparatuses. British naval intelligence proved much more effective, thanks especially
to the superb abilities of the decoders at Bletchley Park who decrypted German
naval messages. Despite widely held belief to the contrary since the program became public knowledge, this task was never easy, because the German codes were
difficult to crack; there were many times when Bletchley and the OIC were in the
dark about German intentions, plans, and movements. Critically, for a large part of
1942 Bletchley Park was unable to read coded messages sent to U-boats.
German naval intelligence was well organized and quite effective at providing
naval commanders with fairly accurate and timely intelligence on the Allied OOB,
convoys, and the losses inflicted by U-boats and the Luftwaffe. B-Dienst was especially effective at reading messages regarding the composition, departure dates, and
routes of Allied convoys. All this proved invaluable to the Kriegsmarine, particularly its U-boat arm.
Operational intelligence is one of the main prerequisites of developing sound operational plans and executing them successfully. Intercepting enemy messages and
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decoding them in a timely manner can provide a decisive advantage. Nonetheless, one
should never assume either that the enemy does not have positive knowledge that his
radio traffic is being intercepted and read or that he is not feeding back false information. Hence, when obtaining information on the enemy, it is prudent to use diverse
sources of information and to avoid overreliance in operational planning on information obtained by cryptanalysis. No code is unbreakable. Hence, one should change
one’s codes often and on short notice.
The Allies refined their plans for convoying to northern Russia over time. Although changes were made for each convoy, the pattern was consistent. Geography
and ice conditions in the Barents Sea simply gave planners little or no choice in
routes and defense forces for each convoy. Admirals Pound and Tovey were strongly opposed to sending convoys during the summer months, when ships were highly
vulnerable to attacks by enemy aircraft and U-boats but they had to execute the
decisions made by the British and American governments. Purely political considerations dominated Allied planning for convoys to northern Russia.
The German plans for RÖSSELSPRUNG were the result of numerous studies prepared by all the major naval commands in Norway concerning the possibility of
employing heavy surface ships and U-boats in the Arctic. As usual in the German
military, the operational-level command issued an operational instruction, on the
basis of which subordinate commanders issued operation orders. However, the absence of joint force commanders meant that no single plan was produced for the
employment of heavy surface ships, U-boats, and Luftwaffe aircraft.
The operational instruction that Naval Group Command North issued on June
4 envisaged employing both the Trondheim and Narvik groups of surface ships. A
major flaw in the plan was the unnecessarily complicated command structure: the
Trondheim group was subordinate to Naval Group Command North, the Narvik
group under Admiral Arctic. Only during the second phase of the operation were
both groups under the operational command of Naval Group Command North.
A major prerequisite for the success of RÖSSELSPRUNG was comprehensive air
reconnaissance of the potential operating area, followed by the weakening by air
attack of the enemy heavy covering force. Naval Group Command North duly requested the 5th Air Fleet to assign more aircraft for reconnaissance—but the 5th
Air Fleet simply refused to do so.
One of the main disadvantages of the lack of sound theater or operational command organization is the resultant highly negative effect on the planning and execution of major naval/joint operations. Optimally, a single commander should have full
authority and responsibility for the combat employment and support of assigned subordinate multiservice forces; otherwise, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to develop
and execute a plan for a major naval/joint operation.
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But perhaps the single greatest problem was Hitler’s unwillingness to risk heavy
surface ships to attack enemy convoys. This risk aversion, in essence, precluded any
effective employment of the German heavy surface ships based in Norway, from
where they might well have prevented the Allies from running convoys to northern
Russia. The German ships retained value only “in being”—that is, to the extent that
they deterred enemy amphibious landing and invasion.
Convoy PQ17 went ahead as planned. Although early detected and thereafter
tracked by German U-boats and aircraft, only three merchant ships were sunk until
the evening of July 4. Admiral Pound’s decision to “scatter” the convoy at that point
was perhaps understandable but cannot be considered sound. No convoy should
be left to proceed independently without direct and distant cover. If the convoy
was considered to be faced with destruction by a superior force, it should have
been directed to withdraw temporarily to a safer distance or return to a safe port.
Admiral Pound also violated basic principles of sound naval command and control
by directly interfering with and bypassing Admirals Tovey and Hamilton. Tovey’s
criticism of the Admiralty was fully justified. Higher commanders normally should
leave their subordinate commanders freedom of action to exercise initiative in the
course of an operation.
An operational commander ashore should not unnecessarily bypass the
next-subordinate commander and issue orders directly to lower tactical commanders.
Doing so shows distrust of the professional abilities of the subordinate commander
and cannot but have a highly detrimental effect on the exercise of initiative by the
subordinate commander and on morale in general. It also diminishes the bypassed
commander’s prestige and influence among tactical commanders. Generally, an operational commander should intervene only when the decisions and actions of a nextechelon commander endanger the success of the operation as a whole or the success of
adjacent commanders.
The positioning of the Home Fleet’s Battle Fleet in relation to Convoy PQ17 on
July 5 was clearly unsound. The heavy ships remained too far away either to provide distant cover and support to the convoy or to engage the enemy heavy surface
group effectively.
Finally, Admiral Raeder’s decision to cancel RÖSSELSPRUNG on the evening of
July 5 was unavoidable: there was little to gain from asking heavy surface ships to
destroy the now widely dispersed ships of (the former) Convoy PQ17. The time to
employ those heavy surface ships would have been prior to the 5th. Yet doing so
then had been clearly impossible, given the strictness of Hitler’s conditions for employing Tirpitz and its ilk. Yet Tirpitz’s presence in Altafjord and the ever-present
possibility of its attacking Convoy PQ17 were the most important factors in the
fateful British decision to scatter the convoy, with its subsequent consequences.
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II Major Convoy Operation to Malta
August 10–15, 1942 (Operation PEDESTAL)

T

he fifteen-mile-long central Mediterranean island of Malta had played a
vital role in British theater strategy since its capture by Britain in September 1800. Its importance was most dramatic, however, during World War
II, when it served as an air and naval base from which the British could attack
Axis convoys to Libya. For the Allies, resupplying Malta with fuel, ammunition,
and foodstuffs was a major problem, however, because of intensive efforts—by
land-based Axis aircraft on Sicily and Sardinia and in North Africa, in combination with heavy surface forces, submarines, and mines—to cut off the island from
the outside world.
The resupply convoy to Malta of August 1942 (Operation PEDESTAL, or Operation MEZZO AGOSTO, “Mid-August,” in Italian accounts) was, in operational terms,
a major defensive naval/joint operation aimed to ensure survival of the island as
a major naval and air base. For the Germans and Italians, it was a major offensive
naval/joint operation to destroy a large convoy.
The Allies were aware of the enormous risks of an all-out effort to supply besieged Malta. Yet supplies were badly needed, and the consequences of failing to
mount an attempt would have been even more disastrous—for the Allied campaign
in North Africa and possibly the entire Mediterranean theater. The execution of
PEDESTAl did in fact result in horrendous losses for the Allies. However, the ships
that reached Malta brought sufficient quantities of fuel and food to keep the island
alive until the great Allied victory at El Alamein, Egypt, in November 1942 turned
the tide of the war in North Africa.
Despite the passage of time, the planning, preparation, and execution by both
sides of this major naval/joint operation offer many lessons on how to employ one’s
naval forces in the littorals—lessons that remain valid today.
OPERATIONAL SITUATION
When Italy entered the war on the side of Germany in June 1940, Malta ceased
to be the main base for the British Mediterranean Fleet. A major part of the fleet
moved to Alexandria, Egypt. After June 1940, the newly created Force H, at Gibraltar, became responsible for the operations in the western Mediterranean and eastern
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Atlantic. Force H was directly subordinate to the Admiralty in London. The high
effectiveness of the German Luftwaffe and the Italian air force units based on Sicily and Sardinia had closed the central Mediterranean to Allied ships sailing to the
Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal. The British forces deployed
in the Middle East had to be supplied, mostly from the United Kingdom and United States, by the much longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. Ships from
the United States had to steam some fourteen thousand miles (passing around the
Cape of Good Hope) before reaching the Suez Canal. Other supplies were carried
by ships from India, Australia, and South Africa.1
In the late spring of 1942, the situation in the central Mediterranean was extremely unfavorable for the Allies. The British Eighth Army in North Africa was
in retreat. The Allied airfields near Benghazi and Derna fell; single-engine fighters
such as Spitfires in bases farther east could not reach Malta. The loss of air bases
also greatly restricted the ability of British Desert Air Force bombers to attack the
Axis lines of supply to North Africa.2 All this gravely threatened the survival of
Malta as a base for the Allied aircraft and submarines. The island came under constant and increasingly effective attacks by Axis aircraft based in Sicily and Sardinia,
and in North Africa. By April 1942 Malta’s reserves of wheat and flour, fodder,
benzene, and kerosene fuel would last only until mid-to-late June. Stocks of white
oil and aviation fuel were sufficient only through mid-August. About 920 tons of
diesel fuel and two thousand tons of furnace oil for refueling warships were by
then available. Stocks of antiaircraft ammunition were sufficient for only about six
weeks of fighting.3
For these reasons, the Allies attempted a dual resupply convoy operation in midJune 1942, one from the west (Operation HARPOON) and another from the east
(Operation VIGOROUS). However, both resulted in significant losses for the Allies.
In HARPOON, out of a convoy composed of six merchant ships totaling forty-three
thousand tons’ burden, only two, carrying some eighteen thousand tons of supplies, reached Malta.4 In VIGOROUS, out of eleven ships carrying 81,500 tons only
two ships, with fifteen thousand tons of supplies, reached the island. The Germans
and Italians had sunk only two merchant ships in the VIGOROUS convoy, but seven
had been directed to return to Alexandria or to Tobruk, Libya. In addition, damage had been suffered by three cruisers, a special service ship, a corvette, and two
merchant ships.5 Nevertheless, the governor of Malta, Gen. John S. S. P. Vereker,
Viscount Gort, was able to report to London on June 20 that the unloading of the
ships that had arrived was almost completed and that he was examining how best
to husband supplies until late September.6
After the failure of the dual-convoy operation (HARPOON/VIGOROUS) in June
1942 and the destruction of the convoy PQ17 to northern Russia in early July, the
mood among senior British civilian and military leaders was distinctly gloomy.
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Nevertheless, they decided to run another major convoy to Malta, but only from
the west. The intent was essentially to repeat the HARPOON operation but with
much stronger air cover.7
For the Germans and Italians, Malta was a growing problem for their efforts
to transport troops and matériel to North Africa. At a conference in Garmisch,
Germany, on January 14–15, 1942, the German navy’s Naval Warfare Directorate
(Seekriegsleitung), and the Italian Admiral Staff fully agreed that in the Mediterranean their most urgent problem was getting supplies to North Africa. For that
the prerequisite was neutralization and elimination of Malta as a base. Hence, there
had to be a Luftwaffe offensive against Malta, and effective blockades of both Malta
and the Sicilian Narrows.8 The German and Italian navies also agreed to employ
their submarines jointly; for that, a prerequisite was considerable improvement in
air reconnaissance.9 Another problem discussed at the conference was the difficulty being experienced in supplying Greece and the Aegean, including Crete. The
Italian navy promised to do everything possible to speed up the supply to Greece,
especially of coal.10
At a meeting with Hitler on March 12, 1942, Adm. Erich Raeder discussed
the Mediterranean problem. Among other things, Hitler agreed that an offensive
should be carried out against the Suez Canal in 1942 but only if it did not reduce the
Luftwaffe’s strength in the Mediterranean. Malta, he agreed, should be captured by
Axis troops or at least, if that was not possible, continue to be attacked by the Luftwaffe; otherwise, the enemy would build up its forces there. That, in turn, would
jeopardize Axis supply traffic to North Africa. Hitler was greatly concerned that the
planned capture of Malta, set for July 1942, might be delayed because of the Italians.
He promised to Raeder to raise the issue of Malta with Benito Mussolini, the Italian
dictator, at their next meeting.11
In June 1942, the SKL assessed that the outcome of the next offensive by Field
Marshal Erwin Rommel, commander of the Panzerarmee Afrika (Panzer Army
Africa, formerly Panzer Group Africa), against Egypt would depend heavily on the
naval situation in the Mediterranean. The British, the SKL posited, clearly recognized that they needed to avoid catastrophe in Egypt; that doing so meant cutting
off the Axis supply routes to North Africa; and that doing that, in turn, would
require the employment of all the submarines in the central Mediterranean and
the use of Malta as a base. The SKL assumed that the British would employ all
naval forces available in Gibraltar and Alexandria and would transfer more from
the Indian Ocean. They would deploy the British troops in Syria to defend Egypt.
In addition, they would bring in strong air forces from the Middle East, the Red
Sea, India, and the eastern Mediterranean.12 The SKL argued that the German reaction to the British actions should include stronger defense of convoys, stronger air
cover for transports, and diverse routing. The most important objective was at least
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the aerial “suppression” (isolation) of Malta, and ideally its capture. This objective
could not be abandoned: Malta in British hands represented the greatest danger to
Axis sea routes to North Africa.13
In North Africa in late June the Allies abandoned defensive positions in Al-Gazala,
Libya, and nearby Tobruk fell on the 21st. Seven days later Axis forces were at Mersa
Matrûh, Egypt, and in possession of airfields 160 miles from Alexandria. The British
dispersed merchant vessels and warships from the Suez Canal zone to the ports of
Haifa and Beirut. They also prepared to block Alexandria’s harbor and port facilities.
Vice Adm. (Acting Adm.) Henry H. Harwood, CINC of the British Mediterranean
Fleet, moved his headquarters to Haifa on July 2.14 The retreat on land and the withdrawal of the fleet greatly increased the lines of operation the Royal Air Force and
the Royal Navy would have to cover to attack Axis convoys to Libya.
By early July 1942, the Panzer Army Africa was forced to stop its offensive at
the first battle of El Alamein.15 However, the engagement was inconclusive, and
the Germans intended to renew the advance in the fall of 1942, in preparation for
which they intensified their resupply to North Africa by sea. The Allies too were
preparing to go on the offensive, in the fall. Among their most important tasks was
restoring Malta’s ability to support attacks on Axis convoys to Libya. Success was
contingent on having sufficient reserves of fuel, food, and other supplies on Malta;
otherwise, Allied submarines and bombers that returned to Malta in mid-July 1942
would have to leave again. In addition, starvation threatened the civilian populace.16 Nevertheless, and despite the mounting losses incurred in resupplying Malta,
British resolve remained unbroken.17
Operating Area
The Mediterranean Sea, with its 970,000 square miles, is the largest of the globe’s
narrow seas. Geographically, the Mediterranean is divided into western and eastern
basins: the western basin consists of the Alborán, Balearic (or Iberian), and Ligurian Seas, while the eastern basin contains the Tyrrhenian, Adriatic, Ionian, Aegean,
and Levantine Seas. The link between the two basins is the Sicilian Narrows.18 The
western Mediterranean and the Sicilian Narrows were the principal operating areas
for the forces opposing each other during PEDESTAL.
The Mediterranean extends more than 2,400 miles from west to east. The distance from Gibraltar to Beirut, Lebanon (then still part of the French Mandate of
Syria and Lebanon), is about 2,015 nautical miles; Gibraltar to Malta is 935 nautical miles; Naples and Taranto in Italy are 983 and 1,250 nautical miles, respectively,
from Gibraltar. The distance from Malta to Alexandria is 823 nautical miles. From the
Strait of Gibraltar to Marseille (France) the distance is about 710 nautical miles. The
maximum width of the Mediterranean is about a thousand miles, but only some 410
separate Marseille and Tunis.
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The average depth of water in the Mediterranean is 820 fathoms. The eastern
Mediterranean is generally deeper than the western part; the greatest depth, 2,815
fathoms, is found off Cape Matapan in the Ionian Sea. The greatest depth of water
in the western basin is 1,914 fathoms, although the waters off the Algerian coast are
generally very deep, reaching 1,367 fathoms.
The Mediterranean contains some 3,300 islands, most of them in the eastern basin. In the west, the largest islands are Sicily (10,000 square miles), Sardinia (9,300),
Corsica (3,350), and the Balearics (1,927 combined). Other, smaller islands and
groups are Malta (115 square miles), the Tuscan Archipelago (114), the Aeolian
Islands (34), and the Aegadian Islands (14.5).
The Strait of Gibraltar, Bonifacio Strait, Messina Strait, and Sicilian Narrows
are the most important choke points in the western basin (see map 7). The thirtythree-mile-long Strait of Gibraltar runs generally east and west. Navigation pre
sents no difficulties. The strait is deep—more than six hundred fathoms at some
places. Its width varies from ten to twenty-four miles, and the narrowest navigable
width (i.e., between the ten-fathom curves) is about seven miles. There are no islands or drying banks (islets exposed at low tide) in the strait other than a few
detached dry rocks very close inshore. Ships usually sail close to either the Spanish
or North African shore to take maximum advantage of currents and tidal streams.19
The Bonifacio Strait between Corsica and Sardinia varies in width in its western part from nine to twenty-two miles; its narrowest point is three and a half
miles wide. The strait is navigationally difficult because of shoals and frequent bad
weather. It is obstructed by numerous islands and rocks. Maddalena is the largest
among the ten islands of the Bucinarian group guarding the eastern approaches to
the strait. Depths in the western approaches to the Bonifacio Strait vary between
twenty-seven and eighty fathoms. In the strait proper, the water in the fairway is
from twenty-seven to forty fathoms. Depths in the strait’s eastern approaches vary
from forty to fifty fathoms.20 The thirty-mile-long Strait of Messina, between the
eastern tip of Sicily and the western tip of Calabria, is between seven and a half and
twenty miles wide and between 150 and 300 fathoms deep.21 The seventy-six-milewide Sicilian Narrows, connecting the western and eastern Mediterranean, is about
137 fathoms deep at the maximum. East of the Sicilian Narrows is the forty-sixmile-wide Malta Channel, between southern Sicily and Malta; to the west of the
Narrows is the 150-mile-wide Sardinian Channel, between Sardinia and Tunisia.
The thirty-two-square-mile volcanic island of Pantelleria (ancient Cossyra) is
fifty-six miles southwest of Cape Granitola, Sicily, and forty-six miles east-southeast
of Cape Bon (six miles northwest of Bizerte; today Watan-el-Kibli, Tunisia). Its terrain is high and broken, rising to some 2,730 feet in the center. The hundred-fathom
curve generally lies between three-quarters of a mile and a mile offshore. The
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eight-square-mile island of Lampedusa, the largest of the Pelagie Islands, is around
seventy miles east-southeast of Cape Bon, 127 miles south of Sicily, and 110 west
of Malta. Some thirty-five miles north-northwest of Cape Bon is Skerki Bank, or
Skerki Channel (Ras al Tib). Composed of rock, coral, and shells, it extends thirtysix miles in a northeasterly and southwesterly direction. It is significant because its
waters are less than a hundred fathoms deep, shallowest over the half-mile-long,
seven-hundred-yard-wide Keith Reef.
Tides in the Mediterranean are relatively small—for example, three feet on average in the Strait of Gibraltar. They are almost nonexistent off Algeria’s coast between Ténès and Jijel and, elsewhere off the Algerian and Tunisian coasts, slightly
less than one foot. The exception is the Gulf of Gabès, where tides reach six and a
22
half feet.
The surface current patterns in the Mediterranean are very different from those
in the Atlantic Ocean. The main reason is the existence of two major basins and
several lesser ones. Evaporation exceeds precipitation. Surface heat loss is significant, especially in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. Surface currents are generally from west to east. Water from the Atlantic entering through the Strait of
Gibraltar moves first northeastward, then generates a clockwise gyre in the eastern
Alborán Sea, its average speed dropping from 1.75 knots to about 0.75 knots in
the vicinity of Alborán.23 Afterward, the water mass flows eastward along Algeria’s
coast, becoming the Algerian Current, to Cape Bizerte at a speed of 0.75 knots. East
of Cape Bizerte the current veers away from the coast toward the east and flows
into the Sicilian Narrows. Between Cape Bon and the Gulf of Tunis the speed of
the current is between 0.5 and 1.0 knots; however, currents over Skerki Bank and
Keith Reef can, in westerly winds, reach four knots.24 In the Sicilian Narrows the
current divides into two main branches. One branch, two-thirds of the Algerian
Current, flows through the Narrows and the Malta Channel, then east of Sicily and
toward the Tyrrhenian Sea. Its speed is between half and three-quarters of a knot;
strong west-northwest winds in the winter can increase the current’s speed to two
knots, whereas strong easterly winds in the fall and spring can temporarily reverse
its direction.25 Afterward this branch follows the Italian, French, and Spanish coasts
westward until it returns to the Strait of Gibraltar. The other main branch flows
west of Sicily into the Tyrrhenian, then along the western Italian coast to the Ligurian Sea. There it becomes the Ligurian Current and continues to flow off the Gulf
of Lion (Golfe du Lion, on which Marseille lies) and Spain’s Catalonian coastline.26
Its speed increases after it encounters Spain’s northeastern coast. Afterward, the
Ligurian Current flows along the continental slope in the northern and southern
part of the Catalonian Sea. A minor branch of the Ligurian Current is deflected to
the northeast, toward the Balearic Islands. The rest flows along the Spanish coast
and exits through the Strait of Gibraltar to the Atlantic.27
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The water in the western Mediterranean ranges in color from green in the vicinity of the Strait of Gibraltar to greenish blue around the Balearics, to blue elsewhere. The average depth of water transparency is about sixty-three feet.28 This
factor made it relatively easy to detect enemy submarines at periscope depth.
The Mediterranean climate is characterized by hot, dry summers and temperate
and wet winters. The south and southeast have an arid, even desert climate. Most
rainfall occurs in late fall and winter, mainly in the form of heavy showers. Winds
of Force 7 (twenty-eight to thirty-three miles per hour, or nearly “moderate-gale
force” on the Beaufort scale) and higher are possible but rare in the summer
months. In the Gulf of Lion, the frequency of gales increases steadily during
October.29
Weather in the Mediterranean is greatly influenced by local winds. Along the
eastern coast of Spain blows an easterly wind that brings storms from the northeast
and east-northeast to between France and Algeria, commonly in the fall and spring.
The northwesterly wind known as the “mistral” blows down the Rhône Valley into
the Gulf of Lion, usually coinciding with low pressure in the Balkans. During the
winter, these winds are reinforced by cold air moving down from the Alps and the
Massif Central of France. Not surprisingly, then, the Gulf of Lion is notorious for
bad weather and northwestern gales. In the winter it is given to cloud cover, heavy
rainfall, and occasional snow, accompanied by violent squalls.30 The warm southwesterly wind called the “sirocco” is most common in the spring, as subtropical
high pressure moves northward across the Mediterranean.
In the western Mediterranean, the sea is roughest during a “levanter.” These
easterly winds are particularly strong off the eastern and southern coast of Spain
and the northern coast of Morocco. Gibraltar is largely protected from them.
Rough seas around the Balearics and Sardinia are often generated by winds up
to gale force blowing from between the northwest and northeast—in some cases
from the southwest, when it is called the “libeccio.” Strong winds from the west and
northwest produce rough seas off the North African coast from Oran to Cape Bon,
as can those from the north and east off the eastern coast of Tunisia. In the vicinity
of Malta, northwesterly and northeasterly winds called “gregales” generate rough
seas for several days at a time between October and April.31
In the western Mediterranean, rains are frequent in the winter but very rare in
summer. For example, in August 1932 average rainfall in Cagliari, Sardinia, was
0.2 inches; in Palermo, Sicily, 0.3 inches; Catania, Sicily, 0.6 inches; and Naples
0.8 inches. In Sicily, Sardinia, and adjacent waters July has the most sunny days,
December the fewest.32 Fog over the open sea occurs only rarely, except east of
Gibraltar, where it forms more often, between July and September. Generally visibility is reduced during a sirocco wind. Sandstorms off the North African coast
can reduce visibility to less than two miles; however, they are generally short-lived
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and localized. South and east of Sicily and around Malta, visibility might be poor
for several days during siroccos.33
Effect of the Physical Environment
The geographic characteristics of the western Mediterranean offered both advantages and disadvantages to the opposing forces. The Allies had de facto strategic
dominance of the Mediterranean, because they controlled the Strait of Gibraltar
and the Suez Canal. Another strategically important exit was the Bosporus and
the Dardanelles (collectively the Turkish Straits), controlled by Turkey, a neutral.
On the Atlantic side, the approach to the Strait of Gibraltar runs from Cape Saint
Vincent (the southwestern corner of Portugal) to Rota (some eight miles northwest
of Cádiz) to Tarifa (the southern tip of Iberia) and Ceuta (on the African side);
the Alborán and Balearic Islands lie in the background.34 Alborán Island and the
Balearics lie just outside the eastern approaches, distant from the strait respectively
about 130 miles to the east and 520 miles to the northeast. The Allied control of the
Strait of Gibraltar was made much easier by the control of Alborán.
Within the western Mediterranean the islands of Corsica, Sardinia, and the
Balearics occupied the most important positions, affecting the employment of naval and aerial forces. Sardinia occupied a flanking position with regard to the Allied sea route from the Strait of Gibraltar. Axis aircraft based there had to fly 150 to
200 miles to attack ships approaching the Sicilian Narrows from the west or sailing
westward to Gibraltar.
In the central Mediterranean, the Apennine (or Italian) Peninsula occupies a
commanding geostrategic position with regard to the surrounding lands and seas.
One leg of the peninsula (the “toe,” as often called) faces the Messina Strait, while
the other (the “heel”) borders the Strait of Otranto. Whoever controlled the southern part of the peninsula held the key to Sicily and guarded the exit to and from the
Adriatic Sea. Any power that controlled Sicily, in turn, was in an excellent position
to dominate the approaches to the central Mediterranean. In 1942 that power was
the Axis: the Italian air force and the Luftwaffe had nine major airfields on Sicily
and four on Sardinia, as well as numerous airstrips and landing grounds.35
The Italian cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo boats based on Sicily and Sardinia
could effectively attack Allied traffic to and from Malta. The distance from Sicily
to Cape Bon is only ninety miles, which a cruiser or destroyer at high speed could
cover in about three hours. An Italian or Luftwaffe bomber needed only some
thirty minutes. The Italian position was strengthened by control of the island of
Pantelleria.36 Pantelleria, strongly garrisoned, was a base for Italian fighters housed
in underground hangars.37
As for Malta itself, its great military/naval importance largely lay in its commanding position in the approaches to both the western and eastern Mediterranean. Malta lies only about eighty nautical miles from Licata, Sicily, and 360 from
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Benghazi, Libya. The distances from Malta to the Libyan coast and to Cape Bon are
190 and 175 nautical miles, respectively. The distances in nautical miles between
Malta and the Italian naval bases at Cagliari (in Sardinia) and Naples and Taranto
(on the Italian mainland) are 330, 322, and 337, respectively. Toulon, France, and
Palma, in the Balearics, are 605 and 620 miles from Malta.
The Sicilian Narrows posed a particular hazard for Allied ships because of Italian mines and the short distances to Axis airfields on Sicily. The mines and the
restricted sea room of the Narrows made it next to impossible to use battleships
and carriers beyond Skerki Bank. Hence, for the last 250 miles of the voyage to
Malta every convoy had to rely on protection from cruisers and destroyers.38 The
Sicilian Narrows were also well suited for the employment of Italian and German
torpedo craft, cruisers, and destroyers. In the early days of the war the Allies swept
the mines easily but with more difficulty and danger later, when the Italians laid
new and more advanced German mines.
Operation PEDESTAL was conducted over very long distances. About 2,350 nautical miles separate Glasgow and the harbor at Valletta, Malta, via Bishop Rock (off
the southwestern corner of the British Isles) and Gibraltar. From Gibraltar to Malta
a convoy had to sail 1,145 nautical miles (or seventy-six hours, at fifteen knots) and
within 150 miles of enemy airfields on Sardinia and Sicily.39
There were also navigational hazards. Prior to the war, steamers en route to
Malta would steer directly to Cape Caxine (northwest of Ras Sidi-Ferruch, Algeria)
and thence along the North African coast, passing to the south of the two Sorelles
Rocks (submerged some eleven miles west of the La Galite Islands) and the La
Galite group itself (twenty-four miles northwest of Cape Serrat, Tunisia), toward
Cape Bon, then northward of Pantelleria and Gozo.40 Ships had to stay well clear
of Keith Reef (forty-six nautical miles north of Cape Bon).41 Bound westward from
Malta to Gibraltar, they would pass north of the La Galite and then toward Cape
Gata (Almería, Spain) to avoid adverse currents, then steer for Gibraltar.42
Allied naval forces at Gibraltar that accompanied convoys sailed essentially
along a single, long line of operations. In contrast, the German and Italian air bases
on Sardinia and Sicily and in North Africa occupied flanking positions, and their
aircraft operated on lines of operation that were multiple, exterior, and short. The
lines of operation of Allied aircraft on Malta, in its central position, though similarly multiple and short, were divergent.
OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
One of the worst problems of the Allies was their highly fragmented command
organization in the Mediterranean. Even two years after the outbreak of hostilities there was no single theater commander responsible for planning and executing all operations, whether involving the army, the Royal Air Force (RAF), or the
Royal Navy. In June 1939 the British established the Middle East Command, with
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headquarters in Cairo, responsible for all operations there and in the Western Desert, later in Greece, British Somaliland, Aden, the Persian Gulf, and Libya as well.
However, the three services were individually responsible for defense of the eastern
Mediterranean and the Middle East.
For the army, the CINC of the Middle East (Gen. Sir Claude Auchinleck until
August 15, 1942, then Gen. Harold Alexander) controlled only ground forces. Directly subordinate to him were the British troops in Egypt, Sudan, Persia, and Iraq,
comprising the British Eighth Army (formerly Western Desert Force), the Ninth
Army (formerly forces in Palestine and Transjordan), and the Tenth Army (formerly Persia and Iraq forces), and also the troops on Malta.43 The RAF commander
in the theater was Air Officer, CINC Middle East Command (Air Marshal Arthur
W. Tedder); in August 1942, the RAF units were deployed in the Western Desert,
Malta, Palestine and Transjordan, Iraq, Aden, East Africa, and Sudan.44
The naval counterpart was CINC, Mediterranean Fleet, Adm. Sir Andrew B. Cunningham. The principal British naval commanders reporting to him in the summer
of 1942 were Vice Admiral (VA) 1st Battle Squadron and Second in Command
Mediterranean Fleet (H. D. Pridham-Wippell); Flag Officer Force H (Vice Adm.
Edward N. Syfret); Flag Officer Commanding Red Sea and Canal Area (Vice Adm.
R. H. C. Halifax); Rear Admiral (RA) Mediterranean Aircraft Carriers (A. L. St. G.
Lyster); RA 15th Cruiser Squadron (Philip L. Vian); RA 7th Cruiser Squadron (H.
B. Rawlings); RA Destroyers (I. G. Glennie); VA in Charge Malta (Ralph Leatham);
RA Alexandria (G. A. Creswell); and RA Training Establishment (R. J. R. Scott).45
The Axis command structure in the Mediterranean was centralized at the
national-strategic level but disjointed at the operational level. Mussolini concentrated all authority over Italian armed forces in his own hands. He was simultaneously minister of war, minister of the navy, and minister of the air force from
late 1933 until his regime ended in July 1943. He appointed undersecretaries who
served as chiefs of staff of the respective services. The chief of the Supreme General
Staff (Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale) was essentially a technical adviser, with no
command authority.
The German command structure in Italy was highly fragmented, hampering
full cooperation in the conduct of operations—a problem considerably worsened
by service rivalries. Hitler, in his Instruction No. 38 of December 2, 1941, appointed Luftwaffe field marshal Albert Kesselring as CINC South (Oberbefehlshaber
Süd). On one hand, Kesselring became responsible for the overall conduct of war
in the Mediterranean and North Africa, directed specifically to “obtain control of
the air and the sea in the area between southern Italy and North Africa, ensuring
the safety of communication to Libya and Cyrenaica, cooperation with the German
and allied [Italian] troops employed in North Africa, stopping enemy traffic in the
Mediterranean and also English supply of Tobruk and Malta in cooperation with
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available German and Italian naval forces.” Kesselring was nominally (not in reality) subordinate to Il Duce (Mussolini) and was to conform in general to guidance
and tasks from the Italian High Command (Comando Supremo). On overarching questions affecting warfare in the Mediterranean and North Africa, Kesselring
was at the same time subordinate to the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht
(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW).46
But on the other hand, Kesselring did not control all the German ground, air,
and naval forces in his theater. He had full control only of all the Luftwaffe units in the
Mediterranean and North Africa. Directly subordinate to him were the commanders
of the 2nd Air Fleet (Luftflotte 2): II Air Corps (Fliegerkorps-Gen. Bruno Lörzer), X
Air Corps (Gen. Hans Geisler), and Air Leader Africa (Fliegerführer Afrika, Gen.
Otto Hoffmann von Waldau). However, Kesselring did not have authority over the
naval forces in the central Mediterranean; these remained subordinate to Admiral
Raeder. Yet Kesselring was authorized to issue instructions to Naval Group Command South (Marinegruppenkommando Süd), in Sofia, Bulgaria. This command,
established in July 1941, replaced Admiral Southeast (Admiral Südost), which had
been set up in April.47 Also, Kesselring did not control the German-Italian campaign in North Africa, which was the responsibility of OKW.
As for coordination with the Italians, Kesselring could send instructions to the
German liaison at the Italian naval high command, Rear Adm. Eberhard Weichold.
Kesselring’s requests for joint employment of German and Italian naval forces had
to be routed through Admiral Weichold. On December 1, 1941, the German Naval
Command Italy (Deutsches Marinekommando Italien) was formally established,
under Weichold. Administratively, this new command was subordinate to Naval
Station North Sea.48 Directly subordinate to the German Naval Command Italy was
the chief of German Sea Transport Italy (Deutscher Seetransportchef Italien), Rear
Adm. Günther Horstmann, in Rome.49 In November 1941, all the U-boats in the
Mediterranean became subordinate to a newly created command, Leader of the
U-boats Italy (Führer der Unterseeboote [F.d.U.]–Italien), in La Spezia. Its chief
was, in turn, directly subordinate to Adm. Karl Dönitz. F.d.U.-Italien comprised the
29th U-boat Flotilla, with six boats.
To make all this complexity even worse, there was little unity of effort between
Germany and Italy in the Mediterranean theater. Neither the Germans nor the Italians fully trusted their nominal partners. Kesselring had the authority only to coordinate, but not to prepare plans for, the joint undertakings. He had some influence
on the employment of Italian air squadrons for the defense of convoys to North
Africa, but the Italian navy resisted all such German attempts. Italian ships from
different squadrons never trained together. Supermarina constantly interfered with
its tactical commanders.50
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What the Allied Commanders Knew
The Allies had fair knowledge of Italian and German naval and air dispositions in
the central Mediterranean. Their most important sources of intelligence were intercepted and decoded German ENIGMA messages. The Allies had solid knowledge not
only of air dispositions but also of Luftwaffe operation orders, air-reconnaissance
reports, and U-boat observations, even appreciations of the situation by Kesselring
and his subordinate commanders. Such intelligence obtained was distributed to
major Allied commanders in the form of “special intelligence summaries” prepared
by the OIC in London.
On the basis of analysis of ENIGMA messages, the Allies assessed that on July
22, 1942, the Italians had deployed at Taranto four battleships (one Littorio-class,
three Cavour-class); three light cruisers (Abruzzi, Garibaldi, and Aosta) at Navarino (Pylos today), Greece; two heavy cruisers at Messina, Sicily; five destroyers,
two torpedo boats, two submarines, and eighteen motor torpedo boats at various
other bases in Sicily; four torpedo boats at Pantelleria; and two light cruisers, six
submarines, and three destroyers at Cagliari, Sardinia.51
Allied intelligence estimated that at Naples there were one Italian light cruiser
(in dock, out of service), three destroyers, and eight submarines. It noted that the
number of destroyers at Taranto varied between ten and twenty, according to the
requirements of convoys from Italy to Greece, Crete, and North Africa.52 Allied
intelligence assessed that if Axis high commanders suspected the Allies of mounting convoys to Malta, the Italians most likely would establish a patrol line of three
or four submarines between Sardinia and the French North African coast and that
four other submarines probably would patrol the Cartagena–Ibiza–Algiers triangle.
To Allied intelligence analysts the German U-boats did not appear “to have maintained patrols in the western Mediterranean.” Yet their view was mistaken, as was
their presumption that boats encountered in that area “so far were apparently on
transit.” More reliably, Allied intelligence also provided detailed analyses of French
naval deployment and shipping routes across the western Mediterranean.53
With regard to enemy air strength, the Allies estimated that on July 23 the Luftwaffe had in service 315 aircraft, including one hundred long-range bombers and
torpedo bombers on Sicily and fifty on Sardinia. In their view, the increase in the
number of long-range bombers was owing to the removal of two air groups (each of
sixty-five to seventy aircraft) from Crete, supposedly because of not any operational need but rather a lack of fuel on Crete.54 The Allies believed the Luftwaffe had on
Sardinia twenty Ju-88 multirole bombers, and the Italian air force had fifteen longrange bombers, thirty single-engine fighter aircraft, thirty-five torpedo bombers,
twenty reconnaissance aircraft, and thirty coastal seaplanes. On Sicily the Luftwaffe
had 120 long-range bombers, twelve reconnaissance bombers, and thirty-six and
twenty-seven single- and twin-engine fighters, respectively. The Italian air force
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had there about eighty long-range bombers, 120 single-engine fighters, twenty torpedo bombers, fifteen dive-bombers, ten reconnaissance aircraft, and fifty coastal
seaplanes.55
On August 5, 1942, the Allies learned from ENIGMA intercepts that the Germans
interpreted the reduction in RAF activity over Malta and Egypt as an indication
of a planned large-scale operation to resupply Malta. The Germans also believed,
intercepts revealed, that the Allies would launch diversionary attacks on the Panzer Army Africa and a combined operation against Mersa Matrûh. The Allies also
knew that the Germans planned to counter these possible moves by redeploying
Luftwaffe aircraft from Greece to Sicily and increasing the combat readiness of air
units in both areas. They also planned to discuss with the commander of the Italian
56
air forces on Sicily joint bombing, torpedo attacks, and training exercises.
Allied intelligence revised its estimates of enemy air dispositions on August 9,
1942. It now erroneously concluded that no German aircraft were based on Sardinia. Actually, the Germans then had 144 long-range bombers, twenty-seven
reconnaissance bombers, and sixty-six single-engine fighters on the island.57 The
Italian air force had deployed on both Sicily and Sardinia a total of some seventy
long-range bombers, thirty-five to forty torpedo bombers, fifteen to twenty divebombers, forty reconnaissance aircraft, fifty coastal seaplanes, fifteen to twenty
fighter-bombers, and ninety-five single-engine fighters. Roughly 55 percent of
these aircraft were operational.58
What the Axis Commanders Knew
In contrast to the Allies, the Italians and Germans lacked information about Allied
plans and intentions prior to August 10. However, they had a reasonably accurate
knowledge of the enemy order of battle and movements once enemy vessels entered
the Mediterranean. Their main sources were Abwehr agents in the Gibraltar area
and in Ceuta and reconnaissance aircraft and submarines. The German and Italian aircraft regularly reconnoitered the Strait of Gibraltar, its eastern approaches,
Malta, Alexandria, the Suez Canal area (especially Port Said and Suez), and Haifa.
For example, at about 1800 on August 2, German aircraft reported the presence in
Gibraltar of one enemy carrier, three cruisers (two in dry docks, one at pier and
under repair), twelve destroyers (two under repair), eight submarines (one under
repair), two auxiliary cruisers, twenty-six freighters (one under repair, four damaged), and eight tankers.59
At 2100 on August 4, the Germans sighted one armed tanker and four destroyers
arriving at Gibraltar from the east and, at 0300, the carrier Eagle, one cruiser (Charybdis), and four destroyers steaming westward from there.60 On August 5, German
naval intelligence reported two destroyers, four submarines, five other warships, and
two steamers in Malta. Several small warships, three tankers, and ten steamers were
sighted in Alexandria. At Port Said observers located one mock-up battleship, one
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cruiser, four destroyers, four submarines, one tanker, four ferries, and twenty-two
freighters. At Suez were four destroyers, a torpedo boat, a depot ship, a submarine,
eight tankers, and thirty-three freighters, plus three other craft.61 At 1800 on August
5 the Germans sighted in Gibraltar two cruisers (one under repair), eight destroyers (two under repair), five submarines (one under repair), two auxiliary cruisers,
twenty-eight freighters (one docked, four damaged), and eight tankers.62
According to Italian agents’ reports, two freighters at Gibraltar were preparing to
leave. At midnight on August 5/6, the cruiser Liverpool with three destroyers sailed
out from Gibraltar, direction unknown. At about 1100 one tanker, two destroyers,
and one submarine proceeded eastward from Gibraltar.63 At about 1200 the next
day, Luftwaffe aircraft sighted two destroyers, two escort boats, two patrol boats,
and two merchant ships at latitude 32° 29ʹ north, longitude 34° 45ʹ east, twentysix nautical miles southwest of Haifa.64 Around noon, German aircraft sighted two
enemy cruisers (Dido and Aurora), two destroyers, three escort boats, four tankers,
and seven freighters. In Beirut was one C-class light cruiser.65
On the morning of August 8, the same German report indicated (erroneously)
that one Argus-class carrier and four destroyers had entered Gibraltar. The Abwehr
reported intensive shipping traffic in the Strait of Gibraltar on the night of August
8/9.66 Finally, the B-Dienst reported that on August 9 there had been observed in
Gibraltar Cairo (light cruiser), Maidstone (depot ship), fourteen destroyers, two
submarines, twenty-three small craft, twenty freighters, six tankers, and one gunboat (in a dock). The Germans also noticed intensified activity by enemy submarines in the eastern Mediterranean.67
OPERATIONAL PLANNING
In the aftermath of the failed dual-convoy operation in June, the need to mount
another resupply of besieged Malta was obvious. The First Sea Lord, Adm. Sir Dudley
Pound, agreed with Prime Minister Churchill that the loss of Malta would be a disaster of the first magnitude to the British Empire, probably fatal in the long run to the
defense of the Nile valley.68 The Allies were willing to accept high risk to resupply
Malta, but their decision became easier when, after the Convoy PQ17 disaster, it
was decided to suspend Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union. At the same time, the
easing of the situation in the Indian Ocean freed forces that could be applied to a
convoy operation to relieve Malta.69
Allied Preliminary Plans
The dual-convoy experience had demonstrated the inability of Allied naval and air
forces to defend the Malta convoys against Axis air forces in the central Mediterranean. Hence, the next major convoy operation to Malta would be mounted from
the west only.70
The overall commander of the new convoy operation, code-named PEDESTAL,
was to be Vice Adm. Edward N. Syfret. He was on his way back from capturing the

89

90

MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945

Vichy base at Diégo-Suarez (Antsiranana today), on Madagascar, when he received
orders to disembark at Takoradi, Gold Coast, and fly directly to the United Kingdom. Planning for the new operation started on July 13, 1942, and was conducted
at high intensity.71
The Allies considered four variant plans—known as A, B, C, and D—to resupply
Malta from the west. Most of them required the availability of the U.S. aircraft carrier Ranger (CV 4, of 17,580 tons full load) for the operation. The Admiralty was in
favor of plan A, if Ranger and its five destroyers were available at Scapa Flow. Under
that plan, the battleships Nelson and Rodney, then with the Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean, also would take part. The Admiralty received information from Malta
that the island could survive until September. Hence, there was no great urgency
to run a convoy in July. This latitude would affect the degree to which the British
government pressed the Americans to release Ranger as envisaged under plan A.72
Plan B would require Ranger to move to Scapa Flow, to transfer twenty-four foldingwing Martlet fighters (U.S. F4F Wildcats) with their crews to the carrier HMS Victorious. Ranger would operate with the Home Fleet to relieve Victorious during its
absence. Ranger would need to retain at least twelve Martlets. However, the Admiralty believed that execution in July 1942 would not allow adequate time for Victorious and the transferred U.S. fighter squadrons to become familiar with each other.
Therefore, should the Americans reject plan A, the Admiralty favored a delay to the
August new moon period. Modified plan B would not interfere with the schedule
of PQ convoys bound for Russia but could be pursued only if Ranger would be
available for service with the Home Fleet until the end of August.
Plan C—simply to employ Victorious alone and with its usual air wing—was considered unacceptable at the outset, because the obsolete Fulmar fighters that Victorious carried were inadequate to protect both the convoy and the battleships south of
Sardinia, where the threat was expected to be greatest. This assessment was based on
the heavy losses to enemy land-based aircraft during Operation HARPOON.73
Plan D contemplated execution in August using British forces exclusively. This
plan would not require American help and would make more time available for
training and for building up a heavy-bomber force in the Middle East to support
the operation. Another advantage was that in August there would be one more
hour of darkness than in July. However, a major disadvantage of plan D was that it
would delay relief to Malta by a month and tie up the merchant ships destined for
the convoy for that month. It also would postpone the assembly and training of the
Eastern Fleet by two and a half months, because that fleet’s sole carrier, Indomitable,
and its two battleships Nelson and Rodney would be in the Mediterranean.74
The Admiralty favored plan A, if Ranger could reach Scapa Flow by July 30;
otherwise the modified plan B would be executed in August. Failing either of those
two plans and setting aside C, the Admiralty would have no alternative but to adopt
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plan D.75 However, adopting plan D would make it unnecessary to send Ranger. Because the Royal Navy was severely short of cruisers and destroyers, Deputy Prime
Minister Clement Attlee and the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen.
Alan Brooke, suggested that the government request the service with the Home
Fleet of the U.S. heavy cruisers Tuscaloosa and Wichita and four destroyers be extended until the end of August 1942.76
The Allied Final Plan for the Main Operation
All planning for the convoy (now officially Operation PEDESTAL) was in the hands
of the Admiralty in London. Among other things, this centralization considerably
reduced the need for transmitting proposals and decisions. In addition, the Admiralty’s planners were already knowledgeable regarding general policy and were able
on short notice to get help and advice from the Naval Staff.77
The final plan for Operation PEDESTAL was similar to that for HARPOON in
June.78 The planners assumed that surprise would be difficult to achieve, because
the Axis had excellent intelligence in the Gibraltar area.79 In its broad outlines, the
plan visualized assembling sufficient forces to counter the diverse threats posed by
Axis air and naval forces based in Sardinia, Sicily, southern Italy, and Tripolitania.80
The planners posited that Operation VIGOROUS had failed because Allied airpower
had been unable to force enemy battleships to withdraw. Also, there had been an
acute shortage of AA ammunition and fuel. This was part of the reason why the
convoy had to sail after dark on June 15. Because it was impossible to increase
the number of land-based aircraft, the only way to bolster the defenses of the next
Malta convoy was to assign much stronger surface forces.81 Enough fighter aircraft
would be required to match the enemy fighters and also deal with the heavy and
torpedo bombers that would threaten the convoy.82
The lessons drawn from the experience of convoys to northern Russia and Malta emphasized the need for tankers. While the British merchant marine did not
have fast (sixteen-knot) tankers, the U.S. Maritime Administration operated two,
Kentucky and Ohio. After some difficult negotiations, the British government was
able to lease these tankers. However, Kentucky was sunk on June 15, 1942, during
VIGOROUS. Ohio alone, of 14,150 deadweight tons (DWT) and carrying 11,500 tons
of black and white oil, was assigned to the convoy.83
In planning PEDESTAL, the Allies correctly assumed that the enemy would concentrate his heavy surface forces south of Sardinia, where they would either attack
the convoy or draw off its escorts to open the way for attack by light forces. They
also expected synchronized attacks by high-level bombers, torpedo bombers, and
dive-bombers on the third and fourth days of the operation and, on the second and
fifth days, high-level bombing and torpedo bomber attacks.84 To minimize losses to
aircraft the convoy would transit the Sicilian Narrows at night.85
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Allied Order of Battle
Operation PEDESTAL (August 10–15)
Main Forces
Force F
(Vice Adm. Edward N. Syfret [Rodney])
Force Z (Rear Adm. A. L. St. G. Lyster)
2 battleships (Nelson [flag], Rodney)
3 aircraft carriers
		Victorious (6 Sea Hurricanes, 16 Fulmars, 12 Albacores)
		Eagle* (16 Sea Hurricanes)
		Indomitable** (10 Martlets, 24 Sea Hurricanes, 16 Albacores)
		
(Total: 72 fighters, 28 torpedo bombers)
3 light cruisers (Charybdis, Phoebe, Sirius)
15 destroyers (19th Destroyer Flotilla: Laforey, Lightning, Lookout, Quentin, Eskimo, Tartar,
Wilton, Westcott, Wrestler, Somali, Wishart, Zetland, Ithuriel, Antelope, Vansittart)
Force P (Convoy WS.5.21.S, Cdre. A. G. Venables)
13 freighters
		Empire Hope*
		Dorset*
		Wairangi*
		Rochester Castle**
		Waimarama*
		Brisbane Star**
		Port Chalmers
		Almeria Lykes (U.S.)*
		Santa Elisa (U.S.)*
		Clan Ferguson*
		Glenorchy*
		Melbourne Star
		Deucalion*
1 oiler (Ohio) (U.S.)**
5 destroyers (accompanied convoy from Clyde to Gibraltar: Keppel, Malcolm, Amazon,
		Venomous, Wolverine)
Force X (Rear Adm. Harold M. Burrough)
4 light cruisers (10th Cruiser Flotilla: Nigeria** [flag], Kenya,** Manchester,* Cairo*)
11 destroyers (6th Destroyer Flotilla: Ashanti, Intrepid, Icarus, Foresight,* Fury, Derwent,
		
Bramham, Bicester, Ledbury, Pathfinder, Penn)
1 ocean tug (Jaunty)

Reserve Escort Group
8 destroyers (Keppel, Westcott, Venomous, Malcolm, Wolverine, Amazon, Wrestler, Vidette)
Force R
2 fleet oil tankers (Brown Ranger, Dingledale)
4 corvettes (Jonquil, Spiraea, Geranium, Coltsfoot)
1 tug (Salvonia)

Supporting Forces
Submarine Group: 10th Submarine Flotilla
2 submarines off Milazzo and Palermo (P.42, P.211)
6 submarines between Malta and Tunisia (P.31, P.34, P.44, P.46, P.222, Utmost)
Malta Escort Force
4 minesweepers (17th Minesweeping Flotilla: Speedy, Hythe, Hebe, Rye)
7 motor launches (121, 126, 134, 135, 168, 459, 462)
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Land-Based Aircraft on Malta
(Air Vice Marshal Keith Park)
9 fighter squadrons
Fighters: Supermarine Spitfire Mk V B
Night fighters: Bristol Beaufighter Mk IV F
Fighters / dive fighters: Hawker Hurricane Mk I
Heavy fighters: Bristol Beaufighter Mk I F
3 torpedo-bomber squadrons
Torpedo bombers: Bristol Beaufighter Mk VI C
Torpedo bombers / recce: Bristol Beaufort I
4 bomber squadrons
Heavy bombers: Consolidated Liberator B-24
Attack/antiship: Bristol Beaufighter Mk I C
2 air recce squadrons
Attack/recce: Short Sunderland Mk II
Recce bombers: Vickers Wellington Mk III; Martin A-30/Baltimore (U.S.)

Secondary Operations
Operation Bellows
1 aircraft carrier (Furious: 38 Spitfires, ferried to Malta)
2 destroyers, August 6–11 (Laforey, Lookout)
5 destroyers, after fly-off on August 11 (Keppel, Venomous, Wolverine, Wrestler)

Operation Ascendant
Force Y
2 freighters (Troilus, Orari)
2 destroyers (Matchless, Badsworth)

Operation MG 3
(Adm. Sir Henry Harwood, Port Said)
Convoy MW 12: 3 merchant vessels
Escort: 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers
At Haifa
(Rear Adm. Philip Vian)
1 merchant vessel
2 cruisers
3 destroyers
Key: * sunk, ** damaged
Sources: Llewellyn-Jones, Royal Navy and the Mediterranean Convoys, pp. 129–31; Between Hostile Shores, pp. 237–40;
Nassigh, Operazione Mezzo Agosto, pp. 206–207, 221–22; Fioravanzo, Azioni navali in Mediterraneo, pp. 410–11.

The planners also made major changes in the convoy screen, based on the lessons learned in June. The escorts had to be powerful enough to thwart an attack
by Italian heavy surface forces.86 The Admiralty considered it too risky to employ
the two battleships in the Sicilian Narrows, so close to the enemy airfields in North
Africa and Sicily.
All three available large British aircraft carriers (Eagle, Indomitable, and Victorious) were assigned to the protection of the convoy. Sea Hurricanes and Martlets
gradually replaced Fulmars. The carriers would be positioned inside the destroyer
screen and in the convoy’s rear. The Italian heavy surface ships were based at Messina, Taranto, and Naples.87 The carriers’ aircraft would have the critical task of damaging them and thereby slowing them down, should they pose an active threat.88
The planners had considerable difficulty in assembling merchant ships, owing to the heavy losses being inflicted by U-boats in the northern Atlantic. On
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the basis of a July 3 request by Malta’s governor to the Admiralty, the planners at
first envisaged a convoy composed of ten merchant ships with a total capacity of
75,000 DWT.89 In mid-July, however, they decided on thirteen freighters and one
tanker, totaling 123,000 DWT.90 The freighters would carry mainly flour and ammunition. The planners allocated cargo so at least some of every commodity would
get through even if the expected heavy losses occurred.91 To enhance its survival
chances, the convoy’s speed of advance (average overall speed) had to be at least
fifteen knots. On the basis of a lesson from HARPOON, an ocean tug would accompany the convoy.92 The Admiralty also decided that—so as not to lose both escorts
and convoy—merchant vessels damaged during the operation would be scuttled,
whereas every effort would be made to preserve warships.93
The convoy was to leave the United Kingdom about August 2 and arrive at Malta on the 13th. In an attempt to confuse German intelligence, the convoy was designated WS (“Winston Special”) 5.21.S, which would ordinarily indicate a convoy
bound around the Cape of Good Hope to Suez.94 Primarily, however, the success of
PEDESTAL would depend on the Allied ability to assemble a powerful support force
and to time the passage so as to outwit the Italians and Germans. Specifically, the
convoy would need to cross the critical area in a moonless period, which meant
between August 10 and 16. The planners selected August 10 as the day the convoy
and its escorts would enter the Mediterranean at Gibraltar: first day of the operation, or D.1 (D+0 in American terms).
The objective of PEDESTAL, as stated in the plan, “was to pass a convoy of 14 motor vessels through the western Mediterranean to Malta and to cover the passage
of two merchant ships and two destroyers from Malta to Gibraltar.”95 The principal objective was to deliver enough fuel, ammunition, and food to allow Malta to
operate as a major naval and air base beyond September 1942—an objective that
was operational in its scale. Major tactical objectives in PEDESTAL were defense and
protection of the convoy, neutralization of the enemy airfields on Sardinia and Sicily, and diversion of enemy forces from the western to eastern Mediterranean. An
essential element of operational planning is determination of the overall force’s size
and composition. The principal factors in this process are the type of operation, the
combat potential of friendly and enemy forces, the number and scale of intermediate objectives and their sequencing, the distances between the base of operations
and the prospective operating area, weather and climatological conditions, and,
notably, intelligence and logistics. Yet the operational commander’s judgment and
experience are most important. For PEDESTAL the Allies assigned the largest available force of aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers to Admiral Syfret.96 He commanded Force F, composed of the convoy and the naval forces of direct screen and
distant cover and support, collected from the Home and Eastern Fleets.
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Not under Syfret’s command but assigned to his defense and support were submarines in the eastern Mediterranean, subordinate to the CINC of the Mediterranean Fleet in Haifa, and land-based aircraft, controlled by the RAF’s Middle East
Command. Force Y at Malta consisted of two destroyers. The Malta Escort Force
(the 17th Minesweeping Flotilla) comprised four minesweepers and seven motor
launches. In addition, the Admiralty assigned eight destroyers as reserve escorts to
screen Force R (the refueling group—two fleet oilers, corvettes, and a tug) and the
carrier Furious.97
Initial lines of operation are critical in both the planning and the execution of a
major naval operation. (In contrast, a geostrategic position is more important in a
campaign.) This Allied convoy and its supporting forces moved along a very long
exterior line of operation. Once in the Mediterranean, all the Allied forces taking
part in the operation used a single line of operation, stretching from the Strait of
Gibraltar to Malta—and accordingly, all faced increasing threat from the air as they
entered the effective range of Axis bombers.
After determining the ultimate objective of the operation, the commander
and his planners must determine corresponding enemy and friendly operational
“centers of gravity,” sources of the massed strength, physical or moral, or leverage
whose serious degradation, dislocation, neutralization, or destruction would have
the most decisive impact on one’s own or the enemy’s ability to accomplish a given
military objective. The principal value of determining the proper enemy center
of gravity is to enhance significantly the odds that one’s forces will be used in the
quickest and most effective way to accomplish a given military objective.
Once the enemy center of gravity is destroyed or effectively neutralized, the
objective has been accomplished but the combat success must be consolidated. Of
course, one’s forces have a center of gravity of their own, which the commander
must assign highly capable, but not overly strong, forces to protect; otherwise, the
operation could be open to a devastating attack.
From the Allied perspective, the enemy’s operational center of gravity in the second phase of the operation (from Gibraltar to the Sicilian Narrows) was clearly the
German heavy bombers and dive-bombers based on Sicily and Sardinia. However,
in the third phase, south of Sardinia, it would shift to the Italian heavy surface forces
(if they sortied from their bases). For the Axis, the enemy operational center of gravity in the second phase was Force Z (three large aircraft carriers, with their fighter
aircraft). Once through the Sicilian Narrows, Force X (the convoy’s direct screen) became the Allied operational center of gravity. Finally, the operational center of gravity
would shift to the Allied fighter aircraft on Malta, once the convoy was within their
effective radius. The reasons there were three successive operational centers of gravity were the flanking position occupied by the enemy land-based aircraft, the restricted operating area, and the high threat posed by the enemy aircraft and submarines.
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Forces assigned for the defense of the convoy would have to be withdrawn when they
reached the area where the odds of their survival were too low.
The operational idea (or scheme) is the very heart of a design for a major naval
operation. In essence, it is identical to what is today commonly called “concept of
operations” (or CONOPS, sometimes “scheme of maneuver”). Ideally, it should be
bold and provide for speedy execution. The simpler the operational idea, the higher
the chances of its successful execution. The operational idea also should be flexible, so that it can accommodate changes to the situation during its execution. It
should ensure decisive employment of one’s forces by focusing their efforts on the
destruction or neutralization of the enemy center of gravity. It should present the
enemy with multidimensional threats that he has little or no chance of countering
successfully.
Perhaps most important, the operational idea should be novel, avoiding stereotyped patterns: it should surprise and deceive the enemy. The operational idea for
PEDESTAL, however, was traditional (see map 8). The unfavorable initial geographic
position was a major reason that it was, while bold, not novel; lines of operation for
each force element were so constrained as to allow little or no flexibility. The Italians and Germans were neither surprised nor deceived; the objective of the operation was all too transparent. The Allies were also unable to achieve surprise because
of the large number of Axis agents in the Gibraltar area.98 The speed of execution
was limited to the fifteen-knot speed of the convoy.
The Allied operational idea envisaged both simultaneous and successive movements of several force elements in both the western and eastern Mediterranean.
Force F would pass through the Strait of Gibraltar on the night of D.1. Its component Force Z (the battleships, carriers, and their escorts) would turn westward, but
remain in the vicinity, on reaching the entrance to Skerki Bank (an area of relatively
shallow water in the Sicilian Narrows) at about 1900 on D.3.99 Force X (the direct
screen) and convoy WS.5.21.S would proceed toward Malta. Force X would halt in
the approaches to Malta during the afternoon of D.4, when the Malta Escort Force
would take over escort duties.100 Force Z would remain near the entrance to Skerki
Bank until the night fighters from Malta took over protection of the convoy (Force
P) and Force X. At that point, on D.4, Force Z would operate to the westward of
Sardinia to distract attention from Force Y (a secondary operation, described below); once its support was no longer necessary, it would return to Gibraltar. Force
X would return to Gibraltar as soon as Vice Admiral in Charge of Malta released
it from protecting the convoy.101 Minesweepers would clear the waterways, thereby
avoiding the loss of merchant vessels to mines that the June convoy had suffered.102
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The Allied initial operational center of gravity—the carrier forces—was well
protected by the fighter aircraft and AA defenses of the carriers’ screens. However,
Force X—the second operational center of gravity—had to rely solely on its own
AA defenses.
The Allied sector of main effort in PEDESTAL was the western Mediterranean,
the eastern Mediterranean that of secondary effort—necessarily, because the convoy would steam from Gibraltar to Malta. Normally, the sectors of effort in a major
naval operation dictate where the main forces and supporting forces are deployed.
In the case of a defensive major naval/joint operation, as was PEDESTAL, the main
forces and most of the supporting ones operate in the sector of main effort—in this
case, the western Mediterranean.
A major naval operation cannot be successful unless it is adequately and reliably supported and sustained logistically. In general, sustainment is the extension of logistical support from the start of combat actions until the ultimate objective is accomplished. Operational sustainment is required to support combat
forces throughout all phases of a major operation. Because of the long distances
involved, the short-legged destroyers needed refueling during the convoy transit.
Malta was not in a position to provide fuel. The lessons of the Arctic and Malta
convoys showed the need to have tankers to accompany the convoy and escorts.
Force R would perform this critically important task. The plan provided that Force
R would enter the Mediterranean via the Strait of Gibraltar with the main force and
then wait near the convoy route to refuel the destroyers as needed.103
The planners for PEDESTAL had great difficulty in preparing a plausible deception plan. The enemy could not be easily deceived, because the geography severely
limited false objectives toward which attention might be diverted. The deception
target, the Axis high commanders, would simply assume that any large convoy with
heavy escort from either Gibraltar or Alexandria was bound to Malta: the ultimate
objective of PEDESTAL was obvious. The Allied planners accordingly did not attempt a deception but only a feint, in the eastern Mediterranean (Operation MG 3),
hoping to convince the Axis commanders not to commit all their forces in the west.
Specifically, a convoy (MW 12) composed of three merchant ships covered by
a force of two cruisers and five destroyers would sail from Port Said, in Egypt, toward a position about one hundred miles south of Crete.104 The group would get
under way on D.2, as soon as possible after learning that the WS.5.21.S convoy had
passed through the Strait of Gibraltar, or on D.3 if it did not receive that report.105
The intent was to lure out the Italian 8th (Naval) Division at Navarino and keep the
Luftwaffe’s aircraft based on Crete on the ground. One Allied submarine would be
off Navarino, while two other boats would be farther west to intercept any Italian
ship from Taranto. To divert further the Italians’ attention from the events in the
western Mediterranean, an Allied submarine would land commandos off Catania
to raid a nearby airfield.106
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Secondary Operations
Under the cover of the convoy operation, the Admiralty planned two secondary
operations: to reinforce Malta with fighter aircraft (Operation BELLOWS) and (Operation ASCENDANT) to bring back from Malta the ships that had survived June’s
dual-convoy operation. The former was undertaken when, during the planning
of PEDESTAL, the British chief of the air staff, Marshal Sir Charles Portal, raised
the issue of the number of fighter aircraft on Malta: by the end of July the island
had only about eighty fighters still in service and was losing about seventeen per
week.107 Hence, the planners decided to reinforce Malta’s air defenses by some forty
Spitfires, ferried by an aircraft carrier prior to the arrival of WS.5.21.S.108 These new
aircraft would not only buttress Malta’s defense but improve the chances of success of PEDESTAL itself. The carrier Furious was selected for BELLOWS, because the
other available carrier, Argus, required (because of its relatively slow speed) wind
of at least fifteen knots to launch aircraft, which it was unlikely to encounter in the
western Mediterranean in August.109 The Admiralty directed Admiral Syfret that
Operation BELLOWS should interfere as little as possible with Operation PEDESTAL.
Furious (carrying four Albacore torpedo bombers and forty Spitfires) would enter
the Mediterranean with the convoy and without making a stop at Gibraltar proceed
to a position south of Sardinia and about 550 miles west of Malta. The Spitfires
would fly off on D.2 or D.3 at any time during daylight.110 Force F would provide
fighter protection until Furious was well west. Five destroyers would escort Furious
back to Gibraltar and then the United Kingdom immediately after the fly-off.111
The second subsidiary operation was meant to get the merchant ships Troilus
and Orari and a screen, collectively Force Y, out of Malta and to Gibraltar. The intent was to mount ASCENDANT after dark on D.1 (August 10).112 Force Y would pass
a point thirty nautical miles south of Lampedusa, pass Kélibia on Cape Bon, hug
the Tunisian coast to Galite Channel, then proceed to Gibraltar.113
Support from Other Forces
The Allies planned to employ submarines and fighter aircraft based on Malta, patrol aircraft based in Gibraltar, and long-range bombers of the RAF Middle East
Command in support of PEDESTAL. The initial plan, drafted on July 20, contemplated stationing eight submarines near Sicily to prevent Italian surface forces in
the Tyrrhenian from attacking the convoy during the last leg of its transit. Of these,
three submarines would take positions between Cape Gallo and Trapani (patrol areas A, B, and C), four submarines between Cavallo and Marettimo (patrol areas D,
E, F, and G), and one between Vulcano and Cape Milazzo, on Sicily’s northeastern
coast (patrol area H). These patrols were to be established by D.1.114
By late July, however, the plan for employing Allied submarines had changed.
Now, one submarine would deploy off Milazzo, one off Palermo, and six between
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Malta and Pantelleria.115 All would reach their assigned positions by dawn on D.4
(August 13).116 They would have complete freedom of action in attacking enemy
ships, making Italian battleships and cruisers their primary targets. After the convoy passed their patrol line, the submarines would screen it, proceeding on the
surface, on a parallel course. They also would report the presence of enemy aircraft
in the convoy’s vicinity.117
The outcome of PEDESTAL was contingent also on close cooperation with RAF
units based on Malta and elsewhere in the Mediterranean. By August 3 the number of serviceable aircraft on Malta had grown somewhat over the July figure, to
between ninety and ninety-five Spitfire fighters and about fifty-five bombers. By
August 10, the number of Spitfires had dropped again to eighty. On August 12,
118
estimated air strength would be 202 aircraft, including 113 Spitfires. At any given
time during the operation itself, there would be serviceable about a hundred Spitfires, thirty Beauforts (twin-engine bombers), thirty-six Beaufighters (a Beaufort
variant whose multiple roles included torpedo bombing), three Wellingtons (longrange medium bombers), two Liberators (the U.S. B-24 design), two Baltimores
(U.S.-designed light attack bombers), and three Albacores and Swordfish belonging to the Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm (FAA). In addition, some sixteen reconnaissance aircraft (five Baltimores, six Spitfires, and five Wellington VIIIs) were available at any one time.119
The Allied aircraft on Malta would conduct reconnaissance day and night along
the probable routes of enemy naval forces; attack the Italian and German bases on
Sicily, Sardinia, and Pantelleria; protect the convoy after it came within their effective
range from Malta; and attack with torpedoes Italian naval forces entering Taranto.120
The Allied aircraft based in North Africa primarily supported the British Eighth
Army. Their additional tasks were to locate, shadow, and report all enemy surface
ships, protect the Allied convoys from air attack, destroy enemy surface ships, and
dislocate enemy air forces on the ground. The enemy bases on Sardinia would be
attacked during the day by low-flying Beaufighters, and during the night by Liberators, from the RAF Middle East Command.121
On August 3, Sir Ralph Leatham, VA in Charge Malta, requested from the Middle East Command four Liberators for bombing enemy airfields on Sardinia and
Sicily during the nights of D.3/D.4 and D.4/D.5. He suggested using also six Boston
light bombers (a variant of the U.S. Douglas A-20 Havoc) or similar aircraft suitable
for high-speed daylight bombing.122 Leatham wanted the RAF to send long-range
escort aircraft from Gibraltar and Malta to the limits of their effective ranges. He
specifically requested, to keep track of enemy surface vessels, air reconnaissance
between Sardinia and North Africa from D.2 to D.5; between Cavallo Island Lighthouse and Marettimo (in the Aegadian Islands) during daylight hours on D.3 and
D.5; and reconnaissance of the Italian naval bases at Taranto, Messina, Palermo,
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Axis Order of Battle
Italian Surface Forces
3rd (Naval) Division (Messina, Rear Adm. Angelo Parona)
3 heavy cruisers (Gorizia [flag], Bolzano,** Trieste)
7 destroyers (Aviere, Geniere, Camicia Nera, Legionario, Ascari, Corsaro, Grecale)
7th (Naval) Division (Cagliari, Rear Adm. Alberto Da Zara)
3 light cruisers (Eugenio di Savoia [flag], Raimondo Montecuccoli, Muzio Attendolo**)
4 destroyers (Maestrale, Gioberti, Oriani, Fuciliere)
8th (Naval) Division (Navarino, Rear Adm. Raffaele de Courten)
3 light cruisers (Duca degli Abruzzi, Giuseppe Garibaldi, Emanuele Filiberto Duca d’Aosta)
5 destroyers

Submarines
18 Italian submarines
Bronzo, Ascianghi, Alagi, Dessié, Avorio, Dandolo, Emo, Cobalto,* Otaria, Axum, Asteria, Brin, Wolframio, Granito, Dagabur,* Giada,** Uarsciek, Vellela
Leader of U-boats, Italy (F.d.U. Italien) (La Spezia)
29th U-boat Flotilla
2 U-boats in western Mediterranean (U-73, U-333)
4 U-boats in eastern Mediterranean

Light Forces
Italian torpedo boats
6 MSs (2nd MS Squadron: MS 16, 22, 23, 25, 26, 31)
13 MASs (15th MAS Squadron: MAS 543, 548, 549, 563; 18th MAS Squadron: MAS 533, 553, 556, 560, 562;
20th MAS Squadron: MAS 552, 554, 557, 564)
German torpedo boats
4 S-boats (S30, S36, S58, S59)

Land-Based Aircraft
328 Italian aircraft
144th, 146th, 170th, 197th, 287th Air Squadrons (Sardinia, Sicily)
90 torpedo bombers: Savoia-Marchetti S.M.79 Sparviero
62 bombers: Savoia-Marchetti S.M.84
25 dive-bombers: Regianne Re 2001; Fiat Rosatelli CR. 42
151 fighters: Aeromacchi Castoldi MC 202, G.50 / G.50 bis A / G.50 ter
Reconnaissance aircraft: (long-range) Cant. Z 107 bis; (seaplane) Cant. Z 501/506B
456 Luftwaffe aircraft
II Air Corps (II Fliegerkorps, at Sala Consilina, 73 miles SE of Naples, Gen. Bruno Lörzer)
Stab (F)/122 (Trapani)
1.(F)/122 (Catania), Stab/JG 53 (Comiso), II./JG 53 (Comiso), I./NJG 2 (Comiso), I./NJG 2 (Heraklion, Crete),
Stab/KG 54/Kü.Fl.Gr. 806 (Catania)
X Air Corps (Athens-Kifissia, Gen. Hans Geisler)
2.(F)/123 (Greece-Crete); Jagd Sta. (Eleusis-Athens); 1./JG 53 (Greece-Crete); 2./NJG 2 (Greece); I./LG, 1/II./
LG, 1/III./LG, 1/2./SAGr, 126/1./SAGr, 126/3./SAGr 126 (Greece-Crete)
328 dive-bombers: Ju-87 B-2/D-3/R-2 Stuka
32 bombers / dive-bombers / torpedo bombers: Ju-88A/A-4, He-111
96 fighters / heavy fighters: Me-109 G-2/G-6 / Bf-109 G-2/G-6, Me-109 F-4 / Bf-109 F-4; (heavy) Me-110 C /
Bf-110C; Me-110 C-4 / Bf-110 C-4; Me-110/Bf-110

Airfields
Sicily
Augusta (seaplanes); Biscari / San Pietro,± Caltagirone,± Catania, Catania/Torazzo,§ Chinisia, Comiso, Corleone,± Enna,± Gela, Gerbini (14 satellite fields), Licata,± Marsala/Stagnone (seaplanes), Milazzo
(seaplanes), Oratel,± Pachino,± Palermo (seaplanes), Palermo / Bocca di Falco, Ragusa, Salemi,±
Sciacca,± Syracuse (seaplanes), Taormina,± Termini,± Torre di Faro,± Trapani/Milo
Sardinia
Alghero / Porto Conte (seaplanes), Borore,± Cagliari/Elmas, Cagliari/Elmas (seplanes), Cagliari/Monserrato,
Capoterra,± Casa Zeppara,± Chilivani, Decimomannu,± Milis, Olbia,± Oristano, Oristano (seaplanes), Ottana,± Pabillonis, Piscina Mendola,± Senorbi,± Tortolì, Venafiorita,± Villacidro±
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Key:
*		 sunk
**		 damaged
±		
landing strip
§ 		
satellite strip
(F) 		
Aufklärunggruppe (reconnaissance group)
Jagd Sta. 		
Jagd Station (fighter station)
JG 		
Jagdgeschwader (fighter wing)
KG 		
Kampfgeschwader (battle wing)
Kü.Fl.Gr.		
Küstenfliegergruppe (coastal air group)
LG 		
Lehrgeschwader (training wing)
NJG 		
Nachtjagdgeschwader (night-fighter wing)
SAGr 		
Seeaufklärunggruppe (naval reconnaissance group)
Stab 		
staff
Sources: Fioravanzo, Azioni navali in Mediterraneo, pp. 410–13; Llewellyn-Jones, Royal Navy and the Mediterranean
Convoys, pp. 129–31; “Operation Pedestal,” supplement, London Gazette, p. 4506; Nassigh, Operazione Mezzo
Agosto, pp. 218–22; DeZeng, Luftwaffe Airfields, pp. 8–255.

Naples, and Cagliari from D.1 to D.5. Daylight air patrols between Cavallo and
Marettimo would be flown from D.3 to D.5, dawn patrols between Sardinia and
North Africa from D.2 to D.5.123 Beaufighters would protect Force X from 1930
to dark on D.3 and from daylight on D.4 until Spitfires could take over. Torpedo
bombers would maintain readiness to attack surface ships and cover the westward
passage of Force X to Gibraltar on D.4.124 RAF aircraft based at Gibraltar would fly
an antisubmarine patrol east of the Strait of Gibraltar.125
Finally, Admiral Syfret expected the British army to support the operation by
staging an attack in Egypt. But he was disappointed—the army refused to take any
action.126 The British army never seemed to understand the importance of Malta to
ultimate Allied victory in the Mediterranean.
Axis Planning
German and Italian operational planning focused on the employment of landbased aircraft from Sicily and Sardinia. The partners prepared their plans separately but agreed to coordinate their attacks; specifically, the Luftwaffe’s II Air Corps
in Sicily coordinated its planning with the sector command of the Italian air force
in Sicily.127 The Axis plans were prepared on very short notice, because the enemy
intent was not discerned until a few days before the convoy operation started. On
August 5, reliable reports from Abwehr agents convinced CINC South, Field Marshal Kesselring, that the enemy was preparing a large-scale attempt to supply Malta
from the west.128 The Germans believed that the enemy would try to pin down
Axis forces by a simultaneous attack against the Panzer Army Africa; they assumed

MAJOR CONVOY OPERATION TO MALTA

there would be a combined sea, ground, and air attempt to capture Mersa Matrûh.
The activity of the enemy air forces in Egypt and on Malta was remarkably light,
considering their known strength; the Germans took this as a sign that preparations were being made for a large-scale operation.129 The enemy was holding forces
in reserve on Malta, probably to support the transit of a convoy through the Sicilian Narrows with fighter protection and by bombing Italian naval forces.130 At the
same time, the Germans correctly inferred the possibility of a simultaneous threat
to Crete by enemy forces in the eastern Mediterranean. Accordingly, Kesselring
directed increased readiness for Luftwaffe units on Sicily and Crete. On August 5,
the day the intelligence was received, he directed aircraft be moved from Crete to
Sardinia and Sicily.131 Kesselring also opened discussions with the Italian air force
132
about joint employment.
II Air Corps increased the combat readiness of its bombers and fighters but
planned to employ them sparingly. Kesselring directed II Air Corps also to prepare
to accommodate reinforcements from X Air Corps that would be transferred for
short-term employment. These reinforcements would, in cooperation with the Italian air force, strengthen the ground organization at Elmas, Sardinia.133
The Allies learned through ENIGMA that the Luftwaffe on Sardinia was having
difficulty with supplies, which prevented full deployment of long-range bombers
and fighters. They also learned that the Germans transferred from the eastern to
the western Mediterranean forty to forty-five long-range bombers and six twinengine fighters. This, in turn, complicated the German situation in North Africa.
Air Leader Africa had been obliged to shift from ground support to provide air
cover for the Axis convoys in the Tobruk area. However, if Field Marshal Rommel
had been engaged heavily at the time, it seems doubtful that even these limited
reinforcements could have been made available.134
The Germans observed in July 1942 the increased activity of enemy forces in the
Strait of Gibraltar area and the western Mediterranean. In their view, if the enemy
were to employ heavy and medium ships for screening convoys to Malta, they required U-boats in the western Mediterranean. Because British forces had operated
in the Majorca–Algiers area, the Operations Division of SKL (1./SKL) believed that
it was necessary to keep two U-boats in that area.135 It also insisted that the weight of
main effort (Schwerpunkt) of U-boat employment should be in the eastern Mediterranean. Now, however, because of the increased threat Malta posed to the Axis supply
traffic to North Africa, SKL directed four U-boats be redeployed from the eastern to
the western Mediterranean. (In the event, they were not on station in time to attack
the convoy.) What the Germans considered strong enemy defenses made employment of U-boats west of longitude 2° east difficult; accordingly, they were deployed
on the Ibiza–Algiers line. The plan was to send one U-boat out of La Spezia each day
from August 1 to the 3rd. The Germans had four U-boats deployed in the eastern
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MAJOR CONVOY OPERATION TO MALTA

Mediterranean. It was also thought desirable to employ U-boats jointly with the Italian submarines. However, that could not be done effectively, because a message from
an Italian submarine to the U-boats required, on average, four hours to arrive.136
In Rome, Supermarina considered four options the enemy might pursue: first,
to use superior naval strength in direct escort of the convoy; second, to sortie the
main battle force to lure the Italians to react in kind; third, to use a strong covering
force to force a passage north of Pantelleria (whereas the Allies planned, instead,
to turn the covering force westward at the entrance to Skerki Bank); and fourth, to
attack the Italian airfields on Sardinia with carrier-based aircraft.137
The Axis operational idea was simpler than that of the Allies (see map 9). The
Germans and Italians essentially followed the same script they had used against
a Malta convoy in September 1941 (Operation HALBERD). There would be joint,
special air reconnaissance of the western Mediterranean by Italian and Luftwaffe
aircraft on August 11 and 12.138 Also, Italian and German aircraft on Sicily and Sardinia, Italian submarines and German U-boats, Italian and German torpedo boats,
and minefields would form successive barriers. These four barriers were intended
to cause the convoy to disperse, allowing a powerful cruiser-destroyer force to attack successfully.139
The Germans and Italians planned the main air attack on the convoy for August 12, south of Sardinia, when fighter escorts would be available to the bombers.140 There would be twenty-two torpedo bombers, 125 dive-bombers, and forty
high-level bombers, all in a tightly synchronized attack. The Italian air force would
deliver the main attack; the Luftwaffe would attack in two waves.141 The principal
objective would be the aircraft carriers (the enemy operational center of gravity, in
operational terms), to render them unable to intervene when the Italian heavy surface forces closed in.142 The Italians planned to deploy eighteen submarines in the
western Mediterranean.143 Seven Italian submarines and two (not four as originally
planned) U-boats would be deployed along the convoy’s estimated route south of
the Balearics, between longitudes 1° 40ʹ and 2° 40ʹ east.144 Ten Italian boats would
be deployed between the Fratelli Rocks and the northern entrance to Skerki Bank.145
Some of these boats would operate in cooperation with aircraft northwest of Cape
Bon.146 One Italian submarine would patrol west of Malta, another off Navarino,
and three more about a hundred miles west-southwest of Crete.147
The Germans and Italians assumed that the enemy convoy would have a stronger screen than they had in June. However, they did not expect the enemy to use
battleships.148 The Italian plan had the 3rd and 7th (Naval) Divisions joining about
a hundred miles north of Marettimo (westernmost of the Aegadian Islands) in the
afternoon of August 12 and then sailing on an intercept course south of Pantelleria through the night.149 Both would attack the remnants of the convoy and its
direct screen (Force X) south of Pantelleria at first light on August 13.150 The Italian
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planners based this timing on the possibility that Axis aircraft could provide effective cover with fighters, because of the larger number of enemy aircraft based on
Malta. Any enemy convoy from Egypt would be dealt with by the 8th (Naval) Division, based at Navarino.151
However, the issue of providing strong air support to the Italian heavy surface
forces was hotly debated between Kesselring and Mussolini and the Italian high
command. The problem was that there were not enough fighters to escort bombers
and torpedo bombers and provide air support to surface ships at the same time.152
Mussolini personally favored cover for surface forces but ultimately decided in
favor of fighter escorts for the bombers.153 The Italian chief of the General Staff,
Marshal Ugo Cavallero, believed the Italian surface forces should be employed, but
154
Supermarina was unwilling to do so without air cover. Admiral Weichold ar155
gued that the Luftwaffe should provide that air cover. However, Kesselring did
not agree.156 Reportedly, Kesselring was convinced not only that there were too few
fighters but that, based on the experience of the second battle of Sirte, of March 22,
1942, and the encounter off Pantelleria on June 15, the Italian heavy cruisers would
fail with or without air cover.157 Ultimately, the Germans used the pretext of lack of
fuel to refuse to provide air cover for the Italian heavy surface forces.158
As for other arms, the Axis planned to have nineteen Italian MAS (motoscafo
armato silurante) boats and four German Schnellbooten (fast torpedo-armed boats,
or S-boats) attack the convoy, for which they would wait off Cape Bon, Pantelleria,
and south of Marettimo.159 Also, between June 1940 and April 1942 the Italians
had laid 2,320 mines between Cape Granitola (the southwestern tip of Sicily) and
Pantelleria; 1,020 between Pantelleria and Ras el Mustafa, Tunisia; 6,880 between
the Aegadians and Cape Bon; and 1,040 between Bizerte and Keith Reef.160 One
Italian destroyer would lay more mines in the Sicilian Narrows during the night of
August 12.161
Opposing Forces
The entire resupply operation to Malta was under the command of Acting Vice Admiral Syfret (see “Allied Order of Battle” sidebar).162 He was in command of Force
F, composed of the convoy and direct-screen and distant-cover forces. Assigned
to the operation was a collection of ships from the Home Fleet and Eastern Fleet.
Submarines deployed in the eastern Mediterranean were subordinate to CINC of
the Mediterranean Fleet, in Haifa. Most of the land-based aircraft were controlled
by the RAF’s Middle East Command.
Supporting naval forces were divided into four force elements, designated Forces
Z, X, Y, and R. Force Z, led by Syfret himself, consisted of two battleships and three
large aircraft carriers (with seventy-two fighters and twenty-eight torpedo bombers), three cruisers, and the 19th Destroyer Flotilla, with fifteen destroyers. Force X,
under Rear Adm. H. M. Burrough, was composed of three light cruisers and one
AA ship of the 10th Cruiser Flotilla, eleven destroyers of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla,
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and one ocean tug.163 Two of these cruisers, Nigeria and Cairo, were fitted for fighter
direction.164 An additional five destroyers were assigned to provide antisubmarine
escort for the convoy during its transit from Britain to the Strait of Gibraltar.165
Force Y, at Malta, consisted of two freighters and two destroyers. Force
R(efueling) was composed of two fleet oilers and one ocean tug, plus four corvettes for escort.166 Malta Escort Force (the 17th Minesweeping Flotilla) consisted
of four minesweepers and seven motor launches. In addition, the Admiralty assigned eight destroyers as reserves; they were intended to provide escort for Force
R and a screen for the carrier Furious.167
The Germans and Italians possessed substantial and diverse forces in the theater, sufficient to inflict heavy losses on the Allied convoy and its covering forces.
The Italians had available for the operation 328 aircraft (ninety torpedo bombers,
sixty-two bombers, twenty-five dive-bombers, and 151 fighters), the Germans 456
(328 dive-bombers, thirty-two high-level bombers, and ninety-six fighters).168 (See
the sidebar for details of the Axis order of battle.) The German II Air Corps mainly
supported the Panzer Army Africa. Some twenty Ju-88s from two air groups of X
Air Corps on Crete moved to Sicily on August 11 and were ready for action the next
morning. Eight more Ju-88s from Crete flew to Sicily on August 12, after completing convoy escort duties in the Aegean. However, most of the torpedo bombers,
whose crews were newly trained, moved from the Mediterranean to Norway in
June 1942 and did not return in time for the operation.169
The Italian navy had theoretically available four battleships, three heavy and
ten light cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, twenty-eight torpedo boats, and sixtyfour submarines. However, the Italians were unable to deploy most of these, lacking fuel and adequate air cover. The Italian navy had received twelve thousand
tons of fuel in June 1942—only about one-fifth the amount consumed by convoys
(fuel reserves then amounted to about 121,000 tons); its battleships were directed
to transfer their fuel to the escorts. Because of this shortage, Mussolini suggested to
Hitler that further enemy attempts to supply Malta be opposed using submarines
and land-based aircraft alone.170
Supermarina planned to employ for the pending operation three cruiserdestroyer formations: the 3rd (Naval) Division, with three heavy cruisers and seven
destroyers; the 7th (Naval) Division, with three light cruisers and four destroyers;
and the 8th (Naval) Division, with three light cruisers and five destroyers. The Italians also had eighteen submarines in the western Mediterranean. Nineteen torpedo
boats (six motoscafo silurante [MS] and thirteen of the larger MAS) were based
within striking range of the Sicilian Narrows. The Germans had available two Uboats and four S-boats.171
EXECUTION
Operation PEDESTAL consisted of four related phases (map 10): assembly of the convoy at the Clyde River estuary, in Scotland, and transit to Gibraltar; from Gibraltar
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Map 10
Operation PEDESTAL: execution,
August 10–15, 1942

MAJOR CONVOY OPERATION TO MALTA

to the Sicilian Narrows; from the Narrows to Valletta, Malta; and return of the
distant- and direct-screening forces to Gibraltar.
The movements of the support groups for PEDESTAL started on July 31, when the
carrier Victorious with its escorts sortied from Scapa Flow.172 On August 6–9 all three
large carriers and their escorts conducted an exercise (Operation BERSERK) between
the Azores and Gibraltar. The main purpose was to rehearse fighter direction and
cooperation among the three carriers.173 Taking part were Force M, from the United
Kingdom (Victorious, the cruiser Sirius, and three destroyers); Force K from Freetown, Sierra Leone (Indomitable, the cruiser Phoebe, three destroyers, and two corvettes); Force J from Gibraltar (Eagle, the cruiser Charybdis, and three destroyers);
and Force W from Freetown (one fleet oiler and two corvettes).174
Prior to the sortie from the Clyde, Admiral Burrough, the Force X commander,
held a meeting on board his flagship with the masters of all the merchant ships and
explained the plan in detail. Convoy WS.5.21.S, escorted by the light cruisers Nigeria (Burrough’s flagship) and Kenya and several destroyers, sailed during the night
of August 2/3 and joined the main body the next morning.175 On August 9, Force R
left Gibraltar and sailed to a position south of Majorca, Balearics.
The assembled Force F passed through the Strait of Gibraltar between 0245 and
0500 on August 10 (D.1) in a dense fog, visibility only about 650 feet.176 The transit,
however, was uneventful. Admiral Syfret believed at the time that because of the
fog and the moonless night enemy agents were unlikely to have observed the Allied
convoy; subsequently, however, he would acknowledge later reports that showed
the enemy was “fully cognizant of our passage of the strait.”177 By 0600 the Germans
had the information: some twenty-four ships had entered the Strait of Gibraltar
from the west, without lights. They also knew that in Gibraltar were a cruiser, eight
destroyers (two under repair), five submarines (one under repair), two auxiliary
cruisers, twenty-two freighters, and seven tankers.178 A German agent reported that
between 0000 and 0200 on August 10 some fifty enemy ships of various sizes had
transited the strait. At 0700, the carrier Argus and four destroyers were (mistakenly) reported in Gibraltar.179 At about 0800, B-Dienst reported that during the
night of August 9/10 an enemy convoy sailing in three groups had passed through
the strait on an easterly course.180
At 1130, after the visibility in the area had improved, an Italian agent reported the
presence of the cruiser Cairo and destroyers.181 Also at about 1130, the Tetuán station
(in Morocco) was directed to pass sighting reports from Alborán Island to Madrid.182
Around noon on August 10, Supermarina too received information that fiftyseven British ships had transited the Strait of Gibraltar eastbound.183 One hour later
the Italians concluded that a large number of enemy warships and merchant vessels, including six large warships, had passed into the Mediterranean during the
night.184 The Italians assigned five air squadrons to reconnoiter the sea area west
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of Sardinia. Seven Italian submarines and two German U-boats were sent to patrol
north of Algiers.185
At 1245 on August 10, Luftwaffe aircraft reported that the enemy convoy was
about seventy nautical miles north of Algiers. The main group was composed of
three battleships, probably of the Nelson class (actually this class comprised only
two ships, Rodney and Nelson). The convoy was accompanied by three carriers,
including what the Germans erroneously believed was USS Wasp, plus twenty to
twenty-five cruisers and destroyers, and twenty large steamers trailing westward of
the van. A separate group of six destroyers was reported to be some seventy-five
nautical miles northwest of Algiers.186
On the afternoon of August 10, Kesselring learned, on the basis of visual observations from Tarifa and Ceuta, that a large enemy convoy, forty to fifty units including possibly two carriers and nineteen freighters, had entered the Mediterranean.
The enemy convoy was on an easterly course and sailing at a speed of thirteen or
fourteen knots. The Germans estimated the convoy would be south of Majorca, in
the Balearic Islands, by 0600 on August 11 and south of Sardinia at about 0600 the
next day.187
At 1700 on August 10, a Vichy French aircraft reported two aircraft carriers,
two battleships, two light cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and twelve merchant vessels
forty-two nautical miles north-northwest from Cape D’Aiguille (some twenty miles
northeast of Oran) on an easterly course.188 (This report was intercepted by Allied
intelligence analysts.)189
German naval intelligence situation analysis at 1800 asserted that given radio
traffic and the enemy ship movements there was a possibility of a “large English
combined operation from the west and the east.” A German agent in Gibraltar reported the movement of some fifty ships including three passenger liners and warships between 0000 and 0200 on the 10th and the arrival of the carrier Argus and
four destroyers at 0700. An Italian agent in Gibraltar reported the arrival of the
cruiser Cairo.190 The observation station at Melilla on the North African coast reported that by 1800 there were no enemy ships in sight. Madrid placed its agents at
both Tangier and Ceuta in a state of increased alertness.191 At 1815, some forty-seven
nautical miles east of Alborán, German aircraft sighted two enemy destroyers.192
At 1800 on August 10, the Italians believed that an enemy force consisting of
one battleship, two aircraft carriers, four cruisers, twenty-three torpedo craft, and
nineteen merchantmen were present in the western Mediterranean.193 They assumed that the British carrier-based aircraft would attack the Italian air bases on
Sardinia. Supermarina estimated that the enemy convoy would transit longitude
10° east at noon on August 11 and reach Cape Bon around noon on the 12th.194
During the following night, the convoy would pass through the Sicilian Narrows in
the area of Pantelleria.195
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German aircraft sighted at 1900 on August 10, forty-two nautical miles north
(bearing 004°) of Cape D’Aiguille, two enemy carriers, two battleships, two cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and twelve steamers steaming eastward.196 A French report
had placed the same formation at 1700 forty-two nautical miles northwest (bearing
334°) of Oran. At 1815 two enemy destroyers were detected forty-seven miles east
of Alborán.197
From air reconnaissance reports, Kesselring directed II Air Corps to put its
long-range bombers in the highest state of combat readiness. He also ordered preparations for the transfer of aircraft, including fighters, from Sicily to Sardinia. Kesselring transferred the Ju-88 torpedo-bomber squadron at Grosseto, in Tuscany, to
Catania, Sicily. However, because of the shortage of fuel on Crete, it was not possible to use German transport aircraft to carry personnel and torpedoes to Sicily
on August 11. Italian fighter aircraft would be transferred from Sicily to Sardinia.
It was also decided that the Italian fleet would operate against the convoy, as it had
against HARPOON in mid-June.198
On August 10, the Allies learned from radio intercepts that during the night of
August 9/10 the Italian Admiralty (Supermarina) had reported, from preliminary
information, that on August 8 British naval forces consisting of one or two carriers, possibly one battleship, four cruisers, twenty-three torpedo craft, and nineteen
merchant vessels had been moving westward toward the central Mediterranean.199
They also learned that during the morning of August 10 the Luftwaffe had reconnoitered between Crete and North Africa as far as Port Said.200 The Allies also knew
that in the evening of August 10 orders were given to fly twenty-five Luftwaffe
aircraft from Greece to Catania, with absolute priority. Luftwaffe planes and Italian
fighters were also being deployed to Sardinia.201
The Germans and Italians had fairly accurate knowledge of the operational situation in the eastern Mediterranean. In particular, British radio traffic revealed to
the Germans the movements of British forces in the eastern Mediterranean, which
indicated they were operating in conjunction with those in the west. On August 10,
German reconnaissance reported intense enemy activity in the eastern Mediterranean. There were four enemy cruisers and ten destroyers about 150 nautical miles
off Port Said on a westerly course and in Alexandria a destroyer, six smaller naval
vessels, and thirteen steamers.202 Luftwaffe reconnaissance detected at the Suez anchorage five destroyers, one repair ship, and one Southampton-class cruiser.203
The first report on the enemy convoy itself on August 11 was received by the
Germans at 0450. It was based on a report (mentioned earlier) from a Vichy French
civilian aircraft made at 1900 on August 10. (It was transmitted to the Germans
through the Armistice Commission.)204 This report had been passed from Algiers
to Toulon in French naval cipher at 1940 on August 10. By 0600 on August 11 German air units in Africa and Sicily had that information.205 By then the Allied convoy
was south of the Balearics, headed toward Cape Bon.206
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On August 11 and 12, the Italian air force organized, in cooperation with the
Luftwaffe, reconnaissance of the entire western Mediterranean.207 At about 0620
on August 11, a U-boat sighted the enemy convoy and its screen. At 0815, a German aircraft reported the convoy approximately ninety-five miles northwest of
Algiers.208 However, other German sources say it was not located by German observers until 0910, when it was near Cape Ténès (about a hundred miles west
of Algiers).209 Afterward and throughout the day, Ju-88 bombers at twenty and
twenty-four thousand feet maintained continuous contact with the enemy convoy
and its covering groups.210
Nevertheless, the Germans apparently did not have a completely clear picture
of the operational situation on August 11. Their reconnaissance reports were often
contradictory with respect to the position and composition of the convoy and its
screening forces. For example, at 1021 a German aircraft reported that the enemy
force was divided into three groups, all sailing easterly. The first of these, the main
force, composed of probably two (possibly three) carriers, twenty to twenty-five
cruisers and destroyers, and twenty merchant vessels, was some forty nautical miles
southeast of Formentera Island (near Ibiza, in the Balearics). The second group—
one carrier (Eagle), four cruisers, seven destroyers, and one large merchant ship—
was seventy nautical miles north of Algiers. At about 1220 the third group, six destroyers, was sixty-five miles southeast of Formentera.211 Another German aircraft
report also described three groups but with different compositions: one, with a
carrier, four cruisers, seven destroyers, and an unidentified unit, seventy-two nautical miles from Algiers at 1240; the second, with three carriers (including possibly
Wasp), three battleships (including possibly Rodney and Nelson), twenty to twentyfive cruisers and destroyers, and twenty merchant ships larger than eight thousand
tons, ninety-eight nautical miles west-northwest (bearing 326°) of Algiers at 1021;
and the third, with six destroyers, some seventy-five nautical miles west-northwest
(bearing 321°) from Algiers at 1220, steaming northeasterly (070°) at between ten
and twenty-three knots. At 1746, the enemy’s main group was north of (bearing
22°) and some ninety miles from Algiers.212
Thus, once the convoy was positively identified, the Germans and Italians had reacted quickly to move submarines and warships to the western and central Mediterranean. The Luftwaffe and the Italian air force had quickly shifted their main efforts
from the eastern to the western and central basins.213 The 3rd, 7th, and 8th Italian
(Naval) Divisions received orders to be in readiness for combat.214 Allied cryptanalysts learned that in the early morning on August 11, ten torpedo-carrying Ju-88s
had been transferred from Grosseto to Catania.215 Also that morning of August 11
they learned of a sighting by a French aircraft the afternoon before of two enemy
carriers, two battleships, two cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and twelve merchant
ships off Cape Ferrat (north of Oran).216 At about noon on August 11 the convoy
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was in fact about seventy-five miles south of Majorca and zigzagging eastward. The
French intelligence service in Algiers observed the convoy off that city at 1300, proceeding east, and so informed German agents in Casablanca.217
BELLOWS, the RAF reinforcement of Malta, was executed between 1230 and
1515 on August 11 from approximately 585 miles out. Out of thirty-eight Spitfires
that flew off from Furious, all but one reached Malta safely.218 On the way back to
Gibraltar one of the destroyers escorting Furious sank an Italian submarine.219
The Allies had learned from decrypted ENIGMA messages that on August 11 the
II Air Corps and the Italian Air Command, Sardinia and Sicily had received orders
to attack the convoy early on August 12, before it reached Malta. All Axis shipping
traffic in the Sicilian Narrows had been suspended.220 Also on the 11th they read
an intercept in which Kesselring averred that if a British threat to Crete existed at
all it could not materialize before August 14.221 Allied intelligence read the results
of a Luftwaffe reconnaissance of Alexandria, Port Said, and Malta on August 10.222
Finally for the 11th, the Allies knew that twenty Ju-88 bombers were to move from
Crete to Sicily.223
The Allies learned from ENIGMA decrypts that at 1155 on August 11 the Italian light cruisers Eugenio di Savoia and Raimondo Montecuccoli (7th Division) at
Cagliari had been placed by Supermarina at two hours’ notice from 1800 on (both
cruisers, in fact, would leave Cagliari at that time, with two destroyers). These
cruisers, together with heavy cruisers Bolzano and Gorizia at Messina, were informed at 1300 that Italian submarines were in an area sixty miles long and forty
wide north of Bizerte. Three Italian submarines, ENIGMA further disclosed, had left
Cagliari at 2045. Light cruisers Raimondo Montecuccoli and Eugenio di Savoia and
two destroyers sailed on an easterly course.224
The Italian plan was to assemble the three heavy cruisers of the Messina group
with eleven destroyers in the Tyrrhenian Sea for a joint foray toward Pantelleria
early in the morning on August 13.225 The Navarino group of three light cruisers and
five destroyers—one of them the German destroyer Z.G. 3 (or Hermes, ex-Greek
Vasilefs Georgios)—would be in readiness against the eastern British group.226 The
Italians doubted that their battleships could be employed: only one battleship was
fully fueled, and no destroyers were available for their protection. They believed
that the cruisers would be sufficient to deal with the British light forces. However,
a sole Italian battleship would not be able to counter the British heavy ships.227 In
case of a British attack on the Libyan coast, both cruiser groups would be employed
in defense.228
Both U-boats on patrol in the western Mediterranean received orders to attack
the enemy convoy. Six Italian submarines were in a waiting position north of Algiers, one north of Bizerte. The Italians had twelve submarines between Bizerte and
Cape Bon. In addition, one submarine was deployed southwest of Malta and five off
Genoa, in case the enemy attempted a landing or bombardment.229
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The Italian plan was to send torpedo boats during the night of August 12/13
south of the newly laid mine barrier, within French territorial waters.230 Also, five
German S-boats based at Porto Empedocle, on the southern shore of Sicily, were
to operate north of Cape Bon, while the Italian MASs would operate eastward of
the cape.231 On August 11, the Germans sent two more S-boats in Soudha Bay to
Empedocle. The same order was given to the S-boats in Augusta, Sicily. The two
in Mersa Matrûh remained there, at the disposal of the commander in North
Africa.232
In the meantime, the Allies had suffered a major loss on August 11, when at
about 1315 U-73 penetrated the screen and fired four torpedoes at the carrier Eagle
(27,230 tons full load), about eighty miles north of Algiers (latitude 38° 5ʹ north,
233
longitude 3° 3ʹ east). The carrier sank in only eight minutes, with heavy loss of
life and all its aircraft.234
B-Dienst reported that at about 1807 the enemy convoy, twenty-one merchant
ships, was some eighty-five nautical miles north-northeast of Algiers and had
been joined by three carriers, two battleships, six cruisers, and twenty destroyers.
At 1955, German aircraft reported one carrier and five cruisers or destroyers plus
one steamer seventy-seven nautical miles north of Algiers on a south-southeasterly
course at ten knots.235
At 1425 on August 11 the convoy’s main body was about seventy nautical miles
north of Algiers. German aircraft counted three carriers (including Furious and
Wasp), the two Nelson-class battleships, four light cruisers, eleven destroyers, twenty merchant ships, and one tanker. Aircraft also reported north of Algiers another
enemy group, composed of a carrier, probably one battleship, two cruisers, fifteen
destroyers, and eight merchant ships.236
At 2045 (one hour after sunset), when the convoy was about two hundred miles
west of Sardinia, thirty-six German Ju-88 bombers and He-111 torpedo bombers carried out several attacks. The Ju-88s dove from about eight thousand feet to between
two and three thousand. Thanks to the convoy’s strong AA defenses, no ship was
hit.237 At 2010 and 2135, Allied Liberators and Beaufighters attacked the Axis airfields
near Cagliari and inflicted some damage.238 During the night of August 11/12 (or one
day before the anticipated passage of the convoy) an Italian destroyer laid a temporary minefield (i.e., to be active for only seventy-two hours) in French waters between
Cape Bon and Ras el Mirh (adjacent to Kélibia, about twenty miles southeast).239
During the morning of the 11th, the X Air Corps had ordered a comprehensive
reconnaissance of the eastern Mediterranean east of longitude 25° east.240 One of
those aircraft sighted four cruisers and ten destroyers southwest of Cyprus, moving
west.241 The same group was sighted at 1700 by a U-boat 155 nautical miles west of
Haifa, still on a westerly course. These reports suggested to the Germans that another major enemy operation was possible, this one in the eastern Mediterranean.
However, comprehensive air reconnaissance on August 12 sighted no major enemy
forces in the eastern basin.242
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The Abwehr had unconfirmed information that on August 12 several freighters
at Alexandria were loaded and ready to sail for Malta. This report, coupled with
several sightings of submarines off Italian and Greek ports, led the Italians to believe
that the enemy movement in the western Mediterranean was more than just a relief
convoy to Malta.243 Indeed, Allied intelligence learned on August 11 that the Panzer
Army Africa believed that the convoy posed a direct threat to Tobruk. Kesselring
too believed that the enemy might attempt to land on the North African coast. The
Germans therefore put their forces in North Africa on the highest alert.244
At 0020 on August 12, the Allies learned from ENIGMA intercepts that Italian
intelligence believed that four enemy cruisers, ten destroyers, and part of the convoy from Gibraltar might be headed for the eastern Mediterranean.245 Later that
morning Allied intelligence read ENIGMA messages in which the Germans claimed
that the Luftwaffe aircraft operating from Sicily had made direct hits with two twothousand-pound bombs on an enemy aircraft carrier, one five-hundred-pound
bomb had hit what was believed to be an aircraft carrier, a cruiser had been hit
by a torpedo, and a large enemy merchant ship had been hit by a two-thousandpounder. A cruiser and a destroyer were possibly on fire.246 The Allies also read that
Supermarina had suspended until further notice sailings of Axis ships from Africa
to Italy or Greece.247
The Allies also intercepted and decoded operation orders issued for the 12th by
the II Air Corps to the 77th Fighter Wing, at Elmas, on Sardinia. The wing was to
expect an enemy formation approaching the Sicilian Narrows early that morning.
The II Air Corps would cooperate with the Italian air force in Sicily and Sardinia
from the early morning of the 12th, operating in waves with fighter escorts.248
On August 12, Allied decrypts indicated that during the evening of August 11
Supermarina was informed of the sighting of four enemy cruisers and ten destroyers south of Cyprus proceeding west. The Italians concluded (erroneously) that
part of the convoy from Gibraltar would proceed west (into the Atlantic). They
also considered employing a single German destroyer (Z.G. 3) jointly with the 6th
(Naval) Division in Navarino if the latter were called on to operate. This division
was put on three hours’ notice for action until further orders.249
Allied intelligence decrypted an ENIGMA message in which Göring informed
Kesselring on August 12 that the destruction of the Malta convoy was of vital importance, and the destruction of aircraft carriers and transports should be the first
priority.250 Allied analysts also learned that the same day Kesselring had issued an
order of the day that, among other things, stated that “for the third time the English
with very strong forces were trying to break through the Sicilian Straits and that it
was possible they would attempt landing in order to influence the military situation
in North Africa.” He insisted that “this must not be allowed to happen. If the British were successful lives of many Germans, which had already been lost in Africa
would have been in vain.”251
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On August 12, the Germans believed that “landings on the African coast between Tripoli and Benghazi were likely on the 13th and 14th in view of very strong
Malta convoy which was attempting to pass through the Sicilian Channel.”252 Hence,
Kesselring decided to deploy fighter aircraft and dive-bombers from Sicily and to
move ammunition and fuel to Castel Benito (near Tripoli).253 A single-engine-fighter
squadron and long-range bombers at Derna would be moved to Benghazi or Tripoli
as necessary. The Germans increased readiness of the Ju-52 transport aircraft.254 Aviation fuel would be transported to Benghazi by all available aircraft—flying without
fighter escort—and Tripoli would be supplied with ammunition and fuel by using
all available transport aircraft and an Italian submarine.255 The Panzer Army Africa
held motorized detachments ready to repel landings. It moved some forces to the
Sollum–Mersa Matrûh area to defend the coast east of Tobruk with three large motorized groups of artillery. Additional troops were prepared for deployment. (These
measures were lifted on August 13 in the light of the success in the attacks on the
convoy).256 In the morning of August 12, the convoy was north of Cape Bougarouni
(Cap Bougaron today, Algeria).257 German and Italian aircraft started to shadow
Force F at 0500 on August 12.258 At about 0610, the Allied carriers launched twelve
fighters to protect the convoy. That number of aircraft was maintained throughout
the day.259 At 0830, intercepts of German radio indicated the presence of two Allied
destroyers and merchant ships some thirty nautical miles west of La Galite on a
westerly course.260
The first attack, carried out by twenty or more Ju-88s, came at about 0915. The
German aircraft were intercepted by FAA fighters some twenty-five miles from the
convoy and inflicted no damage. The Allies claimed eight enemy planes were shot
down.261 At 1100 German aircraft assessed that the convoy consisted of two or three
battleships, two carriers, five cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, and nineteen merchant
ships, including a passenger ship, and passing eastward fifty nautical miles north of
Cape Bon at thirteen to fifteen knots. The convoy was dispersed over a large area.262
At about noon on August 12, some seventy enemy aircraft based on Sardinia,
with a strong fighter escort, approached the convoy. At 1215, the first wave, some ten
Italian torpedo bombers using new parachute-dropped “circling” (pattern-running)
torpedoes, attacked the convoy.263 They did not score any hits. They were followed
by a few German fighter-bombers. The main attack, by forty-two Italian torpedo
bombers, was to have followed after a five-minute interval, but was not carried out
for thirty minutes. The torpedo bombers had been reduced to between twenty-five
and thirty machines when they reached their targets at 1245. They scored no hits,
because of the skillful maneuvering of the convoy.264
The Italian torpedo bombers were followed at 1315 by some twenty German
dive-bombers. Their attack was broken up by the Allied fighters, and only twelve
penetrated to the convoy. However, these hit and heavily damaged a merchant ship,
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Deucalion. At 1345, Italian aircraft attacked the carrier Victorious without result.
Axis losses in the 1315 and 1345 attacks were nine aircraft to Allied fighters and
two shot down by the ships’ AA defenses.265
Allied intelligence at this point concluded (erroneously) that the combination
of a large convoy with strong naval forces from Gibraltar and a feint in the eastern
Mediterranean had induced great uncertainty and apprehension along the entire
North African coast and on Crete, lest a landing take place. The Germans had been
obliged to take several precautionary measures. Yet in fact the Germans recognized
by August 11, as has been seen, that Crete could not be threatened before August
14, and the Allies saw little indication that the Germans were much concerned
about the possibility.266
B-Dienst reported that at 1700 on the 12th the convoy was twenty-six nautical miles northeast of Cape Bon steaming eastward at sixteen knots.267 At 1820 it
plotted the main body of the Allied convoy near Bizerte.268 Between 1800 and 1850
about eighty German and twenty Italian torpedo bombers attacked. Three bombs
struck the carrier Indomitable, and two or three were near misses. As a result, Indomitable was unable to operate aircraft, but it continued steaming at twenty-eight
and a half knots.269 An aerial torpedo hit and heavily damaged the destroyer Foresight, which was subsequently sunk by the British.270
The Allies learned from ENIGMA messages that the Luftwaffe had been informed at 1830 on August 12 that an S-boat flotilla of five (actually four) boats had
left Porto Empedocle at 1600 on a westerly course for Cape Bon. After completing
their mission, the S-boats would leave Cape Bon at about 0430 on August 13, run
on a northerly course as far as latitude 39° north, turn south toward Marettimo, and
then hug the coast to Augusta.271
In general, that evening the Allies’ situation looked promising. Eagle had been lost
to a U-boat, but the mass air attacks south of Sardinia had damaged just one merchant
ship and, among warships, only the carrier Indomitable, lightly, and one destroyer,
heavily.272 However, things would change radically for the worse later that night.
Admiral Syfret had intended that Admiral Lyster’s Force Z would turn back to the
west upon reaching Skerki Bank at 1915, and he had informed the fleet accordingly.
However, because of a twenty-minute delay in reaching that point (because of the
enemy air attacks) Syfret decided to turn back at 1855. He believed further air attacks
prior to darkness were unlikely. Syfret was wrong in that, and wrong too in assuming that after the convoy reached Skerki Bank the threat from submarines would be
eliminated. In his view, the greatest dangers were aircraft by day and torpedo boats
by night. Soon after Force Z reversed course, at 1855, Ju-87s attacked Force X and the
convoy. The convoy was obliged to change the formation from five columns to four
columns at the entrance of Skerki Channel; at 2000, just as it was doing so, an Italian submarine, Axum, torpedoed the light cruisers Nigeria and Cairo and the tanker
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Ohio. Nigeria, damaged, was directed to head to Gibraltar escorted by two destroyers
(and later by a third). Ohio was heavily damaged but remained afloat and was taken
under tow. Cairo was abandoned and eventually sank.273
In the aftermath of the submarine attacks, as several destroyers were helping
damaged ships, at 2030 some twenty Ju-88 bombers and torpedo bombers attacked
again. To compound the problem, fighters from Malta were fired on by Allied
ships. The convoy was protected by only six Beaufighters. The German aircraft
hit two merchant ships, Empire Hope and Clan Ferguson, with bombs and another,
Brisbane Star, with torpedoes. Empire Hope had to be sunk, and Clan Ferguson blew
up, but Brisbane Star would eventually reach Malta.274
Owing to the submarine and air attacks, the convoy was now widely dispersed.
The light cruisers Kenya and Manchester, two merchant ships, and three minesweeping destroyers (Intercept, Icarus, and Fury) sailed ahead along the convoy’s
intended track across Skerki Bank. One destroyer, Pathfinder, was rounding up the
remaining nine merchant ships, spread over several miles to the northwestward.275
At 2112 Kenya was torpedoed by an Italian submarine; it was damaged but remained with the convoy. The already heavily damaged Deucalion was torpedoed
and sunk by the destroyer Bramham at 2212 near the Cani Rocks in the Sicilian
Narrows.276 At 2230, the rest of the convoy was near Cape Bon.277
Because of the loss of Nigeria and Cairo, Admiral Syfret decided to reinforce
Force X by detaching to it one light cruiser, Charybdis, and two destroyers, Eskimo
and Somali, from Force Z. However, the latter was already far to the west, and it
would take these reinforcements several hours to join. Force X’s situation was critical. Syfret had information on the approach of enemy surface forces from the north.
That force was reported at 1922 to be some ninety miles north of Marettimo.278
The Allies intercepted a Luftwaffe report at 1955 of damage probably inflicted
on a carrier, five light cruisers, and one merchant ship. Later in the evening, the
Luftwaffe reported hits on two enemy carriers and probably a cruiser and a destroyer. A ship had been seen afire. A merchant ship larger than twenty thousand
tons had been hit with heavy bombs by Luftwaffe and Italian aircraft. The Italians
probably hit one cruiser and two merchant ships.279 By decrypting ENIGMA messages, Allied intelligence learned that the Germans believed they had damaged an
aircraft carrier, a cruiser, a destroyer, and a twenty-thousand-ton merchant ship.280
While the German and Italian bombers and submarines were attacking, Supermarina executed its plan for intercepting the convoy. The Allies read in intercepted messages that the eight-inch-gun cruiser Trieste had sailed southward from
a northern Tyrrhenian port during the night of August 11/12. Between 0840 and
1000 on the 12th, the eight-inch cruisers Bolzano and Gorizia had left Messina with
four destroyers and steamed northward, and at 0930, the six-inch cruiser Muzio
Attendolo, with two destroyers, had sailed from Naples.
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ENIGMA further indicated that an (unidentified) Italian naval force received orders at 1835 on August 12 to proceed south at twenty knots and join with other
forces ninety miles north of Trapani. Allied analysts inferred correctly that these
orders had been addressed to the cruisers based at Messina and Cagliari. The Allies
also read Supermarina’s orders at 1945 to the cruiser divisions to be ten miles east
of Pantelleria at 0530 the next morning. Supermarina also informed the cruiser
force that all Italian torpedo boats, thirteen torpedo-armed MASs and six MSs, and
four German S-boats, would patrol from south of Marettimo to Cape Bon, keeping
west of longitude 11° 40ʹ east, until dawn on August 13, when they would proceed
toward Pantelleria. At 2200, the cruiser force was directed to reduce speed so as
not to arrive off San Vito, northeast of Trapani, before midnight on August 12/13.
However, at 2345 on the 12th, the Italians abruptly abandoned this operation.
The light cruisers Eugenio di Savoia and Raimondo Montecuccoli, with three destroyers, received orders to proceed to Naples, the heavy cruisers Gorizia, Bolzano,
and Trieste, the light cruiser Muzio Attendolo, and the remaining destroyers to Messina.281 Supermarina now directed the 7th (Naval) Division to move into the Ionian
Sea in indirect support of the 3rd Division. Eventually that too was reversed and
the 7th Division returned to its base.282
The British official history would later claim that the reason Supermarina aborted the operation was probably an RAF demonstration meant to give the impression that a much larger Allied striking force was on the way.283 An Italian source
argues (implausibly) that the problem was inadequate combat readiness of the
Italian ships.284 However, what really forced Supermarina to abandon the operation was lack of air support for its cruiser/destroyer force. As Admiral Weichold,
the German liaison to Supermarina, had been told, there were enough Luftwaffe
and Italian fighter aircraft to protect either the bombers or surface forces but not
both.285 Weichold had argued that if the choice were not in favor of the warships a
great opportunity would be lost to obtain numerical and weapon superiority, after
the withdrawal of the enemy heavy covering forces, and therewith to destroy the
convoy.286 In the event, so it was.
To avoid enemy minefields in the Sicilian Narrows, the convoy’s route had been
laid south of Zembra Island and then close to the coast as far south as Kélibia.287 At
about midnight on August 12/13 the convoy passed near Cape Bon.288 Its attenuated
merchant ships and escorts provided the torpedo boats lying in ambush off Kélibia
many opportunities for attack. The first torpedo boat was detected at about 0040;
between 0120 and 0430, they carried out a large number of attacks on the convoy
and its screen. They were very successful, perhaps surprisingly so. The small torpedo boats were extremely difficult for the cruisers and destroyers to engage. The
first major loss was the cruiser Manchester, torpedoed by two Italian boats near
Kélibia at 0120; the cruiser had to be scuttled, and it sank at 0500. Between 0315
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and 0430, enemy boats torpedoed five merchant ships, all stragglers: Glenorchy,
Wairangi, Almeria Lykes, Rochester Castle, and Santa Elisa. By 0330, Charybdis,
Somali, and Eskimo had joined Admiral Burrough’s main body.289
At daylight the enemy torpedo boats stopped their attacks.290 The scattered ships
were now comparatively easy prey for enemy aircraft.291 At this point (0740), BDienst estimated, the convoy was widely dispersed some twenty-five nautical miles
southeast of Pantelleria and consisted of three or four cruisers, ten destroyers, and
ten merchant ships.292 As all this was happening, early in the morning of August
13, the British submarine Unbroken, in an ambush position twelve miles south
of Stromboli Island, hit and damaged the heavy cruiser Bolzano and light cruiser
Muzio Attendolo with four torpedoes.293
At dawn on August 13, Force X comprised two light cruisers (Charybdis, Kenya)
and seven destroyers (Ashanti, Intrepid, Icarus, Fury, Pathfinder, Somali, and Eskimo).
It protected directly only three merchant ships, Rochester Castle, Waimarama, and
Melbourne Star. One destroyer, Ledbury, accompanied the heavily damaged tanker
Ohio some five miles astern of the main force. Some ten miles northwest was the
merchant ship Port Chalmers and two destroyers, Penn and Bramham. The merchant vessel Santa Elisa was dead in the water and on fire; another, Dorset, sailed
alone; and Brisbane Star, torpedoed the previous night, hugged Tunisia’s coast.294
By 0700 on August 13, Force X and the convoy were about 120 miles west of Malta.295
At 0740, German aircraft reported that the enemy convoy, fifteen light units and
nine merchant ships, was seventy-two nautical miles east of Cape Mahmur, moving
southeastward.296 The convoy had been delayed by torpedo boat attacks but, some
thirty miles south-southeast of Pantelleria, was finally within the effective range of
Malta’s long-range fighters. Beaufighters and Spitfires had begun to patrol above
the convoy 170 miles from Malta and, although without fighter direction, inflicted
considerable losses on enemy aircraft.297
On August 13, the first air attack on the convoy came at about 0810. Twelve
Ju-88s made shallow dives from six thousand to two thousand feet. One merchant
ship, Waimarama, was hit and blew up. Soon afterward, two more merchant ships,
Dorset and Port Chalmers, were attacked too. The next attack, at 0925, was carried
out by six Ju-87s diving to between a thousand and 1,500 feet; Ohio suffered further
damage.298
German and Italian aircraft together struck again at 1017. The Italian aircraft
dropped pattern-running torpedoes on the convoy’s flanks. At 1050, the convoy
was attacked by some twenty bombers, mostly Ju-88s but a few Ju-87s.299 Ohio, although not directly hit, suffered damage from four or five near misses. The last
attack on the convoy’s main body came at 1125. It was carried out by about five
Italian Savoia-Marchetti S.M.79 torpedo bombers accompanied by several aircraft
dropping pattern-running torpedoes. Beaufighters and Spitfires shot down at least
four of them.300 By 1240 the convoy had come within the effective range of the
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short-range Spitfires on Malta. Operating seventy to eighty miles from their bases,
they were able to provide solid protection of the convoy.301
At 1355, German aircraft reported that the convoy consisted of four to six light
units, four or five merchant ships, two damaged merchant ships screened by two
destroyers, and an aircraft mother ship, Unicorn (which in fact was still under construction). The group was some twenty miles west of Malta, moving east at thirteen
knots. In the area of Cape Bon were, they claimed to have sighted, one heavily
damaged carrier, probably of the Wasp class, and three burning merchant ships,
including one tanker.302 The enemy heavy units that had been reported as turning
westward on August 12 were now, at midday on the 13th, twenty-six miles north
of Cape Bougarouni, steaming west at sixteen knots. They comprised a battleship,
a cruiser, and four destroyers. While the aircraft did not observe them, it was assumed that a second battleship and a fourth carrier too were on a westerly course.303
Around 1430 that afternoon the convoy was joined by the Malta Escort Force.
The main convoy now had only three merchant ships. At about 1600, Admiral Burrough with two cruisers and five remaining destroyers turned westward toward
Gibraltar.304 That evening at about 1800 Port Chalmers, Melbourne Star, and Rochester Castle reached Malta. At 1900, enemy aircraft hit and sank the merchant vessel
Dorset. At daylight on August 14, Ledbury arrived at Valletta after its unsuccessful
search for the torpedoed cruiser Manchester in the Gulf of Hammamet. Brisbane
Star, attacked twice after daylight on the 14th by a single enemy aircraft, reached
Malta the same day at 1530. Penn and Bramham towed the heavily damaged Ohio
about a hundred miles to Grand Harbour, Valletta, in Malta, arriving in the morning of the 15th. Shortly afterward, the cargo having just been removed, Ohio broke
in two and became a total loss.305
The German intent for the night of August 13/14 was to employ two S-boats
near Cape Bon. Between twelve and fifteen torpedo boats were sent south of latitude 36° 40ʹ north, longitude 12° east. Luftwaffe aircraft were to carry out night attacks.306 However, because of engine malfunctions the S-boats had to be withdrawn
before they came in contact with the enemy.307
Force X, meanwhile, having left the convoy, had passed twelve miles off the island of Linosa and then steered toward “position R,” seven miles south of Kélibia.
That point was reached at 0012 on August 14. At 0450, when Force X was near the
Fratelli Rocks, Granito, an Italian submarine, fired five torpedoes at the destroyer
Ashanti, Admiral Burrough’s flagship, but scored no hits. By daylight Force X was
south-southeast of La Galite, where it was shadowed by German aircraft. The first
attack, by a few Ju-88s, came at 0730.308
On August 14, German and Italian aircraft continued their reconnaissance of
the western and central Mediterranean. At 1000 an Italian aircraft reported an enemy group including a carrier, some thirty nautical miles north of Cape Fer, moving
westward. German analysts commented that if the report was true, the ship might
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be the fourth enemy carrier, which had not been observed for a long time. German
aircraft reported, from some forty nautical miles west-southwest of Malta, a carrier
and a large merchant ship under tow.309
At 1110, an enemy destroyer was sighted thirty nautical miles east of La Galite
Island steaming west at high speed. At 1310 a force estimated to consist of two
cruisers and five destroyers was sighted thirty-two nautical miles northwest of Cape
Bougarouni moving to the west at between twenty-three and twenty-five knots.310
Between 1030 and 1050, Force X was attacked by some thirty Ju-88s and Ju-87s
and an hour later by about fifteen Italian high-level bombers. Afterward and until
about 1315 twenty Italian S.M.79s struck, nearly hitting several ships but causing
no serious damage. After the S.M.79s broke off, Force X was left alone. At about
1800 on August 14, Force X rejoined Admiral Syfret’s Force Z at latitude 37° 29ʹ
north, longitude 3° 25ʹ east.311
In the central Mediterranean, German aircraft sighted an enemy group of probably four steamers, two or three light cruisers, and three or four destroyers.312 However, a German photoreconnaissance aircraft during the forenoon of August 14
was unable to obtain a clear picture, because of a high-density smoke screen. Later
in the day German aircraft reported the presence in Valletta of four freighters and
the tanker that had been observed under tow the previous day. During the night of
August 14/15, despite the unclear operational picture, Italian MASs and German
S-boats were directed to operate on the route to Malta yet did not establish contact
with the enemy.313
The remainder of Force X arrived at Gibraltar independently. Nigeria and the
destroyers Derwent, Bicester, and Wilton reached Gibraltar at 0010 on August 15.
Several hours later two other destroyers, Somali and Eskimo, also arrived. The three
destroyers that had helped Ohio—Penn, Ledbury, and Bramham—returned on the
21st.314 Force R cruised in the western basin until it was certain it would not be required, then received orders to return to Gibraltar, where it arrived on the morning
of August 16.315
Secondary Operations
While the main action was taking place in the western Mediterranean, there was
rather intense Allied activity in the eastern basin. As planned, the Allies carried out
MG 3, a feint to distract enemy attention away from the western Mediterranean.
The convoy, MW 12, composed of three merchant ships, left Port Said after dusk
on August 10, accompanied by two cruisers, ten destroyers, and two other escorts;
one more merchant ship, escorted by two cruisers and three destroyers, left Haifa
at 0300 on the 11th. These two groups joined in the early morning, then sailed
westward to the longitude of Alexandria, where they turned back and dispersed.
Their specific aim had been to lure the Italian 8th (Naval) Division out from Navarino and to keep Luftwaffe aircraft on Crete in place.316 German aircraft observed
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these movements. Early in the morning of August 12, Kesselring informed X Air
Corps of the position (latitude 33° 40ʹ north, longitude 28° 34ʹ east) of four enemy
merchant vessels, six cruisers, and an unknown number of destroyers sailing on a
northeasterly course at twelve knots. He believed this convoy to be possibly an English “spoof ” but did not exclude the possibility of a simultaneous supply operation
bound for Malta from the eastern Mediterranean. He directed the X Air Corps to
arrange exhaustive reconnaissance of the entire eastern Mediterranean area on the
morning of August 12.317
During the night of August 12/13 Allied cruisers and destroyers shelled the
port of Rhodes, and that day RAF aircraft attacked the airfield at Maritsa, on the
northern tip of Rhodes. Also, that day a British submarine put commandos ashore
at Simeto, near Catania, to set explosives on the pylons of a cable-stayed bridge.
However, the Allied actions apparently did not faze the Italians: the 8th (Naval)
Division remained in port, where it was reinforced by a German destroyer. The
Italians contented themselves with holding up local traffic along the North African
coast and, as noted above, shipping between Italy and Greece. MG 3, then, did not
deceive the Axis and therefore failed to reduce the intensity of attacks on the main
convoy in the western Mediterranean.318
The Allies also executed Operation ASCENDANT—the return to Gibraltar of the
two merchant ships that had survived the June convoy—as originally planned. Force
Y, with the two freighters, left Malta at about 2030 on August 10. It reached the area
of Cape Bon the next day and arrived at Gibraltar at about 1000 on the 14th.
The RAF’s long-range bombers made only sporadic attacks against enemy airfields on Sardinia and the airfield on Pantelleria. In addition to the night attack on
Cagliari on August 11, the next day RAF bombers attacked the airfields near Cagliari from 0045 to 0315 and Pantelleria at 0245 and from 2110 to 2203. On August
13, they attacked Trapani from 0105 to 0345 and Pantelleria from 0515 to 0545.319
Aftermath
Despite the all-out Axis effort to destroy the Allied convoy and then its remnants,
five merchant ships—four freighters and the heavily damaged Ohio—out of fourteen
eventually reached Malta. The convoy and its defensive forces had been subjected to
intense attacks by some 240 enemy bombers and ninety torpedo bombers.320 Two of
the ships that reached Malta had sustained so much damage that they almost sank
on the way.321 Ohio never sailed again. The Allies had lost a carrier (Eagle), two light
cruisers (Manchester and Cairo), and one destroyer (Foresight); another carrier (Indomitable), two light cruisers (Nigeria and Kenya), and one destroyer were put out
of commission for a considerable time. Some 350 men had lost their lives. The Fleet
Air Arm had lost thirteen aircraft in combat, plus sixteen others sunk with Eagle.322
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The RAF had lost five. The enemy losses were thirty-five aircraft, including two shot
down over Malta.323 The Allies were unable to risk such losses in warships again
anytime soon; they would not attempt another large convoy operation to resupply
Malta until November 1942.324
For their part, as of August 16 the Germans estimated that the enemy had committed forty-one ships for the defense and protection of the convoy from August 12
through the 15th: three carriers, two battleships, five cruisers, twenty-six destroyers, one submarine, and four corvettes. They considered that of the enemy order of
battle remaining on August 12, one carrier (Eagle) and one cruiser (Manchester) had
been sunk.325 The next day the Germans concluded the enemy convoy had consisted
of twelve merchant ships, including at least one tanker, had sailed from Greenock,
Scotland, and was bound to Malta. They correctly assessed that each ship was loaded with gasoline, petroleum, cooking oil, ammunition, and soup and other food.
The convoy did not include any U.S. carriers, they noted, but an American unit had
taken part in the night battle off Kélibia. The French confirmed from prisoners that
the convoy had consisted of twelve ships, not twenty-one, as B-Dienst had thought
at one point.326
The Germans estimated enemy losses as at least seven warships and sixteen
merchant ships, one transport, and one tanker, for a total of twenty-five units. The
merchant ship tonnage destroyed was 180,000 BRT (the average size of the ships
being eleven thousand BRT).327 Specifically, they claimed to have sunk the carrier
Eagle, the cruisers Manchester and Cairo, and a destroyer.328 They estimated that the
enemy had also lost three other destroyers and other units were variously damaged.
The enemy had lost—for certain, it was assessed—nine freighters and probably
more, up to sixteen.329 The Germans believed that thirty-nine enemy ships (three
carriers, two battleships, four cruisers, twenty-two destroyers, plus eight other units
of unknown class, probably destroyers) had returned to Gibraltar.330
Nevertheless, despite these successes, the Germans concluded, with reason, that
the outcome of the operation was unsatisfactory. The enemy had succeeded in getting four freighters and one tanker to Malta. The Germans also presumed (correctly) that cargo had been distributed among the freighters in such a way that if
any of them reached Malta, the island would be supplied with some of everything it
needed. The arrival of even so few freighters would have prolonged its survival for
several weeks, enabling the enemy to interfere seriously with Axis supplies during
the decisive phase of the struggle in North Africa.331
The Axis forces, then, did not accomplish their stated operational objective.
They had achieved, however, a great tactical victory. German and Italian aircraft
carried out twenty-nine attacks, all but two against ships at sea; of the total attacks,
Italian aircraft conducted eleven. Axis aircraft sank the destroyer Foresight and four
merchant ships and damaged the carrier Indomitable and three merchant vessels. A
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single German U-boat sank one large aircraft carrier, Eagle. Italian submarines sank
the light cruiser Cairo and two merchant ships (one of them in cooperation with
aircraft). Italian submarines also damaged two light cruisers (Nigeria and Kenya) and
one merchant ship. An Italian submarine and German bombers heavily damaged
the tanker Ohio.332 Especially noteworthy were the successes achieved by the Italian
MSs/MASs, which sank the light cruiser Manchester and three merchant ships and
damaged one merchant ship.333
On the other side, Allied submarines heavily damaged one heavy and one light
Italian cruiser (Bolzano and Muzio Attendolo, respectively); neither put to sea again.
The Axis lost forty-two aircraft.334 Allied destroyers sank two Italian submarines
(Cobalto and Dagabur), and aircraft damaged another, Giada.335
Despite the heavy losses suffered, PEDESTAL was a clear operational success for the
Allies. About thirty-two thousand tons of supplies arrived safely, allowing Malta to
carry on for another ten weeks. By August 22 all cargo had been unloaded from the
five surviving ships, as well as the fifteen thousand tons of fuel Ohio had carried.
Perhaps surprisingly, Axis aircraft did not attempt to interfere with the unloading.336 Moreover, while PEDESTAL was in progress three Allied submarines carried
ammunition, torpedoes, and aviation fuel from the east to Malta. These supply
trips continued in September and October 1942.337
Taken altogether, these supplies allowed Allied submarines and aircraft to intensify their attacks on the Axis supply lines to North Africa in the critical period
of the campaign there. The Allies were able to obtain air superiority over Malta
and thereby dramatically change in their favor the situation in the central Mediterranean.338 During September 1942, the Allies sank more than a hundred thousand tons of enemy supplies destined for North Africa. By mid-October the Africa
Corps had only three days’ supply in reserve instead of the minimum fifteen days’
worth prescribed for starting an offensive. In November 1942, Field Marshal Rommel lost the battle of El Alamein (October 23–November 11, 1942)—and the tide
of war in North Africa turned in favor of the Allies.339
CONCLUSION AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
Operation PEDESTAL took place at a time when Allied fortunes in the Mediterranean were at their nadir. The island of Malta was close to being unable to serve as
the air and submarine base for Allied efforts against the Axis forces in North Africa. While the Axis forces on the ground had been forced to stop their advance after
the inconclusive first battle of El Alamein, they were still within striking distance
of the Nile valley. They were preparing to resume their advance and seize Egypt as
soon as they had sufficient reserves of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies. For
the Allies, it was vital that Malta remain in their hands; otherwise, they knew, the
Axis would, by seizing Egypt, radically improve its position in the Middle East. The
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operational decision to run a major resupply operation to Malta, accordingly, was
made by the strategic leadership in London, not by the Admiralty or the fleet commanders in the theater.
In making a decision, the operational commander always should carefully weigh
the potential risks versus the benefits of a pending major operation in terms of its
effect on the campaign as a whole. Potential losses might be prohibitive, yet in some
situations taking such a high risk can be prudent if the outcome would gain valuable
time for the campaign as a whole.
The strategic leadership normally should not make decisions that rightfully belong
to the operational or tactical commanders. An exception is when the strategic situation is so serious that failure to take decisive action might have a major impact on the
course, or even the outcome, of the war in a theater. Then, only the strategic leadership
can ensure that adequate forces are or become available to accomplish the ultimate
objective.
In the summer of 1942, the Allied command organization in the Mediterranean
was highly fragmented. No single commander had the authority and responsibility to conduct the planning and employment of all three services. The basic plan
for the Malta resupply operation was prepared in London; plans in support of the
operation were then prepared by the respective service component commanders
in the Mediterranean. These headquarters were separated by long distances. The
mission’s success depended almost entirely on cooperation among the services, but
strong parochialism made that very difficult to achieve. Even though Malta’s survival was vital to its own campaign in North Africa, the British army was unwilling
to support the operation with a diversionary attack.
The Axis command organization in the Mediterranean lacked unity not only
of command but also of effort. The Germans and Italians had separate command
structures and prepared plans separately. The German theater structure itself was
also highly fragmented. Kesselring was nominally in command of the entire southern theater, but he did not control the Axis campaign in North Africa or, even de
facto, the employment of German naval forces. The Italian command organization
was made chaotic by overlaps of responsibility and authority. Also, the higher naval authorities constantly interfered with the decisions and actions of subordinate
tactical commanders.
In a sound theater organization, a single operational commander has full (at least
operational) command over and control of the assigned multiservice and multinational forces. The chain of command should be simple and straightforward, with ideally no overlap of authority and responsibility among command echelons. Sound lines
of authority and responsibilities are simple and clear at all levels of command, but
especially at the operational and theater-strategic levels. Unity of effort is best ensured by appointing the same commander for both planning and execution. Service
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parochialism is one of the major impediments to the necessary cooperation in the
drafting of plans for major operations or campaigns and one of the major causes of
duplication of effort, which wastes sorely needed resources and time.
The Allies’ single greatest advantage was their ability to intercept and decode
German ENIGMA messages in a timely fashion. Allied commanders thereby obtained generally accurate and detailed knowledge of the enemy’s plans, actions,
and pending reactions. The Allies possessed excellent knowledge of the strength
and the planned movements of Luftwaffe units in the Mediterranean. They also
had reliable knowledge of the strength and movement of Italian submarines and
surface forces. However, their assessment of German U-boat strength was faulty.
For its part, the Axis had only limited capability to intercept and decode enemy radio messages. Its commanders relied mostly on air reconnaissance and submarine
reports for the location, composition, and movements of an enemy force. Yet they
also had a solid network of agents in the Gibraltar area and in Ceuta and some in
the Suez Canal zone.
The ability to obtain accurate, reliable, timely, and relevant information on the enemy order of battle, plans, intentions, and movements is of inestimable value in the
planning and execution of a major operation or campaign. However, the importance of
good intelligence should not be overestimated. Having what is today called “information
dominance” is only one among many factors involved in making a sound decision, often
not even the most important one. Much more important are commanders’ experience
and character and the soundness of their judgment. Also, an operational commander
might make a sound decision but still suffer a setback or even defeat at the hands of a
weaker opponent who acts faster, not having waited for perfect knowledge of the situation. In some situations, the weaker side can succeed without knowledge of the stronger side’s plans and intentions by virtue of a much more favorable geographic position,
qualitative superiority, or faster and more determined action.
Planning for PEDESTAL was sound and thorough. A major problem that it faced
was finding enough freighters given the simultaneous Allied commitments to supply the Soviet Union. Another problem was assembling a powerful force for distant
cover and support and direct screen of the convoy; commitments in British home
waters and the Indian Ocean stretched naval resources to the limit. The Allies had
learned, however, the proper lessons from the failure of the dual convoy operation in June 1942, and they applied them to the PEDESTAL plan. Geographically, the
configuration of the western and central Mediterranean was a major and negative
planning factor in PEDESTAL. The long distance from Gibraltar to Malta vis-à-vis
the proximity of the Axis airfields dictated the types and numbers of forces available for support and their employment in combat.
It probably would have been wiser not to conduct the ferrying operation simultaneously with the resupply effort. Air reinforcements to Malta could have been
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sent instead either before or shortly after PEDESTAL. Also, destroyers for the carrier
Furious would have greatly strengthened the air and antisubmarine defenses of the
convoy, Force Z, or Force X.
In planning a major operation, the commander should avoid adding tasks unrelated to the accomplishment of the ultimate operational objective. Additional tasks
not only unnecessarily complicate the basic plan but also reduce the forces available
to accomplish the main objective. Additional tasks also usually require more time
and thereby may considerably complicate or even endanger the outcome of a major
operation.
The Allied feint in the eastern Mediterranean was poorly conceived: the real
objectives of the pending operation were simply obvious to the enemy. In addition, the forces assigned to the feint were too small in themselves to compel the
Germans and Italians to draw forces from the western and central Mediterranean.
Only a viable threat of an Allied invasion of Crete or mainland Greece would have
forced the enemy to react operationally, let alone strategically. It is quite possible,
however, that a sizable diversionary attack by the British army in the Libyan Desert
might have forced the Germans and Italians to divert land-based aircraft from the
attack on Force F.
A major operation is likely to be more successful if the planners also prepare a
plausible operational deception plan. Feints, demonstrations, or ruses should be conducted not in isolation from but, without exception, integrally with such a plan. A
feint or operational deception is unlikely to succeed if the objective is unmistakable.
In any case, forces assigned to operational deception should pose in themselves such
a threat as to lead the enemy to react operationally or even strategically, not merely
tactically.
Lacking good prior intelligence on the movements of enemy forces, the Axis
leaders could not make their plans until mid-August, largely in response to enemy
actions. Nevertheless, their plans for the employment were solidly based. The Axis
partners commanded an extremely favorable geographic position. A large number
of Italian airfields and naval bases flanked the route of enemy convoy in the western and central basins; Axis aircraft and surface forces based on Sardinia and Sicily
operated from exterior positions but along short lines. The single major error on
the German side was Kesselring’s decision not to provide strong air cover for the
Italian heavy surface forces.
Lack of adequate air strength on Malta greatly complicated the Allied challenges.
The Allies did not have enough heavy bombers on Malta to inflict substantial damage on the air bases on Sicily and Sardinia. They also lacked fighters to assure the
safety of the convoy once it came within range. The Germans and Italians, in contrast, had a large number of land-based aircraft available for attack as well as support. The Germans also were able to redeploy from Crete to Sicily. Yet despite the
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large number of aircraft overall, the Axis lacked sufficient fighters to escort bombers and also cover surface ships. As for the Italians, lack of fuel essentially immobilized their battleships. They were, however, able to assemble a considerable number
of submarines, while the Germans had only two U-boats.
Both the German and Italian pilots showed a great deal of determination, skill,
and courage in their repeated attacks against the convoy and its supporting forces.
The Italian submarines and the U-boats achieved great success against both surface
ships and merchant vessels. Most striking was the effectiveness of the Italian and
German torpedo boats against the scattered convoy on the night of August 12/13.
Yet the Germans and Italians made a major mistake in deciding to focus on the
enemy’s undamaged ships. This most likely is why Ohio reached Malta. The Italian
decision to cancel the planned heavy surface force attack on the remnants of the
convoy also was a great mistake probably costing the Axis a tactical, even operational, success.
Warfare in a typical narrow (enclosed or semienclosed) sea differs considerably
from that on the open ocean or in littorals bordering the open ocean. Land-based
aviation is a formidable threat to surface ships operating in a narrow sea. Success in
a narrow sea cannot be ensured without an adequate degree of air superiority within
the given area of operations. Also, in narrow seas a weaker side can inflict substantial
losses on a stronger opponent by skillful use of favorable geographic position, submarines, small surface combatants, and mines.
The Allies enjoyed an almost uninterrupted stream of decoded ENIGMA messages and from them unprecedented knowledge and understanding of the enemy
situation, plans, and pending actions. The Allied commanders knew the German
intentions and orders of the day. Further, and despite the great odds against them,
Allied aviators and sailors displayed a superb fighting spirit—especially the merchant mariners. One of the major errors on the Allied side was the decision, based
on false assumptions, to turn Force Z westward; heavy Allied losses resulted. Operation MG 3 failed to make any impression on the Axis commanders. This is no
surprise, because Allied planners had based the entire effort on a faulty premise:
the operation represented a waste of time and resources.
The Axis commanders had a reasonably accurate picture of the situation in the
western Mediterranean once the enemy convoy transited the Strait of Gibraltar.
Most of their intelligence came from reconnaissance aircraft. Nonetheless, the Germans and Italians formed an exaggerated impression of the true capabilities of the
Allied force that entered the Mediterranean. The probable reason was the sheer size
of the surface force assigned to support the convoy.
With their almost total destruction of the enemy convoy to Malta, the Germans
and Italians achieved a major tactical victory; however, they failed to gain operational success, because they did not destroy the last five Allied merchant ships.
Those ships alone brought enough supplies to Malta to enable it to survive for
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another ten weeks. Hence, Operation PEDESTAL was a clear Allied operational
victory.
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III The Allied Landing at Anzio-Nettuno
January 22–March 4, 1944 (Operation SHINGLE)

T

he Allied amphibious landing at Anzio-Nettuno on January 22, 1944, Operation SHINGLE, began a major offensive joint/combined operation. For
the Germans, it necessitated a major anti-amphibious operation. Despite
Allied superiority in the air and at sea, the Germans were able to bring up large
forces quickly and seal the beachhead. The two sides suffered almost equal losses
during some four months of fighting. The Allied forces on the beachhead were unable to break out or to capture the critically important Colli Laziali (Alban Hills),
which dominated the two main supply routes to the German forces on the Gustav
Line, until the main Fifth Army advanced close to the beachhead. Only the naval
part of the operation was planned and executed excellently.
The decision to launch Operation SHINGLE primarily was made on the basis of
political and strategic, not operational, considerations. Ironically, the Allied political leaders—Winston S. Churchill in particular but other high-ranking, operational commanders as well—grossly underestimated the Germans’ will to fight and
their war-fighting capabilities. Another major reason for the failure of Operation
SHINGLE was very poor leadership by the Allied operational commanders. In retrospect, on the basis of the true situation at the time, SHINGLE should not have been
planned, let alone executed. It never had a realistic chance of success. It was a vast
gamble that ultimately failed.
STRATEGIC SETTING
In the spring of 1943, the strategic situation in the Mediterranean was highly favorable to the Western Allies. The campaign in North Africa had ended with the
surrender of the German-Italian forces in Tunisia on May 12. At a conference in
Washington, DC, May 12–27 (TRIDENT), the highest Allied leaders had confirmed
their decision to seize Sicily next (Operation HUSKY). The Combined Chiefs of
Staff (CCS) directed Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had been Supreme Commander Allied Forces, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, to prepare options for
continuing the war in southern Europe after capturing Sicily.1
Eisenhower’s staff considered three such options. One envisaged the capture
of Sardinia and Corsica, followed by a descent on southern France; the greatest
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advantage of this option was that it would support the main, upcoming effort in
Normandy. The second option, which the British favored, contemplated a thrust
through Italy to support guerrillas in the Balkans and to bring Turkey into the
war on the Allied side. The third was a landing in southern Italy, then an advance
northward, using Italy as a logistical base and acquiring airfields for the long-range
bombing of Germany and the Balkans. The general belief was that the latter option
would force Italy out of the war, which would remove twenty-one Italian divisions
from the Balkans and five from France. The Germans would be forced to take over
the defense of the Italian Peninsula, weakening their forces in Western Europe.2
The Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, fell from power on July 25, 1943, after
the Fascist Grand Council passed a vote of no confidence. Shortly afterward, the
Italian king, Vittorio Emanuele III, appointed Marshal Pietro Badoglio as the new
prime minister. Hitler wasted no time in reacting to the new developments in Italy.
On July 26, he directed Field Marshal Erwin Rommel to “assemble troops in the
Alps and prepare for a possible entry into Italy.”3 On July 30, Rommel gave these
troops orders to cross the Italo-German frontier and seize the Alpine passes, under
the pretext of securing supply routes. The Italians protested, but they did not want
an open clash with the Germans. The Germans then moved into northern Italy,
explaining that this would permit the Italians to concentrate more of their forces to
defend southern Italy.4 By early September, eight German divisions had moved into
northern Italy, where they eventually supported other German forces stationed in
the south. The 2nd Parachute Division (ParaDiv) was moved from France to Ostia,
near Rome—as, so the Germans informed the Italians, a reinforcement for the Axis
forces in Sicily. After the successful evacuation of the German forces in Sicily across
the Strait of Messina in mid-August, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, CINC South,
organized four severely depleted German divisions into a new Tenth Army.5
The relative ease of the victory on Sicily convinced the British that the Allies
should now assume higher risks and invade Italy’s mainland, to drive the country
out of the war. The first step, the British argued, should be the capture of Naples,
then Rome. American planners hesitated to embark on such a course of action.
They were much concerned (correctly, as it turned out) that an invasion of the
Italian mainland would lead to a long and indecisive peninsular campaign. It also
probably would require additional resources and thereby impede the buildup of
Allied forces for the planned Normandy invasion (Operation OVERLORD).6
On September 3, 1943, in Cassibile, Sicily, the Allies signed an armistice with
the Italian government. It was kept secret until September 8, when Italy’s surrender
was formally announced.7 However, the Germans had anticipated that the Italians
would change sides and had prepared Case AXIS (ACHSE) (formerly ALARIC) for such
an eventuality. Shortly after September 8, German forces moved rapidly to disarm
their erstwhile allies in Italy, France, the Balkans, and the Aegean Islands. On the
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12th, German paratroopers raided Gran Sasso (Operation EICHE/OAK) and liberated Mussolini from captivity. Afterward, Mussolini established the so-called Italian Social Republic—in effect a German puppet state—in the northern part of Italy.
On September 3, the British Eighth Army crossed the Strait of Messina and
landed in Reggio di Calabria (Operation BAYTOWN). Six days later, the Allies carried out a large amphibious landing in the Bay of Salerno (Operation AVALANCHE).
The invading force was composed of the U.S. Fifth Army, commanded by Mark W.
Clark and comprising the U.S. VI Corps and the British 10 Corps. It was transported in some 450 ships.8 The majority of the invading force had assembled at bases in
North Africa and made a “shore-to-shore” assault. All the Allied landing craft and
smaller escort vessels had to be refueled on their way from the North African ports
9
and hence were staged through two ports on Sicily’s north coast.
The enemy landing did not surprise Field Marshal Kesselring.10 He ordered an
all-out effort to throw the enemy force back into the sea. When that attempt failed
on September 15–16, Kesselring ordered a delaying defense and an orderly withdrawal. The battle for Salerno was costly for both sides: German casualties were estimated at 3,500 men; American losses were also about 3,500, the British some 5,500.11
After landing at Salerno, the U.S. Fifth Army advanced along the west coast to
Naples, while the British Eighth Army moved up the east coast. By the end of September, the Fifth Army had reached the Volturno River. Naples was liberated on
October 1, its port virtually destroyed.12 The Allies had bombed the city, but German
demolition teams had inflicted most of the damage, destroying all communications,
transportation, water, and power-grid infrastructure.13 The British Eighth Army
seized the Foggia airfield complex intact on September 29; Allied heavy bombers
later used these airfields.14 The Eighth Army outflanked German positions by an
amphibious landing at Termoli. Gen. Bernard L. Montgomery paused to reorganize
and resupply his forces, after which his Eighth Army crossed the Biferno River on
October 3.15 By that time, and despite a considerable numerical superiority on the
ground, at sea, and in the air, the Allies had suffered over twelve thousand casualties
(two thousand killed, seven thousand wounded, 3,500 missing).16
The German Tenth Army’s stubborn delaying defense of southern Italy convinced Adolf Hitler not to abandon Italy. On October 4, he decided that a stand
would be made south of Rome. At that time, the Germans had only eight divisions
of the Tenth Army in the southern part of Italy. In northern Italy, there were nine
divisions of Army Group B. By the end of October three of these were to leave for
the Eastern Front, two for southern Italy. Two other divisions would arrive from
southern France.17 Kesselring was directed to continue the delaying defense as far
back as the Gaeta–Ortona line.18
The Germans hurriedly constructed several successive defense lines across the
Italian Peninsula.19 The first, the Victor Line, stretched from Termoli in the east to
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the Biferno and along it through the Apennine Mountains to the Volturno River in
the west. Behind that line was the Barbara Line, a series of fortified hilltops extending
from Colli al Volturno along the Trigno River to the Adriatic coast.20 On the 12th,
Kesselring ordered the withdrawal of German forces to the Barbara Line. By midOctober, the German defensive line ran along the Volturno and Trigno Rivers.21
The U.S. Fifth Army breached the Barbara Line in early November. The
Germans fell back to the Bernhardt (or Reinhard) Line, which had been established some seventy-five miles south of Rome. It was a ninety-mile-long
salient running over the massif of Monte Camino, enclosing the peak of Monte Camino, Monte la Difensa, Monte la Remetanea, and Monte Maggiore. It
consisted of gun pits, concrete bunkers, turreted machine-gun emplacements,
barbed wire, and minefields.
By early November, Hitler and the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht believed that it was unlikely that the enemy would use Italy as a springboard for invading the Balkans. The German strategy in Italy remained what Hitler had stated
in his directive of October 4, 1943: a protracted defense of the barriers across the
Italian Peninsula.22 Kesselring was ready to do everything possible to defend the approaches to Rome. In mid-November, he had eleven German divisions in southern
Italy versus twelve Allied.23
The Allies held an important conference in Cairo on November 22–26, 1943
(SEXTANT). Prime Minister Churchill wanted the Allies to make a more determined
effort in Italy. He argued that the Allied forces needed to reach the Po River by the
spring of 1944, even if that meant weakening or delaying the Normandy invasion.
In contrast, the Americans insisted that no new operations in the Mediterranean
should be allowed to affect adversely any planned redeployments of Allied forces
for the Normandy invasion. The Allies decided at Cairo to cancel a planned landing on the Andaman Islands (Operation BUCCANEER), in the eastern Indian Ocean,
and released its forces for other theaters. Adm. Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Commander, South East Asia Command, was directed to send about half of his amphibious craft to the Mediterranean and England.24
At the Allied conference in Tehran on November 28–December 1, 1943 (EUREKA), the main topic was whether to focus on the planned invasion of Normandy
or intensify Anglo-American efforts in the Mediterranean. Both President Franklin
D. Roosevelt and the Soviet dictator, Stalin, insisted on an attack across the English
Channel, combined with a landing in southern France. Churchill agreed regarding
southern France but insisted on a more determined effort in Italy. For him, it was of
paramount importance that the Allies capture the Italian capital, Rome, by mounting a large amphibious landing in its vicinity. Churchill also advocated intensified
efforts to entice Turkey to enter the war against Germany. However, Roosevelt and
Stalin were adamant that the focus remain on Normandy. A second conference in
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Cairo, held December 4–6, confirmed the decision of the Tehran Conference that
OVERLORD would be the most important Allied effort in 1944, that nothing was to
be done elsewhere to endanger its success.25
By December 1, 1943, the Allied armies had reached the Bernhardt Line, defended by Tenth Army’s XIV Panzer Corps (PzCorps), commanded by Gen. Fridolin
von Senger und Etterlin. The Bernhardt Line was a bulge in front of the more formidable Gustav Line (protecting the approaches to Rome through the Liri Valley). The
latter, eighty-four miles long and ten miles deep, consisted of a series of interlocking
positions extending across the peninsula from just north of the mouth of the Garigliano River on the Tyrrhenian Sea to the mouth of the Sangro River on the Adriatic.
It centered on the town of Cassino, near which was a peak 1,700 feet high on top
of which stood a sixth-century monastery. The Gustav Line’s positions consisted
of deep underground bunkers, labyrinthine tunnels, machine-gun emplacements,
antitank ditches, minefields, and concertina wire.26 The Todt Organization (Orga
nisation Todt, or OT, a civil and military engineering organization named after its
founder, Dr. Fritz Todt) pressed prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians into service
to build it.27 Kesselring promised Hitler that his forces would hold the Gustav Line
for at least six months.28 Behind the central part of the Gustav Line and about five
miles north of it the Germans established the Hitler Line, based on strongpoints at
Aquino and Piedimonte. This would be a fallback position (or “switch line”) if the
Gustav Line was penetrated. In May 1944, the Hitler Line would be renamed the
Senger Line (after Gen. Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin). The Bernhardt, Gustav,
and Hitler/Senger Lines together constituted the “Winter Line.”
On November 20, the British Eighth Army opened an offensive with three divisions on the Adriatic front. However, torrential rains stopped its attack for about
a week. By December 2, the Eighth Army had resumed its offensive, but German
resistance was slowing its progress. On December 27 Montgomery stopped his advance without achieving his objectives. On the Fifth Army front, the British 10
Corps, deployed along the Garigliano River, carried out a demonstration aimed at
drawing the German forces toward the coast. Afterward, it attacked in the direction
of Monte Camino. On December 2–3, the U.S. II Corps attacked Monte Camino
but took more than a week to secure this important position.29
By early December 1943, the Allies had fourteen divisions in southern Italy; two
more were anticipated to arrive by the end of the month. The arrival of these units
would make it possible to pull out VI Corps for the Anzio landing.30
Allied Theater Command Organization
The Allied command structure in the Mediterranean was highly fragmented. The
various Allied headquarters in the theater were separated by long distances, making
operational planning very difficult. The planning procedures of the British and the
American staffs differed considerably. So too did the American and British views
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on the degree of control the strategic leadership would grant to theater commanders and other high-level military leaders. In general, an American theater commander had more independence in exercising his responsibilities than his British
counterpart. The Americans interpreted CCS directives as guidance, not orders. In
contrast, British theater commanders were controlled tightly by the British chiefs of
staff, who in turn were strictly subordinate to their prime minister.31 This situation
was made even more difficult by personal animosities between higher commanders, national differences, and the parochialism of services.
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower was CINC, Allied Forces, North Africa until December 10, 1943, when his title changed to Allied CINC, Mediterranean Theater. The
same day, the CCS directed consolidation of Allied major commands in the theater.
All British forces in the Middle East were placed under Allied Forces Headquarters
(AFHQ), commanded by General Eisenhower. A major problem in the new structure
was the absence of a component commander for ground forces. Eisenhower’s deputy
was a British general, Harold Alexander, who was also commander of the 15th Army
Group, which was composed of the U.S. Fifth Army (General Clark) and the British
Eighth Army (General Montgomery). Directly subordinate to Eisenhower were Gen.
George S. Patton Jr., commander of the U.S. Seventh Army (in Sicily); Gen. Alphonse
Juin, commander of the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC); and Gen. Władysław
Anders, commander of the Polish 2nd Corps.
The decision made at the Tehran and Cairo Conferences in December 1943
to consider the Normandy landing the highest priority in 1944 led to several major command changes in the Mediterranean theater. The most important was the
departure of Eisenhower to become Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary
Forces for the invasion of northwestern Europe. The CCS did not expect Eisenhower to leave the theater until after the capture of Rome, but he transferred his
staff to London right away, believing the immediate prospects for taking Rome to
be poor.32 On January 2, 1944, Eisenhower formally became Supreme Allied Commander for the pending Normandy invasion.33 On the 8th he was replaced in the
Mediterranean by a British general, Henry Maitland Wilson. (Wilson’s title was
later changed to Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.)34 A U.S.
general, Jacob L. Devers, Commanding General European Theater of Operations,
was appointed Alexander’s deputy. Devers also became Commander, North African Theater of Operations, heading all U.S. forces in the Mediterranean.35 General Montgomery, of the Eighth Army, was chosen to lead an army group in the
cross-Channel invasion; he was replaced by Lt. Gen. Oliver W. H. Leese on January
1, 1944. (These command changes had originally been planned to go into effect
in late December 1943.)36 On March 9, 1944, Alexander became Supreme Allied
Commander, Mediterranean Theater. His 15th Army Group became on January 11
the Allied Forces in Italy, seven days later the Allied Central Mediterranean Force,
and then, on March 9, 1944, the Allied Armies in Italy.37
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The highest-ranking Allied air commander in the theater was British air chief
marshal Arthur W. Tedder, Commander, Mediterranean Air Command (changed to
the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, or MAAF, on December 10, 1943). In December
1943 it was announced that Tedder would go to England and become Eisenhower’s
deputy. He was replaced by Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker of the U.S. Army Air Forces.38
The principal components of the theater’s Allied air forces were the Middle East
Air Command (renamed Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East on December 10, 1943), the U.S. Ninth Air Force, and the Northwest African Air Forces. The
latter consisted of the following (listed with designations before and after January
1, 1944): Northwest African Strategic Air Force (Mediterranean Allied Strategic Air
Force); Northwest African Coastal Air Force (Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air
Force); Northwest African Tactical Air Force (Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air
Force); Northwest African Troop Carrier Command (disbanded); Northwest African
Photographic Reconnaissance Wing (Mediterranean Allied Photographic Reconnaissance Wing); and Northwest African Air Service Command (disbanded).39
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, Royal Navy, was Commander in
Chief, Mediterranean Fleet. Directly subordinate to him were Commander in Chief,
Levant and six flag officer commands (Gibraltar and Mediterranean Approaches,
Western Mediterranean, Malta and Central Mediterranean, Levant and Eastern
Mediterranean, Western Italy, and Tunisia), plus a number of type commands (e.g.,
Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers and Commodore Destroyers, Eastern Mediterranean). When in October Admiral Cunningham was appointed First Sea Lord, he was
relieved by another British admiral, John H. D. Cunningham (no relation).40
The most senior U.S. Navy officer in the Mediterranean was Vice Adm. H. Kent
Hewitt, whose title had changed for each major amphibious landing operation, including AVALANCHE. On September 16, 1943, Rear Adm. Frank J. Lowry relieved
Richard L. Conolly as Commander, Landing Craft and Base, North African Waters.
Lowry also replaced Rear Adm. John L. Hall as Commander, VIII Amphibious
Force, on November 8, 1943.
German Theater Organization
Prior to the end of September 1943, Field Marshal Kesselring, as CINC South, had
full command over all three services of the German armed forces deployed in theater. However, just when the Germans most needed unified command in the Italian
theater, Hitler ordered a drastic change that fragmented it severely.41 So in November,
Naval Command, Italy (Deutsches Marinekommando Italien) and 2nd Air Fleet were
resubordinated to their respective services and directed thereafter merely to cooperate with Kesselring.42 As CINC South, Kesselring directly commanded eight divisions,
mostly mechanized or panzer units. Some of these forces were newly arrived from
North Africa and had not been brought back to full strength. All German ground
units had been weakened considerably during the long withdrawal from Salerno.43
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On August 16, 1943, Field Marshal Rommel and his Army Group B were deployed to the northern part of Italy. Rommel’s mission was to seize the threatened
Genoa–Leghorn (Livorno)–Venice–Trento area and the Apennine crossing between Leghorn and Ancona. A larger mission was to pacify northern Italy, crush
the insurgents in Istria and Slovenia, protect the lines of communication and
coastal flanks of the theater, and organize the defense of northern Italy.44 Rommel’s
headquarters (HQ) was established on the Lago di Garda, fifteen miles northwest
of Verona. Army Group B’s thirteen divisions were mostly reorganized or reactivated units from the Eastern Front—generally unsuitable, because of a lack of
mobility, for combat in the southern part of Italy.45 Normally, Kesselring, as theater
commander, should have been in control of both Army Group B and Tenth Army;
in fact, however, he and Rommel were coequal, both directly subordinate to Hitler.
On November 6, however, Kesselring was appointed CINC of a newly established theater command, Oberbefehlshaber Südwest (Southwest), as well as commander of Army Group C (formally established on the 21st). Army Group B was
dissolved.46 Rommel was sent to strengthen the Atlantikwall (Atlantic Wall) defenses in Western Europe against an anticipated large-scale invasion. Part of Rommel’s staff was assigned to the headquarters of CINC Southwest, the rest to the
newly created Army High Command (Armeeoberkommando) 14. Organizationally, this command was between an army group and an army corps, but it commonly was known as the “Fourteenth Army.” On November 21, 1943, Kesselring
formally took over the entire Italian theater. Yet he did not command the navy or
air force. However, Kesselring did have under his control the Luftwaffe’s paratroop
units and administrative control over the Luftwaffe units deployed in his theater.47
Those operating from Italy had been subordinated on June 10, 1940, to the Kommandierender General der Deutschen Luftwaffe in Italien, the Commanding General of the German Luftwaffe in Italy. (In 1941 this title was changed to General
of the German Luftwaffe at the Supreme Command of the Royal Italian Air Force
and in July 1944 to Commanding General of the German Luftwaffe, Central Italy,
or Kommandierender General der Deutschen Luftwaffe in Mittelitalien.)
German Naval Command, Italy, with HQ at Levico Terme (after February 1944
at Montecatini Terme), controlled surface forces and all other elements of the
Kriegsmarine that were present. The exception was that the chief of naval transport was directly subordinate to the Supreme Command of the Navy. In February
1943, a special staff was created within the Italian Naval Ministry for the convoying service. After the fall of Tunisia in May 1943, this staff was merged with the
German Naval Command, Italy. In November 1941, the newly created staff of the
Commander, U-Boats, Italy (F.d.U. Italien) was incorporated into the German Naval Command, Italy, in Rome. In August 1943, this command was renamed Commander, U-Boats, Mediterranean (F.d.U. Mittelmeer), with headquarters in Toulon,
southern France. It was to be dissolved in September 1944.48
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After the capitulation of Italy in September 1943, the Germans took over coastal
defense in northern Italy. In late spring 1944, the major commands of the German
Naval Command, Italy were the 7th Defense Division (HQ in Nervi); Sea Defense
Commandant, Italian Riviera (La Spezia); and Sea Defense Commandant, Western
Adriatic (Venice).49
In January 1944, the most important command on the western coast of Italy
was Naval Commander, Italian Coast (established in September 1943) at La Spezia,
subordinate to German Naval Command, Italy. It encompassed four naval district
commands: Genoa, La Spezia, Leghorn–Viareggio, and Civitavecchia. Naval Command, Istria, however, reported to CINC Southeast, in Salonika, Greece. Set up
in September 1943 at Duino, near Monfalcone, its responsibility encompassed the
area from the mouth of the Tagliamento River up to the island of Sušak, Croatia,
including the islands of Cres and Lošinj. Other commands subordinate to German
Naval Command, Italy were High Commander, Coastal Artillery, Italy (established
in August 1943); Chief, German Naval Transport, Italy (Deutscher Seetransport,
Italien); the naval arsenals in La Spezia, Pola, and Venice; and the naval artillery
arsenal in Florence/Sangunetto (near Verona).
Allied Operational Intelligence
The main sources of information of Allied intelligence were ULTRA intercepts,
agents in German-occupied territory, German prisoners of war, air reconnaissance,
and various modes of technical collection. Of these by far the most important for
German orders of battle, locations and activities of forces, states of supply, and plans
and intentions were the ULTRA decrypts from Bletchley Park. At this point, ULTRA
analysts were reading two, sometimes three, messages from the Luftwaffe’s liaison
officers (Flivo-Flug-Verbindungsoffiziere) almost every day. For example, ULTRA revealed the timing of Kesselring’s successive withdrawals all the way back to the Gustav Line. ULTRA also read the situation reports of the Tenth Army and Army Group
B (and its successor the Fourteenth Army), as well as messages exchanged among
Hitler, OKW, and Kesselring. Divisional reliefs and withdrawals rarely escaped the
attention of the ULTRA analysts. The Allied decoders kept planners informed about
the current state of and shortages in Axis fuel, ammunition, and rations.50 ULTRA
revealed Hitler’s decision to appoint Kesselring CINC of all German forces in Italy
(he became CINC South on November 21). It also intercepted on November 20 a
message that OKW had sent to Kesselring on the 11th concerning how he intended
to regroup his forces. The dissolution of Army Group B was confirmed when the
newly created Fourteenth Army took control of all its divisions.51 On November 18,
ULTRA indicated that Luftwaffe aircraft were reconnoitering the Naples area, probably, analysts assessed, to determine the status of landing craft in the bay. Another
ULTRA message made clear that Kesselring had replaced some of the German divisions along the Gustav Line opposite the Fifth Army.
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In practice, the benefits of ULTRA could be mixed. For example, the Allies
learned that Kesselring considered the 26th Panzer Division (PzDiv) and 29th
Panzer-Grenadier Division (PzGrDiv, combining armor and mechanized infantry)
ill-suited to positional combat in mountainous terrain (he probably also wanted a
more mobile reserve in case the Allies landed on either of Italy’s coasts).52 But the
Allies were unable to take advantage of the implied enemy weakness, because the
message was only decoded on November 20, nine days after being intercepted; by
then these two formations had been replaced by the 44th and 371st Infantry Divisions (IDs). Still, this decrypt had value in that it gave the Allies some inkling of
the forces they might encounter in an Anzio landing. Another ULTRA message on
November 20 revealed that four German parachute divisions were being reconstituted in the vicinity of Rome. However, ULTRA was unable to disclose where these
divisions were later deployed. These two messages seem to indicate that the Anzio
landing might be more risky than decision makers assumed.53
Taken together, however, these messages suggested that an Anzio landing might
be more risky than Allied decision makers had assumed.54 On three occasions in
December ULTRA decrypts described in detail the defensive works (e.g., guns emplaced and mines laid) that would be faced, as well as estimated effectiveness of
deliberate flooding. On December 27, Gen. Walter Warlimont, head of the OKW
planning staff, declared to Kesselring that in view of the situation in both the East
and West manpower had to be economized in Italy, so Kesselring’s watchword must
be “build, build, and keep on building.”55
ULTRA messages generally (with some exceptions) were shared only within Allied headquarters at the army level or higher. This meant that none of the Allied
corps and division commanders received them. Moreover, even at the army level
ULTRA reports were not known to many American planners. For example, only
four persons within Fifth Army headquarters were authorized to read ULTRA intercepts: General Clark; his chief of staff, Gen. Alfred Gruenther; the staff intelligence
officer (G-2), Col. Edwin B. Howard; and the deputy G-2, a Major Riggs.56 The Fifth
Army’s operations officer (G-3), Brig. Gen. Donald W. Brann, was not authorized
to know about ULTRA, but the 15th Army Group’s G-3, Brig. Gen. R. B. Mainwa
ring, was. That put General Clark’s G-3 at a great disadvantage in discussions with
General Alexander’s G-3.57
The Allied MAAF intelligence section focused on collecting information and
disseminating it to subordinate commands in the form of digests, appreciations,
and special reports. The air planners emphasized targeting for interdiction. Throughout
the MAAF chain of command, however, top priority was given to photoreconnaissance,
for determining the effectiveness of air strikes. ULTRA supported photoreconnaissance
by pinpointing areas where photographs should be taken. Otherwise, Allied air
planners were especially concerned about German air-surveillance radars and flak
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units. B-17 heavy bombers were fitted with directional antennas and receivers to
monitor the frequencies of the radars.58
British intelligence estimates generally were excellent. However, sometimes they
were overly optimistic—to enhance troop morale.59 According to Clark, Brig. Terence
Airey, the 15th Army Group’s intelligence officer responsible for German forces
in northern Italy beyond the immediate battle area, estimated that if the Allied
landing at Anzio was successful the Germans would attempt to seal off the beachhead—and in so doing leave their strong position at Cassino. Airey’s expectation
was that the Germans would then fight a delaying action northward past Rome, to
where several German divisions then idle in southern France could be sent.60 Colonel Howard, Fifth Army G-2, was skeptical. He suggested that the enemy would
concentrate all available forces to defeat the landing and prevent the Allies from
reaching the Alban Hills. In other words, a landing at Anzio would not lead the
Germans to abandon their southern front. Clark wrote that he was fully aware of
the enemy divisions outside of Italy and that they might be dragged into the battle
but hoped “that [they] would not be.”61
In essence, the ULTRA decrypts showed how the Allied front line looked from
the German side. They frequently revealed what the Germans knew about Allied
forces and how they interpreted their own reconnaissance reports. For example, on
January 10, 1944, ULTRA showed that Kesselring learned the previous day from a
report sent on January 3 by the Abwehr (military intelligence) station chief in Paris
that General Wilson was pushing preparations for landings on both coasts, with
all forces available in the Mediterranean theater, to be expected around the 15th.62
In the first three weeks of January 1944, ULTRA revealed that the Germans repeatedly had misinterpreted the movements of Allied naval vessels. For example, the
Germans were apparently unconcerned by the disappearance of landing craft from
Bizerte or by the presence of Allied carriers in the eastern Mediterranean—they
thought the latter were carrying reinforcements of land-based aircraft.63
German Operational Intelligence
Kesselring and his major subordinate commanders apparently had fairly accurate
knowledge of the Allied forces positioned along the Gustav Line and in southern
Italy. The Germans knew the approximate size and composition of enemy air and
naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean. Their main sources of intelligence were
radio intercepts by B-Dienst, Luftwaffe reconnaissance, and enemy POWs. Their
greatest problem was that they did not have information on enemy plans and intentions. Hence, they relied on patterns in past Allied actions to make assessments
about the future.
Reliance on these sources—inadequate and limited in comparison to those of
the Allies—meant that the Germans had only an approximate knowledge of the enemy’s forces and the availability of amphibious shipping. They also lacked precise
information on preparations for amphibious landings, including possible beaches.
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Most of the German air-reconnaissance reports pertained to enemy naval movements in the western and central Mediterranean, with a focus on the sea area between Sicily and North Africa, and the port of Alexandria, Egypt. For example,
during the night of January 8 a German reconnaissance aircraft reported an enemy
battleship, two carriers, and five escorts north of Cape Bougarouni, near Skikda
(Algeria). On January 11 at about 1520, a German aircraft sighted three enemy
battleships, one carrier, two cruisers, and five destroyers some forty nautical miles
north-northwest of Alexandria on a southeasterly course. About five nautical miles
eastward were some twenty commercial ships. The Luftwaffe expressed caution
about the reliability of that report: it had been sent by young and inexperienced
airmen.64 On the evening of January 11, a German aircraft reported a large number
of commercial vessels and landing craft between Sicily and southern Italy, as well
as destroyer escorts in the Bay of Salerno.65 In its summary of the situation in the
Mediterranean on December 31, 1943, Naval Group Command Southwest noted
that the enemy had withdrawn about twelve tank landing ships (LSTs) from the
Mediterranean but had moved in eighteen smaller tank landing craft (LCTs) from
the Atlantic.66
In the ten days prior to the landing at Anzio, German aircraft observed intense
shipping traffic in the Naples area. For example, on January 13 they reported the
presence of forty commercial vessels or “landing boats,” three probable cruisers,
and five patrol boats twenty nautical miles west of Naples steaming northward.67
At 2102 the same day, Luftwaffe aircraft sixty-five nautical miles northwest of Messina observed seven (probably commercial) ships and five patrol boats, also northbound. At 2135, near Palermo, aircraft sighted sixteen merchant ships and one escort on a northeasterly course.68 At 1850 on January 13, some twenty nautical miles
west of Naples, Luftwaffe aircraft sighted about forty ships (probably merchant
ships but perhaps landing craft), three probable cruisers, and five patrol boats, all
moving north. At 2100 the same day, the aircraft sighted seven probable merchant
ships and one destroyer southwest of Naples on an east-northeasterly course (i.e.,
probably bound for Naples).69 On January 18, about three nautical miles southwest
of the mouth of the Garigliano River, in the Gulf of Gaeta, German aircraft reported four enemy destroyers firing at positions on land.70 At about 1810, about three
miles southwest of that point, four enemy destroyers, one probable heavy unit, one
destroyer, and a few small ships were sighted.71 At 1625 the next day, Luftwaffe aircraft reported four probable destroyers in the western part of the Gulf of Gaeta and
two transports in the eastern part.72
ALLIED PRELIMINARY PLANS
SHINGLE originated in concept as an amphibious landing in the German rear. The
idea arose in October 1943, when it became obvious that the Germans would fight
for the entire peninsula rather than quickly withdrawing to northern Italy. Their
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stiffening resistance, combined with rough terrain, and poor weather had produced a stalemate, and Allied planners looked for a way to break it.73 The British
successfully carried out a landing at Termoli, on Italy’s eastern coast, on October
2–3. This raised hopes that the Allies might replicate that success on the western
coast, thereby outflanking the Gustav Line.74
At a meeting at La Marsa, Tunisia, on October 9 Eisenhower and his senior
commanders considered how to increase the tempo of the lagging campaign in
Italy. General Alexander strongly advocated a landing behind the German right
flank, as a part of the general offensive to seize Rome.75 He envisioned landing five
divisions, an idea that never got traction, because it was clearly unrealistic: the Allies had neither the troops nor the amphibious lift for so large an operation.76 But
on October 26 Churchill wrote to Roosevelt, “I feel that Eisenhower and Alexander
must have what they need to win the battle in Italy, no matter what effect is produced on subsequent operations.” He thus was threatening Operation OVERLORD
directly.77
Eisenhower approved Alexander’s idea for a landing south of the Tiber River
(which passes through Rome) after the Fifth Army reached a position from which
it could link up with the landing force within forty-eight hours.78 He also promised
to press the CCS to retain enough LSTs in the Mediterranean for such a landing. At
the Allied conference in Quebec on August 17–24, 1943 (QUADRANT), the decision
had been made to redeploy immediately sixty-eight of the ninety LSTs in the Mediterranean to other theaters for operations scheduled for 1944.79 However, now the
British wanted to retain fifty-six British and twelve American LSTs in the theater
until December 15 and were looking for more troops for a divisional amphibious
assault.80 The situation with LCTs was little better: out of 201 in the Mediterranean,
some 120 were scheduled to leave for Britain and India. The remaining amphibious
craft were all lighter-type ships, already operating continuously: ferrying, supplying the Eighth Army in the Adriatic, and working ports on both Italian coasts.81
So, mainly because of the paucity of landing ships, the earliest possible date for a
landing was December 20. Alexander projected that lift capacity was required for
23,000 men, 2,250 vehicles, and 1,200 tons of stores. This estimate included 1,300
men per assault wave in assault landing craft (LCAs) and landing craft, vehicle,
personnel (LCVPs).82
On November 3, Eisenhower met with his principal subordinates at Carthage,
Tunisia, to confirm plans already tentatively agreed to. The Fifth Army could
advance quickly a dozen miles through the Cassino line (the Gustav Line), then
northward an additional twenty-five miles. When it reached the Frosinone area,
Eisenhower would authorize an amphibious assault somewhere in the Rome vicinity. Frosinone is about forty miles south of Rome, close enough that the main force
of the Fifth Army could achieve a rapid linkup with the landing force.83 Eisenhower
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believed (wrongly, as it turned out) that the Germans held a line near Cassino to
cover Rome and to support a retrograde movement. The German evacuations of
Sardinia and Corsica seemed to indicate an intention to withdraw rapidly from
southern and central Italy. In Eisenhower’s view, the Germans might well pull back
all the way to the Pisa–Rimini line.84
By November 17, the 15th Army Group had completed plans for a two-phase
offensive in southern Italy. The Eighth Army would attack as soon as the 20th.
After seven to ten days, the Fifth Army would follow up with another attack. If opportune, an amphibious landing would be launched when the Fifth Army reached
the Capistrano–Priverno–Ferentino line.85 Beaches near Anzio were chosen as the
site.86 Originally, the landing was tentatively scheduled for December 20, 1943.87
Fifth Army HQ established a planning staff at Caserta (twenty-three miles north
of Naples), headed by its G-3.88 The staff studied possible landings south of the
Volturno River; south of the Garigliano River, in the Mondragone area; in the Gulf
of Gaeta, in the Sperlonga and Terracina areas; at Anzio; and at Civitavecchia.89
Clark proposed landing a single division, reinforced to 24,000 troops and 2,700 vehicles, some hundred miles behind the enemy rear, to “cling to a shingle” for about
a week.90 He planned to use one of his best divisions, the U.S. 3rd ID. However, Maj.
Gen. Lucian K. Truscott Jr., its commander, protested, “You are going to destroy the
best damned division in the United States Army. . . . [T]here will be no survivors.”91
The controlling factor was the weather. The planners considered that a minimum
of seven days would be necessary for loading, rehearsal, and approach. Because
of the shortness of good weather in January and February, sustaining forces that
landed ashore would be very difficult.92
A possibility for a major amphibious operation appeared when the Fifth Army
reached the Winter Line. Because of his limited number of troops, Clark did not
think a landing was feasible; however, Alexander had just the opposite view.93 At a
conference that Alexander organized in Bari on November 8, Alexander proposed
to keep the LSTs after December 15 for an amphibious landing in support of the
main offensive on Rome. In his view, an Allied force landing at Anzio, south of
Rome, might threaten the enemy’s main supply lines to the Gustav Line; it might
even, combined with a penetration of the Gustav Line, force the Germans to abandon their positions.94
On November 8, Alexander issued Operations Instruction Nr. 31, directing the
Eighth Army to drive up the Adriatic coast to Chieti, then wheel west of Highway
5 toward Rome (Phase I). The Fifth Army would advance up to the Liri-Sacco valley and then to Frosinone (Phase II). The one-division amphibious landing south
of Rome aimed at the Alban Hills would be carried out after the Fifth Army came
within a supporting distance (Phase III).95 That landing might be combined with
an airborne drop of one regimental combat team (RCT). Planning for Phase III
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would be the responsibility of the Fifth Army HQ, assisted by a naval planning staff
under Rear Admiral Lowry.96 At that time, only a single division could be detached
from the main front; yet, because the Allies believed the Germans capable of a rapid
buildup, a single-division landing clearly would fail unless the main front linked up
with it within forty-eight hours of the landing.97
On November 24, Clark issued his Operations Instruction Nr. 11, in which he
specified that the Fifth Army would resume its advance in several phases, with the
main thrust toward the Liri Valley.98 It was essential to attack as soon as possible so
that the army could support the amphibious landing prior to the withdrawal of the
LSTs.99 Clark also believed that if the main Fifth Army could not reach a mutually
supporting position within a week prior to the landing’s D-day, the entire operation
100
would have to be either postponed or abandoned.
As noted, the landing at Anzio originally was scheduled for December 20,
1943.101 However, December was the worst time of the year for an amphibious landing, because it was the peak month of the rainy season; January was little better.
Rain and low clouds would hamper air operations and severely restrict the Allies’
ability to supply the landing force over the beaches. Only an estimated two out of
seven days in January would be good for an amphibious landing. This meant that
the entire operation would have to be completed within forty-eight hours.102
Lack of sufficient amphibious lift was a major and continuous problem for the
prospective Anzio landing (which had acquired the code name Operation SHINGLE). The original lift allocation by CINC, Mediterranean—forty-two LSTs, sixty
infantry landing craft (LCIs), plus attendant support craft—was sufficient for only
one reinforced division. Clark wanted to add the 1st Armored Division (ArmdDiv)
to the landing force. However, he was unable to do that, because of the shortage
of amphibious shipping.103 The Fifth Army staff, especially its logistics officer (G4), estimated the need as forty-two LSTs (including seventeen, vice the allocated
ten, equipped with six davits apiece), thirty-five operating and fifteen supply LCTs,
and 250 DUKW amphibious vehicles to carry artillery pieces.104 This would provide lift for about 24,600 men and 2,700 vehicles. The additional seven six-davit
LSTs would be necessary to provide more LCAs or LCVPs for the assault wave; the
beaches were too shallow for larger landing ships. The Navy was able to assign the
additional LSTs. Nevertheless, conflicting Army space requirements continued to
be a major problem.105
At the SEXTANT conference in Cairo, Eisenhower suggested that the proposed
landing at Anzio be carried out as planned. He still expected that the Fifth Army
would capture Frosinone in mid-December. Although the conference as a whole
did not actually endorse the operation, the general assumption was that it would be
executed once the Eighth Army and the main Fifth Army broke through the Gustav
Line and advanced northward as planned.106
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First Outline Plan
An outline plan for the Anzio landing was issued on November 25. The Navy considered that fifteen days were required for preparation and that five days should be
allowed for the possibility of bad weather. This meant that the decision on whether
to launch Operation SHINGLE would have to be made by December 20.107 The plan
called for the amphibious landing east of Anzio to be executed after the main Fifth
Army reached the Capistrano–Ferentino–Priverno line. The landing force would
link up with it within seven days after landing and then attack the Alban Hills.108
The assault plan assigned the assault to the U.S. 3rd ID, reinforced by a tank battalion and a tank-destroyer battalion, plus light antiaircraft battalions.109
To achieve surprise, there would be no preliminary shore bombardment. Instead, two Ranger battalions would land near Anzio before H-hour on December
20 and move to Anzio to take out coastal defenses. However, the distance was too
great, and the plan was modified later to land the Rangers in Anzio itself. The 504th
Parachute Regimental Combat Team (ParaRCT) would be dropped along the main
road leading inland from Anzio to prevent enemy reinforcements from reaching
the beaches. The Allied planners estimated that the Germans had 27,500 men in
the Rome area and that these forces could be reinforced with one division from
near Sezze (east-northeast of Anzio) and perhaps two more from northern Italy.110
Before daylight on the 20th, 3rd ID would land with seven days’ supplies but no
follow-up forces. It would hold the beachhead until the main Fifth Army reached
Frosinone, then join in the advance on Rome.111
The main Fifth Army offensive against the Gustav Line started on December 1.
Monte Camino was captured, but progress into the Liri Valley was slow. To clear
the way to Cassino it would be necessary to break through the Mignano Gap, a narrow pass.112 Yet even after ten days of fighting, Fifth Army had failed to reach either
Monte Cassino or Frosinone.113 The British Eighth Army, on the Adriatic front, also
bogged down.114 In his memoirs, Truscott would write that “a worse plan would be
difficult to conceive.” The plan envisaged not a sector of main effort but instead “a
simultaneous attack across the entire front with the same worn divisions. No overwhelming air support was provided.”115
Because of the lack of success in breaking through the Gustav Line, Clark proposed on December 10 that the landing at Anzio not be tied to the advance of the
main Fifth Army.116 He suggested instead that the landing force dig in, consolidate
the beachhead, and wait for it. But that would require a much larger landing force
than previously and would place much greater demands on lift, support, and sustainment. The landing at Anzio would essentially become an independent major
operation. In any case, meeting the original schedule of December 20 for the Anzio
landing was impossible; he projected that the earliest Fifth Army could reach Frosinone was January 10, 1944.117 This delay would complicate the matter of amphibious
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shipping. When the LSTs needed for the buildup on Corsica in preparation for the
invasion of southern France had detached, there would be only thirty-seven on
hand, not the forty-two Fifth Army’s staff considered necessary.118 Hence, on December 18, Clark recommended that Alexander cancel the landing at Anzio; four
days later, Alexander did so.119 The Fifth Army planning staff was reduced, and 3rd
ID, earmarked for the Anzio landing, recalled its planning personnel to prepare for
its employment on the main front.120
The Plan Is Revived
But by the end of the month the operation had been unexpectedly brought back on
the table, and in an equally unexpected way. The major command changes in the
Mediterranean theater had an immediate and significant effect on Allied strategy.
Until then, Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, had essentially made the strategic decisions for that theater, through Eisenhower. However,
when Eisenhower moved to England, Marshall’s influence in the Mediterranean
was weakened greatly. The British Chief of Staff, Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, de facto
assumed the primary planning responsibility there. As a result, Churchill began to
play a greater role in formulating strategy for the Mediterranean.121
Consequently, political-strategic, not operational, considerations were most important in the final decision to conduct a landing at Anzio.122 Churchill was both
physically and mentally exhausted after the Cairo Conference. Leaving Cairo by
plane on December 11, he had planned to stop at Eisenhower’s headquarters in
Tunis, then visit Alexander and Montgomery in Italy. However, Churchill fell seriously ill for about a week and spent several weeks thereafter recuperating. This gave
him ample time to review the results of the Cairo and Tehran Conferences and the
reasons for his inability to persuade Roosevelt to focus Allied efforts on the eastern
Mediterranean.123
Churchill was in particular very dissatisfied with the progress of the war in Italy.
On December 19 he wrote to the British chiefs of staff that “the total neglect to
provide amphibious action on the Adriatic side and the failure to strike any similar
blow on the west have been disastrous. None of the landing craft in the Mediterranean have been put to the slightest use for three months. Neither coming home
in preparation for OVERLORD nor in the Italian battle. There are few instances even
in this war, of such valuable assets being so completely wasted.”124
On December 22, Churchill received a positive response from the British chiefs
of staff: they agreed that “the stagnation in Italy cannot be allowed to continue and
that an amphibious landing should be used to strike around the enemy flank and
open up the way for a rapid advance to Rome.” They suggested that if more landing
craft were made available for a landing at Anzio, a larger force could be put ashore,
and long before the main Fifth Army reached Frosinone. Doing so would have a
far-reaching effect on the progress of the campaign and likely open the way for a
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rapid advance. This statement captured Churchill’s imagination. It gave him what
he believed to be an achievable objective. He was now convinced that SHINGLE was
the answer to the stalemate on the Italian front.125 Churchill greatly exaggerated the
stakes, however, writing that “if Rome were not captured, the world would ‘regard
our campaign as a failure.’ . . . [W]hoever holds Rome holds the title deeds of Italy.”
He wrote to Clark that without Rome the campaign would “peter out ingloriously.”126
At the end of December, indeed, the operational situation in southern Italy was
not very favorable for the Allies. The front line extended from the east banks of the
Sangro River in the east to the Garigliano River and the Gulf of Gaeta in the west.
Eighth Army had failed to reach the Pescara–Popoli road. The main Fifth Army
was unable to advance northward and seize the Liri Valley, the main avenue to
Rome. Churchill and his senior commander in the Mediterranean theater agreed
that the only way to break the stalemate was an amphibious landing to threaten the
German supply routes to the right (western) flank of the Gustav Line.127
Churchill, though ill, convened and presided over a special conference at Tunis
on Christmas Day. There he argued—overoptimistically—that a landing at Anzio
would cause the Germans to withdraw forces from central and southern Italy and
thereby hasten the liberation of Rome. Eisenhower disagreed but was overruled.128
Churchill’s subordinates were unwilling to challenge his strongly held views—he
had pneumonia, and he already had made up his mind.
Thus, it was Churchill who ultimately made the decision to land at Anzio. Opposing and skeptical views did not receive proper hearings. Clark would write in
his memoirs that Brig. Kenneth W. D. Strong, the British G-2 at AFHQ and thus
Eisenhower’s intelligence officer, was dubious. Strong was well aware of the political importance of Rome to Hitler. He also knew that the German divisions in
France and Yugoslavia were not busy during the winter months and so could be
moved to Italy if needed. Churchill disregarded this view, believing the capture of
Rome worth the risk.129 Not surprisingly, General Alexander deferred to his prime
minister. Another factor in the decision to go ahead was the doubling of the original size of the landing force by the addition of a British division.130
Even so, Churchill and his advisers were mistaken in believing that a two-division
landing force plus some paratroopers could, by cutting off the German Tenth Army’s
lines of communication, force it to withdraw from the front or at least immediately
retreat.131 Underlying their error was their having allowed the size and composition
of the landing force to be determined not by the objective to be accomplished but
by the availability of troops and landing craft.132 The planned landing force clearly
was inadequate to accomplish its stated objective.
On December 26, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that the Anzio landing would
decide the battle for Rome and probably achieve the destruction of a substantial
part of the German army. He asked Roosevelt to approve keeping the LSTs in place

THE ALLIED LANDING AT ANZIO-NETTUNO

for a few weeks. Two days later, Roosevelt replied favorably, agreeing to delay redeployment of fifty-eight LSTs scheduled for Operation OVERLORD.133 However,
Roosevelt imposed conditions: that OVERLORD remain the paramount operation
and that proposed landings on Rhodes and in the Aegean be sidetracked.134 He also
stipulated that Anzio should not interfere with the air buildup on Corsica for the
invasion of southern France (Operation ANVIL, later DRAGOON).135
Alexander assured Churchill by radio that “Clark and I are confident of great
chance of pulling off something big if given the means.” He also suggested the possibility of landing VI Corps (i.e., part of it) south of Anzio, near the front line,
which would eliminate the need for an extended resupply. In his view, one division
followed by other forces could land and cut off Highway 7 (which paralleled the
coast about ten miles inland and led to Rome) and perhaps make it possible to
bypass Frosinone.136
Churchill’s idea of landing at Anzio was complicating the American plan to support the cross-Channel invasion with a landing in southern France. General Marshall later recalled the struggle over the size, composition, and timing of ANVIL as
“a bitter and unremitting fight with the British right up to the launching.”137 On
January 6 Churchill tried to persuade General Brooke to visit him in Marrakesh,
where the prime minister was still recovering: “We must get this SHINGLE business
settled, especially in view of the repercussions of the new proposals about ANVIL
which will certainly make the U.S. Chiefs of Staff Committee stare.”138
As it turned out, Brooke did not visit Marrakesh.139 However, on January 7
Churchill presided at a conference there attended by Maitland Wilson, Alexander,
Maj. Gen. (promoted to lieutenant general in January 1944) Walter Bedell Smith
(Chief of Staff, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force), and Adm. Andrew B. Cunningham. There a decision was made to move D-day for the Anzio
landing ahead as much as possible, to gain time before the required redeployment
of the LSTs to England. The aim was to give the LSTs time for at least two trips to
Anzio, three if the weather was favorable, speeding up the transport of supplies and
follow-up forces. On the second and final day of the conference, Alexander and
Cunningham did most of the talking.140 Alexander was able to secure twenty-four
LSTs until the end of February.141 Churchill was very happy with the results of the
Marrakesh conference, wiring Roosevelt that “unanimous agreement for action as
proposed was reached by the responsible officials of both countries and all services.” Churchill left Marrakesh on January 14, having won his argument that the
Anzio landing must be carried out.142
The Amphibious Objective Area
Anzio (Roman Antium) was selected as the amphibious objective because of its proximity both to Rome and to the German front line (see map 11). Anzio is some thirtyfive miles southwest of Rome and was about sixty-two miles from the front, which
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was then on the Garigliano River.143 Anzio itself was a small port, its harbor enclosed
within a six-hundred-yard-long breakwater. Yet the port was still subject to considerable swell. Anzio’s harbor could provide anchorage for ships that drew no more than
ten feet.144 About a mile and a half east is the small port of Nettuno. The two were
connected by a good road, and both were linked to Rome by rail.145
North and east of Anzio (i.e., the south-facing shore of the point near Anzio),
the coast is one of sandy, gently shelving beaches with long dunes above the highwater mark. All these beaches are exposed.146 Farther southeast, all the beaches,
with the exception of the northwesternmost, were too rocky, too small, or of too
shallow a gradient for a landing (i.e., craft would ground too far out).147 No gradient
was better than one foot in sixty: the average was 1 : 90, that on the west beach was
148
1 : 120.
The coastal area extending from Fiumara Grande, northwest of Ostia, toward
Anzio is low, almost flat, and sandy—full of dunes. The area immediately around
Anzio is of moderate elevation, averaging two hundred feet in height, constituting a plateau that at the time was thickly wooded.149 The area immediately north
(i.e., inland) of Anzio and Nettuno consisted of scrub timberland, bog, and rolling
grazing land.150 There were also many ditches, up to fifty feet wide. The roads were
generally good; however, tanks had difficulty moving during the rainy season. The
terrain offered little cover from enemy fire except for some minor woods.151
The area between Point Torre Astura, not quite ten miles south of Anzio, and
the Tiber, about fifty miles north, and extending inland to the round, volcanic mass
of the Alban Hills is generally a low plateau. It drops off to the south toward the
Pontine Marshes and in the north rises sharply to the Alban Hills. The Alban Hills
are some twelve miles southeast of Rome and fifteen miles north of Anzio. The
dominant (but second highest) peak of the Alban Hills is the 3,114-foot Mount
Cavo. The area is cut by several streams and drainage canals. The coastal plain
is very swampy in spots, especially during the rainy season.152 The larger coastal
plain, stretching from Terracina (about thirty miles south of Anzio) to the Tiber, is
dry, gently rolling countryside, wooded in many spots. It rises slowly to a railway
embankment some thirteen miles north of Anzio. It was then cultivated ground,
characterized by vineyards and small farms.153 The area west of the Alban road is
cut by a series of gullies (waterworn ravines), of which the largest two, Moletta and
Incastro, run southwest from the Alban Hills toward the sea. Often fifty feet deep,
these gullies would prove difficult obstacles for armor.154
Southeast of Anzio were the Pontine Marshes, originally a low, swampy, malarial area, wet and spongy, growing chiefly sphagnum moss. They extend from
the Alban Hills to Mount Circeo, 1,775 feet high. As part of a large reclamation
and resettlement project undertaken by Mussolini’s Fascist government, the Pontine Marshes had been carefully drained, irrigated, and converted into cultivated
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fields. An extensive system of ditches, canals, and pumping stations made movement difficult in general; during the rainy season the area was impassable to most
heavy equipment. Being largely treeless, it offered scant cover for the troops. Cover
was available in the Padiglione Woods, which extended three to five miles north of
Nettuno. There a force might be prepared for an attack. However, after leaving the
forest such a force would be vulnerable, its movements easily observable—there
was no cover between the woods and the coastal railway.155
East of the Padiglione Woods the entire right flank of the planned beachhead
line was protected by the 170-foot-wide Mussolini Canal, which drained the northern Pontine Marshes.156 The main canal was built like an antitank ditch, with steep
sides sloping to a shallow, sixteen-foot-wide streambed. The combination of canals
157
and marshes made the right flank of the beachhead a poor avenue for attack.
The 3,100-foot mountain mass of the Alban Hills, about twenty miles inland by
good roads from the beaches of Anzio, controls the southern approaches to Rome,
fifteen miles north. East of the Alban Hills is the Velletri Gap. The 5,040-foot Monti
Lepini (the Lepini Mountains) stretch along the inner edge of the Pontine Marshes
southeastward toward Terracina.158 Both the Alban Hills and the Lepini Mountains
protected the German Tenth Army’s vital supply lines. In operational terms, the
Alban Hills were a “decisive point,” because they dominated Highway 6 (the Via
Casilina) and Highway 7 (the Via Appia). They also formed the last barrier the
Germans could defend to prevent Allied entry into Rome.159
The road network on the Anzio plain was well developed, but the roads themselves were of poor quality. The most important road used for supplying German
troops on the front line was Highway 7, which was narrow and easily defensible.
It ran along the coast, around the Aurunci Mountains, then through the Pontine
Marshes. Highway 6 runs from Rome through the Liri Valley. A defender could
easily block it in the narrow Mignano Gap, ten miles southeast of the Liri Valley.160
The main west coast railway paralleled these highways. Along the network of paved
and gravel roads crisscrossing the farmlands were numerous two-story podere
(farmhouses) for recent settlers. The provincial town of Aprilia (whose community
center the Allied troops would call “the Factory”) was modern.161
In the Anzio-Nettuno area, the mean wind velocity is 9.3 knots. The winds blow
from the northern quadrant 42 percent of the time, from the western quadrant 26
percent. Only 2–3 percent of the time are there gale-force winds, thunderstorms
perhaps 1 percent. In January and February, the wind comes largely from the north
and east. The offshore/inshore wind cycle is extremely irregular.162 Along the coast
between Elba and Civitavecchia, southerly winds prevail. Gales lasting two or three
days and their accompanying depressions move eastward across the northwestern
Mediterranean. Southerly and southwesterly gales bring low clouds, drizzle or continuous rain, and sometimes snow, until the wind veers to the westward. Southwesterly winds generate heavy seas on the Italian coast.163
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THE FINAL PLAN
Operation SHINGLE was now essentially an independent operation, to be executed
whether the main Fifth Army was within striking distance or not.164 (The modified
operation is sometimes referred to as SHINGLE II.) The landing at Anzio would be
a two-division instead of a single-division assault.165 The CCS also approved the
request that the 504th ParaRCT, which was due to leave the Mediterranean in early
January 1944, remain long enough to conduct a parachute drop.166
On January 2, General Alexander issued his Operational Instruction Nr. 32.
Fifth Army’s mission would be to carry out an assault landing in the vicinity of
Rome, with the “object of cutting the enemy lines of communication and threatening the rear of the German 14 [Panzer] Corps.” The operation would take place
in the period of January 20–31, 1944, as early as the weather made possible. The
initial landing force would be composed of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division, two armored elements (one U.S., one British), U.S. Army Ranger battalions, one RCT, the
U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, the British 1st Division, and two British commandos
(units of about four hundred men).167
Alexander’s operational instruction stated that if Eighth Army, despite its reduction in strength, could reach the Pescara line and pose a threat to Rome through
Popoli (in the province of Pescara) by January 20, it would “have a great bearing on
the success of the whole situation.” Canadian Corps HQ and the 4th Indian Division “will be moved forward to make a show of strength on Eighth Army front.”
Cover plans would be coordinated by 15th Army Group HQ. Fifth Army “will
make as strong a threat as possible” toward Cassino and Frosinone shortly prior to
the assault landing at Anzio to draw the enemy reserves that might be employed
against the landing forces, then breach the enemy front and take all opportunities
to “link up rapidly with the seaborne operation.”168
Clark was of two minds about the prospects for success of the Anzio landing.
On the one hand, he realized fully the disadvantages of weakening the main Fifth
Army forces on the front line, the long distance separating the landing force from
the main Fifth Army, German strength, and the problems of retaining enough LSTs
to sustain VI Corps after the landing. On the other hand, however, Clark saw a
great opportunity for speeding up his drive to Rome—if the gamble at Anzio paid
off. In the end, his ambition got the better of him, and he became an enthusiastic
supporter of Operation SHINGLE.169 Clark predicted to Alexander on January 2 that
the Anzio landing would “exercise a decisive influence on the operation to capture
Rome.”170 After he received the final decision on the Anzio landing, Clark asked
Alexander to be relieved of responsibility for planning the invasion of southern
France so he could remain in Italy as commander of Fifth Army.171
Yet in his memoirs Truscott wrote that no one below the army level believed
that the landing of two divisions at Anzio would cause the Germans to withdraw
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from the southern front. Neither, he recalled, did any see even a remote chance that
the main Fifth Army would be able to cross the Rapido River and fight its way up
the Liri and Sacco valleys to join the Anzio forces within a month.172 Be that as it
may, shortly after the Christmas conference in Tunis, Clark appointed Maj. Gen.
John P. Lucas, commander of the U.S. VI Corps, to command the ground forces at
Anzio. Lucas had commanded a division and a corps prior to being assigned to the
Mediterranean theater.173
Composition of VI Corps
During the planning for the Anzio landing, a major problem was that VI Corps,
as constituted for the operation (it also possessed an armored division and another of infantry, both remaining on the mainland), would consist of both U.S.
and British units. Eisenhower shared some misgivings about that in a personal letter on December 29 to Alexander, especially concerning the great difficulties of
supporting such a landing force logistically.174 Different equipment and spare parts
requirements would exacerbate supply problems. Also, the British division was at
only two-thirds of its prescribed strength. Eisenhower asked Alexander whether he
might not prefer a corps composed of two U.S. divisions, “when you as a British officer had the deciding responsibility and when the Prime Minister has been such a
staunch advocate of the project.” Or perhaps Alexander may have thought it “undesirable from a political point of view for a corps of two British divisions to be given
the opportunity for the direct capture of Rome.” Eisenhower concluded, “Neither of
these two factors should be allowed to outweigh the military advantages of launching the assault by any troops you believe best fitted and most available.”175 Neither
Lucas nor Truscott wanted a British division to be part of VI Corps. They believed
that a mixed corps would complicate not only supply but command and control, as
well—though neither explained exactly what command problem he anticipated.176
On January 8, General Wilson, in a response to Eisenhower’s letter to Alexander, explained that the reason for the mixed corps was the lack of time to organize
a corps composed of only British or only U.S. forces. In his view, should a British
corps now be assigned, the reshuffle would be difficult to conceal from the Germans. An all-U.S. corps would require the withdrawal of a second American division from the front. This would weaken the main Fifth Army’s pending offensive
against the Gustav Line, which could not be allowed to happen.177
The Problem of Amphibious Lift
As has been seen, one of the major problems facing the Allied high commanders
was how long the LSTs could remain to support the Anzio landing. The doubling of
the original landing force meant much more amphibious lift and a larger logistical
effort. Fifty-six LSTs were now scheduled to sail for Britain on January 15, 1944,
leaving only thirty LSTs in the Mediterranean—less than half the number needed.178
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So few LSTs would have been sufficient only for a regimental-size landing.179 The
lift required for SHINGLE could be secured by delaying until February 5 the redeployment of fifty-six LSTs to Britain and by temporarily withdrawing sixteen from
the buildup on Corsica. That would make a total of eighty-eight LSTs, ninety LCIs,
sixty LCTs, and eight infantry landing ships (LSIs) available for Anzio.180 Because
fifty-eight LSTs had to be redeployed immediately after the landing at Anzio to the
United Kingdom, the initial landing force would not have the benefit of continued
maintenance over the beaches or subsequent buildup of the initial force.181
Alexander asked Churchill to resolve the situation with LSTs, because only six
would be available after D+2 to land vehicles for two divisions. The planners estimated that fourteen LSTs were required to maintain the landing force until it was
182
joined with the main Fifth Army.
Shortly after the Tunis conference, the CCS decided to delay the scheduled departure of the LSTs for Britain for three weeks. Ten LSTs were taken off the Corsica
run for the moment, and eight were diverted from an operation formerly planned
for the Indian Ocean in 1944. Thus, some ninety LSTs were available to launch the
Anzio operation, more than sufficient. Because of the need to redeploy LSTs to
Britain it would not have been possible to run resupply or follow-up convoys. In
addition, some sixteen LSTs had to be returned to the Corsica run not later than
February 5, to compensate for time lost in their diversion to the Anzio landing.
Other LSTs had to be withdrawn immediately after the landing at Anzio for overhaul and refit. In fact, only six serviceable LSTs would be available for the operation
after D+2—and even that number might be reduced by operational losses.183An
additional ten LSTs were needed for fifteen days after D-day to build up supplies.184
Both Alexander and Clark considered follow-up convoys essential to the ultimate success of an Anzio landing, so they made every effort to secure them.
Admiral Lowry too argued that the combination of too few LSTs and bad weather
would jeopardize the supply for a two-division force. Because of the anticipated
heavy German resistance on the Gustav Line, it was not possible to anticipate precisely where the main Fifth Army front line would be on the landing’s D-day;
neither could it be predicted when the main Fifth Army would link up with the
landing force. However, an enemy counterattack on the beachhead could certainly
be expected. Hence, it was critically important that the Anzio landing be selfsupportable indefinitely.185
On January 2, Clark warned Alexander that the release of all but six LSTs by
February 3 would make the entire operation extremely hazardous. He requested
that Alexander make “every effort to hold adequate number of craft for SHINGLE
until such time as success of operation is assured.” Clark had also seen that the
small number of assault craft would allow landing only one Ranger battalion and
five infantry battalions fully combat loaded. Clark had been willing nevertheless to
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land VI Corps at reduced strength, but on the assumption that “we would be able to
retain a reasonable number of LSTs for resupply purposes and to transport the necessary vehicles needed by the assault force.” He considered twenty LSTs the minimum: ten for two weeks to transport vehicles and ten indefinitely for supply purposes. The figure of twenty postulated that the Navy would remove its load limit of
four hundred tons per LST; if not, twenty-four would be required. In Clark’s view,
supply by sea would be necessary for at least fifteen days after the landing.186 In all
of this he was presuming a main Fifth Army “attack in greatest possible strength in
Liri Valley several days in advance of Shingle with the object of drawing maximum
number of enemy reserves to that front and fixing them there.” That was the only
way that “the Shingle force exercises a decisive influence in the operation to capture
Rome.” That raised the point that his estimate of twenty (or twenty-four) LSTs did
not allow for the possibility of a buildup after the initial invasion, although it was
“quite conceivable that the enemy situation may make that action necessary.”187
At a CINCs’ meeting in Tunis on January 3, concern was expressed that with
the LSTs promised elsewhere, the Operation SHINGLE landing force would have
only eight days’ sustainment. That meant that if the main Fifth Army did not link
up with VI Corps within eight days, the Anzio force would have to choose between
remaining on the beachhead and withdrawing. Yet it was agreed that despite these
risks the possible gains justified the calculated risk. Because the situation on the
front was unfavorable, Alexander believed that a linkup between the main Fifth
Army and VI Corps within the eight days was highly improbable, and accordingly
he made every effort to keep enough LSTs on hand for SHINGLE’s separate needs.188
Timing
The timing of the landing at Anzio-Nettuno depended on many factors. For one thing,
D-day was contingent on the advance of Fifth Army; the release of an Army division
for the landing was being withheld pending developments on that front. Also, the Navy
asked for a minimum of twenty days to complete its own plans and that all craft
arrive in the Naples area ten days in advance for briefing, rehearsals, and loading.189
The impending removal from the Mediterranean of many of SHINGLE’s LSTs
required the main Fifth Army to conduct an all-out offensive, as Clark had envisioned. The purpose was to obtain a new position in sufficient time to allow the
landing at Anzio to be completed prior to the withdrawal of these craft. No reliance could be placed on maintaining the landing force over the beaches, because of
unfavorable weather conditions; any extensive follow-up was also precluded. The
weather forecast was unreliable beyond forty-eight hours. Having no assurance of
more than two days of operational weather in seven demanded that the operation
start during clear or clearing weather and be completed within forty-eight hours.
Hence, no ship or craft could be bulk loaded; all equipment and supplies had to be
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either packed or carried on wheels. Enough supplies for seven days had to be carried in the ships and craft of the assault convoy.190
A conference in Marrakesh on January 7 decided that the Anzio D-day had to be
moved as far forward as possible to maximize the availability of landing ships and
craft. If D-day were January 22, for instance, the enemy would have little time to
prepare; some eighty-two LSTs could be used; and all, or at least more, of these LSTs
would be available for the possible landing of a third, small division after D+5 (which
in that case would be January 27) if the weather were favorable. The current plan was
that all the LSTs would remain in the theater until February 3. By February 23 their
number would be reduced to twenty-five, to twelve by the end of the month.191
The landing at Anzio was provisionally scheduled to take place between January
20 and 31, 1944. Eisenhower, and the Royal Navy in particular, wanted to assemble
landing craft in England as soon as possible for Operation OVERLORD. Hence, and
as outlined above, a D-day as close to January 20 as possible was highly desirable.192
Also, ULTRA decrypts had revealed that the Germans planned to demolish harbor
facilities in the Anzio-Nettuno area. For example, an ULTRA intercept on the 11th
reported that demolition charges at Nettuno required renewal, owing to deterioration by the weather; preparations were to commence shortly. Five days later, ULTRA
decrypted a January 14 request by the German regional commander at Civitavecchia
to discuss with I Parachute Corps (ParaCorps) whether, and if so to what extent, partial demolition of Nettuno and Civitavecchia harbors could be carried out without
making them useless for German supply traffic. On the 21st, as the invasion force
was in the final hours of preparation, an ULTRA analysis of another intercept reported
that “on nineteenth [January], task of preparing demolitions in above harbors [Nettuno and Civitavecchia] [was] allotted to two technical detachments.”193 Here was one
of the reasons Clark decided to adhere to the previously agreed “invasion schedule
and, if anything, establish D-Day as close to 20 January as possible. Otherwise, [the]
limited numbers of landing craft [assigned] might encounter severe obstacles resulting from German demolitions in the harbors preventing [Clark] from landing troops
and equipment ashore in a timely manner.” Any delay in landing would give the Germans more time to destroy the Anzio-Nettuno port facilities, which would be critical
for unloading the material necessary to sustain the beachhead.194
Indeed, General Lucas asked for a delay, to January 25 to allow proper rehearsal.
As a compromise, the 22nd was selected as D-day.195 H-hour was set for 0200, to
give the landing forces four hours of darkness. Morning twilight would begin a few
minutes before 0600, and the sun would rise at 0731.196 Sunset would occur at 1711.
Fifth Army Planning
Fifth Army headquarters started detailed planning on December 31. The Navy’s
planning staff was headed by Admiral Lowry, commander of the VIII Amphibious
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Force and of Task Force 81, already formed for the operation. The air plan was
prepared by Maj. Gen. J. K. Cannon, Commander, XII Air Support Command,
and his staff.197 It was decided that the British contingent would be transported by a
separate but subordinate task force under Rear Adm. Thomas H. Troubridge, RN.
Troubridge and his staff worked at the planning section of the 15th Army Group
headquarters in Caserta.198 However, some key commanders were not involved in
planning, specifically General Lucas, who was with his staff at Maddaloni (southeast of Caserta), and Capt. E. C. L. Turner, in charge of the Rangers, who spent most
of the time at Pozzuoli, on the Gulf of Naples.199 Plans for Operation SHINGLE were
approved on January 12, only ten days before D-day.200
Clark’s plan to breach the Gustav Line concurrently with the Anzio landing was
promulgated by Operations Instruction Nr. 12, issued on December 16, 1943, and
amended by Operations Instruction Nr. 13 of January 10, 1944. Clark’s intent was
that the main Fifth Army, reinforced with two divisions from Eighth Army, would
attack the German Tenth Army across the Garigliano and Rapido Rivers, break
through the Gustav Line, and drive up the Liri Valley. This offensive should have
sufficient strength, he projected, to draw the German reserves. While the enemy was
preoccupied defending the Gustav Line, the Allies would land at Anzio-Nettuno.201
Clark’s Operations Instruction Nr. 13 specified that the French Expeditionary
Corps (2nd Moroccan and 3rd Algerian Divisions, reinforced, and the 3rd and 4th
Groups of Tabors—irregular Moroccan troops) would start the general offensive
of Fifth Army at H-hour on D-day, set for January 12 (see map 12). It would attack east “along the general axes Cardito–Atina and Aquafondale–S. Elia and seize
the high ground north and northwest of Cassino.” On D+3 (January 15), II Corps
(34th and 36th IDs, reinforced, and 1st ArmdDiv) would attack and secure Mount
Trocchio. On order (estimated on D+8, i.e., January 20), II Corps would force the
Rapido River, establish a bridgehead in the vicinity of Sant’Angelo, and then, with
maximum use of armor, advance west and northwest. On the left flank, the British
10 Corps (5th, 46th, and 56th Divisions and 23rd Armoured Brigade) would on
order (estimated D+5) cross the Liri River and seize a bridgehead in the vicinity of
Sant’Ambrogio. It would then attack northward in the direction of San Giorgio. The
main Fifth Army’s reserve (45th ID) would be prepared to reinforce Allied forces in
the Liri Valley between the Rapido and Melfa Rivers.202 On D+10 (January 22), VI
Corps would land at Anzio-Nettuno.203
Clark’s Field Order Nr. 5, issued on January 12, pertained specifically to the Anzio landing force, which was meant to “launch attacks in the Anzio area on H-Hour,
D-Day,” its mission “(a) to seize and secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Anzio,”
and “(b) advance on Colli Laziali.”204 The word advance implied a significant change
in the mission.205 In fact, the second part of Clark’s order generally was vague: it
seemed to contradict the first part, by directing Lucas not just to hold the beachhead but to advance out of it, toward the Alban Hills (for the linkup with the main
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Fifth Army seven days after the landing). In any case, since the first outline plan
(above) it had been understood that the attack on the Alban Hills would be made
after the linkup, not by VI Corps alone. This change in mission caused much controversy, in the immediate aftermath and continuing to the present.206
Alexander did not help matters by failing to warn Clark not to change his mission statement for VI Corps. In a personal meeting with Clark, Alexander was cautious. Alexander knew from ULTRA that the Germans had a sizable force in the
Rome area (I ParaCorps, of two divisions), but he was not sure whether it would be
in the vicinity of Anzio on D-day. Hence, he emphasized to Clark the importance of
securing the beachhead as the first order of business. Afterward, Clark could focus
on the mission assigned to VI Corps.207
On January 12, Brigadier General Brann visited Lucas to brief him about the final
main Fifth Army order for the Anzio operation, specifically the vaguely worded mission statement. Brann made it clear that Lucas’s primary task was to seize and secure
a beachhead; Clark expected no more. At the same time, it was understood that Lucas
was free to take advantage of an opportunity to capture the Alban Hills; however, in
Brann’s view the chance of one arising was slim. Clark too did not think it would be
possible for Lucas to reach the hill mass while at the same time holding the beachhead to protect the port and the landing beaches. Loss of the port and beaches would
completely isolate VI Corps, leaving it at the mercy of the Germans. Clark did not
want Lucas to push on to the Alban Hills at the risk of sacrificing VI Corps.208
Brann’s visit to Lucas was highly unusual. It probably shows how uncomfortable
Clark was at that time with the entire operation. After the war, Clark confirmed this
unease: “There was no possibility of going ahead and capturing the Alban Hills in
the face of the concentrated troops that were ordered to meet us and did meet us.”209
Allied Assumptions
The Fifth Army plan for the Anzio landing was based on several assumptions. The
planners expected the Germans to react very strongly to the Allied landing in the
rear of XIV PzCorps.210 Alexander and his G-2 were convinced that the Anzio force,
by cutting off the enemy forces at the Alban Hills, would threaten the German rear.
The landing would compel the Germans to weaken their forces deployed along the
Gustav Line. This, in turn, would enable the main Fifth Army to break through the
German defenses and quickly make contact with Allied forces at the beachhead.211
Clearly, Alexander relied on presumed enemy intentions rather than on enemy capabilities—thereby making one of the most fundamental errors that can arise in
estimating a situation and making a decision.
Colonel Howard, G-2 of the main Fifth Army, was much less optimistic. He estimated that the Germans had one corps headquarters and two divisions, plus contingents of paratroopers and panzer forces, in the vicinity of Rome. Like Alexander,
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he believed that the landing at Anzio would constitute such a serious threat that
the Germans would have to react very strongly: “an emergency to be met by all the
resources and strength available to the German high command in Italy.” The Germans would concentrate forces against the beachhead to prevent the invaders from
advancing to the Alban Hills; otherwise German withdrawal from southern Italy
would become necessary. But to do that, the G-2 estimated, the Germans need not
weaken the Gustav Line; they could move in additional divisions from the Adriatic
front; also, they could count on two more divisions arriving from northern Italy
over the ensuing two weeks.212
Specifically, Colonel Howard assessed that VI Corps could expect initial D-day
resistance from one division assigned to watch the coast, four parachute battalions
from Rome, a tank and an antitank battalion, and coast-defense personnel—altogether 14,300 men by D+1. Another division and an SS (Schutzstaffel) infantry regiment (InfRgt) were north of Rome. Also, an RCT and perhaps elements of
the Hermann Göring Panzer Division could arrive by D+2 or D+3. The Germans
might bring the 26th PzDiv from the Eighth Army front. That would give them
some thirty-one thousand men. If the main Fifth Army attack was sufficiently
strong, however, it should pin down all the enemy reserves in the beachhead area.
Ironically, in light of later events, the G-2 did not believe the Germans could bring
reinforcements down quickly from northern Italy, especially in the face of overwhelming Allied air superiority. The estimate was that the German buildup north
of Florence would probably amount to not more than two divisions by D+16. The
final summary by the main Fifth Army on January 16 also pointed out the increasing attrition of enemy troops.213
The Luftwaffe was not considered a major threat. By early January almost the
entire 2nd Air Fleet, under Gen. Wolfram von Richthofen, had left Italy for Germany. There, Allied planners assumed, air attacks on German air bases would reduce Luftwaffe strength by 60 percent.214 They considered it unlikely therefore that
the Luftwaffe would reinforce its units in Italy to counter the Anzio landing, so the
“enemy air effort, never strong, should gradually diminish.”215
Clark would later say that another consideration in his plans was the presumption that Eighth Army would attack with sufficient force during this period to prevent any movement of German troops from its front to either the Gustav Line or
the Anzio sector. He also believed (erroneously) that Allied air forces could isolate
the beachhead area by heavy and coordinated attacks to destroy enemy communications and that accordingly the Germans would be unable to shift their reserves
rapidly enough to counter the Allied landing and the planned thrust inland. However, in this instance and throughout the Italian campaign Clark would see this
“isolation” theory invoked repeatedly, only to see the enemy, again and again, move
his forces by railroad and highway, with some difficulty but with great effectiveness, even when the weather was bad.216
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The VI Corps Plan
The mission of VI Corps in Phase I of the landing, as stated in Clark’s outline plan
of January 12, was “by first light D-Day to capture and/or reduce enemy gun batteries capable of seriously interfering with the assault on the beaches and to launch
assaults on the beaches north and northeast of Anzio and establish a beachhead.”
In Phase II, the mission was simply to “attack in the direction of Colli Laziali.”217
Confusingly, D-day in the VI Corps plan was January 22, while the Fifth Army’s
plan referred to the landing at Anzio-Nettuno as occurring ten days after the Dday of its own offensive. Clearly, the VI Corps planners should have referred to the
landing date as Fifth Army’s D+10, not their own D-day.
The VI Corps scheme of maneuver (or “operational idea”) envisaged a simultaneous landing on the Anzio and Nettuno beaches. The U.S. 3rd ID (under Major
General Truscott) would land three regiments over the X-RAY beaches, two miles
south of Nettuno. In the center, the 6615th Ranger Force (Provisional), with the
83rd Chemical Battalion and the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, would land
over YELLOW Beach adjacent to Anzio harbor, with the mission of seizing the port
and clearing out any coastal-defense batteries there. On the PETER beaches, six
miles northwest of Anzio, the 2nd Brigade Group of the British 1st Division (Maj.
Gen. W. R. C. Penney) would land. The 2nd Special Service Brigade of the 9th and
43rd Commando would advance eastward to establish a roadblock on the main
road leading from Anzio to Campoleone and Albano. The various forces landing
would link up to consolidate a beachhead seven miles deep that centered on the
port of Anzio.218
The original discussion called for landing the Rangers over the PETER beaches.
The Rangers would then drive to the south and take out heavy gun emplacements
at Anzio before daylight. However, because of the distance between PETER and
Anzio, the Rangers’ landing was moved to the beaches just southeast of Anzio harbor. Also, it had been planned to have the 52nd Troop Carrier Wing drop the 504th
RCT behind the beaches shortly prior to H-hour, to cut the Anzio–Albano road. It
was realized, however, that an airdrop most likely would give warning to the enemy
defenders; in any case, the 504th RCT’s mission would be similar to that of the British 1st Division.219 Moreover, if enemy planes attacked at the same time, the 504th
might be fired on by friendly antiaircraft artillery.220 Hence, the paratroop drop was
canceled on D–2.221
The planners assumed initial heavy German resistance, so they provided a
strong floating reserve: the bulk of the British 1st Division, with the 46th Royal
Tank Regiment. In addition, the 24th Field Regiment, the 80th Medium Regiment,
and the 504th Parachute Infantry would land behind the 3rd ID and assemble in
a VI Corps reserve.222 Lucas tentatively planned to use the corps reserve in two
ways. If the enemy reacted in strength, the reserve would be assembled and would
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counterattack; or, if the situation permitted, it could advance toward the Colli
Laziali to cut the enemy communication routes. This attack could be conducted
either up the Albano road and then toward Rome or via Cisterna and Velletri to cut
Highway 6 near Valmontone.223
The 15th Army Group headquarters prepared a “cover plan” (or operational
deception plan) aimed at misleading the enemy with regard to the timing and direction of the Anzio landing. Because it was hardly possible to conceal that an amphibious landing was being prepared at Naples, the Germans had to be convinced
that the Allied intent was to land farther north on Italy’s western coast, near Civitavecchia or even Leghorn, toward the end of January.224
Originally, a naval feint was planned at Ostia Lido, at the mouth of the Tiber River,
on D-day. This site was changed first to Palo, about fifteen miles north of the Tiber’s
mouth, and then, at General Clark’s insistence, to Civitavecchia, some forty miles
north. The reason was that most of the German troops already were north of the
Tiber River; a feint at Ostia Lido, if successful, would tend to draw the enemy closer
to, not farther from, the landing area.225 Instead, a British antiaircraft cruiser and two
destroyers would shell Civitavecchia at H-hour. At the same time, six cruisers and
destroyers would appear off Terracina, again to distract German attention from Anzio.226 Civitavecchia would be bombarded once more at midnight on D+1 by cruisers and destroyers.227 In addition, fishing craft were assembled in Corsican harbors,
where army engineers made a great show of “secret” activity, assembling dummy supply dumps and constructing imitation landing craft. Information was “leaked” from
Caserta that Fifth Army would not advance in January but that the British Eighth
Army, with fresh troops, would move up the Italian Adriatic coast.228
A radio deception plan included the establishment on Corsica of a radio station
purporting to be the advance headquarters of VI Army Corps. This station would
transmit messages, plausibly building up in volume until H-hour at Anzio.229 There
were also to be wireless broadcasts to resistance forces and agents in Italy, using a
cipher it was known the Germans could read. The messages notified the recipients
that an invasion was imminent at Civitavecchia.230
Logistical Support and Sustainment
Logistics for Operation SHINGLE required a great deal of planning. Innovative ways
to sustain the landing force ashore had to be found. The likelihood of clear weather
no more than two days out of seven dictated that the assault convoy be completely
unloaded within forty-eight hours; everything would be “combat loaded,” ready
for quick removal in the sequence in which it would be needed.231 The available
LSTs could carry only seven days of supplies for the troops.232 Admirals John Cunningham and Lowry wanted to warn Lucas not to rely on support over the beach,
because of the probability of bad weather and the urgent need for the LSTs in other
operations, but rather disembark the whole force immediately after the landing.233
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At a conference in Marrakesh on January 7, an American colonel, Edward J.
O’Neill, Clark’s assistant chief of logistics, suggested driving loaded trucks onto
DUKWs, and driving the DUKWs into LSTs, through their bow doors. At AnzioNettuno the DUKWs would disembark and proceed to the beach, where the trucks
would drive ashore and then directly to supply dumps on the beachhead. Meanwhile, the LSTs would embark empty trucks of the previous echelon and take them
back to Naples. The U.S. Seventh Fleet had used a similar procedure successfully in
the Southwest Pacific Area. However, this idea was rejected by Churchill, Adm. Andrew Cunningham, and Gen. Bedell Smith, who objected that unpredictable winter
weather could make it difficult to land the DUKWs carrying loaded trucks. Also,
sandbars might block them. In addition, the Royal Navy was concerned that the
Germans might destroy the port facilities at Anzio-Nettuno. As it turned out, the
DUKWs were able to reach the shore (though ultimately for other purposes), and
the Germans failed to demolish the port facilities.234
Clark himself, however, eventually accepted the idea of carrying preloaded
trucks on LSTs, albeit without DUKWs.235 The trucks would load up to their fiveton capacities at Naples dumps and drive directly into the LSTs. Arriving at AnzioNettuno the LSTs would beach themselves (as they were designed to do), open their
bow doors, and drop the bow ramps, down which the trucks would drive and continue to the VI Corps dumps. Some 1,500 trucks were assembled expressly for this
purpose.236 This method reduced the unloading time from a full day to a single hour.
Without it, maintaining the Allied forces at Anzio would have been impossible.237
The assault and follow-up shipping would be mounted from Naples and its
satellite ports. Organization of the convoys for the British contingent was the responsibility of the AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon, while the Peninsular
Base Section had the same responsibility for the U.S. contingent. Because, as noted,
all unloading had to be completed within forty-eight hours and the beaches were
poor, the port had to be put into operation quickly. Some thirty LCTs, all available
DUKWs, and both U.S. and British assault landing craft (LCVPs and LCAs, respectively) would be used to unload larger ships. Heavy stores and equipment would be
loaded in Algiers, instead of the heavily congested port of Naples, on eight Liberty
ships. Four of the Liberty ships would sail with the assault convoy, and the other
four would follow.238
For logisticians, it was difficult to project sustainment requirements, because of
uncertainty about when the landing force would join up with the main Fifth Army.
They settled on supplies for thirty-five days to be delivered by sea. The weather forecast dictated that a convoy be scheduled every three days, with the expectation that
at least one convoy would get through and arrive between periods of bad weather.239
The assault units would carry supplies for two days, and the convoy would bring
seven hundred trucks and a hundred DUKWs loaded with three days’ supplies of
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all types. An additional ten days’ worth would be carried by the second group of
Liberty ships. The follow-up convoys would each consist of four Liberty ships and
fourteen LSTs carrying five hundred trucks, plus landing craft as needed.240
Another problem to be resolved to ensure a continuous flow of supplies, given
the inadequate port facilities, was the shallow water of the approaches to the beaches. The Fifth Army’s G-4 intended to maintain the flow of supplies over the beaches
as long as necessary, but it would be impossible if the weather was unfavorable. It
would then be necessary to rely on the port of Anzio, which, while small, could
handle LSTs. The plan provided for the assault force to be followed on the first
day by port reconstruction engineers to deal with any German demolition. If the
port was unavailable, the LSTs and LCTs would be unloaded exclusively over the
beaches, over pontoon causeways (prefabricated sectional floating bridges) across
the shallow water. Tonnage restrictions were placed on landing ships and craft to
ensure the shallowest possible beaching draft.241
Naval Plans
Naval planning for the original Operation SHINGLE started on November 18, 1943.
It was a joint effort of Task Force 81’s planning staff and Fifth Army headquarters at
Caserta.242 The work on the final plan (i.e., for SHINGLE II) started on December 31,
1943, and ended on January 12. The chief planner was Admiral Lowry. Adm. John
Cunningham, CINC, Mediterranean, set up an advance headquarters at Naples.243
TF 81’s area of responsibility was bounded on the east by Italy’s west coast, to the
west by longitude 11° 20ʹ east, and to the south by latitude 40° 50ʹ north.244
During the planning process a thorough study of the proposed beaches and their
gradients was made, from aerial photographs and reconnaissance on the ground.
The photographic reconnaissance was exceedingly accurate and highly satisfactory.245 Beach reconnaissance by divers, however, accomplished little other than to
establish the depth of water over the outlying bars.246 Loading restrictions were put
on LSTs and LCTs because of an unfavorable (i.e., too flat) beach gradient.247 Scouts
and raiders brought back descriptions and images that were used to familiarize the
amphibious force personnel with silhouettes of the selected beaches, for recognition at night.248
The beach study assessed that the port of Anzio—if not demolished—could
handle six LSTs at one time and thereby relieve traffic over the X-RAY beaches.249
Because the beach east of Anzio could not accommodate two divisions, it was decided, after consultation with the AFHQ Joint Beach Committee, to land the British division over the west beach. Naval reconnaissance parties sent ashore there
reported that light assault craft could land, despite the shallowness of the beach.250
The planners selected two main landing sites. One was a 5,600-yard stretch
about five miles west of Anzio. The approach was very shallow (a gradient of
1 : 110), and the sand was too soft for vehicles, especially in the exits through the
dunes.251 This sector was selected for the PETER force and was in turn divided into
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three beaches, designated GREEN, AMBER, and RED, each thirty to sixty yards wide.
Not only the soft sand but in some places five-foot banks impeded entrance to the
dunes in the rear. The dunes were backed by a tree belt that varied in depth from
fifty to four hundred yards. Behind the trees were fields and orchards. A “metaled
road” (paved with stone chips mixed with tar) ran roughly parallel to, and five hundred to eight hundred yards behind, the beach.252
From the sea, the beaches would be difficult to locate at night, and any heavy
winds would seriously impede reaching them. A sandbar (only one was known of
at this point) approximately 150 yards offshore extended almost the entire length
of these beaches; it was for this reason that, as mentioned, LSTs had to unload over
causeways, four hundred feet long. LCVPs, LCAs, DUKWs, and possibly LCTs,
253
however, could reach the beaches directly. The Navy recommended to the Army
that at the PETER beaches neither troops nor equipment be landed from LSTs, LCTs,
or infantry landing craft. The troops would be required to wade through several
hundred feet of water to the beaches.254
Another landing site was at Nettuno, four miles northeast of Anzio. The approach to the Nettuno beaches also was shallow (with gradients of 1 : 80 to 1 : 85).255
Designated as the X-RAY sector, the Nettuno site was divided into three beaches,
RED, GREEN, and YELLOW; they were 2,860 yards long in all and each ten to twentyfive yards wide. Here two sandbars lay 150 yards offshore, extending the entire
length of the beach; a minimum of six feet of water over the bar could be expected.
These beaches were suitable for LCVPs and LCAs, and in some places LCTs and
LCIs. Pontoon causeways would be required for LSTs.256 YELLOW Beach, 820 yards
long and forty yards wide, was composed of rough sand. There were no offshore
rocks or bars, but the gradient was so shallow (gradient 1 : 130 to 1 : 150) that YELLOW was suitable only for LCVPs, LCIs, LCAs, DUKWs, and some LCT variants.
Craft drawing three feet or more would ground 150 yards offshore.257
Allocation of craft to the beach groups depended primarily on the beach gradients. None of the LCIs or the LCTs Mark 3 or 4 were assigned to the PETER beaches.
All the LCIs were assigned to X-RAY, most of the LCT Mark 5s to PETER.258
TF 81’s Operation Plan Nr. 147-43, issued on January 12, 1944, stated that the task
force’s mission was to “establish 3rd ID (reinforced) Major Gen. Lucian Truscott in
positions ashore near Cape D’Anzio in order to attack the rear of the enemy’s right
flank.” Clearly, TF 81’s mission was not consonant with what Clark had laid out
to Lucas; it more resembled the mission General Alexander had issued to Clark’s
Fifth Army. In Plan 147-43 the mission of the PETER force was simply “the landing
of the First British division (reinforced).”259 It did not elaborate on what the British contingent’s mission would be ashore. Otherwise, the TF 81 plan postulated
that the enemy would offer strong resistance and that “strong enemy submarine,
E[nemy]-boat and air attacks are to be expected.” The planners also assumed that
mines would be encountered but that the weather would allow landing through
surf on the designated beaches.260
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For gunfire support of the X-RAY force, TF 81 planners organized four firesupport groups plus a rocket and AA support group to deliver “prearranged fires”
prior to H-hour. The British Bombarding Squadron would do the same in support
of the PETER force.261 To achieve surprise, no preliminary bombardment would be
conducted except for a short, intense rocket barrage at H–10 and H+5 by three
specially modified craft known as LCT (R)s.262 Shore fire-control parties would be
provided by the 3rd ID for RED and GREEN Beaches. The Rangers would be supported by a British forward observation officer (FOO) party during their advance
from YELLOW Beach, the British 1st Division by a British bombardment troop (four
FOO parties). The 504th Paratroop Regiment would be accompanied by one shore
fire-control party.263
Finally, TF 81’s plan envisaged that the Allied air forces would provide comprehensive support of the landing force during the sea transit and the landing on the
Anzio and Nettuno beaches.
Air Plans
One of the most controversial aspects of Operation SHINGLE was air support for
the troops on the ground. Eisenhower planned to isolate the area of operations by
employing strategic bombing to divert and slow the German units that he believed
would inevitably be sent toward the Anzio beachhead. British and American army
and air force planners in London believed the best way to accomplish that was to
attack marshaling yards, rail centers, and large repair facilities. Intelligence analysts
and air force planners in the Mediterranean commands disagreed; they wanted rail
bridges, road bridges, and viaducts destroyed.264 Finally, it was agreed that bridges
and the railway system would be targeted. Yet General Clark did not have much
faith in strategic bombing or air interdiction. The disagreement over targets with
the Army Air Forces (which had subsumed Army Air Corps) did little to convince
Clark that airpower would help his command.265
Planning by air commands for Operation SHINGLE was completed on December
30, 1943. The effort was divided into three related phases. Phase I (January 1–14)
aimed to disrupt enemy communications in northern Italy and deceive the enemy
about Allied intentions by supporting the deception plan. Phase II (January 15–21)
was to isolate the landing area by attacks on road and rail communications north of
Rome (as discussed above) and in front of the Fifth and Eighth Armies.266 In Phase
III (from January 22 to the end of the operation), Allied aircraft would provide
cover to convoys and the beachhead and close air support to the landing forces.267
Specifically, the XII Tactical Air Command, the Desert Air Force, the Coastal
Air Force, and the Tactical Bomber Command would obtain air superiority over
the beaches, provide close air support, destroy enemy airfields, and hinder enemy communications. The 64th Fighter Wing would protect the battle area during the landing.268 The XII Air Support Command, reinforced by two groups from
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the Desert Air Force, would provide direct air support, while the Tactical Bomber
Force would conduct heavier bombing.
The primary air mission was the interdiction of rail communications in west
and central Italy from south of latitude 44° north to the Rome area. The 42nd Bombardment Wing would interdict the Florence–Rome, Arezzo–Orte, and Pisa–Rome
lines; two alternative routes, Empoli–Siena and Pisa–Pistoia–Florence; the bypass
lines through Viterbo–Rome; and the Nice–Genoa–La Spezia–Pisa line. This plan
was modified on January 15, with highest priority awarded to attacking rail traffic
on the Arezzo–Rome and Arezzo–Orte lines; the Leghorn–Civitavecchia–Rome
line if it was reopened; the Terni–Sulmona line; and the Viterbo–Rome bypass. The
secondary missions were interdiction of communications on the southern coast of
France (from Nice to Pisa via Genoa) and on the Italian east coast (the Pescara–
Falconara line) and neutralization of Piombino’s harbor and marshaling yards.269
The Coastal Air Force would provide both day- and night-fighter cover over the
Naples and Salerno loading areas and the Ischia swept channel to the Pontine Islands,
as well as A/S protection for the latter. By night, radar patrol aircraft would fly A/S
patrols from the Ischia swept channel up to the landing beaches. In addition, the
Coastal Air Force would ensure both night- and day-fighter cover for rehearsal areas and convoy routes near Salerno. The XII Air Support Command would provide
fighter cover over the convoy routes from the Pontine Islands to the assault areas,
over the assault beaches themselves, and over the transport area off the beaches.270
ALLIED PREPARATIONS
Orders for the naval part of the operation were issued on January 16. All commanders taking part were briefed that day at Naples.271 Admiral Lowry directed that
all landing craft were to arrive at Naples prior to the 15th; their commanders too
were briefed on the 16th. Five (later ten) LSTs and a group of LCIs and LCTs had
already assembled in the Naples vicinity for training with the British 1st Division
and the U.S. 3rd ID.272
The Anzio-Nettuno landing had by then required significant redeployment of
forces on the Allied front. The 3rd ID was assembled at Pozzuoli on New Year’s Day.
VI Corps turned over its sector of the Fifth Army front to the French Expeditionary
Corps on January 3 and moved its headquarters to Maddaloni (three miles southeast of Caserta). The most difficult redeployment involved Eighth Army, which
shifted no fewer than three divisions and attached units to the main Fifth Army
front. Between January 1 and 5, the British 1st Division was moved from Foggia on
the Adriatic front to Salerno; it was followed by the 2nd Special Service Brigade.
The British 5th Division was shifted to reinforce the British 10 Corps in an attack
across the Garigliano River.273 The New Zealand 2nd ID was moved from Orsogna
to Venafro to join the 15th Army Group reserve.274 To minimize the possibility of
enemy detection of these movements, the affected units were ordered to maintain
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radio silence; however, because of the absence of enemy aircraft, they were allowed
to move during daylight.275 To support the demonstration that Eighth Army was to
make to fix the German forces on its front, the headquarters of the Canadian Corps
and the 4th Indian Division had to be brought forward from reserve.276
In the short time between January 4 and 19, VI Corps ran large-scale landing
exercises. Their focus was on the movement to the beach, initially small units, then
battalions and regiments. Infantry battalions rehearsed tactical landings under
simulated fire, removing minefields and barbed wire and knocking out pillboxes.
Artillery units rehearsed loading and unloading their guns, and so forth, into and
out of DUKWs. Assault landings were practiced, first using landing craft mock-ups
on dry land and then, in the battalion and regimental exercises, with craft provided
277
by the Navy.
Preparations for the Anzio landing culminated in a corps landing exercise (WEB278
FOOT) six miles south of Salerno on January 17–19. It was not really a full-scale
rehearsal, although all the assault units, DUKWs with their organic weapons, and
token support weapons and vehicles took part.279 The rehearsal went reasonably
well for the British; however, the U.S. contingent encountered heavy weather on
the night of the 17/18th.280 Few of its landing craft arrived at the proper beaches.281
Some disembarked so far out from shore that the forces arrived at the beach late.282
About twenty DUKWs sank.283 With them were lost several men and a number
of 105 mm howitzers.284 In general, the situation on the U.S. beaches was chaotic.
Generals Lucas and Truscott both insisted on another rehearsal, but Clark refused,
for lack of time.285
In the meantime, the Allied air forces were interdicting road and rail communications in northern Italy. These massive “operational fires” were designed, by preventing the movement of enemy troops or supplies, to have a major impact on the
course and outcome of Operation SHINGLE. German troops in Italy moved mostly
by rail, using three main routes: on the western coast, the eastern coast, and in
the middle, from Florence to Rome. All of them ran through very mountainous
terrain. Allied tactical bombers attacked key marshaling yards and bridges almost
constantly; their main targets were the rail yards at Florence, Pisa, Arezzo, and
Terni and the bridges at Orte, Orvieto, and Cecina, on the central and west coast
routes.286
In addition, between January 1 and 13 Allied bombers systematically struck rail
communications in central Italy with the aim of preventing resupply of German
units on the front in southern Italy.287 They also conducted massive attacks on German airfields, specifically four fighter airfields near Rome and three at Perugia for
reconnaissance aircraft.288 On January 21, bombers also attacked German airfields
at Montpellier, Salon-de-Provence, and Istres (used by torpedo bombers and glide
bombers) in southern France.289
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By the 19th, the Allied airmen claimed, “all communications from northern
Italy to Rome [had been] cut.” In the event, however, this bombing did not do much
good for the forces that landed at Anzio-Nettuno. The Germans filled runway craters overnight, and their engineers always kept at least one rail track open—that
was all they needed for troop and supply trains, and the needs of the civilian population could wait. Nevertheless, the attacks grounded the Luftwaffe’s reconnaissance aircraft at Perugia just before the assault convoy sailed.290
Complicating all these preparations for the Anzio landing were very unsatisfactory Anglo-American military relations in the Mediterranean. The problem was
especially apparent in the combined headquarters, where American and British
officers were “clannish” and did not mix freely with their counterparts. The Americans, for instance, viewed the British as selfish and obstinate. The exception was
Fifth Army headquarters, which did not seem to suffer from such British-American
friction. Clark, the first U.S. Army commander to command large combined formations, had by January 7, 1944, six British divisions and one Moroccan, one New
Zealand, one Indian, and one Canadian division to support his four American
divisions.291
Even for Fifth Army, however, the chain of command above Clark was a breeding ground for Anglo-American difficulties. Formally, there was a single chain of
command running from the CCS through the British or American theater commanders, then to the American, British, and other Allied forces, all the way to the
division level. However, there was also an informal but very important personal
chain of command, which ran along national lines. For example, General Alexander regularly communicated with General Brooke without going through Eisenhower. But then, Clark often communicated with Eisenhower without notifying
Alexander. Eisenhower attempted to ensure that Clark kept Alexander fully informed about these direct discussions but did not try to stop them.292
Both the Americans and the British accepted this informal approach to the
chain of command. It did not become a problem in itself until Alexander and Gen.
Ronald Penney, commander of the British 1st Division, began to criticize between
themselves the performance of General Lucas, Penney’s direct superior, during the
Anzio landing. Penney complained that Lucas did not inspire confidence in his
subordinates and did not know what to do about the situation after the Allies went
ashore. (Penney had been Alexander’s signal officer prior to assuming his command within VI Corps.)293
Also, Alexander believed that Clark did not like the British. If Clark in fact did
not, Alexander had given him a reason, by often giving instructions to divisionlevel commanders, Clark’s Fifth Army subordinates, directly and visiting them
for discussions. Whatever his prior opinion of the British, Clark certainly did not
like that, and a certain degree of animosity did develop on Clark’s side. For their
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part, the British generally regarded Clark as excessively ambitious, as well as vain,
temperamental, and sensitive.294 Clark argues in his memoirs that he encouraged
cooperation and understanding to strengthen Americans’ ties with their British
comrades.295 Truscott would write in his own memoirs of a lack of understanding
among British and American commanders and staffs. This he recalled as being
especially true in the case of VI Corps and its British divisions. Reportedly, Lucas
had little trust in his British subordinate commanders or their troops, and the British commanders returned the favor. The VI Corps staff worked with British units
a great deal but was not familiar with their organization, staff procedures, or tactical methods. Some American staff members failed to appreciate the difference in
national characteristics generally and tended to be critical of all things British and
296
impatient with methods that were unfamiliar to them.
GERMAN PLANS AND PREPARATIONS
There were barely enough German troops in Italy to hold the southern front and
protect rear areas. In case of a large enemy landing, Army Group C would be threatened with collapse, and reinforcements would have to come from adjacent theaters
and Germany proper. Foreseeing this contingency, the OKW issued orders at the
end of December 1943 to the CINCs of the West (France and the Low Countries)
and the Southeast (the Balkans) and to the commander of the Replacement Army
(Ersatzheer) specifying the units that would be transferred to Italy in that event.
Kesselring thus was assured that reinforcements would be on the way shortly; until
they arrived, however, he was to employ all immediately available forces to repulse
the landing.297 The Germans believed that while they could not prevent an enemy
landing, they could contain and destroy the forces that got ashore.298
By December 20, 1943, the OKW’s Joint Operations Staff (Wehrmachtführungsstab) had prepared contingency plans in case of a major enemy landing on
the Ligurian coast (MARDER 1) and on the Adriatic coast (MARDER 2). Each detailed the movements of specific units then in southern France, southern Germany,
or the Balkans to the Italian theater. In addition, Kesselring had prepared five contingency plans of his own for, respectively, the following scenarios: a landing in the
Rome area (Case RICHARD), near Leghorn (Case LUDWIG), in the vicinity of Genoa
(Case GUSTAV), in the Rimini–Venice area (Case VIKTOR), and on the Istrian Peninsula (Case IDA) (see map 13).299 By the end of 1943 it was clear to Kesselring that
the coast opposite Rome from Civitavecchia to Gaeta, especially Campagna, was
particularly vulnerable. His chief preoccupation was to create a reserve to counter
any large-scale landings. Prearranged code words would bring forces from all parts
of the Italian Peninsula to mass at the invasion point.300
Case RICHARD called for moving forces subordinate to the Tenth and Fourteenth
Armies, as well as the SS & Police Command, Italy; the XI Air Corps; and the 2nd
Air Fleet. Specifically, Tenth Army would make available one of the panzer divisions
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or panzer-grenadier (i.e., mechanized infantry) divisions in its reserve, one panzer
reconnaissance detachment, and other smaller units. Fourteenth Army headquarters
would be relocated from northern Italy to the Rome area. It would move combatready forces of the 362nd ID, 114th Light (Jäger) ID, and two reinforced regimental
groups, one from the 356th ID, and another from the 65th ID. The SS & Police Command would make available the 16th PzGrDiv Reichsführer-SS (less one regiment)
and the 35th Panzer-Grenadier Regiment (PzGrRgt). XI Air Corps (redesignated as
I Parachute Corps on January 1, 1944) would move 4th ParaDiv and some corps
troops; 2nd Air Fleet would make available four heavy AA detachments.301
More broadly, the defense of Italy’s coast had a very high priority for the Germans. They considered all of it to be threatened by an enemy landing, ranging in
size from the tactical—in support of enemy forces on the front line—to the “strategic” (actually, operational)—meant to cut off an entire army group. Kesselring’s own
contingency plans for defense against landings on Italy’s western and eastern coasts
involved reaction forces created from rear-echelon troops, such as AA units along
the coast, replacement units, engineers, and other support units. They would fight
as infantry until maneuver units could reach the beachhead.302 For the Germans, the
main lesson of Salerno had been that a landing force had to be thrown back into
the sea within twenty-four hours—that is, before the enemy could deploy its artillery and so consolidate the beachhead. Hence, the German reaction units had to be
deployed close enough to the coast to reach the scene in one night’s march—being
unable to move during daylight hours because of Allied air superiority.303
The Germans had organized five coastal-defense sectors, centered on Genoa,
Leghorn, Rome, Rimini–Ravenna, and Istria (in the southeast theater). Each was
fortified and guarded by small units. In October 1943, Fourteenth Army consolidated the defenses on the Gothic Line (Pisa–Rimini) and between La Spezia on the
west coast and Pesaro on the east coast. The Germans also paid attention to the defense of the Voralpen (Alpine foothills) Line, stretching from the Italo-Swiss border
to Istria. In the case of a successful enemy landing, these lines would offer prepared
defensive positions in the rear of the central Italian front.304
For defense against a large enemy landing, Army Group C prepared orders detailing which armies and independent corps would move to the threatened coastaldefense sector. These orders pertained only to combat units and essential service
troops; the remaining forces would stay in their respective sectors. For security, the
various defense sectors had code designations. Army Group C issued a timetable
for alerting and redeploying specific units. It assigned to all units their march and
convoy routes; gave the locations of dumps for fuel, munitions, and food rations;
assigned troops to road and bridge repair; and provided for communications during the march. All rear-area forces were to be prepared to repulse airborne landings. All affected units were to be ready to start moving between eight and twelve
hours after the alert was received.305
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Map 3: GERMAN CONTINGENCY PLANS, 20 DECEMBER 1943
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Map 13
German contingency plans,
December 20, 1943

179

180

MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945

Army Group C was well aware of the inadequacy of the fortifications and forces
close to the coast. Neither OKW nor Army Group C believed it possible to defend Italy’s coast successfully against a large amphibious landing with the forces on
hand. Nevertheless, the Germans made constant efforts to strengthen what they
considered threatened sectors. They emplaced additional coastal guns, constructed
obstacles, mined offshore waters, and inundated certain coastal areas. But the situation on Tenth Army’s front limited the extent to which forces could be spared for
coastal defense. Whenever an enemy offensive caused a crisis on its front, reinforcements were sent from northern Italy, weakening those potentially available to
coastal defenses.306
Prior to the Allied landing at Anzio-Nettuno, only three divisions of Fourteenth
Army were combat ready—the 44th ID, the 90th PzGrDiv, and the 334th ID—and
all of them had been transferred to Tenth Army. At the same time, the battle-weary
65th ID was moved from Ortona, south of Pescara on the Adriatic coast, to northern Italy. The Germans had activated the 278th ID and the 16th SS PzGrDiv. Also,
the OKW had directed Fourteenth Army to release the 371st ID for redeployment
to the Eastern Front. All this left Fourteenth Army with only eight divisions—none
of them fully combat ready.307
The situation west of Rome was especially acute. The Germans had long considered it possible that the Allies might land in Tenth Army’s rear to support Allied
forces on that front. However, Fourteenth Army was unable to accept the additional
responsibility of defense south of Rome; for its part, OKW was unwilling to weaken
defenses any further in northern Italy, because of uncertainty about whether the enemy intended to land west or south of Rome, in the Gulf of Genoa, or on the Istrian
Peninsula. For this reason, Tenth Army was left to secure on its own the coastal sector
in the vicinity of Rome; Tenth Army, in turn, gave I ParaCorps this responsibility.308
After World War II, some of Kesselring’s staff officers, in interviews with representatives of the U.S. Army’s Information Office, would state that OKW had believed the most probable areas for an enemy landing to be Genoa, Leghorn, Rome,
Venice, and Istria. Of these, they would recall, the most critical had been that around
Rome, because an enemy landing there would cut off Tenth Army communications,
probably causing a rapid collapse of the southern front.309 When, therefore, OKW
received in early January more information pointing to a landing in the Rome area,
it decided to replace the 3rd PzGrDiv with the much stronger 90th PzGrDiv, then
on the Adriatic coast. A lull in the first two weeks of January allowed the Germans
to do so.310 The regrouping started on January 10.311 The 29th and 90th PzDivs of I
ParaCorps were assigned to the coastal sector, and the Hermann Göring PzDiv was
held as a mobile reserve, between Rome and the southern front.312

THE ALLIED LANDING AT ANZIO-NETTUNO

OPPOSING COMMANDERS AND FORCES, JANUARY 22, 1944
The Allies initially enjoyed a large superiority in forces on the ground, and their
strength at sea and in the air was overwhelming for the duration of the AnzioNettuno operation.
The Allies
General Alexander’s 15th Army Group was the highest command echelon of ground
forces on the Italian mainland. Alexander personally had intelligence, good looks,
and charm—everything came easily to him. An imperturbable coolness made him
appear unconcerned even in moments of the gravest crisis; Alexander always gave
the impression that he had something in reserve. For him, no situation was so hopeless that it did not allow of some remedy.313 General Brooke would say that Alexander
never had “the slightest doubt that all would come out right in the end.”314 Alexander
was charming, gallant, and professional, more persuasive than forceful. In planning,
he always sought the advice of his subordinates. He listened to their arguments and
thought aloud. Alexander would never impose a decision on an unwilling subordinate commander. In his view, if he did so a subordinate would have misgivings, and
if the operation failed, would lose confidence in Alexander. Less appealingly, however, Alexander’s operations were neither daring nor creative.315
Fifth Army, led by General Clark, was the command most directly involved
in Operation SHINGLE. Clark had graduated 110th in a class of 139 from the U.S.
Military Academy, at West Point, in 1917; had been wounded in World War I; and
passed through the Army War College, class of 1937. He had earned a reputation
as one of the U.S. Army’s most talented (and ambitious) officers. Yet he had never
commanded a large formation in combat before he took over Fifth Army.316 For
most of his career, Clark had served in various training establishments and staffs.
He had been Gen. Lesley McNair’s staff operations officer. In June 1942, Clark took
command of U.S. ground forces in the European theater; that November he became Eisenhower’s deputy. Clark made a secret and dangerous submarine trip to
North Africa just prior to the Allied invasion of North Africa (Operation TORCH).
Now forty-eight, he was much younger than most lieutenant generals—he had
been promoted to that grade from lieutenant colonel in just three years. Clark
was aggressive, hardworking, and efficient; Eisenhower thought that Clark was
“the best organizer, planner, and trainer of troops that I have met.” Before Clark’s
Fifth Army had made the landing at Salerno he had (because of his youth and inexperience) shown great deference to his superiors. However, after Salerno he had
become more self-assured and less deferential. Clark was cordial with the British,
although he grew disenchanted with them. In general, he tried to hide his sensibilities behind a mask of coldness.317
The main Fifth Army was deployed along a thirty-five-mile-long front line
stretching from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Abruzzi National Park. On the left flank

181

182

MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945

was the British 10 Corps (Lt. Gen. Richard L. McCreery); the U.S. II Corps (Maj.
Gen. Geoffrey Keyes) held the central part of the front. On the right was the FEC
(General Juin). The Allied positions were a short distance from a line between the
Garigliano and Rapido Rivers.318
General Lucas, at the head of VI Corps, had been characterized by General Marshall as having “military stature, prestige, and experience.” He had assumed command of VI Corps at Salerno on September 20, 1943, when Clark relieved Maj.
Gen. Ernest J. Dawley, who appeared to be a victim of battle fatigue and stress.
General Clark wanted an experienced corps commander who could reestablish
leadership of the corps’s operations at Salerno.319
As finalized, the “first wave” consisted of the U.S. 3rd ID, the British 1st Division,
the 46th Royal Tank Regiment, the U.S. 751st Tank Battalion, the U.S. 504th Parachute Infantry Battalion, three U.S. Ranger battalions, and two British commando
battalions (see sidebar “VI Corps Composition, January 22, 1944”). The 45th ID
(Combat Command A, a task-organized combined-arms unit of about brigade size)
would be in reserve as reinforcement once the lodgment had been established.320
Enough LSTs being available, it was proposed to send as the first follow-up force
the U.S. 1st Armored Division (Combat Command B) and one RCT of the 45th ID,
plus three more battalions of the corps artillery. The timing of the follow-on force
would depend on how quickly the assault convoy could turn around. That, in turn,
was contingent on the weather and enemy resistance. It also was decided provisionally to send the remainder of the 45th ID and the 1st Armored Division.321
VI Corps Composition, January 22,1944
(Maj. Gen. J. P. Lucas; HQ / HQ Co.)
Antiaircraft Artillery
35th AAA Bde
68th Coast Artillery Rgt (AA) (minus 3rd Bn)

Armor
1st Armored Division (Combat Command B)
(Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon)
6th Armd InfRgt
1st Armd Rgt
27th/91st Armored Field ArtyBns (105 mm howitzers)

Attached to 1st Armored Division:
191st TankBn
751st TankBn
81st Armd Recce Bn
18th Field ArtyBde
35th Field ArtyGrp
15th Field Arty Observation Bn
1st Battalion, 36th Field ArtyRgt (155 mm guns)
1st Battalion, 77th Field ArtyRgt (155 mm howitzers)
141st/938th Field ArtyRgt (155 mm howitzers)
69th Armored Field ArtyRgt (105 mm howitzers)
456th Parachute Field ArtyBn (minus Batteries C and D) (75 mm pack howitzers)
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976th/977th Field ArtyBns (155 mm guns)
434th AAA Automatic Weapons Bn

Infantry
3rd Infantry Division
(Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott)
3rd CavRecce Troops (Mechanized)
9th Field ArtyBn (155 mm howitzers)
7th RCT
7th InfRgt
10th Field ArtyBn (105 mm howitzers)
15th RCT
15th InfRgt
39th Field ArtyBn (105 mm howitzers)
30th RCT
30th InfRgt
41st Field ArtyBn

Attached to 3rd Infantry Division:
441st AAA Automatic Weapons Bn
601st Tank Destroyer Bn

45th Infantry Division (Combat Command A)
(Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles)
45th CavRecce Troop (Mechanized)
189th Field ArtyBn (155 mm howitzers)
157th RCT
157th InfRgt
158th Field ArtyBn (105 mm howitzers)
179th RCT
179th InfRgt
160th Field ArtyBn (105 mm howitzers)
180th RCT
180th InfRgt
171st Field ArtyBn (105 mm howitzers)

Attached to 45th Infantry Division:
504th RCT
504th ParaInfRgt
509th ParaInfBn
645th Tank Destroyer Bn

British 1st Division
(Maj. Gen. W. R. C. Penney)
1st Division Royal Artillery
2nd, 19th, and 67th Field Rgts RA
1st Recce Rgt
2nd InfBde
3rd InfBde
24th Guards InfBde
46th Royal Tank Rgt

56th (London) Infantry Division
(Maj. Gen. G. W. R. Templer)
64, 65, and 113 Field Rgts RA
100 Light AA Rgt RA
44 Recce Rgt
167 InfBde
168 InfBde

Tank Destroyers
701st Tank Destroyer Bn
894th Tank Destroyer Bn

183

184

MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945

1st Special Service Force (“Devil’s Brigade”)
(Brig. Gen. Robert T. Frederick)
1st Rgt
2nd Rgt
3rd Rgt

6615th Ranger Force
(Col. William O. Darby)
1st Ranger Bn
3rd Ranger Bn
4th Ranger Bn

Allied Air Forces
2,700 aircraft (more than half based at Brindisi, Foggia, and Termoli)
Sources: Forsythe et al., Cassino and Anzio, pp. 254–60; Clark, Anzio, pp. 274–77; Molony, Campaign in Sicily 1943 and the
Campaign in Italy, pp. 648–49, 653; Wilhelmsmeyer, Der Krieg In Italien, pp. 240–41.

Admiral Lowry was responsible for mounting, embarking, and landing the
ground force and supporting it until the beachhead was established.322 The assault convoy consisted of two command ships, four Liberty cargo ships, eight LSIs,
eighty-four LSTs, ninety-six LCIs, and fifty LCTs, escorted by cruisers, destroyers,
and a large number of smaller naval vessels (see sidebar “Task Force 81 Composition, January 22, 1944”).323 TF 81 consisted of the X-RAY and PETER forces, respectively. Lowry commanded seventy-four ships of the X-RAY force carrying American
troops, Admiral Troubridge ninety-four ships of the PETER force with the British
part of VI Corps.324
The X-RAY force was divided into several functional groups: a control group
of two flagships, a minesweeper group (to establish a mine-free channel), and an
escort group (for antiair and antisubmarine defense). A beach identification group
would precede the assault craft to locate the beaches accurately and mark them
with colored lights. Then three landing-craft groups would land the assault waves.
The 1st Naval Beach Battalion would follow the first wave to improve the marking of beach approaches and control boat traffic. After daylight a salvage group
Task Force 81 Composition, January 22, 1944
81 Control Force
VI Corps (Maj. Gen. J. P. Lucas)
U.S. 3rd ID (Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott)
British 1st Armoured Division (Maj. Gen. W. R. C. Penney)

81.1 Force Flagship (Rear Adm. Frank J. Lowry)
USS Biscayne (AVP 11)
USS Frederick C. Davis (DE 136)
81.10 Beach Company Group
1st Navy Beach Bn
81.11 Salvage Group
1 ARS (Prosperous)
81.12 Air Navigation Group
2 PTs
81.13 Loading Control Group
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81.14 Return Convoy Group
1 LCI (L)
81.2 Ranger Group (Capt. E. C. L. Turner, RN)
2 LSI (M)s (Royal Ulsterman, Princess Beatrix)
1 transport (Winchester Castle)
1 LST, 3 LCTs, 3 SCs, 1 LCI (H)

X-ray Force (Rear Adm. Frank J. Lowry)
81.3 Red Beach Group (Cdr. William O. Floyd, USN)
12 LSTs, 31 LCI (L)s, 22 LCTs; British: 1 LCG, 1 LCF, 1 LCT (R), 4 PCs, SCs
81.4 Green Beach Group (Cdr. O. F. Gregor, USN)
1 LCI (L) (flagship)
2 British LSI (L)s (Circasia, Ascania)
16 LCI (L)s, 11 LCTs, 1 LCG, 1 LCF, 1 LCT (R), 2 PCs, 2 SCs
81.5 First Follow-Up Group (Capt. J. P. Clay, USN)
39 British LSTs, 20 LCI (L)s, 7 LCTs
81.6 Escort Group (Capt. J. P. Clay, USN)
1 DD (Plunkett) (flagship)
4 DDs (Gleaves, Niblack, HMS Croome, HHMS Themistocles)
2 DEs (Herbert C. Jones, Frederick C. Davis)
2 AMs (Ready, Sustain)
81.7 Sweeper Group (Cdr. A. H. Richards, USN)
1 AM (Pilot) (flagship)
7 AMs (Strive, Pioneer, Portent, Symbol, Dextrous, Sway, Prevail)
14 YMSs
1 SC

X-ray Fire Support Group
		81.8 Gunfire Support Group (Capt. Robert W. Cary)
		81.8.2 Fire Support Group One
		1 DD (Mayo)
		1 LCG
		81.8.2 Fire Support Group Two
		2 DDs (Woolsey, Ludlow)
		1 LCG
		81.8.3 Fire Support Group Three
		
1 CL (HMS Penelope)
		1 DD (Edison)
		81.8.4 Fire Support Group Four
		1 CL (Brooklyn)
		1 DD (Trippe)
		81.8.5 Rocket and AA Support Group
		
3 LCT (R)s, 1 LCF
		81.9 Beach Identification Group
		
1 SS (HMS Uproar, P31)
		1 DD (Crete)
		
3 PCs, 2 SCs

Peter Force (Rear Adm. Thomas H. Troubridge, RN)
British 1st ArmdDiv
4 transports (HMS Bulolo, Glengyle, Derbyshire, Sobieski [Polish])
2 AA and fighter-direction ships (HMS Ulster Queen, Palomares)
8 DDs (HMS Beaufort, Brecon, Englefield, Kempenfelt, Tenacious, Tetcott, Urchin, Wilton)
2 gunboats (HNLMS Flores, Soemba)
6 minesweepers (HMS Bude, Rothsay, Rinaldo, Fly, Cadmus, Waterwitch)
4 PCs (trawlers) (HMT Two Step, Sheppey, Hornpipe, St. Kilda)
14 British LSTs, 5 U.S. LSTs, 2 LCG (L)s, 31 LCIs, 1 LCI (H), 1 LCT (R)
2 PCs (U.S.)
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1 oiler (British Chancellor)
1 net tender (HMS Barndale)
2 tugs (U.S.) (Evea, Edenshaw)
4 hospital ships (HMS St. Julien, St. Andrew, Leinster, St. David)
1 beacon submarine (HMS Ultor, P53)

Peter Force Fire Support Group (Rear Adm. J. M. Mansfield, RN)
81.8.6 British Bombarding Squadron
2 CLs (HMS Spartan, Orion [flagship])
4 DDs (Laforey, Loyal, Jervis, Janus)
Sources: Operation Plan Nr. 147-43, pp. 1–2; Annex F: Gunfire Support Plan Nr. 153-43, p. 1; Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio,
app. 3, “Naval Forces Engaged in the Assault on Anzio, 22 January 1944," pp. 395–97.

would lay pontoon causeways for unloading heavier craft. A loading control group
at Naples would handle berthing and loading of craft there.325
MAAF had about 2,600 aircraft, organized in nearly fifty-nine squadrons (twentytwo fighter, six fighter-bomber, four light-bomber, twenty-four medium-bomber,
and two and a half reconnaissance).326 About 75 percent of the Allied aircraft were
operational. In late 1943 they had been moved from North Africa to new bases on
Sardinia, Corsica, and the mainland of Italy. The MAAF’s B-17 and B-24 heavy
bombers were used for strategic bombing. Its B-25 Mitchell, B-26 Marauder, and
Wellington medium bombers were to attack targets fifty to a hundred miles behind the enemy front. The MAAF’s A-20 Havoc and Martin 187 Baltimore medium
bombers would destroy installations and facilities closer to the front. De Havilland
Mosquitoes and A-36 Apaches (also known as Invaders) provided direct support to
ground troops. Spitfire, Hurricane, P-38 Lightning, P-40 Hawk, P-47 Thunderbolt,
and P-51 Mustang fighters escorted Allied bombers and intercepted and destroyed
enemy fighters.327
The Germans
On the German side, all ground forces in the Italian theater were subordinate to
Army Group C, led by Field Marshal Kesselring, who was, as noted, also CINC
Southwest. Kesselring was one of the best German commanders in World War II.328
He was a born leader, highly intelligent and always open to new ideas.329 Kesselring
was by nature genial, optimistic, and cheerful. He had a great and rare ability to
distinguish between what was essential and what could be disregarded. He had a
strong sense of what it was possible to accomplish.330 A Luftwaffe officer, he had no
experience as an army field commander, but he had a cool head, reacted quickly to
unforeseen events, and made sound decisions. Kesselring was extremely effective
in conducting a delaying defense in Italy. He applied the principle of mobility and
always had a reserve available.331
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The German ground forces under Kesselring comprised Tenth and Fourteenth Armies, totaling twenty-four divisions. Fourteenth Army, under Gen.
Eberhard von Mackensen, was deployed north of the Grosseto–Ancona line.
It consisted of eleven and a half divisions, of which four were in the process of
forming and four were in defensive positions. Tenth Army, under Gen. Heinrich
von Vietinghoff genannt (known as) Scheel, consisted on January 20, 1944, of
two army corps plus one panzer and one infantry division. Opposed to the British Eighth Army was LXXVI PzCorps, with four divisions; Fifth Army faced
four divisions of XIV PzCorps.332 (For details see sidebar “German Order of
Battle, January 1944.”)
In the late fall of 1943, the Axis powers had about two thousand aircraft in the
Mediterranean. However, no more than 50 percent of them were operational. Some
five hundred Italian aircraft were considered obsolete and of little combat value. By
the end of 1943 the Luftwaffe had about 550 aircraft in service in Italy, southern
France, and the Balkans. However, almost all the heavy bombers were withdrawn
from Italy, leaving only about fifty Ju-88s in Greece and Crete and some sixty Ju88s, He-111s, and Dornier Do-217s in southern France. Most of the fighters, some
230 Messerschmitt Me-109s and Focke-Wulf Fw-190s, were in Italy, about a third
of them at fields around Rome.333 On December 31, 1943, 2nd Air Fleet had in service 288 aircraft (147 of them operational). The overall number included 184 fighters (seventy-eight operational) and thirty-one reconnaissance aircraft (twenty-five
German Order of Battle, January 1944
Supreme Commander, Southwest / Army Group C
(Oberbefehlshaber, Südwest / Heeresgruppe C)
(Field Marshal Albert Kesselring)

Tenth Army (January 20, 1944)
(Gen. Heinrich Gottfried von Vietinghoff genannt Scheel)
XIV Panzer Corps
(Gen. of Panzer Troops Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin)
15th PzGrDiv (Lt. Gen. Eberhard Rodt)
16th SS PzGrDiv (SS-Gruppenführer Max Simon)
71st ID (Lt. Gen. Wilhelm Raapke)
94th ID (Lt. Gen. Bernhard Steinmetz)
LI Mountain Corps
(Gen. of Mountain Troops Valentin Feuerstein)
1st ParaDiv (Lt. Gen. Richard Heidrich)
44th GrDiv “Hoch und Deutschmeister” (Maj. Gen. Hans-Günther von Rost)
5th Mountain Div (Maj. Gen. Max-Günther Schrank)
Group Hauck
(Gen. of Artillery Friedrich-Wilhelm Hauck)
305th ID (Gen. of Artillery Friedrich-Wilhelm Hauck)
334th ID (Maj. Gen. Helmuth Böhlke)
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Fourteenth Army (February 9, 1944)
(Gen. Eberhard von Mackensen)
I Parachute Corps
(Gen. Alfred Schlemm)
4th ParaDiv (Maj. Gen. Heinrich Trettner)
65th ID (Maj. Gen. Helmuth Pfeiffer)
29th PzGrDiv (Lt. Gen. Walther Fries)
715th ID (Motorized) (Maj. Gen. Hans-Georg Hildebrandt)
114th Light (Jäger) Div (formerly 714th ID) (Lt. Gen. Karl Eglseer)
LXXVI Army Corps
(Gen. Traugott Herr)
Hermann Göring PzDiv (Maj. Gen. Paul Conrath)
3rd PzGrDiv (Lt. Gen. Fritz-Hubert Gräser)
26th PzDiv (Lt. Gen. Smilo Freiherr von Lüttwitz)
362nd ID (Lt. Gen. Heinz Greiner)

Independent Regiments
Inf Training (Lehr) Rgt
1027th Reinforced PzGrRgt (2 Bns)
1028th Reinforced PzGrRgt (2 Bns)

Directly Subordinate to the Fourteenth Army
“Nembo” Bn / ParaRgt “Folgore” (Capt. Corradino Alvino) (Italian Social Republic)
“Barbarigo” Bn / Decima Flottiglia MAS (Capt. Umberto Bardelli) (Italian Social Republic)

German Forces Defending the Bridgehead, January 28, 1944:
ParaPzDiv Hermann Göring (1 PzRgt; 2 PzGrRgts)
29th PzGrDiv (1 PzGrRgt; 1 RecceDet)
3rd PzGrDiv (2 PzRgts)
15th PzGrDiv (2 PzRgts)
90th PzGrDiv (1 PzRgt)
16th SS PzGrDiv (2 PzGrRgts)
1st Para Light Div (1 Para Light Rgt; 1 Para Machine Gun Bn)
4th Para Light Div (3 Para Light Rgts)
65th ID (3 GrRgts)
71st ID (3 GrRgts)
356th ID (1 RecceDet)
114th Light Div (1 Light Rgt)
Inf Training (Lehr) Rgt
Para Light Training (Lehr) Rgt
2nd Luftwaffe Light Bn
Sources: Clark, Anzio, pp. 277–78; D’Este, Fatal Decision, pp. 444–48; Wilhelmsmeyer, Der Krieg in Italien, p. 247; Molony,
Campaign in Sicily 1943 and the Campaign in Italy, pp. 653, 663–65.

operational).334 Specifically, the Germans had operational eighteen short-range Me109s and seven Ju-88/Me-410 long-range reconnaissance aircraft.335 By January 20,
1944, 2nd Air Fleet had 337 aircraft, among them two hundred fighters (136 operational) and twenty-five short-range (twenty operational) and six long-range (two
operational) reconnaissance aircraft.336
The Kriegsmarine had in Italy only three S-boats and two U-boats.337 On January 1 thirteen U-boats were deployed in the Mediterranean, but only three were at
sea during that month.338
FIFTH ARMY’S JANUARY OFFENSIVE
On January 12, Fifth Army resumed its offensive against the Gustav Line (see map
14). The FEC attacked in the direction of Monte Cassino, and the British 10 Corps
advanced across the lower Garigliano River toward Minturno–Ausonia (Operation
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PANTHER).339 The attackers gained initial successes with the assistance of a surprise
landing of strong forces west of the mouth of the Garigliano.340
Alexander issued Operational Instruction Nr. 34, “The Battle for Rome,” on January 12. The forces of the Fifth Army, it stated, “have now started a series of operations on their present front designed to break through the enemy’s main defensive
positions in the area south of Cassino, and to draw in his reserves. These operations
will culminate with an attack by two corps across the Rapido River on or about 20
January.”341 In paragraph 3 of the same document, Alexander stated that Fifth Army
would also prepare an amphibious operation
to land a corps of two divisions and the necessary corps troops, followed by a strong and
fully mobile striking force based on elements of a third division in the Nettuno area. The
“object[ive] of this operation will be to cut the enemy’s main communications in the Colli
Laziali area southeast of Rome and to threaten the rear of the 14 Army [actually Panzer]
Corps.” Weather permitting this amphibious operation will be launched on 22 January
which will be D-Day. The decision whether the weather is suitable or not will be made by
the CINC 15th Army Group in consultation with the CINC of the Mediterranean [Fleet]. If
the weather prohibits its being launched on 22 January it will be postponed from day to day
until the weather is suitable. It will not be postponed for any other reason than because of
weather.342

Alexander stressed the importance of not allowing the enemy “any respite in
which to reorganize or take up new positions.”343 The mission of the main Fifth
Army was to force the enemy to withdraw to the north of Rome, in the process
inflicting maximum enemy losses south of Rome. At the same time, the neighboring Eighth Army would “maintain sufficient pressure on the enemy forces to
prevent movement of the 76 German Corps [LXXVI PzCorps] to the Fifth Army
front.”344 The enemy, Alexander predicted, would be compelled to react to the threat
posed by the landing to his communications and rear, giving the Allied forces an
opportunity to break through the German main defenses; the main Fifth Army
and VI Corps would “join hands at the earliest possible moment.” Afterward, Fifth
Army would advance past Rome as quickly as possible and reach the general line
of Terni–Viterbo–Civitavecchia. The objective for Eighth Army was more distant,
the Ravenna–Rimini–Faenza (some thirty miles southeast of Bologna) line; Fifth
Army would meanwhile carry on to the Pistoia–Florence–Pisa line.345
Further, Alexander laid out, a naval task force under the command of Rear
Admiral Lowry “will be supporting the amphibious operation.”346 As for aviation,
the missions of the Tactical Air Force (assisted by the Strategic Air Force) prior
to D-day were, in order of priority, destroying enemy air forces and attacking rail
communications north of Rome. After D-day, the Tactical and Strategic Air Forces
would concentrate on the following, again in order of priority: maintenance of air
superiority over the battle area, interruption (interdiction) of enemy road communications leading to the area of the amphibious operation, and attacks on enemy
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Map 14
Offensive by main Fifth
Army, January 17–20, and
Anzio-Nettuno landing,
January 22, 1944

THE ALLIED LANDING AT ANZIO-NETTUNO

columns approaching the area of the amphibious operation and also troop concentrations within striking distance of the beaches.347
On January 16, the main Fifth Army G-2 issued what proved to be a false and
highly optimistic assessment of the enemy’s situation and intentions. Among other
things, it estimated that “within the last few days there have been increasing indications that enemy strength on the Fifth Army front is ebbing, due to casualties, exhaustion, and possibly lowering of morale. One of the causes of this condition, no doubt,
has been the recent, continuous Allied attacks.”348 Moreover, it appeared doubtful, in
view of that weakening, that “the enemy [could] hold [an] organized defensive line
through Cassino against a co-ordinated army attack. Since this attack is to be launched
before SHINGLE, it is considered likely that this additional thrust will cause him to
withdraw from his defensive position once he has appreciated the magnitude of that
operation.”349
In heavy fighting on January 18 and 19, British forces crossed the lower Garigliano River on a wide front. It appeared that the German front in the south would
indeed collapse. The bulk of the Hermann Göring PzDiv and all local reserves already had been committed, and the 3rd PzGrDiv and 71st ID could not arrive before
the 22nd.350 ULTRA disclosed that the Fifth Army offensive was in fact against German
reserves from the Rome area: General Senger und Etterlin, commander of the XIV
PzCorps, had asked for reinforcements, and Kesselring, confident that there would
be no seaborne landing in his rear, had agreed to send the 29th and 90th PzGrDivs to
the front line on January 18—exactly what Alexander had hoped to accomplish.351
It is not known whether the G-2s privately revised their views on receiving reports
about the movement of the two German divisions to the Gustav Line. In any case,
they were not authorized to disseminate changes to their estimates that would compromise ULTRA sources.352
Nevertheless, and despite successive attacks, neither the French nor the British
were able to break through the German mountain defenses. On January 20, the U.S.
II Corps tried to cross the Rapido River; after two days of bitter fighting and heavy
losses, that attack too proved unsuccessful. By the 22nd the attack on the Gustav
Line had bogged down amid strong German counterattacks. It would prove fortunate for the Allies at Anzio, however, that the German Tenth Army had been forced
to commit most of its operational reserves.353
On January 18, ULTRA disclosed that Hitler had ordered Kesselring to commit a
major part of his forces on the Foro position (also called the Hitler Line).354 ULTRA
also intercepted Kesselring’s situation assessment the same day—that only two battalions and two engineer companies were left in the Rome area, too weak to repulse
even a strong commando raid. In other words, for several hours the roads to Rome
were wide open. However, that message was not decrypted in time to change Alexander’s or Clark’s plans.355
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On January 20, ULTRA learned that the I ParaCorps headquarters would take
over operational command on the main front, relocating from near Rome at 0900
on January 21. Its eastern boundary would coincide with what had been the western
boundary of the 15th PzGrDiv on the Gustav Line, and its mission was to regain that
line. The movement left the Anzio-Rome area essentially without effective combat
assets to respond to the Anzio-Nettuno landing.356 Only two weak battalions of 29th
PzGrDiv remained south of the Tiber River in a position to oppose VI Corps.357
After the Anzio landing on January 22, the Allies would learn from ULTRA that
the headquarters of I ParaCorps had assumed control over the 24th, 90th, and
29th Divisions. That meant initial German resistance at the beachhead in the first
few hours would be light, because the nearest reserves were committed elsewhere.
However, that intelligence was unknown to Lucas, because security regulations
prohibited Fifth Army HQ from sharing ULTRA with him, a corps commander.
Also, neither the 29th nor the 90th PzGrDiv was identified by contact in combat
until January 22.358 During the first three weeks of January ULTRA revealed that the
Germans had repeatedly misinterpreted the movements of Allied naval vessels in
the Mediterranean. For example, the Germans apparently were unconcerned by
the disappearance of landing craft from Bizerte. Also, they assessed that Allied
carriers were in the eastern Mediterranean for the purpose of reinforcing landbased aircraft.359
Notwithstanding, the Germans were very interested in Allied amphibious ships
and craft in the Mediterranean theater, and ULTRA read the reports of German
reconnaissance aircraft collecting information on them. For example, on January
12 the Kriegsmarine reported that enemy naval vessels had left Gibraltar on the
night of January 5/6 bound for the Gulf of Taranto, calling at Algiers and Malta.
On arrival, they would await, the German analysts assessed, four smaller units that
had left Gibraltar on January 8 or 9. An aircraft carrier was in Sicilian waters. A
large convoy would leave Gibraltar between the 12th and 15th bound for Barletta
(on the southern Adriatic coast of Italy), carrying English troops whose equipment
suggested they were destined for landing operations. On January 14, ULTRA intercepts disclosed reporting from German agents that “an Anglo-American landing
intended on the night of 23 or 24 January” was being planned, possibly in Italy or
Greece.360 It also revealed that Kesselring had directed one of three battalions of the
Hermann Göring PzDiv to watch the coast in the rear of the 94th ID. This meant
that Kesselring was strengthening coastal defenses somewhere around Gaeta with
thirty or forty tanks.361 An ULTRA intercept on January 15 made clear the level of
German concern over an imminent amphibious landing: Kesselring had the previous day directed X Air Corps to conduct high-altitude photoreconnaissance of
Port Said, with special attention to carriers and landing craft.362 ULTRA revealed
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that Kesselring knew the identification and location of each of the fifteen Allied
divisions, even the American units in Sicily as of January 7 just prior to the Anzio
operation.363
THE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
On January 19–20, activity in the port of Naples and its satellite harbors greatly intensified as troops, weapons, equipment, and supplies were embarked. The schedule had been prepared and coordinated by the joint loading board of the Peninsular
Base Section, Fifth Army, and by VI Corps. Each division was responsible for its
own loading areas, movement to the docks, and embarkation. Vehicles were waterproofed in division areas and loaded on January 19.364 The troops of X-RAY force
were loaded at four locations in the Gulf of Naples. The PETER force was assembled
in the afternoon of January 21 north of Capri.365 The initial assault force of fifty
thousand men, 5,200 vehicles, and some 375 ships and craft was comparable in size
to that which had landed at Salerno in September 1943.366
General Lucas established his command post on board the small seaplane tender
Biscayne on the afternoon of the 20th. The weather forecast predicted negligible
swell and a thick morning haze to cover the landing beaches. That same day, TF
81 received confirmation that D-day would be January 22 and H-hour, 0200.367 At
0500 on January 21, the ships of TF 81 put to sea.368
The distance from Naples to the Anzio-Nettuno beaches is some 110 miles. The
convoys sortied, rendezvoused, and approached the beaches exactly as planned.369
TF 81’s track from the Gulf of Naples to Anzio was roundabout, to keep the ships
clear of minefields and conceal their destination as long as possible.370 Proceeding at about five knots, the assault convoy passed four to twelve miles seaward of
Ischia and the Pontine Islands.371 The LCTs and other landing craft of X-RAY force,
however, took a shorter course, closer to shore. Minesweepers were ahead of the
convoy; cruisers and destroyers protected the flanks against U-boats and torpedo
boats; fighters provided air cover.372 The sea was calm, the temperature about fiftyfive degrees Fahrenheit, and the ceiling about six thousand feet—good for air reconnaissance and attacks.373 However, TF 81 was not detected during its transit.374
Reportedly, the last German air reconnaissance of the port of Naples had been on
December 11, 1943.375 When the convoy came within five miles of reference vessel
CHARLIE (about three and a half miles from the center point of the landing beaches)
it reduced speed by half a knot to allow stragglers to catch up.376
Also on January 22, just before the landing force moved to the beach, the British
bombardment group composed of two light cruisers (HMS Orion, Spartan) and
four destroyers (HMS Janus, Jervis, Laforey, and Loyal) attacked the coastal batteries at Terracina. The 12th Minesweeping Flotilla cleared mines for the transit of the
bombardment force through the Gulf of Gaeta.377
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The Landing
At 0005 on January 22, in the darkness of a moonless night, the Allied assault
force dropped anchor off Anzio-Nettuno.378 Lucas would later remark that it had
“achieved what is certainly one of the most complete surprises in history.” However,
Clark and others who possessed ULTRA information recognized that the surprise
was only limited and tactical. In any case, the factors that had contributed to it included the wireless silence TF 81 maintained during its transit; inadequate German
air and sea reconnaissance; the absence of German radar posts on the western coast
south of Piombino; and, more broadly, a failure of German military intelligence.379
As discussed earlier, Allied troops and landing craft had been assembled at Corsica and Sardinia for a deception effort.380 During the night of January 21/22, the
British cruiser Dido, the French destroyer Le Fantasque, and the British destroyer
Inglefield conducted a diversionary bombardment of Civitavecchia. At daybreak
this force moved south to bombard the coast between Formia and Terracina to
check any enemy reinforcements toward Anzio.381 Allied coastal craft also made
dummy landings. The Germans, preoccupied by heavy fighting along the Gustav
Line, paid little attention to the diversionary landing.382 In general, ULTRA did not
reveal whether the Germans believed the deception story the various diversions
had been designed to convey. It seems, however, that they did not: they conducted
no troop movements in apparent response, as if discounting the credibility of these
distractions and preferring to rely on their aerial reconnaissance to warn them of
actual, imminent amphibious attack.383
The landing at Anzio-Nettuno was carried out as planned (see map 15). All the
waves except the DUKWs (which did not roll out of their LSTs until 0400) landed
within two minutes of their scheduled times. Some LCIs grounded on the inner
bar and unloaded via LCVPs. The CHARLIE reference vessel proved effective.384 In
the PETER sector, a British submarine, HMS Ultor (P53), had helped minesweepers
clear mines at 2030 on D–1. However, because of inadequate rehearsal, gear was
fouled, and there were near collisions and narrow escapes from floating mines.385
The PETER force arrived at its landing sector at about midnight.386 At H–10 (earlier than planned), two British LCT (R)s launched a powerful five-minute barrage
of five-inch rockets;387 they fired some eight hundred rockets.388 Two cruisers (USS
Brooklyn and HMS Penelope) and five U.S. destroyers also provided fire support.
In X-RAY force’s sector, fire support was provided by Orion and Spartan. In reserve
were two Dutch gunboats, Flores and Soemba.389 Enemy movements detected on
the coast road in the Formia area brought shelling by Dido and a destroyer.390 The
Tactical Air Force flew about 810 sorties in support of the landing on D-day, while
the Strategic Air Force conducted operational fires, attacking the enemy airfields
in southern France.391
In the PETER sector, both the LSTs and LCTs unloaded over pontoon causeways. Ten LSTs assigned to PETER were sent to X-RAY for unloading.392 Unloading
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on PETER beaches was complicated by sandy cliffs that extended some four miles
northward from the lighthouse. The LCTs did not beach until 0645 and, owing to
the absence of exits from the beach and delays in rigging causeways, did not unload
until 1045.393 Because of the unfavorable beach gradient, troops disembarking from
LSTs had to wade over three hundred feet to shore. Everything except infantry had
to roll ashore over a causeway, and only a single ship could unload at a time. Also,
the movement of vehicles off the beach was impeded by soft and boggy ground.394
By 1600 on D+1 all SHINGLE assault craft had been unloaded except on the PETER
beaches, and those were completed during the night of D+1. On D+3, the PETER
beaches closed out; the craft and three pontoon sections there were sent to the X395
RAY beaches, the latter under tow.
In the X-RAY sector, two miles east of Nettuno, the 3rd ID landed on RED and
GREEN Beaches. A British submarine, HMS Uproar (P31), had guided through the
approach lanes a force of twenty-three minesweepers, which found only a few mines
there.396 The larger ships were discharged quickly over pontoons laid in threes. By
1500 on D-day, supplies were being trucked directly to the VI Corps dumps. Meanwhile, the 36th Engineer Combat Regiment cleared the port of Nettuno, which was
by early afternoon able to receive four LSTs and three LCTs simultaneously.397
TF 81 did not have precise information on the enemy minefields. The only
mines found were in the fire-support area, within the twenty-five-fathom curve.
One minesweeper, USS Portent, was sunk by a mine;398 the AA ship HMS Palomares
and the destroyer USS Mayo were damaged.399
The Luftwaffe’s initial missions were to hinder the enemy buildup and attack
supply shipping, mainly with torpedo and glide bombers.400 But the Luftwaffe flew
only 140 sorties on D-day, January 22.401 At about 0850, eighteen to twenty-eight
fighter-bombers made three attacks on the unloading areas but sank only a single
160-foot LCI.402 That same day, Allied aircraft flew 1,200 sorties.403 Their main targets were the roads leading to the landing beaches. However, the Germans quickly
repaired them.404
TF 81’s after-action report identified a number of lessons learned from the landing at Anzio-Nettuno. One was that in assaults on beaches defended by minefields,
beach obstacles, coastal batteries, and radar installations, prior air bombardment is
necessary to soften them. Also required was heavy strafing of beaches just prior to
H-hour. The approach to the shore should be made during the night hours to obtain
tactical surprise, but H-hour should be at dawn. The increased risks of a daylight
landing, particularly the likelihood of more-accurate and heavier enemy gunfire,
had to be accepted over those of landing in pitch darkness through minefields and
over beach obstacles. To deal with the latter, the TF 81 report recommended prior
insertion of Beach Jumper (BJ) units and raids by parties of five hundred to a thousand men. The landing plan, TF 81 indicated, had to be flexible; should one targeted
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Map 5: ANZIO LANDING AND PLANNED LODGEMENT AREA
Marino
Lake
Albano
Albano

Colli

Laziali

Lake
Nemi

Genzano
Cecchina

Nº 7

xx

Velletri

4 (Elms)

Lanuvio

Osteriaccia

Campoleone

71

29
III

104-(-)

129

7

28

RY
Carano

O F ADV
ANC E ELE ME
NT S 2 4
Padiglione Woods

INI

PETER FORCE
xx

1(-)

TIA

L

OB

JEC

TIV

UA

30

RY

III

Conca

ES

D - DA
Y

C

III Campomorto

III

Borgo Piave

504

Nettuno
Anzio

Sessano

15(-)

Littoria

YELLOW

RED
GREEN

III

e

RED
AMBER
GREEN

7

JAN

in

x

II

R 3

Ca na l

2

II

24

nt

x

NS

Isola Bella

L IN EPadiglione

lini

P O S IT IO

HEAD

356

Po

x

Ponte
Rotto

Hermann
Göring

S

B E AC H

II

L

2

xx

Cisterna

UA

sso

x

JAN

es

E

tt
M o l e a R ive r

M a rs h

LIN

Aprilia
(The Factory)

Carroceto

PA
TR
O

II

II

Cori

Mu

2

III

Nº

Ardea
tro
as
Inc

Riv
er

196

Borgo Sabotino

R

xx

III

3

504

X-RAY FORCE

SCALE

Yards
1000 0

1

2

3

Miles
4

5

Academics/JMO/Vego/2016/APR/Map3Anzio

Map 15
Anzio landing and
planned lodgment area

THE ALLIED LANDING AT ANZIO-NETTUNO

beach—or even all of them—prove impossible to cross, any opening or soft spot in
defenses the BJs had identified had to be exploited with the least possible delay.405
The report emphasized the need for the maximum use of vehicle-loaded LSTs to
reduce unloading times to the minimum. It took much longer and required many
more personnel to unload Liberty ships into LCTs and then LCTs onto the beaches.
Good organization, not only for managing the assault waves but also during preloading, was essential. It also was necessary to delineate clearly the responsibilities
of the Army logistical and Navy beachmaster parties, both shipboard and ashore.406
TF 81’s after-action report also emphasized both strict enforcement of fire discipline and the value of using LCT (R)s on all landing beaches.407
Finally, TF 81 recommended that several dress rehearsals with loaded craft be
held. The timing and execution of an assault depend on many factors, any of which
may spell disaster. The landing at Anzio-Nettuno was successful because of the
favorable weather and the relative lack of enemy opposition. However, this success
hid some serious mistakes, which could be corrected only by training. During the
dress rehearsal for Operation SHINGLE in the Gulf of Salerno, Admiral Lowry nearly called the landing off. If that decision had been made, the landing delayed, and
the assault attempted in weather similar to that encountered during the rehearsal,
the result would have been catastrophic. It is simply not acceptable to run the “risk
of lack of proper training against a well-defended shore.”408
Establishing the Lodgment, January 22–24
VI Corps captured all its initial objectives by noon on January 22.409 The only resistance came from elements of two depleted battalions of the 29th PzGrDiv.410 These
units had just been withdrawn from hard fighting along the Gustav Line and assigned to what had been expected to be a long rest, coast watching between the
Tiber River and Nettuno. A few scattered minefields, mostly in the port and on the
PETER beaches, were at first the greatest hazard to VI Corps.411 After sunrise on Dday, however, 88 mm batteries far inland began sporadically shelling the port and
the PETER beaches. Despite the attempts of Allied cruisers and destroyers, these
guns were not silenced all day.412
After the landing, the Allied forces advanced and expanded the beachhead. The
British 1st Division began to move up the Anzio–Alban Hills road toward Campoleone, supported by the 179th Rgt. of the U.S. 45th ID, and captured Aprilia.413 By
the evening of D-day, advance elements of the 30th Infantry and the 3rd Reconnaissance Regiments had seized all the bridges across the Mussolini Canal. However,
the Hermann Göring PzDiv recaptured most of them that night.414 By midnight on
D-day, about 36,000 men and 3,070 vehicles, plus large quantities of supplies—90
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percent of the assault convoy load—had been brought ashore.415 VI Corps losses
were minor: thirteen killed, forty-four missing, and ninety-seven wounded.416
Despite later claims to the contrary, some ULTRA messages were shared with the
“uncleared” commanders taking part in SHINGLE. On January 20 the British Admiralty informed Commander, Task Force 81 that “service of Ultra will open for Admiral
Lowry and Major General Lucas immediately.”417 Three days later the British Operational Intelligence Centre in the Mediterranean reported that “naval information for
Admiral Lowry being passed as Admiralty Ultra but no service to General Lucas until
the recently requested special party [i.e., to handle and protect the material] has been
formed.”418
Alexander and Clark visited the beachhead on January 22. Both seemed satisfied with the VI Corps progress. Alexander was very optimistic, but Clark was
somewhat subdued, warning Lucas, “Don’t stick your neck out, Johnny. I did it at
Salerno and got into trouble.”419 Alexander and Clark visited Lucas again on the
24th to be briefed on the situation and the measures VI Corps had taken. In neither of these meetings did Alexander or Clark urge Lucas to be more aggressive
or expand the lodgment; in fact, Lucas later claimed that Alexander told him the
“operation was a shining piece of work.”420
By January 24, VI Corps had moved about a mile and a half north of Aprilia,
creating a large salient in the German lines. Probing attacks by the 3rd ID toward
Cisterna and by the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (ParaInfRgt) toward Littoria made some progress but were halted by stiff resistance.421 By that day it had become clear that the main Fifth Army could not link up with VI Corps as originally
planned. Accordingly, VI Corps was directed to consolidate its gains on the ground
before starting an advance toward the Alban Hills, in the process of which Lucas’s
intermediate objectives would be the capture of Cisterna and Campoleone.422
Allied fighters and light bombers strafed and bombed rail transport and highway networks. A few days prior to the landing, heavy bombers had flown missions
against key airfields in Italy and southern France to forestall interference by the
Luftwaffe. Attacks were conducted on the Italian railways and highways the Germans used for moving supplies and reinforcements toward their southern front, as
well as on key bridges and railroad yards from Rome north to the Brenner Pass.423
The Luftwaffe’s medium bombers, armed with radio-guided glide bombs, and
torpedo aircraft made frequent raids on the Anzio-Nettuno area. They skimmed
at low altitude at dusk through the mist and hails of AA fire, releasing bombs on
and torpedoes at the shipping in the crowded harbor.424 They carried out twenty
attacks on shipping, with 150 sorties, on the nights of January 23/24 and 24/25.425
At dark on the 23rd, a radio-guided glide bomb sank HMS Janus and heavily damaged Jervis.426 The next day, the anchorage was attacked in daylight by fifteen Luftwaffe heavy fighters, followed by another forty-three at dusk. After dark, fifty-two
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aircraft repeatedly attacked the transport area.427 The aircraft attacked the British
hospital ships St. David, Leinster, and St. Andrew, sinking St. David and damaging
Leinster.428 The U.S. destroyer Plunkett (DD 431) was hit by a single bomb; fiftythree men were killed, but Plunkett reached Palermo under its own power. The
light cruiser Brooklyn (CL 40) was nearly struck several times.429
The unloading of the Liberty ships proceeded slowly, by DUKWs—all the LCTs
were unloading LSTs. During the evening of D+2 the wind increased to Force 7. By
morning, seven LCTs and all the pontoons were broached on the beach, the victims
of high surf and shallow beach gradients. These craft were high and dry—in some
cases, a hundred feet from the water. The unloading of Liberty ships stopped. LSTs
just arriving were diverted to the port area of Anzio, but unloading remained slow
owing to poor control of the incoming craft, restrictions in the harbor, and insufficient turning room in the basin. By the end of D+9, 201 LSTs and seven Liberty
ships had been unloaded in all, including 137 LSTs in the port of Anzio.430
The unloaded amphibious ships and craft were returned to Naples in small
groups rather than being held for assembly into larger convoys. They were in some
cases inadequately escorted, but the risk had to be taken, and no losses from submarine torpedoes were suffered.431
Lucas’s Decision
After the landing, General Lucas had two courses of action open to him: the first
was to move quickly to attempt to capture the Alban Hills, twenty miles distant; the
second was to consolidate the beachhead and prepare for a counterattack. Lucas rejected the first course of action, partly because at Salerno the Germans had reacted
quickly and almost defeated the Allied landing force. He was completely unaware
of the ULTRA report that the two German divisions in the Rome area had been sent
to the Gustav Line. Lucas also did not know that the Germans had only two maneuver battalions in the Anzio-Nettuno area. As it was, he thought his two-division
force inadequate for a move so far inland, which would leave its flanks vulnerable.
By adopting the second course of action Lucas could consolidate a small beachhead; expand it to encompass Campoleone and Cisterna, along with their roads
and railroad intersections; or send an RCT to occupy the Alban Hills to screen the
beachhead and disrupt any approaching German forces. In the end, Lucas combined the first two, seeking to consolidate a small beachhead, then gradually enlarge it.432 By January 24, Lucas had made that decision, and VI Corps conducted
only limited operations. Lucas showed more interest in capturing the port of Anzio
intact and putting it to work handling troops and matériel.433
Lucas’s decision not to advance toward and attempt to capture the Alban Hills
was to become highly controversial. Predictably, Churchill blamed Lucas for failing not only to capture the Alban Hills but also to take Rome immediately.434 Clark
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would write in his memoirs that he had been disappointed by the “lack of aggressiveness of VI Corps [at Anzio], although it would have been wrong in my opinion
to attack to capture our final objective [Alban Hills] on this front. [But] reconnaissance in force with tanks should have been more aggressive to capture Cisterna and
Campoleone.”435 Clark also after the war remarked that when Lucas landed,
he established himself ashore securely on that little beachhead as far as he could. You can’t
go way out because you’d get cut off. You just can’t spread it that thin with no reserves, you
see. So, he did right. I was up there, frequently and I checked him. We began immediately
to get the [ULTRA] intercepts, you see, as to what counteractions the Germans were taking[,] and to have ordered Lucas to go with his two divisions and to start forward march
was asinine.436

Clark believed at the time that while Lucas could have captured the Alban Hills,
he could not have held them—the Germans would have cut his extended force to
pieces. This was why he had rephrased Lucas’s mission orders. Clark also felt it
would not have been wise before the operation to order Lucas to seize the Alban
Hills, because doing so would have jeopardized Lucas’s efforts to secure the initial
beachhead line.437 Alexander too supported Lucas’s decision. In his memoirs he was
to conclude that, in hindsight, Lucas had been right to consolidate before striking
out. Alexander also remarked that the enemy “is quicker than we are, quicker at
regrouping his forces, quicker at thinning out on a defensive front to provide troops
to close gaps at decisive points, quicker in effecting reliefs, quicker at mounting attacks and counterattacks, and above all quicker at reaching decisions on the battlefield. By comparison our methods are often slow and cumbersome, and this applies
to all our troops, both British and American.”438
Eisenhower also approved Lucas’s actions. He stated,
The situation was almost a model for the classical picture for initiating battle of destruction. . . . The Nettuno landing was really not much heavier in scale than an airborne
landing would have been during those critical days when time was all-important. The force
was immobile and could not carry out the promise that was implicit in the situation then
existing. . . . [T]here will be no great destruction of German divisions as a result thereof.

General Marshall essentially endorsed the decision made by General Lucas not
to move to the Alban Hills, at least immediately or until the beachhead was fully
secured.439
The Fifth Army’s two main efforts at Anzio and Monte Cassino were incapable
of mutual support, and neither was powerful enough to do the job (capture Rome)
alone. The Allies simply did not have sufficient forces to secure a beachhead, capture the Alban Hills, then seize Rome, while simultaneously protecting the lines of
communication required to consolidate these objectives.440
On the German side, Kesselring and his chief of staff, Gen. Siegfried Westphal,
apparently were convinced that Lucas had missed a great opportunity by not capturing the Alban Hills shortly after the landing. Kesselring would write in his memoirs that Lucas could have cut the German lines of communication, placing Axis
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forces along the Gustav Line in jeopardy.441 Westphal would point out that the road
to Rome was practically open to the enemy until January 25.442
The German Reaction
Kesselring and the OKW had long anticipated a major landing in the rear of their
forces in Italy. Kesselring and his staff had noted the concentrations of troops and
ships between Naples and Sicily after January 13. However, they believed a landing
improbable prior to the resolution of the enemy attack on the Garigliano River,
because the German Tenth Army was counterattacking from its right flank against
that advance. Kesselring interpreted the heavy air raids on railways and roads in
central and northern Italy as attempts to cut off the Tenth Army’s supply lines, not
as preparations for a landing.443
Nevertheless, from that point Kesselring took specific and prudent steps to
guard against a landing. On the basis of reconnaissance reports, Kesselring believed
that the enemy had sufficient forces to start a new offensive on the land front and to
conduct an amphibious landing simultaneously. Having observed increased naval
activity in the Naples region, he decided not to move reserves from the Rome area
to the Garigliano River but to weaken defenses on the southern front in places not
threatened immediately, especially in the Adriatic sector. He ordered the immediate transfer of the 3rd PzGrDiv to the south.444
On January 18, Kesselring ordered alerts for German forces throughout Italy
(with the exception of the German Naval Command, Italy, which did not alert its
forces against the enemy landing, supposedly because of its shortage of personnel).
The Allied commanders learned about Kesselring’s orders on the 19th, through ULTRA. (Ironically, Kesselring’s staff would try to dissuade him from alerting forces on the
night of January 21/22, because constant alerts were wearing down the troops.)445
Because of the threat of a breach of the Gustav Line on the Garigliano, Kesselring moved combat forces in the Rome area southward for a possible counterattack;
west of Rome, the remaining forces were so weak that they could be employed only
for coastal observation in the Tarquinia–Terracina sector.446 The only headquarters
in the Rome area was that of Army Group C; no other staff was available to organize an emergency defense.447
At 0235 on January 22, the first report of four or five enemy cruisers in the
Anzio-Nettuno area was sent by the 8th Company of the 71st PzGrRgt to its battalion command.448 Westphal was awakened at 0300 and informed that enemy forces
had landed at Anzio-Nettuno at about 0200. At 0600 Kesselring reported to the
OKW that a landing had taken place.449 Westphal immediately alerted the subordinate forces affected.450 Soon afterward, the first alerted German units began to
move.451 RICHARD, as previously noted, called for forces in the Rome area to contain the beachhead and for uncommitted forces on the Gustav Line to move to the
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scene. Battalion and regimental forces on the line but in minimal contact with the
enemy would also be moved to the Anzio area.452
ULTRA disclosed that Army Group C had informed OKW that a
strong Allied formation landed area Anzio Nettuno 0100 hours according to [Luftwaffe’s]
intelligence 1100 hours [on January 22]. In whole sea area west of Anzio about 250–300
units. Close inshore about 100 units unloading, including fifteen large transports. Twenty
five kilometers [15.5 miles] west of Anzio further units including destroyers and cruisers.
Impression thus gained of large scale landing as at Salerno. Second large landing formation
sighted between Anzio and Tiber estuary.453

The German Navy High Command overestimated the size of the enemy forces supporting the landing as comprising a carrier, four cruisers, and twenty destroyers.454
The situation on the German Tenth Army’s southern flank was now critical and
required redeployment of all reserves in the Italian theater. Failure to take immediate countermeasures could lead to the cutting off of Tenth Army and the collapse
of the entire southern Italian front. Therefore, Kesselring intended to establish a
defensive line against the beachhead as quickly as possible. At that point, he had
to assume that the enemy might seize the Alban Hills before sufficient German
troops could be brought up. These considerations made a counterattack necessary;
to conduct it, reinforcements would have to be transferred from other theaters.455
By using the advantages offered by central position and good railroads and roads,
the Germans were able to mass quickly much larger forces in the Anzio-Nettuno area
than the main Fifth Army’s G-2 had anticipated.456 By the end of January 22 the
Germans had about ten thousand men sealing the enemy beachhead. The next day,
the Germans had in the Anzio area some sixteen thousand combat troops. By the
24th the Germans had encircled the beachhead, and the Allied reconnaissance patrols were met with German resistance.457 Kesselring also had immediately alerted
the 4th ParaDiv and replacement units of the Hermann Göring PzDiv in the Rome
area and directed them to block all roads leading to Rome from the Alban Hills.458
ULTRA detected all the related movements, except those of two battalions that used
telephone instead of radio.459 At 0600 Kesselring requested that the forces from
other theaters earmarked for Case RICHARD be sent to Italy.460 He decided to divert
temporarily some of the reinforcements for Tenth Army arriving from northern
Italy, southern France, and Yugoslavia.461 Gen. Alfred Schlemm’s I ParaCorps was
ordered to stop its attack on the Garigliano River, withdraw the 29th PzGrDiv, and
send it to the Anzio area. Tenth Army was directed to release from the Adriatic
front various units, especially motorized reconnaissance detachments and infantry
divisions, and send them to Anzio.462
At 0710 on January 22, Kesselring directed General Mackensen to transfer all
forces earmarked for Case RICHARD.463 Mackensen accordingly ordered the following units to proceed immediately to the Anzio area: the 65th ID (less one regiment)
at Genoa, the 362nd ID (less one regiment) at Rimini, and two regiments of the
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newly formed 16th SS PzGrDiv at Leghorn. Their movements started that evening
and continued through January 23.464
At 0830 on the 22nd, Kesselring directed General Vietinghoff to transfer I ParaCorps headquarters and all its combat troops that could be spared to the Anzio area
as quickly as possible. The forces most suitable for release by the Tenth Army were
the 71st ID and the parts of the 3rd Panzer-Grenadier Division and of the Hermann
Göring Panzer Division that were then on the Tenth Army front (the remainder
of each was still on the march from the north).465 In addition, local reserves were
withdrawn from the southern front. Since the enemy had landed tanks, antitank
forces and artillery had to be released for Anzio. From the Adriatic front, the Tenth
Army sent elements of the 26th Panzer Division and the 1st Parachute Division.466
Tenth Army sent to the Anzio front the following forces on January 22 and that
night: from the area of Cassino, the 3rd PzGrDiv (less one regiment, one artillery
battalion, and one engineer company), elements of the Hermann Göring PzDiv
(the staff, reconnaissance battalion, one artillery battalion), the 26th PzDiv (2nd
Artillery Detachment, one panzer artillery detachment), and four artillery battalions of troops controlled by the Army High Command (known as general headquarters, or GHQ, troops)—the 525th Heavy Anti-Tank (A/T) Battalion, the 450th
and 451st Light and 764th Heavy Artillery Battalions—that were now directly subordinate to divisional or corps headquarters. Also directed to move to the Anzio
area were 2nd Parachute Brigade of the 2nd Light Parachute (Jäger) Division; two
“employment groups” (Einsatzgruppen) of 4th Light Parachute (Jäger) Division;
one fortress-construction and one pioneer battalion; and two Russian “volunteer”
(actually conscript) battalions (Ost battalions) from the Senger Line.467
From the Adriatic defenses the 33rd Battalion (Bn) of the 1st Regiment (Rgt),
the Machine Gun Bn of the 1st ParaDiv, and the 500th Heavy A/T Bn (GHQ troops)
were directed to move to the Anzio area. HQ 71st ID and all of its elements then en
route from the north to join Tenth Army were also thrown into Anzio positions.468
The 26th PzDiv was ordered to leave the front in the Avezzano area and become a
reserve in the Anzio area. These movements were conducted under conditions of
intense enemy air activity, fog, and icy railroad tracks in the Apennines.469
After the withdrawal of units from the Gustav Line, the defense of the Garigliano
sector became questionable. Kesselring believed that during the night of January
22/23 the enemy would attack with strong forces from west of the Alban Hills toward Rome. He planned to counter by joining forces south of Rome. I ParaCorps
could be expected in the Anzio area in the afternoon of the 23rd or early the next
day. This corps received orders to defend between the Tiber River and the Alban
Hills and Sezze and under no circumstance allow the enemy to close with Rome or
control the Frosinone–Rome road. Kesselring also established defenses on the west
and south edges of Rome.470
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Late in the morning of January 22, the Joint Operations Staff of the OKW issued by telephone the code word “Marder 1.” That triggered a series of preplanned
movements: CINC West (Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt) transferred by rail to
CINC Southwest (Field Marshal Maximilian Reichsfreiherr von Weichs) the partially mechanized 715th ID, the 998th Artillery Battalion (GHQ troops), the 1st
Battalion of the 4th Panzer Regiment (PzRgt, with Panther tanks), the 301st Panzer Battalion (PzBn), and the 216th Assault Howitzer Detachment. CINC Southeast deployed the 114th Light (Jäger) Division and two artillery battalions of GHQ
troops.471 The Replacement Army in Germany sent to Italy the headquarters of
LXXV Corps, the Infantry Demonstration (Lehr) Regiment, the 1026th Infantry
Grenadier Regiment, the 1027th PzGrRgt, the Artillery Demonstration Regiment,
the Rocket Launcher Demonstration Battalion, three battalions of security troops,
two battalions of Russian “volunteers,” six construction battalions, and the 508th
PzBn (with Tiger tanks). Neither CINC West nor CINC Southeast could provide
a second division as planned in Case RICHARD, because of the previous transfer of
troops to the Russian front. Immediate activation of the 92nd ID in Viterbo was
ordered.472
On the eve of the landing at Anzio, the Luftwaffe’s strength in the Mediterranean had been reduced to about two hundred aircraft. However, the Luftwaffe
reacted quickly and energetically to the new threat.473 After a phone conversation
with Hitler, Göring ordered all available aircraft to Italy. During the night of January 22/23, the OKW directed CINC Southeast to send the 1st and 2nd Air Groups
(Gruppen) of the 26th Battle Wing (Kampfgeschwader), the 2nd Air Group of the
100th Battle Wing (flying Do-17s), and the 2nd Air Group of the 50th Battle Wing
(with He-177s).474 Luftwaffe Command / CINC Southeast would transfer to the
2nd Air Fleet the 3rd Squadron, 1st Group of the 1st Battle Wing (Ju-88s); the 1st
Squadron, 2nd and 3rd Groups of the 100th Bomber Wing (Do-217s); and the 2nd
Group of the 40th Battle Wing (He-177s).475
Between January 23 and February 3, some 140 long-range bombers were
brought in from northwestern Germany, southern France, and Greece. Antishipping aircraft in southern France were reinforced by between fifty and sixty Do-217s
and He-177s armed with radio-controlled glide bombs. By February 23, about fifty
single-engine fighters had been moved down from northern Italy to the Anzio area.
By the end of the month about forty more single-engine fighters had been sent
(though the Germans never had more than thirty-five fighters available within effective range of the enemy lodgment at Anzio). Despite all difficulties, Luftwaffe
strength in the Mediterranean by March 1944 had grown to 750–75 aircraft, including around six hundred in the central Mediterranean, of which about 475 were
available for operations in the Anzio area.476
Tenth Army units moved to the beachhead rapidly, despite enemy air raids. This
was made possible by employing staff officers from Headquarters Army Group
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C, Tenth Army, and I ParaCorps to direct the traffic. These officers had to divert
troops that were arriving from northern Italy for Tenth Army’s southern front toward the beachhead. Units with no organic transportation (i.e., of their own) were
brought up quickly via supply columns already at hand. Rear-area troops were employed to clear mountain passes of ice and snow.477
At 1700 on January 22, I ParaCorps established a defensive line at the Anzio
beachhead and took command of all arriving troops.478 That evening it became
clear to Kesselring that the landing was a major enemy effort. Vietinghoff back at
Tenth Army recommended withdrawing immediately from the Gustav Line and
shortening the Garigliano–Rapido front to free two combat-hardened divisions for
Anzio. But Kesselring, perceiving a lack of aggressiveness by the enemy VI Corps,
instructed Vietinghoff to stand fast. This was a bold decision, because the first
strong contingents from Tenth Army could not be expected earlier than the 24th
and if the enemy tried a breakout before then, Kesselring estimated, his forces on
hand would not be strong enough to resist.479
Kesselring, however, decided to stop a counterattack then in progress on the
Garigliano River, thereby freeing up yet more forces. During the evening of January
22, Kesselring directed Tenth Army to send to the beachhead three grenadier battalions and one artillery battalion from the Hermann Göring PzDiv, one PzGrRgt
and two artillery battalions from the 15th PzGrDiv, one battalion from the Brandenburg Regiment, the 60th Engineer Bn (GHQ troops), and one AA artillery battalion (GHQ troops). In addition, the 26th PzDiv, which was employed on Tenth
Army’s left flank, was relieved and transferred to Avezzano so as to participate in
the intended counterattack at Anzio.480
Regiments from Fourteenth Army, CINC West, CINC Southeast, and the Replacement Army had all been planned for and now proceeded without special
orders. At 1900 on January 22, the troops of Fourteenth Army began to leave
their areas in northern Italy. On January 23–24 the transportation of troops from
France, Germany, and the Balkans began. Those forces had all arrived in Italy by
the 31st, despite constant air attacks on roads and railroads. By this time, their
advance elements were already deployed at the beachhead.481
The bulk of the Hermann Göring PzDiv remained available as a reserve in the
Rome area. The original plan of OKW was to transfer that division to France on
January 20. Its replacement was the 71st ID, on the way from Istria. OKW believed
that Tenth Army would be able to contain local reserve units until the arrival of the
new reinforcements.482
Kesselring moved his headquarters about twenty-eight miles north to underground bunkers at Monte Sorrate, a secure and bombproof place.483 He directed
General Mackensen to take over the defense in the Anzio area; I ParaCorps and
LXXVI PzCorps became subordinate to him. Mackensen’s mission was to strengthen the defensive ring and reduce the enemy bridgehead.484

205

206

MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1939–1945

The Germans anticipated that the landing force would limit itself to reconnaissance, patrols toward the north, and artillery fire on German positions. By the
24th Kesselring was convinced that there was no danger of an enemy breakout. By
then the German defenders had seventy artillery batteries in place, including AA.
Kesselring assessed that the enemy did not have sufficient troops on the beachhead
for a large-scale attack, only for local attacks. The Germans did learn that the U.S.
2nd ArmdDiv and a British tank brigade were newly on the beachhead, but that
would give the enemy at most three infantry divisions, one armored division, and
two or three armored battalions or brigades. That strength he considered insufficient for an attack on the Alban Hills, which would require effective flank protection. Therefore Kesselring expected (correctly, as it turned out) that for the next
few days the enemy would attempt only to expand and consolidate his beachhead
in preparation for a full-scale attack later and that even local attacks or raids would
not begin before January 26.485
Relying on these assumptions, Kesselring decided to counterattack, with the
objective of destroying the landing force or driving it back into the sea. Every effort
would be made to deliver this blow before the enemy had completed his initial
consolidation. Kesselring directed Mackensen to speed up the concentration of
forces of Fourteenth Army, for use in the counterattacks; the 26th PzDiv and 56th
Rocket Regiment (at Monte Cassino) were directed to the beachhead.486 However,
a concerted attack could not start before the 28th, because forces could not be
assembled earlier. If the enemy attacked after all, the counterattack would start
immediately, regardless.487
On January 24, ULTRA disclosed to the Allies that the 3rd PzGrDiv, then serving as a Tenth Army reserve, had arrived on January 23, with lead elements of the
71st ID, in the Anzio beachhead area. A German report that the 3rd PzGrDiv was
in Tenth Army’s reserve was intercepted on January 21 but was not deciphered and
disseminated to Fifth Army until 0533 on the 23rd. Yet it was clear from ULTRA
that Kesselring intended to defend, not withdraw from, the Gustav Line, and at the
same time bring in a large number of troops to contain the Allies in the Anzio area.
ULTRA correctly reported which German units were pulled out from the Gustav
Line and revealed that elements of the 15th PzGrDiv, the Hermann Göring PzDiv,
and 1st ParaDiv had been ordered to the beachhead.488
By the end of January 25, the Germans had almost twenty-six thousand combat
troops on the line. Instead of weakening the Gustav Line, the Germans had brought
in some thirty-four thousand troops to the area.489 By January 25, elements of eight
German divisions were facing Anzio, and five more, with many supporting units,
were on the way.490 This number was much larger than Allied intelligence had believed possible. The Allies had estimated that German commitments in northern
Italy and elsewhere would limit reinforcements to only two divisions from north of
Rome, and those not for sixteen days.491
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THE BATTLE ASHORE, JANUARY 24–29
By D+3 (January 25), VI Corps had seized a solid beachhead ashore.492 The initial
beachhead was an area roughly seven miles deep and fifteen miles wide centered on
the port of Anzio. Its twenty-six-mile perimeter was considered the maximum VI
Corps could hold.493 Yet the beachhead was too small: enemy artillery could reach
any part of it, and the Allied forces within it had little space for maneuver.494 German artillery observers in the Alban Hills possessed an unobstructed, even spectacular, view of the congested beachhead by which to direct fire.495
Clark paid another visit to Lucas and the beachhead on January 25. He was
then very concerned with the progress of the main Fifth Army, fighting bloody
battles with the Germans.496 That day ULTRA indicated that the 26th PzDiv on the
Gustav Line was being sent to Avezzano for refitting and eventual deployment to
the beachhead, to be replaced by the 305th ID. The ULTRA intercept collectors were
virtually flooded with orders going to various German units.497
Also on January 25, the Germans conducted aggressive, tank-supported patrols
to probe Allied dispositions and strength. At the same time they concealed the
massing of the newly arrived forces and tried to delay any attempt to expand the
beachhead. The first major unit after the Hermann Göring PzDiv to arrive in the
Anzio-Nettuno area was the 29th PzGrDiv from Pescara. The 104th PzGrRgt was
disengaged in the Liri Valley and sent to a position in the central beachhead sector
near Padiglione. The German main force was concentrating farther inland, near
Velletri. Some five thousand paratroopers of the newly formed 4th ParaDiv were
moved from the Rome area to the beachhead.498
On January 26, American troops were within three miles of Cisterna and two
miles beyond the west branch of the Mussolini Canal. Lucas directed 3rd ID to stop
attacking.499 Rain, hail, and sleet at Anzio hindered logistics; that day only seven
LSTs were unloaded. Two heavy raids by Luftwaffe bombers during the night destroyed numerous trucks and caused ammunition explosions.500
On January 27, Alexander expressed dissatisfaction to Clark that VI Corps was
not pushing rapidly enough. The next day, Clark visited Lucas again and got the impression that the outcome depended on which side could increase its forces more
quickly, the Allies or the Germans. Clark urged Lucas to take bold offensive action.
As Clark remembered later, he wanted Lucas to secure Cisterna as a strongpoint in
a defensive line; however, either Clark did not remember correctly later or Lucas
misinterpreted his remarks at the time.501
On January 29, the British light cruiser Spartan and destroyers Loyal and Laforey
bombarded the enemy positions along VI Corps’s flanks; the destroyers would continue their support for the next two days.502 The Luftwaffe carried out its two heaviest air raids to date that day, at dusk and at midnight; the 110 Do-217s, Ju-88s, and
Me-210s sank a Liberty ship and Spartan.503 They also destroyed a large part of the
supplies on the beaches.504 The arrival of the German reinforcements to the Anzio
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area generally was misinterpreted by Lucas and his staff. As each new German division or one of its units was identified by reports of POW interrogations, listening
posts, or other routine intelligence sources, Lucas and his G-2 assumed that an
entire German division was present, nearby, or en route. Therefore, VI Corps estimates of the enemy’s forces often were exaggerated.505 For example, Lucas assumed
on January 28 that the entire 65th ID had arrived at the beachhead when in fact one
of its regiments never moved from northern Italy. Lucas made these errors because
the pertinent ULTRA intercepts were never sent to him from General Clark. ULTRA
laid out a pretty accurate picture of all the movements of all the German forces toward the beachhead, down to the regimental, even battalion, level, with the exception of information on the movements of the 362nd ID and the 16th SS PzGrDiv.506
THE BATTLE ASHORE, JANUARY 30–MARCH 4
By January 30, the Germans had built a strong defensive line in front of Cisterna
and Campoleone (see map 16). The terrain—riven with gullies and made soggy by
rain—worked in their favor. They concentrated about thirty battalions, supported
by panzers and artillery, for a February 1 counterattack; they kept six battalions in
reserve.507 For his part, Lucas, also on January 30, planned a two-pronged attack:
one force would cut Highway 7 at Cisterna before moving east into the Alban Hills;
the second would advance northeast up to the Albano road and break through the
Campoleone salient. Lucas still believed that a quick linkup with the main Fifth
Army in the south was possible; yet German resistance all along the perimeter was
growing stronger, not weaker.508
It was the 3rd ID and two Ranger battalions that were to attack Cisterna. Rangers would spearhead the attack, infiltrate the German lines, and hold Cisterna until
other forces arrived. In the meantime, two infantry regiments (the 7th and 15th)
would cut Highway 7 in the vicinity of Cisterna. The 504th Parachute Regiment
would attack along the Mussolini Canal to divert enemy attention.509 The British 1st
Division and 1st Armoured Division would advance toward the Alban Hills.510 No
preliminary artillery preparation was considered necessary, but extensive air supporting fires, plus a smoke screen laid by aircraft, and naval gunfire support were
scheduled. The air force prepared an elaborate air support plan.511 But unknown to
Lucas, his attack would be aimed directly at the center of a concentration of thirtysix German battalions massing for their counterattack, planned for February 1.512
On January 28–30, in a preliminary move prior to the VI Corps attack, the 45th
ID, then in reserve, relieved the British 1st Division and U.S. 3rd Infantry Division
on the beachhead flanks so these two divisions could use their full strengths in the
assault. Elements of the 45th ID and VI Corps engineers took over the positions of
an infantry brigade along the Moletta River and a paratroop regiment on the opposite flank along the Mussolini Canal. At the same time, the Ranger force and an
infantry battalion were relieved by a British reconnaissance regiment in the quiet
central beachhead sector.513
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The attack on Cisterna was launched on January 30, spearheaded by the two
U.S. Ranger battalions. Both were ambushed and trapped by the Germans. Most
of the Rangers were captured; out of 767, only six escaped.514 The 3rd ID, attacking
Cisterna on January 30–31, fought stubbornly but was unable to break through—in
part because the division attacked along a seven-mile front toward an objective
three or four miles away. At the same time, the British 1st Division tried to breach
the enemy’s defense line along a railroad by seizing a crossing at Campoleone.515
After three days of heavy fighting, growing enemy strength forced Lucas to abandon his assault. The Allied attack had failed to reach its stated objectives. Allied
troops did, however, drive sixteen miles inland to Campoleone and seventeen miles
toward Cisterna before the swift enemy reaction sealed in the beachhead.516 It also
forced the German Fourteenth Army to commit most of its forces, which in turn
forced postponement of the counterattack intended to wipe out the beachhead.517
By February 2, VI Corps had taken about 1,500 prisoners and had inflicted heavy
casualties. Its own casualties ran to about 6,500.518
The failure of the Allied breakout convinced Clark, Alexander, and Lucas that the
Germans were preparing to counterattack. Hence, a decision was made to send about
1,800 men of the American-Canadian 1st Special Service Force and artillery units to
the beaches, quickly. This reinforcement raised the total number of Allied troops on
the beachhead to about one hundred thousand men. The German Fourteenth Army
still outnumbered the Allies in the Anzio area; however, many of its units were short
of ammunition, inadequately trained, and lacking in experienced leaders.519
On February 2, Alexander issued Operations Instruction Nr. 37, “Development
of the Operations from the Anzio Bridgehead.” The enemy, the instruction stated,
would be driven out of Cisterna. The left flank of the “bridgehead” (Alexander’s
soldierly term) would advance to the general line defined at each end by the Campoleone railway station and the south bank of the Incastro River. Afterward, the
new defensive line would be held by a minimal number of troops. At the same time,
the right flank of the beachhead would advance generally from the Cisterna area to
the canal junction and thence along the Mussolini Canal to the sea. That line too
would be held with a small force.520
On February 2, Admiral Cunningham directed Admiral Lowry to turn over command of the naval forces supporting the Anzio-Nettuno operation to Rear Adm. J. A. V.
Morse, RN, who was Flag Officer, Western Italy. Morse established standing A/S
patrols to cover the new inshore route from Naples to Anzio so Allied ships could
transit that route unescorted, thereby releasing escorts for other commitments.
First German Counterattack, February 3–5
The Germans had planned to attack from north to south along the Albano–Anzio
road, with the main concentration on either side of the Factory at Aprilia. The
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Map 6: HOLDING THE BEACHHEAD 28 FEB–03 MARCH 1944
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original date for the attack was January 28. But on the 26th Kesselring and Mackensen
postponed it to February 1 to await the arrival of reinforcements (the 1027th and
1028th InfRgts, the Special Artillery Demonstration Regiment, the Special Rocket
Projector Demonstration Battalion, and the 1st Battalion of the 4th PzRgt).521 These
reinforcements had left Germany by train and were expected to arrive in Italy around
January 26–27.522 Allied bombing of roads and railways delayed them.523 By January
28, Fourteenth Army had deployed the Hermann Göring PzDiv to the eastern sector,
around Cisterna; the 3rd PzGrDiv to the central sector, at Campoleone; and the 65th
ID to the western sector, in the vicinity of the Moletta River. In the rear of this perimeter, other units also were grouped for counterattacks. Four to five miles separated
the Germans’ main defense line from the front line occupied by VI Corps.524
The German plan called for three main phases: Phase I (February 3–10), preparatory attacks to cut off the British salient at the Albano road and capture the
Factory; Phase II (February 16–20), penetration of the enemy perimeter along the
Albano road; and Phase III (February 28–March 2), an attack on Cisterna combined with penetration of the beachhead defenses along the Mussolini Canal.525
Although doubtful of the plan’s prospect for success, Mackensen prepared a forceful counterattack. The 4th ParaDiv and 65th ID of the I ParaCorps would pinch
off the Campoleone salient, recapture the Factory, and then break out to the sea
along the Albano road. LXXVI PzCorps (3rd PzGrDiv, 715th Motorized ID, 71st
ID, Hermann Göring PzDiv, and 26th PzDiv) would attack south of Cisterna along
the Mussolini Canal and try to reach the enemy perimeter at Nettuno and Anzio.526
On February 3, Clark learned via ULTRA about the pending German counteroffensive.527 The relevant decrypt disclosed Mackensen’s estimate of the situation to
Kesselring: that two Allied infantry divisions had appeared in the forward lines;
that to the west, opposite the northern flank of the 65th ID and opposite Combat
Group Gräser, was the British 1st Division; in the east, opposite the eastern flank
of the 71st ID and the western flank and center of the Hermann Göring PzDiv,
was the U.S. 3rd ID. Each Allied division was supported by one tank brigade. On
the eastern flank the enemy had two or three Ranger battalions and one parachute
regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division. The enemy units facing the flank of the
65th ID and the 4th ParaDiv were not identified. Mackensen assumed that the U.S.
1st ArmdDiv and 45th ID were deployed in the rear of the beachhead. He was unsure, however, about the whereabouts of the 2nd ArmdDiv (U.S.), one British corps
headquarters, and another British division. Intense shipping traffic indicated the
imminent arrival of reinforcements. Mackensen assessed that the Allies had suffered heavy losses in men and tanks, which prisoners confirmed, but that neither
their will to attack nor their endurance to resist had been broken. The enemy’s advantages lay in his strong, accurate artillery abundantly supplied with ammunition,
his naval gunfire support, and his air forces.528
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Mackensen intended to launch limited attacks and then, after the enemy was
sufficiently weakened, an all-out counteroffensive. The first attack would be
launched during the night of February 3/4 by one reinforced regiment, with tanks,
in the bulge north of Aprilia. I ParaCorps would exploit its progress by advancing
south past the line running from a point 0.9 miles northwest of Colle Vallelata to
Colle della Mandria. If successful, the attack would continue during the night of
February 4/5, led now by the 65th ID and Combat Group Gräser. The objective
would be to recover ground on both sides of Aprilia. No further attacks were specifically planned, but in general, similar attacks would be launched in rapid succession to prevent effective countermeasures by the enemy. Anticipating strong Allied
artillery, air support, and stubborn, determined resistance, the Germans expected
substantial losses. It appeared doubtful to Fourteenth Army that it would be able
to eliminate the beachhead with the forces then available; to do that, it requested
additional troops from Army Group C. While coastal defenses in other areas might
be depleted, Fourteenth Army considered this calculated risk worthwhile.529
On February 4, the Germans reorganized their forces. I ParaCorps (4th ParaDiv
and 65th ID) came under the command of Fourteenth Army and was assigned the
western sector, from a point west of the Albano road to behind the Moletta River.
LXXVI PzCorps (71st ID, 715th Motorized ID, 26th PzDiv, 3rd PzGrDiv, and the
Hermann Göring PzDiv) was transferred from Tenth Army to Fourteenth Army
and deployed in the central and eastern sectors of the beachhead perimeter.530 The
Germans resumed their attack against the weakened British 1st Division on February 7. In two days of bitter fighting, they pushed the British out of the Factory and
Carroceto. On the 11th, American troops tried to retake Aprilia; they failed but
inflicted heavy casualties on the German defenders.531
The Germans had now launched their counterattack as planned; the first and
second phases had been successful, but the third had failed.532 On February 11, Alexander issued Operations Instruction Nr. 42 for the conduct of future operations.
He considered it essential to ultimately driving the enemy north of Rome that VI
Corps resume its own offensive as soon as the tactical situation permitted. In his
view, the enemy forces facing VI Corps must surely be exhausted for the moment
by their counterattacks.533 VI Corps had to be able to resume the offensive on short
notice: it was possible that, perhaps prompted by the success of an advance against
the Gustav Line by the New Zealand Corps, the enemy would move troops from
the beachhead to the main front, and should that happen, it was critical that VI
Corps immediately take advantage of it. Alexander’s new instruction laid down that
VI Corps must drive the enemy out of Cisterna and secure that place as the pivot
for a further advance on Velletri; there would be some hard fighting. Alexander
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directed VI Corps to plan an all-out offensive. The advantage gained would be even
greater if it coincided with operations in the Liri Valley.534
Between February 3 and 15, the Luftwaffe carried out only seven attacks against
Allied shipping in the Anzio-Nettuno area. The highest number of sorties on a single night was no more than fifty. There were about twenty sorties by Do-217s and
He-177s armed with Hs-293 radio-controlled glide bombs. The Ju-88s in northern
Italy were capable of no more than harassing raids, mainly on ground targets, and
daylight raids on shipping by fighter-bombers were even less effective.535
Second German Counterattack, February 16–22 (Operation FISCHFANG)
On February 9, Mackensen issued an order for a major attack aimed to capture the
Factory, Carroceto, and Buonriposo Ridge. These positions would allow the Germans to launch an all-out attack on the Anzio beachhead.536 His order noted that
during the last days the enemy has brought to and employed on the beachhead fresh reinforcements. The 56th Infantry Division (Br) has just been identified. More reinforcements
can be counted on. After the seizure of Aprilia, heavy enemy attacks against that sector are
expected.
The Fourteenth Army will attack the enemy beachhead on X day, 15 February, 1944 at Y
hour, with its main effort between 1.5 km west of Aprilia–Nettuno highway and the Fosso di
Spaccasassi. . . . The front will be pierced and the attacking forces will push through to Nettuno and destroy enemy forces of the beachhead.537

Mackensen’s main effort would be made along a four-mile front astride the Anzio–
Albano road and anchored on Buonriposo Ridge in the west and on Spaccasassi
Creek to the east. After breaking through the main enemy defensive line, the Germans planned to drive through to Anzio and Nettuno, splitting VI Corps in two
and defeating it in detail. Forces for the counterattack would be under the command of I ParaCorps to the west of Anzio and LXXVI PzCorps to the east.538
The Germans launched their new counterattack on February 16. As planned,
they moved down the Anzio–Albano road on a four-mile front, but the initial attacks by the 3rd PzGrDiv and 715th Motorized ID were beaten back with heavy
losses; the Germans achieved only minor penetrations. They had better success in
a more intensive assault against the 45th ID at dawn on February 18, destroying a
battalion of the 179th Infantry Regiment and pushing the remainder back half a
mile to the VI Corps’s final defensive line by midmorning.539 By noon on February
19, however, Allied air and artillery superiority had turned the tide. A final assault
against the 180th and 179th InfRgts was stopped by air strikes and massed mortar,
machine-gun, artillery, and tank fire. Renewed attacks on the 19th and 20th were
much weaker, and Allied defenders readily broke them up.540
Nevertheless, the Germans did not abandon their objective—to destroy the Allied forces on the beachhead—but simply changed their tactics. Instead of the frontal assaults in the center, they would now attack the Allied flanks. The Germans
initially massed their forces on the eastern flank and struck along the Spaccasassi
Creek on the Carano–Aprilia road near Padiglione; on February 20 they shifted to
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the western flank and attacked at Buonriposo Ridge.541 On the 20th Kesselring told
his commanders that the number of enemy troops had been overestimated and
that undue cautiousness among both officers and the rank and file had resulted. He
urged his subordinates to regain their old self-confidence and aggressiveness and
to be, as they had been in the past, “inspired by an impetuous urge to attack.” It was
necessary to advance even if adjacent friendly troops had been stopped. The enemy
strongpoint had to be bypassed. The objective would be to establish bridgeheads
across the Mussolini Canal and Astura Creek.542
Although the Germans continued harassing attacks until February 22, for the
Allies the crisis had passed; VI Corps went on the offensive locally and retook some
lost ground.543 The German Fourteenth Army truly was now close to the point of
544
exhaustion. It had either to bring up additional troops or to pause for rest. In
the meantime, and unknown to the Germans, the Allies in the Anzio lodgment
were in great difficulties themselves. Their troops were exhausted too. VI Corps
was defending a perimeter almost thirty-five miles long with fewer than five divisions; many of its soldiers had been in combat almost continuously for more than a
month. Also, the Germans were able to concentrate their artillery fire on the salient
and did so, bombarding the Allied troops mercilessly.545
The VI Corps’s inability to break out had become a matter of great and increasing concern to Churchill and Gen. Maitland Wilson, the Mediterranean commander. On February 11 Churchill wrote to Alexander, “I am sure you realize how
great disappointment was caused at home and in the United States by the stand-still
at Anzio.” While he did not know what orders Lucas had received, Churchill acknowledged, “it is a root principle to push out and form contact with the enemy.”546
Wilson had informed Churchill that as of February 10 the Allies had in the Anzio
bridgehead some eighteen thousand vehicles, including four hundred tanks and
more than 1,200 carriers and half-tracks.547 This prompted Churchill to remark
that for him it was a “spectacle” to see eighteen thousand vehicles “accumulated
by the 14th day [after D-day] for only 70,000 men or less than four men to a vehicle including drivers and attendants, though they did not move more than 12
or 14 miles”—it was “most astonishing.” He also wondered why seventy thousand
American and British troops were being blocked by at most sixty thousand Germans. Churchill clearly was impressed by “the ease with which the enemy moved
their pieces about on the board and the rapidity with which they adjusted the perilous gaps they had to make on their southern front is most impressive.” He saw in
all that “very awkward data in regard to OVERLORD.”548 General Wilson noted how
rapidly the Germans had built up their forces to seal the beachhead. Their troop
strength had increased from ten infantry battalions and two reconnaissance units
on January 24 to twenty-nine infantry battalions and seven reconnaissance units on
the 30th, to forty infantry battalions and seven reconnaissance units on February
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5. In his view, bad weather was the main factor that had prevented Allied air forces
from cutting off railway traffic from northern Italy to Rome.549
Lucas Is Relieved, February 22
Neither Alexander nor Clark was entirely happy with Lucas’s performance. They
believed Lucas was tired, physically and mentally. Clark intended first to make
General Truscott Lucas’s deputy commander and soon thereafter to transfer Lucas
and appoint Truscott as VI Corps commander. This and other command changes
within VI Corps became effective on February 17.550 On the 22nd Clark formally
relieved Lucas and appointed Truscott. (Lucas served for three weeks as Clark’s
deputy at Fifth Army HQ before returning to the United States to be first deputy
and then commander of Fourth Army at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.)
Clark later explained that he had been unable to resist pressure from Alexander
and Alexander’s deputy Devers to relieve Lucas. Yet he thought that Lucas had done
all he could at Anzio.551 For his part, Lucas had reportedly been frustrated as VI
Corps commander because, he strongly suspected, Fifth Army was not giving him
all the available intelligence on the enemy.552 However, as discussed elsewhere, this
was only true until January 20. Afterward, Lucas was put on the list of recipients of
ULTRA intercepts.
Truscott, Clark thought, was the most outstanding of all the Fifth Army division
commanders. A quiet, competent, and courageous officer with extensive battle experience in North Africa, Sicily, and mainland Italy, Truscott inspired confidence.553 He
had been on the General Staff in 1941. In April 1942, General Marshall had sent him
to the Combined Operations HQ under Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten. Truscott was
directly responsible for the organization of the U.S. Army’s Ranger battalions. He
was sent to North Africa to coordinate British, French, and American efforts to cut
Rommel’s lines of communication to Tunisia. Afterward, he became commander
of the 3rd ID under General Clark. He worked well with the British, who had the
highest regard for his judgment.554
Apparently, Truscott found conditions in VI Corps headquarters highly unsatisfactory. He later recalled that the VI Corps staff had never been positive or confident
in planning or execution. Although it had many able staff officers, proposals often
were put forward without proper analysis, orders were based on cursory study of
maps and intelligence, and few staff officers bothered much about reconnaissance.
Conferences often became debates, usually making for decisions that were accepted
only with reluctance and rarely supported in a way that inspired confidence.555
Third German Counterattack, February 28–29
The third and last major German effort to throw the Allied forces back into
the sea started at midnight on February 28/29. VI Corps and 3rd ID responded
strongly; for each German shell, they fired twenty—sixty-six thousand rounds
on February 29 alone. The Germans’ biggest success, albeit at heavy cost, was an
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eight-hundred-yard penetration north of Carano.556 The German main effort was
against the U.S. 3rd ID, holding the Cisterna sector. LXXVI PzCorps (the 114th
Light Division, 362nd ID, 26th PzDiv, and Hermann Göring PzDiv) aimed at penetrating the Allied defenses from Carano to Isola Bella. Success would open the
road for the 29th PzGrDiv all the way to Nettuno and Anzio.557
On February 22, Allied signals intelligence disclosed that the enemy attack
would come along the axis of the Cisterna–Nettuno road. On February 24, Clark
issued Operations Instruction Nr. 16, directing VI Corps to restore its forward positions and prepare those positions for defense.558 By the time the attack started on
February 29, General Truscott knew which German forces would take part in it
and had regrouped accordingly.559 The German attack failed, but when on March
1 Mackensen reported the fact to Kesselring he gave as the main reason the insufficient training and lack of experience of replacement troops. That meant, in his
view, he would be unable to eliminate the beachhead. Mackensen suggested instead
that new methods be applied to counter eventual large-scale enemy attacks from
it. He thought that any such attack would probably be made in connection with an
offensive against Tenth Army and, possibly, simultaneously with the expected invasion of Western Europe. German troops should try to reduce gradually the size of
the beachhead, thereby improving the likelihood of repulsing such an attack when
it occurred.560
In a message sent to Mackensen at 1840 on March 1, Kesselring stated that the
weather had made the ground so muddy—contrary to predictions, it had been
raining continuously for eighteen hours—that neither tanks nor horse-drawn vehicles could move. Therefore, all concentrated attacks had to be halted. Divisions
with carefully prepared local raids already in train would carry on with them, but
all units not involved were to be withdrawn for rest and for reception and integration of replacements.561
Afterward, Mackensen explained in an order to his subordinate commanders
Fourteenth Army would now launch only minor (but well-prepared) attacks to reduce the enemy beachhead. The 26th PzDiv and the 29th PzGrDiv would be withdrawn from the front and used as tactical (actually part of operational) reserves.
The enemy was to be engaged along the entire front by the remaining forces. Each
division on the front was to launch at least two raids every night. Starting immediately, attacks in company to battalion strength would be made, to improve German
positions and inflict losses on the enemy. Newly seized lines would be fortified and
mined immediately, to prevent effective enemy counteraction.562
Mackensen’s order added instructions specific to various sectors and combat
arms. For I ParaCorps it was most important to gain ground on the western flank
of the 4th ParaDiv, and thereby reduce further the beachhead there. It also would
be necessary to push forward to the Buonriposo and Botaccia gorges. I ParaCorps
would carry out its company-to-battalion-strength attacks on March 2, 4, and 6.563
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In the LXXVI PzCorps sector, the front was to be pushed to Colle Biadaretto,
Colle Carano, Colle del Pozzo, Rubbia Woods and Rubbia Hill, Isola Bella, and a
small forest northeast of Isola Bella. The 29th PzGrDiv and 26th PzDiv were to be
withdrawn to form the operational reserve already mentioned: the former as soon
as possible, to the vicinity of the Cisterna–Velletri area, the latter in the near future,
to the area defined by Cecchina–Genzano–Albano. The mission of the artillery,
including the antiaircraft variety, would be to support the offensive operations of
the corps; systematically shell enemy artillery; annihilate all observed enemy points
of resistance; fire on all profitable moving targets; and shell enemy ships, harbor
installations, and disembarkation points.564
STALEMATE, MARCH 5–MAY 22
Five days of fighting ensued, during which the Germans lost 3,500 men killed,
wounded, and missing.565 On March 4, Mackensen decided that further attacks
were useless and went over to the defensive.566 The best German divisions were
withdrawn to the area south of Rome as Army Group C’s operational reserves.567
Others, including elements of the 16th SS PzGrDiv, were sent to northern Italy. In
early March, the Hermann Göring PzDiv left for Leghorn for rest and refitting, preparatory to an expected redeployment to France. The 114th Light (Jäger) Division
withdrew in early March for a rest period; it was to reappear on the Eighth Army
front. As of the 14th, Fourteenth Army’s strength was about 135,700 men, 65,800
of them combat troops.568
In the course of these changes, battle-hardened troops generally were replaced
with second-rate units; an exception was the 8th PzGrRgt (the 8th) of the 3rd
PzGrDiv, which was withdrawn from the Gustav Line.569 A major part of the reinforcements were Italian troops who had remained loyal to Mussolini when Italy
changed sides in October 1943 and now fought with the Germans. In mid-March
the Barbarigo Battalion of the San Marco Marine Regiment and one battalion of
the 1st Regiment, Milizia Armata, appeared in the Littoria sector. Not trusting their
Italian allies, the Germans mixed Italian units with German ones down to the platoon level.570 In spite of these precautions, some fifty men of the San Marco Marines
deserted during their first ten days on the front line.571
After six days of continuous bombing, shelling, and fighting, the men of VI Corps
were as exhausted as their German counterparts and were replaced with fresh forces.572
The British 56th Division was relieved by the British 5th Division in early March and
left the beachhead. The British commando units also were withdrawn. The British
1st Division remained at Anzio except for the 24th Guards Brigade, which was sent
to Naples, replaced by the 18th Brigade. The 504th ParaInfRgt rejoined the 82nd
Airborne Division and left for Britain in late March. On April 1, the 4th ParaDiv
also departed. The withdrawal of these forces was more than offset by the arrival of
the 34th ID on March 21. This division relieved the 3rd ID in the Cisterna sector on
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March 28. The arrival of fourteen thousand fresh reinforcements in March brought
the Allied strength up to ninety thousand troops by the end of March.573
After March 4, there was a lull in the fighting for almost ten weeks. Both sides
limited themselves to defending, though actively, the positions they held.574 In many
ways, the Anzio-Nettuno front now resembled the western front of World War I.
Most Allied casualties were caused by artillery and air attacks. The Germans used to
devastating effect their 280 mm K5(E) Leopold railway guns (called “Anzio Annies”)
mounted on the Alban Hills.575 VI Corps built up a huge logistical reserve in preparation for a May offensive, to be followed by a drive to Rome. Allied aircraft and artillery constantly pounded enemy positions.576
The Germans, despite their reduced strength around the beachhead, still considered a new offensive. Tentative plans drafted on March 13 envisaged a large-scale attack on March 29, either in the Alban road sector or from Cisterna. But the planned
counteroffensive was postponed on March 23, then abandoned entirely on April 10.577
The Allies too planned a large-scale attack, in the Cisterna sector. Field Order
Nr. 18, issued on March 18, directed a frontal assault by the British 1st and 5th
Divisions astride the Albano road against the German salient, while the U.S. 45th
Division attacked from the southeast toward the Factory.578
But no large-scale actions actually occurred after March 4. Allied and German
troops both carried out aggressive patrolling and frequent raids to improve their
positions, feel out the enemy, and keep him under constant pressure. The nightly
raids and patrol clashes, the constant exchange of harassing fire, and continual air
attacks kept the front at the beachhead very much alive.579
BREAKOUT, MAY 23–JUNE 1
On May 5, Clark gave orders to Truscott to start Operation BUFFALO. VI Corps
would break out of the beachhead on the Cisterna front—at Cori, at the base of
the Lepini Mountains, and at Velletri, near the base of the Alban Hills (see map
17). It would then drive east through the Velletri Gap to cut Highway 6 and trap
the major part of the enemy forces trying to withdraw north through the Liri Valley. The ultimate objective was to destroy the entire Tenth Army south of Rome at
Valmontone.580
Alexander had dictated these plans, and Clark had little faith in their feasibili581
ty. Clark informed Truscott that VI Corps should be prepared at any moment
during the breakout to swing north for a quick advance to Rome, especially if it
encountered stiff resistance on the route to Valmontone or if the British advance
up to the Liri Valley was slower than anticipated. The plan was that the U.S. 1st ID
would make the initial assault, supported by the 3rd ID and the 2nd Special Service
Force. The 45th ID would move beyond Carano on the left as far as the Campoleone–
Cisterna railroad, while the 36th ID would exploit the breakthrough.582
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On the night of May 11/12, Fifth and Eighth Armies launched the long-awaited
offensive against the Gustav Line. The main Fifth Army attack was staged from a
bridgehead north of the Garigliano River, between the Liri Valley and the sea. Eighth
Army launched its attack on the Cassino front, which it had taken over after the failure of an offensive in February.583 After a week of fighting, the Germans abandoned
Monte Cassino. By May 15, the FEC and the U.S. II Corps had broken the Gustav
Line.584 Clark had a plan to shift two divisions of II Corps (the 85th and 88th IDs) to
Anzio after they completed the initial breakthrough in the south. They would have
combined with VI Corps to start a powerful drive out of the beachhead.585
On May 20, Clark directed the main Fifth Army to advance toward Terracina,
which fell into Allied hands on the night of May 23/24. American troops then advanced northward over the flat terrain toward the Pontine Marshes to meet elements
of VI Corps.586 In the meantime, at 0545 on May 23, the VI Corps artillery opened a
barrage on the Cisterna front, followed by armor and infantry advancing along the
entire line from Carano to the Mussolini Canal. The German resistance was very
stiff, but the British 1st Armoured Division penetrated the enemy lines. The XII
Tactical Air Command completed the last of its 722 sorties on May 24. VI Corps cut
Highway 7 above Cisterna and encircled the town, which fell into Allied hands on
May 25, at the cost of 475 Americans killed, 2,320 wounded, and 785 missing.587 The
main Fifth Army and VI Corps finally joined up in the early morning of May 25.588
The breakout was costly to VI Corps, which took about four thousand casualties
in the five-day offensive. The 1st Cavalry Division alone lost a hundred armored
vehicles. But Allied troops took 4,840 German prisoners, including about a thousand in Cisterna, and destroyed or damaged some 2,700 vehicles.589
On May 26, Clark directed VI Corps to shift the weight of its main effort from
Valmontone to the west of the Colli Laziali and then to capture the Factory. This
order was carried out, but the enemy resistance was stiffening.590 By dusk on the
30th, Fifth Army’s drive appeared to have stalled; from May 31 to June 2 Fourteenth Army fought hard to check its advance. The Germans offered especially stiff
resistance to VI Corps, which had been on the offensive since the 23rd. But finally,
on the night of June 2/3, the main German forces withdrew northward from the
Alban Hills, leaving only scattered rear-guard elements. At 0800 on the 4th, the first
American troops entered Rome. With that, the ultimate operational objective of
the Anzio-Nettuno landing had been accomplished—but by other forces.591
RESULTS
During the Anzio-Nettuno landing and battle ashore, VI Corps suffered 29,200
combat casualties: 4,400 killed, 18,000 wounded, and 6,800 missing or made prisoner. About two-thirds of these casualties occurred in the heavy fighting that ended on March 4. In addition, the Allies suffered some 37,000 noncombat casualties
(26,000 Americans). Out of the total combat losses, 16,200 were American (2,800
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Map 7: THE BREAKTHROUGH, 25–26 MAY 1944
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killed, 11,000 wounded, and 2,400 missing or made prisoner). During the first
thirty days, the overall combat-casualty rate in VI Corps was 17 percent, for the
British units 27 percent. During the entire operation, about thirty-three thousand
casualties (twenty-four thousand Americans) were evacuated by sea. Fourteenth
Army suffered 27,500 casualties (5,500 killed, 17,500 wounded, 4,500 missing or
made prisoner).592
The Allies made a tremendous and highly successful effort to sustain their forces
ashore. Supplies were brought in on preloaded trucks in LSTs, by LCTs, and on
Liberty ships. Starting on January 28, a convoy of six LSTs was sent each day from
Naples, each vessel carrying fifty loaded trucks. Each convoy brought 1,500 tons of
cargo (60 percent ammunition, 20 percent fuel, 20 percent rations).593 Some fifteen
LCTs also made a weekly turnaround from Naples with supplies. Every ten days
four Liberty ships loaded with supplies at Naples and North African ports arrived
at Anzio. The LSTs and LCTs could dock at Anzio; Liberty ships had to be unloaded
offshore and their cargo brought ashore by LCTs or, in calm weather, by DUKWs.
Fifth Army managed the port and dump areas. On February 6, the 504th Engineers
took over operation of the port and beaches.594
The beachhead was within range of the German artillery, and it was subjected
to constant air raids. That vulnerability made the supply situation at Anzio more
difficult. The air raids and artillery bombardments reduced the efficiency of beach
personnel by some 10 percent. Some of the ammunition and gasoline dumps were
concentrated in a small and especially vulnerable area. Between January 22 and
March 10 bombing destroyed about a thousand tons of ammunition, artillery 228
tons more. Yet such losses were never (with the possible exception noted below)
critical. Supplies were dispersed in many separate dumps and protected by earthen
bunkers.595
The bunkers were erected by bulldozers and, critically, Italian laborers. By the
end of January the security of the beachhead was threatened by ammunition and labor shortages. The beachhead needed many civilian laborers to clean up debris and
to dig in the dumps. However, after the landing some twenty-two thousand civilians
had been evacuated; only about 730 able-bodied men were left. It was to alleviate
these shortages that Italian laborers were hired in Naples and brought to Anzio.
Initially, a port battalion was stationed at the beachhead to unload Liberty ships.
But unloading needed to be quicker, because of the constant danger of Luftwaffe
raids. So on about March 1, a new procedure was adopted: one port company was
embarked in each Liberty ship.596
At the beginning of February there was a shortage of LCTs to unload the Liberty ships. Most of those on hand had been in service more than a year without
overhaul: on February 6, only fifteen were serviceable, a number that increased
only to twenty-two by February 12. As stopgaps, between ten and twenty LCIs were
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employed and the Liberty ships anchored closer to shore so DUKWs could help
in unloading; between 450 and 490 DUKWs were so used at Anzio. The situation
improved greatly in late February when more LCTs became available. By March,
supply problems at the beachhead had been largely solved. With the seasonal improvement in the weather, it became possible to unload five or six Liberty ships at a
time.597 The greatest volume of supplies arrived in March, when some 157,275 tons
were discharged; the peak was on March 28, when 7,830 tons were unloaded. Large
reserves of supplies, as noted above, were built up in anticipation of the Fifth Army
offensive in May. By May 23, the beachhead had, in addition to its normal ten-day
reserve, an additional thirty days’ worth. Overall, between January 22 and June 1,
some 513,500 tons of supplies were discharged, about 3,920 tons per day.598
CONCLUSIONS AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
The Allied amphibious landing at Anzio-Nettuno on January 22 did not itself accomplish its stated ultimate operational objective, despite the enormous superiority
of the forces the Allies committed to it, on land, in the air, and at sea. The main
reasons for this failure were, first, unsound decisions by Allied political and military
leaders, and second, deficient performance by operational commanders in planning
and execution. The Germans proved much tougher and more resourceful than the
Allies anticipated, and the German operational commanders performed much more
effectively than their counterparts.
The Allied command organization in the Mediterranean was fragmented and
complex. Some high commanders held two positions or even more. The names of
service components and major tactical commands changed frequently, sometimes
for no apparent reason. Perhaps the most fragmented command structure was that
of the air forces—there were simply too many tactical commands in the Mediterranean theater, and their responsibilities overlapped. The German command organization in the Mediterranean, after the capitulation of Italy, underwent major
changes as well, after which it too lacked badly needed unity of command.
Command organization is one of the key prerequisites of sound command and
control. It should be simple and straightforward. It should avoid overlapping responsibilities. Changes in the command structure should not be made often, especially in the
course of a campaign or major operation. Optimally, a single operational commander
should be entrusted with command responsibilities for all forces taking part in a campaign or major operation.
One of the Allies’ greatest advantages was their ability to intercept and read
high-level German radio messages. ULTRA intercepts provided a steady stream of
information about orders of battle and the state of fuel, ammunition, and food. The
cryptologists at Bletchley Park were able to read the estimates and plans of Kesselring and his subordinate commanders and the exchanges between Hitler, the OKW,
and Kesselring. Allied high commanders were informed in this way about German
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assessments of Allied forces. However, Allied commanders could not “sanitize” the
information sufficiently—that is, package it in a way that would not compromise
the source—to relay it to their major subordinates. In addition, British intelligence
officers in the theater did not share all ULTRA information with their American
counterparts, not trusting them to protect it properly. Here was a source of not only
distrust but difficulty in reaching agreement.
An ability to intercept and read in a timely way coded enemy messages provides
an enormous advantage. Such a capability must be highly classified, yet subordinate
commanders directly involved in combat must possess information that will allow
them to make sound decisions. At a minimum, higher commanders should have
the authority to sanitize received information and transmit the result to subordinate tactical commanders. In any case, one’s operational intelligence should not
rely overly on technical means but should use other sources as well—in particular,
human intelligence.
The idea of an Anzio-Nettuno landing, set aside in mid-December, was revived
by Churchill late that month. His insistence, strongly supported by other Allied
leaders, on capturing Rome as soon as possible led to the adoption of Operation
SHINGLE. This decision was based primarily on political, not military, considerations—it was an operational decision made by strategic leadership. It also was
based on highly suspect assumptions about the timing and scope of the enemy’s
likely reaction to a landing in its rear. Allied commanders and their staffs paid more
attention to the enemy’s supposed intentions than to his capabilities—a common,
but often fatal, mistake.
Political and other nonmilitary considerations always should be taken fully into
account. In some exceptional cases, the operational commander should consult the
higher political-military leadership about the advisability of a proposed major operation and the availability of the resources necessary for it. But otherwise, the operational commander—not high political leaders—should be primarily responsible for
and have the principal role in determination of the need for and in the planning,
preparation, and execution of a major operation.
Clark’s proposal on December 10 to disconnect the landing at Anzio-Nettuno
from Fifth Army’s progress from south to north constituted a radical change. It
made the landing an independent major joint operation instead of an integral part
of a renewed Fifth Army offensive. It also largely doomed the landing.
An amphibious landing whose aim is to envelop an enemy flank on the coast
should be planned and executed not as an independent major operation but as an
integral part of a major offensive joint/combined operation by the main forces on the
land front. Hence, the landing’s timing and the amphibious objective area should be
selected to ensure a rapid linkup between the landing force and the main force on the
land front; otherwise, an amphibious landing, notwithstanding its accomplishment of
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a major tactical objective, will likely fail to impact the course of the larger operation.
In such a case, the operational commander risks too much for too little. Against a
strong and skillful enemy such an error can be fatal.
The lack of sufficient reserves and the situation on the main Italian front required that the Anzio-Nettuno landing force be a mix of American and British
units. This created problems in both planning and execution. American and British units used different staff and tactical procedures, and relationships among the
Allied commanders and their staffs were generally poor. Relatedly, the timing and
duration of Operation SHINGLE were affected heavily by the need to redeploy a
large number of LSTs from the Mediterranean in time to support the Normandy invasion. Another complicating factor was the necessity of a sizable number of LSTs
to build up forces on Corsica for the planned invasion of southern France.
In the planning and execution of SHINGLE itself, a major problem was a divergence of views on the main mission of VI Corps. Capture of the Alban Hills, as envisioned in Alexander’s operations instruction, clearly would have constituted what
the Germans would have considered a serious threat to supplies vital to the Tenth
Army on the main front and so might have forced a general German retreat toward
Rome—that is, served an operational objective. In contrast, capturing a lodgment
in the Anzio-Nettuno area and essentially staying within it, as laid down in Clark’s
operations instruction, achieved only a tactical objective, if a major one.
Operational commanders must formulate missions for subordinate commanders that
are in consonance with the mission set by their higher commanders. Even if they have reservations about the missions laid out, they are not authorized to change higher operational
commanders’ mission unilaterally and drastically. Missions laid out for and issued to subordinate commanders should be short, clear, and above all militarily achievable. There is
in this context perhaps nothing worse than vague or open-ended missions.
VI Corps was simply too small to accomplish the mission Alexander had stipulated. It could capture the Alban Hills, but it could not hold them if the enemy reacted in
force. Yet without seizing and holding the Alban Hills it was not possible to endanger
seriously the supply routes to the Gustav Line, which is what would have forced the
Germans to react operationally—that is, to start withdrawing toward Rome.
One of the most important and fundamental requirements in determining a military objective is to balance the factors of space, time, and force. Any serious imbalance
has to be resolved, whether by scaling down the objective, reducing distances, increasing the time available, assigning larger forces, or some other action. This process is
more an art than a science.
The prospects of a landing at Anzio-Nettuno were highly dependent on the main
Fifth Army’s ability to break through on the Gustav Line and advance quickly up
the Liri Valley in the direction of the Alban Hills and ultimately Rome. However, its
offensive should have been renewed much earlier than January 12, when plans were
issued for the Anzio-Nettuno attack. Still, before the landing a decision could have
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been made on whether to go ahead with or cancel SHINGLE. As it was, the main Fifth
Army’s attack on the Gustav Line, although sequenced, lacked a clear main effort.
Instead of the majority of forces being staged in one sector—on the right or left flank
or in the center—each corps attacked within its own sector toward one of two widely separated objectives, Monte Cassino and the Liri Valley. The 15th Army Group
should not have been expected to carry out, almost simultaneously, both attacks.
Lucas’s decision to consolidate the beachhead, once established, instead of moving quickly to capture the Alban Hills has been criticized heavily by commanders
and historians. Yet it should be evaluated on the basis of the information Lucas had
at that time. He apparently did not know that only weak forces defended the approaches to Rome. But the most important reason for his decision not to advance to
the Alban Hills was that two divisions were inadequate to defend a greatly enlarged
beachhead. He might have sent either the Rangers or one regimental combat team
to the hills in the hope that the Germans would be induced to withdraw from the
Gustav Line, but it is unlikely that they would have done so.
Lucas was apparently quite content to dig in on the beachhead—perhaps too
content. A more energetic and aggressive commander, such as Gen. George S. Patton Jr., almost certainly would have tried to capture the Alban Hills, only twenty
miles away. Yet one cannot say, even with the benefit of hindsight, whether such a
commander ultimately would have been more successful than Lucas.
But perhaps the biggest mistake the Allied high command made was allocating
an inadequate force to the Anzio-Nettuno landing and then failing to ensure that it
could join up with Fifth Army within forty-eight hours.
Major amphibious landings are perhaps the most complex and risky of all military
undertakings. They require detailed planning and must be executed energetically yet
flexibly. The commander of the landing force must make quick but sound decisions.
Freedom of action can be achieved only by acting quickly, aggressively, and without
waiting for orders from a higher commander. Hence, the operational commander
must pay great attention to professional abilities, command style, and personality
traits in selecting a landing force commander.
It is hard to understand how Churchill and many higher Allied commanders
at this point in the war so badly and repeatedly underestimated the German will
to resist stubbornly any large-scale threat to the Gustav Line. The Germans rarely,
when faced with serious situations in their rear, simply folded their tents and silently stole away.
VI Corps eventually tied up large enemy forces that otherwise would have
been available on the southern Italian front or possibly in France. Yet one wonders
whether a better solution to the stalemate in southern Italy in the winter of 1943
might not have been an advance through the Liri Valley toward Rome instead of
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almost simultaneous attacks toward Rome and Monte Cassino. If VI Corps had
been deployed in such a sector of main effort, it might have been possible to breach
the German defenses on the Gustav Line much earlier than mid-May 1944. With
four army corps at his disposal instead of three, General Clark might have captured
Rome much earlier than he did.
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